Mr. Chief Justice TANEY
delivered the opinion of the court.
The court proceed to dispose of the motion made by the attorney-general for-leave to be heard on behalf of the United States, in the suit between the State of Florida and the State of Georgia.
[491]*491It appears that the boundary line between these two States is in controversy, and a bill has been filed in this court by the State of Florida to ascertain and establish it.
The attorney-general has filed an information, stating that the United States are interested in the settlement of this line; that the territory in dispute contains upwards of one million two hundred thousand acres of land, and was ceded to the United States by Spain as a part of Florida; and that, the United States have caused the whole of it to be surveyed as public land, and sold a large portion of it, and issued patents to the purchasers. And upon these grounds he asks leave to offer proofs to establish the boundary claimed by the -United States, and to be heard, in their behalf, on the argument.
The motion is resisted on the part of the States, and the question has been fully argued by counsel for the respective parties. And as it is, in seme degree, a new question, and concerns rights and interests of so much importance, we have taken time to consider it.
If the motion was merely to be heard at the argument, there would, we presume, have been no opposition to it on the part of the States. For it is the familiar practice of the court to hear the attorney-general in suits between individuals, when he suggests that. the public interests are involved in the decision. And he is heard, not as counsel for one of the parties on the record, but on behalf of the United States, and as representing their interests. This was done in several instances at the last term, where the United States had sold lands as a part pf the public domain, which were claimed by individuals under grants alleged to have been made by France or Spain previous to the cession to this country.
In these cases, however, they were argued by the attorney-general upon the evidence produced by the respective parties. No new evidence was offered on. behalf of the United States. And the objection now made is, that he cannot be permitted to adduce evidence in the case, unless the United States are parties on the record; and that they cannot, under the provisions óf the constitution, become parties in this court, in the legal sense of the term, to a suit between two States.
We proceed to consider this objection.
The constitution confers on this court original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party. And it is settled, by repeated decisions, that a question of boundary between States is within the jurisdiction thus conferred.
But the constitution prescribes no particular mode of proceeding, nor is there any act of congress upon, the, subject . [492]*492And at a very early period of the government a doubt arose whether the court could exereise its original jurisdiction without a previous act of congress regulating the process and mode of proceeding. But the court, upon much consideration, held, that although congress had undoubtedly the right to prescribe the process and mode of proceeding in such cases, as fully as in any other court, yet the omission to legislate on the subject could not deprive the court of the jurisdiction conferred; that it "was a duty imposed upon the court; and in the absence of any legislation by congress, the court itself was authorized to prescribe its mode and form of proceeding; so as to accomplish the ends for which the jurisdiction was given.
There was no difficulty' in exercising this power where individuals were parties ; for the established forms and usages in courts of common law and equity would naturally be adopted. But these precedents could not govern a case where a sovereign State was a party defendant. Nor could the proceedings of the English chancery court, in a controversy about boundaries, between proprietary governments in this country, where the territory was subject to the authority of the English government, and the person of the proprietary subject to the authority of its courts, be adopted as a guide where sovereign States were litigating a question of boundary in a court of the United States. They furnished analogies, but nothing more. And it became, therefore, the duty of the court to mould its proceedings for itself, in a manner that would best attain the ends of justice, and enable it to exercise conveniently the power conferred. And in doing this, it was, without doubt, one of its first objects to disengage them from all unnecessary technicalities and niceties, and to conduct the proceedings in the simplest form in which the ends of justice could be attained.
It is upon this principle that the court appear to have acted in forming its proceedings where a State was a party defendant. The subject came before them in Grayson v. Virginia, 3 Dal. 320. And the court there said that they adopted, as a general rule, the custom and usage of courts of admiralty and equity, with a discretionary authority, however, to deviate from that rule where its application would be injurious or impracticable. And they at the same time passed an order directing, process against a State to be served on the governor or chief magistrate, and the attorney-general of the State. This was in 1796. And the principle upon which its process was then framed, as. well as the mode of service then prescribed, has been followed ever since, with this exception, that in subsequent cases the chancery practice, and not the admiralty, is regarded as furnishing the best analogy. But the power and [493]*493propriety of deviating from the ordinary chancery practice, when the purposes of justice require it, have been, constantly recognized; and were distinctly asserted in the case of Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 14 Pet. 247, and again in the same case, in 15 Pet. 273, and was recognized in the case of New Jersey v. New York, 5 Pet. 289.
