State of Arkansas v. Tyler Dewayne Pate

2023 Ark. 6, 659 S.W.3d 274

• Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas
• Decided: February 9, 2023
• Status: Published

Opinion

Cite as 2023 Ark. 6 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CR-22-219

Opinion Delivered: February 9, 2023

STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE FAULKNER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 23CR-20-625]

TYLER DEWAYNE PATE HONORABLE TROY B. BRASWELL, APPELLEE JR., JUDGE

DISMISSED.

SHAWN A. WOMACK, Associate Justice

The State appeals this case claiming an error by the circuit court regarding a speedy-

trial ruling. Appellee, Tyler Pate, argues that this is an improper State appeal under our

rules. We agree, and accordingly dismiss the appeal.

On June 6, 2019, Arkansas State Police were dispatched to a two-car accident

involving Tyler Pate and Phillip Moore. Moore was injured, and police suspected Pate, who

had empty beer cans in his vehicle, of driving while intoxicated. On June 14, 2019, Pate was

charged in Faulkner County District Court for driving while intoxicated.

The district court set an initial trial date for September 24, 2019. Pate moved for a

continuance, and the district court granted his motion and continued the trial for a start

date of December 17, 2019. The State subpoenaed Moore to appear at the December 17

trial. The day before trial, Moore, using counsel that was not on the record, filed a motion for continuance because he was “recently” hospitalized and could not attend. The court

granted the motion for continuance on December 16, 2019, for a trial start date of March

24, 2020.

Prosecutors subsequently filed a felony information in the Faulkner County Circuit

Court. On June 17, 2020, Pate was charged in the Faulkner County Circuit Court with

second-degree battery in violation of Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-202 (Supp. 2017). The State

subsequently filed an amended information, and Pate was charged with having committed

battery in the second degree, driving while intoxicated, careless and prohibited driving, and

failure to wear a seatbelt. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-13-201; Ark. Code Ann. § 5-65-103 (Repl.

2016); Ark. Code Ann. § 27-51-104 (Repl. 2010); Ark. Code. Ann. § 27-51-702.

On August 31, 2021, Pate filed a motion to dismiss the State’s prosecution based on

a speedy-trial violation. Pate argued that his “right to a speedy trial on these charges had

been violated because he was not tried within twelve months of his arrest and/or the filing

of charges, as required by Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.1 and 28.2(a).” The State filed a response and

argued that the speedy-trial clock was tolled between December 16, 2019, and March 24,

2020, in accordance with Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.3(d) and (h).

The speedy-trial hearing was held on October 29, 2021. There, the court found that

the speedy-trial clock began to run on June 14, 2019, and concluded that the State was

charged with a total of 366 days. It ruled that the charges be dismissed since Pate had not

been tried within twelve months, as required by Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.1. On February 9, 2022,

the State filed its notice of appeal.

2 The State argues that the circuit court’s ruling, that the district court erred by failing

to determine if a 98-day period was excluded at the time it ordered the continuance, conflicts

with the plain text of Rule 28.3 and must be reversed. Pate argues that this is an improper

State appeal pursuant to Ark. R. App. P.–Crim. 3.

The circuit court found that 366 days of speedy-trial time, consisting of three time

periods, had run against the State:

 June 14, 2019, through September 23, 2019, totaling 102 days.  December 17, 2019, through March 23, 2020, totaling 98 days.  June 17, 2020, through November 29, 2020, totaling 166 days.

The period of December 17, 2019, through March 23, 2020, totaling 98 days (the

“December Continuance”), is the issue on appeal. Moore’s attorney, who was not of record,

filed the December Continuance to give Moore time to attend the trial, given Moore’s

hospitalization at that time. The circuit court addressed the December Continuance by

stating:

On December 16, 2019, the district court granted a continuance filed by an attorney not of record and whom neither represented the State nor the Defendant. A review of the pleadings reveal [sic] the attorney requesting the continuance, was private counsel for the named victim. Despite the lack of standing, the court continued the case from December 17, 2019 to March 24, 2020. The court’s order did not toll a speedy trial.

The Circuit Court is not in a position to go backwards in time and review the court’s order to determine whether speedy trial should have been tolled. Specifically, the record is void of any motion filed by the state wherein they requested that time be tolled. Further, the State did not file an objection to the order until the current motions were filed on or about August 31, 2021. Such an objection should have been filed at or near the time the order was entered in the District Court. The

3 absence of language tolling time in the order necessitates that the time was charged to the State.

As a threshold matter, we must assess jurisdiction to hear the State’s appeal. State v.

Siegel, 2018 Ark. 269, 555 S.W.3d 410. Contrasted to the right of a criminal defendant, the

State’s right to appeal is limited by the provisions of Rule 3 of the Arkansas Rules of

Appellate Procedure –Criminal. State v. Ledwell, 2017 Ark. 252, 526 S.W.3d 1. This court

has continuously held that it will not accept a State appeal unless the correct and uniform

administration of the criminal law requires review by this court. Ark. R. App. P.–Crim. 3(d).

This means that we will review only State appeals that are narrow in scope and that involve

the interpretation, not the application, of a criminal rule or statutory provision. Ledwell,

supra; State v. Jenkins, 2011 Ark. 2. The case cannot involve a mixed question of law and fact.

State v. Brashers, 2015 Ark. 236, 463 S.W.3d 710. As we’ve stated before, when the resolution

of a State’s attempted appeal turns on the facts of the case and does not require

interpretation of our criminal rules with widespread ramifications, the appeal is not proper

under Rule 3. State v. Johnson, 374 Ark. 100, 286 S.W.3d 129 (2008). State appeals that

merely demonstrate that the circuit court erred are not permitted. Id.

Here, the State contends that the issue presented in this appeal involves the correct

and uniform administration of the law. The State argues that the circuit court erred as a

matter of law because it faulted the district court for not precisely mentioning the tolling of

time, resulting in 98 days erroneously charged to the State. We are not persuaded. Indeed,

the circuit court stated, “[t]he absence of language tolling time in the order necessitates that

4 the time was charged to the State.” However, this is not a statement of law, nor does this

sentence address any legal interpretation of Rule 28.3. Instead, the circuit court stated just

before that statement:

Specifically, the record is void of any motion filed by the state wherein they requested that time be tolled. Further, the State did not file an objection to the order until the current motions were filed on or about August 31, 2021. Such an objection should have been filed at or near the time the order was entered in the District Court.

It then appears that the circuit court’s concern was with the overall lack of language

surrounding tolling the time; it did not rule as a matter of law that specific language is

required at a specific time. This ruling was limited to the facts of this case only, therefore

falls outside the purview of Ark. R. App. P.–Crim. 3(d).

The State’s appeal in this case is essentially a challenge to the circuit court’s findings

of fact regarding the speedy-trial calculation. Thus, it does not present an issue of

interpretation of a criminal rule that would have widespread ramifications. Accordingly, the

State’s appeal is not authorized under Rule 3, and we dismiss.

Special Justice KAREN WHATLEY joins.

WYNNE, J., not participating.

Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Christian Harris, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellant.

Robert M. “Robby” Golden, for appellee.