State of Cal. Ex Rel. State Pub. Wks. Bd. v. Covich

260 Cal. App. 2d 663, 67 Cal. Rptr. 280, 1968 Cal. App. LEXIS 1900
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedMarch 29, 1968
DocketCiv. 11551
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 260 Cal. App. 2d 663 (State of Cal. Ex Rel. State Pub. Wks. Bd. v. Covich) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State of Cal. Ex Rel. State Pub. Wks. Bd. v. Covich, 260 Cal. App. 2d 663, 67 Cal. Rptr. 280, 1968 Cal. App. LEXIS 1900 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968).

Opinion

PIERCE, P. J.

—The appeal is by the State of California, plaintiff in a proceeding in eminent domain. The property condemned consisted of fractional lots improved by two old apartment houses located on “O” Street between 14th and 15th Streets in Sacramento. Condemnation was for use in connection with the Capitol Master Plan. The case was tried to a jury which awarded the condemnees $120,000. The state’s *665 motion for a new trial was denied. It appeals from the judgment.

The sole contention on appeal is that the eondemnees’ two appraisers who appraised the property jointly fixed values contrary to law, speculatively and as of a date 3 years subsequent to the date of trial. 1

As is not unusual the two experts produced by the state appraised the value of the property at approximately one-half of the value placed upon it by the two eondemnees’ experts. One of the former fixed its value at $57,000, the other at $63,000. Condemnees’ appraisers jointly reached the same sum: $120,000. Indicative of the fact that the science of real estate appraisal is not now an exact science is that both sides presented experts who used the same basic methods of appraisal, reaching widely disparate results.

Both the state’s and eondemnees’ experts started with the fundamental and venerable rule, the early expression of which by our Supreme Court was: “ [T]he rule is of universal acceptance that the measure of . . . damage is the market value; that is to say, the highest price estimated in terms of money which the land would bring if exposed for sale in the open market, with reasonable time allowed in which to find a purchaser, buying with knowledge of all of the uses and purposes to which it was adapted and for which it was capable. ’ ’ (Sacramento etc. R. R. Co. v. Heilbron (1909) 156 Cal. 408, 409 [104 P. 979].) It has been adopted by Evidence Code section 814 with additional explication as that price “which a willing purchaser and a willing seller, dealing with each other in the open market and with a full knowledge of all the uses and purposes for which the property is reasonably adaptable and available, would take into consideration in determining the price at which to purchase and sell the property. ...”

Both sides’ appraisers also considered what has been referred to as the appraisal “trinity.” This combines three methods or “approaches” by appraisers to reach the market value of real estate: (1) the current cost of reproducing the property less depreciation from all sources; (2) the “market data” approach or value indicated by recent sales of comparable properties in the market, and (3) the “income *666 approach,’’ or the value which the property’s net earning power will support based upon the capitalization of -net income. This three-approach means of reaching market value is usually combined. It is stated in American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, “The Appraisal of Real Estate” (3d ed.) at page 66: . . In the majority of his assignments, the

appraiser utilizes all three approaches. On occasion he niay believe the value indication from one approach will be more significant than from the other two, yet he will use-all three as a check against each and to test his own judgment.” All three methods have been judicially approved. (United States v. Eden Memorial Parle Assn. (9th Cir. 1965) 350 F.2d 933, 935.) In the “income approach” various techniques are employed. The technique selected will depend upon the belief of the appraiser making the appraisal as to the highest and best use of the subject property. One technique is known as the “building residual” or “gross multiplier” approach. Another is called the “property reversion” or “property residual” approach. The state’s appraisers adopted the former approach; the condemnees’ appraisers adopted the latter. The state’s position is that use of the “property reversion” technique resulted in evaluation of the property three years after the date of trial rather than as of the date of trial. Two statements, one by each of condemnees ’ appraisers, ;are taken out of context to support the contention. Since ■ the statements of the two appraisers are substantially the .same, use of one of them will suffice. We set it forth in a footnote. 2

The appraisers’ statements only seem like a future evaluation. The fallacy of the state’s argument may best be illustrated by an elaboration of the facts. The -existing improvements on the subject property consist of two old houses remodeled into one bedroom apartments and the owner’s living quarters. The state’s appraisers envisaged the highest and best use of the property being condemned ( con *667 ceded to be the basis for consideration in the appraisal of market value—Hayward Union High School Dist. v. Lemos (1960) 187 Cal.App.2d 348, 351 [9 Cal.Rptr. 750]) to be the continued use of the present buildings for the rest of the life thereof, deemed to be 20 years. Condemnees’ appraisers, on the other hand, saw a present value for a higher and better use. It had been stipulated that the area would probably be rezoned from R-5 to C-2. Such rezoning would permit high rise apartment buildings or hotel-motel complexes. Condemnees’ experts deemed that to be the highest and best use of the property. In an appropriate “transitional” neighborhood presentation of market values based upon such uses was proper. (People ex rel. Dept. of Public Works v. Donovan (1962) 57 Cal.2d 346, 352-353 [19 Cal.Rptr. 473, 369 P.2d 1].) The state in fact does not on appeal quarrel with the highest and best use adopted by condemnees’ appraisers. Nor does it contend here that the “comparable sales” used by those appraisers were improper. Actually, it is the differences between the beliefs of the appraisers of the opposing parties regarding such uses and sales which explain the higher market value fixed by condemnees’ appraisers and not their differences as to methods of calculation. We will explain this.

Implicit in the use of “comparable sales,” of course, is that the sales compared shall have similarity to the subject property. A factor involved is similarity of location. The subject property is a block from the south boundary of Capitol Park. Close by are the state capítol and several state buildings; also a large modern church and the city’s newest hotel. Several blocks away is a freeway in the process of building, part of a system which, when completed, will surround Sacramento. The section directly involved will be completed this year. Benefits to through traffic are not its only purpose. It will also “tie together” the various sections of the city. Fifteenth and Sixteenth Streets (less than one and two blocks respectively east of the subject property) will be principal avenues of approach and departure to and from the freeway. Across the street from the property and to its north, under the present Capitol Master Plan, is the proposed governor’s mansion.

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Bluebook (online)
260 Cal. App. 2d 663, 67 Cal. Rptr. 280, 1968 Cal. App. LEXIS 1900, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-of-cal-ex-rel-state-pub-wks-bd-v-covich-calctapp-1968.