We proceed to apply these principles to the case before us. It - is manifest, if the facts stated in the suggestion of the attorney-general are supported by testimony, that the United States have a deep interest in the decision of this controversy. And if this case is decided adversely to their rights, they are without remedy, and there is no form of proceeding in which they could have that decision revised in this court or anywhere else. Justice, therefore, requires that they should be heard before their rights are concluded. And if this were a suit between individuals, in a court of equity, the ordinary practice of the court would require a person standing in the present position of the United States, to be made a party, and would not proceed to a final decree until he had an opportunity of being heard.
But it is said that they cannot, by the terms of the constitution, be made parties in an original proceeding in this court between States; that if they could, the. attornéy-general has no right to make them defendants without an act of- congress to authorize it.
We do not, however, deem it necessary to examine or decide these questions, ^hey presuppose that we are bound to .follow the English chancery practice, and that the United States must be brought in as a party on the record, in the technical sense of the word, so that a judgment for or against them may be passed by the court.
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Mr. Chief Justice TANEY
delivered the opinion of the court.
The court proceed to dispose of the motion made by the attorney-general for-leave to be heard on behalf of the United States, in the suit between the State of Florida and the State of Georgia.
[491]*491It appears that the boundary line between these two States is in controversy, and a bill has been filed in this court by the State of Florida to ascertain and establish it.
The attorney-general has filed an information, stating that the United States are interested in the settlement of this line; that the territory in dispute contains upwards of one million two hundred thousand acres of land, and was ceded to the United States by Spain as a part of Florida; and that, the United States have caused the whole of it to be surveyed as public land, and sold a large portion of it, and issued patents to the purchasers. And upon these grounds he asks leave to offer proofs to establish the boundary claimed by the -United States, and to be heard, in their behalf, on the argument.
The motion is resisted on the part of the States, and the question has been fully argued by counsel for the respective parties. And as it is, in seme degree, a new question, and concerns rights and interests of so much importance, we have taken time to consider it.
If the motion was merely to be heard at the argument, there would, we presume, have been no opposition to it on the part of the States. For it is the familiar practice of the court to hear the attorney-general in suits between individuals, when he suggests that. the public interests are involved in the decision. And he is heard, not as counsel for one of the parties on the record, but on behalf of the United States, and as representing their interests. This was done in several instances at the last term, where the United States had sold lands as a part pf the public domain, which were claimed by individuals under grants alleged to have been made by France or Spain previous to the cession to this country.
In these cases, however, they were argued by the attorney-general upon the evidence produced by the respective parties. No new evidence was offered on. behalf of the United States. And the objection now made is, that he cannot be permitted to adduce evidence in the case, unless the United States are parties on the record; and that they cannot, under the provisions óf the constitution, become parties in this court, in the legal sense of the term, to a suit between two States.
We proceed to consider this objection.
The constitution confers on this court original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party. And it is settled, by repeated decisions, that a question of boundary between States is within the jurisdiction thus conferred.
But the constitution prescribes no particular mode of proceeding, nor is there any act of congress upon, the, subject . [492]*492And at a very early period of the government a doubt arose whether the court could exereise its original jurisdiction without a previous act of congress regulating the process and mode of proceeding. But the court, upon much consideration, held, that although congress had undoubtedly the right to prescribe the process and mode of proceeding in such cases, as fully as in any other court, yet the omission to legislate on the subject could not deprive the court of the jurisdiction conferred; that it "was a duty imposed upon the court; and in the absence of any legislation by congress, the court itself was authorized to prescribe its mode and form of proceeding; so as to accomplish the ends for which the jurisdiction was given.
