State of Florida v. Mashayla Maneisha Prophet

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedOctober 1, 2025
Docket4D2024-1045
StatusPublished

This text of State of Florida v. Mashayla Maneisha Prophet (State of Florida v. Mashayla Maneisha Prophet) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State of Florida v. Mashayla Maneisha Prophet, (Fla. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA FOURTH DISTRICT

STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellant,

v.

MASHAYLA MANEISHA PROPHET, Appellee.

No. 4D2024-1045

[October 1, 2025]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; Sarah Willis, Judge; L.T. Case No. 502019CF007238D.

James Uthmeier, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Sorraya M. Solages- Jones, Senior Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Jacob M. Noble of Noble Law, Palm Beach Gardens, for appellee.

WIGAND, CHRISTOPHER, Associate Judge.

Appellant, the State of Florida, appeals the trial court’s entry of a downward departure sentence for Appellee, Mashayla Maneisha Prophet. Below, Prophet entered an open plea to one count of home invasion robbery with a firearm, where the lowest permissible scoresheet sentence was 79.8 months. The trial court granted her request for a downward departure and sentenced her to three years in prison followed by four years’ probation. Because competent, substantial evidence does not support the statutory ground upon which the trial court relied, we reverse and remand for resentencing.

On the morning of July 30, 2019, the victim opened the rear door of his house to let out his dog and was immediately confronted by a masked man with a handgun. The masked man struck the victim in the head with his handgun, demanded the victim’s safe, and pushed the victim toward his bedroom, where the safe was located. The masked man stole (among other things) the victim’s safe, car, and a blue jacket in which the victim routinely stored money.

One of the only individuals who knew the layout of the victim’s house was Prophet, who was the victim’s estranged girlfriend and the mother of one of his children. Police later determined that the masked man was Prophet’s new boyfriend. Prophet voluntarily spoke with detectives and denied any knowledge of or involvement with the home invasion. Contrary to Prophet’s statement, cell tower records reflected that her cell phone was within the cell tower sector of the victim’s residence leading up to the robbery. She and her new boyfriend exchanged seventeen text messages before the robbery. Prophet’s cell phone records also showed that she had called her new boyfriend while he was in the process of stealing the victim’s vehicle. Later, police discovered that Prophet still had remote access to the victim’s surveillance system.

Thereafter, Prophet was charged with home invasion robbery with a firearm, to which she entered an open plea. Prophet’s scoresheet reflected the lowest permissible sentence of 79.8 months.

The State requested a ten-year prison sentence, arguing Prophet was the mastermind behind the crime and sought to inflict pain and terror upon the victim. The State noted she was near the victim’s home when the robbery occurred, in constant communication with her new boyfriend during the robbery, and assisted in concealing or destroying evidence after the robbery.

Prophet requested a downward departure pursuant to section 921.0026(2)(j), Florida Statutes (2024), arguing: (1) she had committed the crime in an unsophisticated manner; (2) the crime was an isolated incident; and (3) she demonstrated remorse.

The trial court found that all three prongs were met and granted a downward departure to three years in prison followed by four years’ probation. The State timely appealed.

We conclude competent, substantial evidence does not support the statutory ground upon which the trial court relied. As this Court has previously explained:

A trial court’s decision whether to depart from the guidelines is a two-part process. First, the court must determine whether it can depart, i.e., whether there is a valid legal ground and adequate factual support for that ground. Legal grounds are set forth in case law and statute and the facts supporting the ground must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. This aspect of the court’s decision to depart is mixed question of law and fact and will be sustained on review if the court applied the right rule of law and if competent substantial evidence supports its ruling. Competent substantial evidence is tantamount to legally sufficient evidence, and the appellate court will assess the record evidence for its sufficiency only, not its weight.

2 Second, where the requirements set out above are met, the court must determine whether it should depart, i.e., whether departure is indeed the best sentencing option for the defendant. In making this determination, the court must weigh the totality of the circumstances in the case, including aggravating and mitigating facts. This decision is within the sound discretion of the court and will be sustained on review absent an abuse of discretion.

Staffney v. State, 826 So. 2d 509, 511 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (quoting State v. Baksh, 758 So. 2d 1222, 1224-25 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)).

A trial court may impose a downward departure sentence if it finds the “offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner and was an isolated incident for which the defendant has shown remorse.” § 921.0026(2)(j), Fla. Stat. (2024). Competent, substantial evidence must support all three factors to downwardly depart under the statute. See Staffney, 826 So. 2d at 513. A downward departure is prohibited without such evidence. § 921.0026(1), Fla. Stat. (2024); see also State v. Guerra, 328 So. 3d 1002, 1005 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (“This court must reverse if it finds that any of the three elements are unsupported by competent substantial evidence.”) (citing Bellamy v. State, 199 So. 3d 480, 482 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)).

This Court has defined “sophisticated” as “having acquired worldly knowledge or refinement; lacking natural simplicity or naiveté.” Staffney, 826 So. 2d at 512 (quoting State v. Fleming, 751 So. 2d 620, 621 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)); see also Bellamy, 199 So. 3d at 483 (a crime is unsophisticated when the acts constituting the crime are “artless, simple, and not refined”).

In assessing sophistication, courts do not consider the “type of crime,” see Bellamy, 199 So. 3d at 484, or whether the crime was “executed as planned,” see State v. Anderson, 352 So. 3d 352, 355 (Fla. 4th DCA 2022). Instead, courts consider the “planning that went into the crime,” whether it involved “several distinctive and deliberate steps,” or whether the defendant “lured and set up the victim.” See Bellamy, 199 So. 3d at 483-84 (citation omitted).

Here, no competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the robbery was unsophisticated. The stipulated facts from the probable cause affidavit established that Prophet engaged in extensive advance coordination with her new boyfriend, directing his actions before and during the robbery. More than two hours before he had entered the victim’s house, they had exchanged seventeen texts discussing the plan. She also advised him on how and when to wake up the victim and gain entry into his house.

Prophet further instructed her new boyfriend as to where the safe was located and what specific items to take from the house. They called each other six times

3 in the minutes after the robbery. Prophet made two of those calls while her new boyfriend fled in the victim’s car. Afterward, Prophet concealed evidence by deleting text messages from her phone and moving physical evidence from her and her new boyfriend’s shared home.

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Related

Banks v. State
732 So. 2d 1065 (Supreme Court of Florida, 1999)
Staffney v. State
826 So. 2d 509 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2002)
State v. Fleming
751 So. 2d 620 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1999)
State v. Baksh
758 So. 2d 1222 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2000)
Bellamy v. State
199 So. 3d 480 (District Court of Appeal of Florida, 2016)

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State of Florida v. Mashayla Maneisha Prophet, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-of-florida-v-mashayla-maneisha-prophet-fladistctapp-2025.