There was no difficulty' in exercising this power where individuals were parties ; for the established forms and usages in courts of common law and equity would naturally be adopted. But these precedents could not govern a case where a sovereign State was a party defendant. Nor could the proceedings of the English chancery court, in a controversy about boundaries, between proprietary governments in this country, where the territory was subject to the authority of the English government, and the person of the proprietary subject to the authority of its courts, be adopted as a guide where sovereign States were litigating a question of boundary in a court of the United States. They furnished analogies, but nothing more. And it became, therefore, the duty of the court to mould its proceedings for itself, in a manner that would best attain the ends of justice, and enable it to exercise conveniently the power conferred. And in doing this, it was, without doubt, one of its first objects to disengage them from all unnecessary technicalities and niceties, and to conduct the proceedings in the simplest form in which the ends of justice could be attained.
It is upon this principle that the court appear to have acted in forming its proceedings where a State was a party defendant. The subject came before them in Grayson v. Virginia, 3 Dal. 320. And the court there said that they adopted, as a general rule, the custom and usage of courts of admiralty and equity, with a discretionary authority, however, to deviate from that rule where its application would be injurious or impracticable. And they at the same time passed an order directing, process against a State to be served on the governor or chief magistrate, and the attorney-general of the State. This was in 1796. And the principle upon which its process was then framed, as. well as the mode of service then prescribed, has been followed ever since, with this exception, that in subsequent cases the chancery practice, and not the admiralty, is regarded as furnishing the best analogy. But the power and [493]*493propriety of deviating from the ordinary chancery practice, when the purposes of justice require it, have been, constantly recognized; and were distinctly asserted in the case of Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 14 Pet. 247, and again in the same case, in 15 Pet. 273, and was recognized in the case of New Jersey v. New York, 5 Pet. 289.
We proceed to apply these principles to the case before us. It - is manifest, if the facts stated in the suggestion of the attorney-general are supported by testimony, that the United States have a deep interest in the decision of this controversy. And if this case is decided adversely to their rights, they are without remedy, and there is no form of proceeding in which they could have that decision revised in this court or anywhere else. Justice, therefore, requires that they should be heard before their rights are concluded. And if this were a suit between individuals, in a court of equity, the ordinary practice of the court would require a person standing in the present position of the United States, to be made a party, and would not proceed to a final decree until he had an opportunity of being heard.
But it is said that they cannot, by the terms of the constitution, be made parties in an original proceeding in this court between States; that if they could, the. attornéy-general has no right to make them defendants without an act of- congress to authorize it.
We do not, however, deem it necessary to examine or decide these questions, ^hey presuppose that we are bound to .follow the English chancery practice, and that the United States must be brought in as a party on the record, in the technical sense of the word, so that a judgment for or against them may be passed by the court. But, as we have already said, the court are not bound, in a case of this kind, to follow the rules and modes of proceeding in the English chancery, but will deviate from them where the purposes of justice require it, or the ends of justice can be more conveniently attained.
It is evident that this object can be more conveniently accomplished in the mode adopted by the attorney-general, than by following the English practice in cases where the government have an interest in the issue of the suit. In a case like the one now before us, there is no necessity for a judgment against the United States. For when the boundary in question shall be ascertained and determined by the judgment of the court, in .the present suit, there is no possible mode by which that decision can be reviewed or reexamined at the instance of the United States. They would therefore be' as effectually concluded by the judgment as if they were parties [494]*494on the record, and a judgment entered against them. The case, then, is this: Here is a suit between two States, in relation to the true position of the boundary line which divides them. But there are twenty-nine other States, who are also interested in the adjustment of this boundary, whose interests are represented by the United States. Justice certainly requires that they should be heard before their rights are concluded by the judgment of the court. For their interests may be different from those of either of the litigating States. And it would hardly become this tribunal, intrusted with jurisdiction where sovereignties are concerned, and with the power to prescribe its own mode of proceeding, to do injustice rather than depart from English precedents. A suit in a court of justice between such parties, and upon such a question, is without example in the jurisprudence of any other county. It is a new case, and requires new modes of proceeding. And if, as has been urged in argument, the United States cannot, under the constitution, become a party to this suit, in the legal sense of that term, and the English mode of proceeding in analogous cases is therefore impracticable, it furnishes a conclusive argument for adopting the mode proposed. For otherwise there must be a failure of justice.
Indeed, unless the United States can be heard in some form or other in this suit, one of the great safeguards of the Union, provided in the constitution, would in effect be annulled.
By the 10th section of the 1st article of the constitution, no State can enter into any agreement or compact with another State, without the consent of congress. Now, a question of boundary between States is, in its nature, a política question, to be settled by compact made by the political departments of the government. And if Florida and Georgia had, by negotiation and agreement, proceeded to adjust this boundary, any compact between them would have been null and void, without the assent of congress. This provision is obviously intended to guard the rights and interests of the other States, and to prevent any compact or agreement between any two States, which might affect injuriously the interest of the others. And the right and the duty to protect these interests is vested in the general government.
But, under our government, a boundary between two States may become a judicial question, to be decided in this court. And, when it assumes that form, the assent or dissent of the United States cannot influence the decision. The question is to be decided upon the evidence adduced to the court; and that decision, when pronounced, is conclusive upon the United States, as well as upon the States that are parties to the suit. [495]*495Now, as in a case of compact, it is, by the constitution, made the duty of the United States to examine into the subject, and to determine whether or not the boundary proposed to be fixed by the agreement is consistent with the interests of the other States of the Union; it would seem to be equally their duty to watch over these interests when they are in litigation in this court, and about to be finally decided. And, if such be their duty, it would seem to follow that there must be a corresponding right to adduce evidence and be héard, before the judgment is given. For this is the only mode in which they can guard the interests of the rest of the Union, when the boundary is to be adjusted by a suit in this court. For, if it be otherwise, the parties to the suit may, by admissions of facts and by agreements admitting or rejecting testimony, place a case before the court which would necessarily be decided according to their wishes, and the interest and rights of the rest of the Union excluded from the consideration of the court. The States might thus, in the form of an action, accomplish what the constitution prohibits them from doing directly by compact. Nor is this intervention of the United States derogatory to the dignity of the litigating States, or any impeachment of their good faith. It merely carries into effect a provision of the constitution, which was adopted by the States for their general safety; and, moreover, maintains that universal principle of justice and equity, which gives to every party, whose interest will be affected by the judgment, the right to be heard.
Upon the whole, we think the attorney-general may intervene in the manner he has adopted, and may file in the case the testimony referred to in the information, without making the United States a party, in the technical sense of the term; but he will have no right to interfere in the pleading, or evidence, or admissions of the States, or of either of them. And, when the case is ready for argument, the court will hear the attorney-general, as well as the counsel for the respective States; and, in deciding upon the true boundary line, will take into consideration all the evidence which may be offered by the United States, or either of the States. But the court do not regard the United States, in this mode of proceeding, as either plaintiff or defendant; and they are, therefore, not liable to a judgment against them, nor entitled to a judgment in their favor. We consider the attorney-general as the proper officer to represent the United States in this court; and that the general government, in bringing before us for consideration the rights and interest of the Union in the question to be decided, does nothing more than perform a duty imposed upon it by the constitution. And, as the mode in which that duty is to be per[496]*496formed here is not regulated by law, but must depend upon .the rules and regulations prescribed by the court, we shall not embarrass the proceedings by endeavoring to conform thém strictly to English precedents and pleadings, and regard the mode in which the information on behalf of the United States has been presented, to be the simplest and best manner of bringing their interest before the court, and of enabling it to do justice to all parties whose rights are involved in the decision.
Mr. Justice McLEAN, Mr. Justice DANIEL, Mr. Justice CURTIS, and Mr. Justice CAMPBELL, dissented.