FILED BY CLERK IN THE COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF ARIZONA MAY 17 2012 DIVISION TWO COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION TWO
THE STATE OF ARIZONA, ) ) 2 CA-CR 2010-0380 Appellee, ) DEPARTMENT A ) v. ) OPINION ) JAMES DARRELL JOHNSON, ) ) Appellant. ) )
APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PIMA COUNTY
Cause No. CR20054530
Honorable Deborah Bernini, Judge
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED
Thomas C. Horne, Arizona Attorney General By Kent E. Cattani and David A. Sullivan Tucson Attorneys for Appellee
Lori J. Lefferts, Pima County Public Defender By David J. Euchner Tucson Attorneys for Appellant
E C K E R S T R O M, Presiding Judge. ¶1 Appellant James Johnson was convicted of second-degree murder and
sentenced to an aggravated, twenty-two-year prison term. In this appeal, he raises
numerous assignments of error regarding his sentencing proceedings. For the following
reasons, we vacate his sentence and the jury’s findings that the offense was committed in
an especially cruel, heinous, or depraved manner, and remand the case to the trial court
for further proceedings.
Factual and Procedural Background
¶2 Johnson was convicted after a bench trial of the second-degree murder of
his former wife, and the court sentenced him to an aggravated, twenty-two-year prison
term. In his first appeal, we found he had not waived his right to have a jury determine
the aggravating factors to be used in determining his sentence and we remanded the case
to the trial court. Upon remand, the jury found that Johnson had committed the murder in
an especially cruel manner and in an especially heinous or depraved manner;1 he had
caused emotional harm to the victim’s family; and he had disfigured the victim, depriving
the family of an open-casket funeral. The court found the aggravating factors outweighed
the mitigating factors and again sentenced Johnson to an aggravated, twenty-two-year
1 Although committing the murder in an especially cruel, heinous, or depraved manner is just one statutory aggravating factor, see A.R.S. § 13-701(D)(5), the jury found and the court weighed them as two separate aggravators. We further discuss that issue below. 2 term of imprisonment.2 Johnson filed this timely appeal, and we have jurisdiction
pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A)(4).
Sufficiency of Cruel, Heinous, or Depraved Murder3
¶3 Johnson argues the evidence presented was insufficient to prove the
aggravating factor that the crime had been committed in a cruel, heinous, or depraved
manner. At the close of the aggravation hearing, he moved for a “judgment that [the]
aggravating circumstance was not proven,” pursuant to Rule 20, Ariz. R. Crim. P. The
trial court denied the motion, and we review its ruling de novo. See State v. West, 226
Ariz. 559, ¶ 15, 250 P.3d 1188, 1191 (2011).
¶4 We will reverse the trial court’s ruling “only if there is a complete absence
of substantial evidence to support the charges.” State v. Carlos, 199 Ariz. 273, ¶ 7, 17
P.3d 118, 121 (App. 2001). Substantial evidence has been defined as “more than a mere
scintilla” and “proof that ‘reasonable persons could accept as adequate and sufficient’” to
2 Because our sentencing statutes were renumbered in 2009, and the relevant portions are materially the same as when Johnson committed the offense in November 2005, for ease and clarity we have referred to the current versions of those relevant statutes throughout this decision. The relevant statutes in effect at that time, former A.R.S. §§ 13-702 and 13-710, can be found in 2005 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 20, § 1; 2005 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 133, § 1; 2005 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 166, § 1; and 1994 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 236, § 5. 3 Although we vacate the jury’s finding of this aggravating factor and remand for other reasons set forth below, we nonetheless address Johnson’s sufficiency claim because the trial court arguably would be precluded from further consideration of this aggravating factor were we to conclude the state presented insufficient evidence to support it.
3 support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Mathers, 165 Ariz. 64, 67, 796
P.2d 866, 869 (1990), quoting State v. Jones, 125 Ariz. 417, 419, 610 P.2d 51, 53 (1980).
Denying a Rule 20 motion is proper “where reasonable minds could differ on the
inferences to be drawn from the evidence presented.” State v. Belyeu, 164 Ariz. 586, 590,
795 P.2d 229, 233 (App. 1990). We conclude sufficient evidence existed here that a
reasonable jury could have found the factor beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶5 Johnson relies primarily on capital cases to support his argument. The state
counters that “reviewing courts have undertaken a much more holistic and far less
rigorous analysis of this issue in the non-capital context,” citing State v. Stanhope, 139
Ariz. 88, 94-95, 676 P.2d 1146, 1152-53 (App. 1984); State v. Meador, 132 Ariz. 343,
347, 645 P.2d 1257, 1261 (App. 1982); and State v. Inglish, 129 Ariz. 444, 445-46, 631
P.2d 1102, 1103-04 (App. 1981).4 And, subsequent jurisprudence suggests our supreme
court was compelled to set forth a narrowing construction to the especially cruel, heinous,
or depraved aggravating factor to comply with Eighth Amendment standards that are
arguably inapplicable in the non-capital context. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639,
652-56 (1990), overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); see
also Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361-62 (1988) (distinguishing vagueness
4 These cases largely predate the later line of capital cases, issued by our state supreme court on the same topic, that provide a narrower construction for the meaning of the phrase “cruel, heinous, or depraved.” E.g., State v. Walton, 159 Ariz. 571, 586-87, 769 P.2d 1017, 1032-33 (1989) (cruelty depends on victim’s experience before death and whether defendant intended or reasonably could foresee victim’s suffering or mental anguish). Thus, whether the state’s line of authority retains its vitality in the non-capital context has not yet been squarely resolved. 4 challenge to capital aggravating factors brought under Eighth Amendment from
vagueness challenge under Due Process Clause). We also recognize, however, that
almost all intentional murders can be characterized as cruel to the victim, and most all of
those who commit such crimes arguably have acted in a heinous and depraved fashion.
See State v. Knapp, 114 Ariz. 531, 543, 562 P.2d 704, 716 (1977) (recognizing “‘all
killings are atrocious’” and defining especially cruel, heinous, or depraved factor as
applying to murders deviating from norm), quoting Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910
(Fla. 1975); see also Maynard, 486 U.S. at 364 (stating, without more guidance defining
terms in aggravating circumstance, “an ordinary person could honestly believe that every
unjustified, intentional taking of human life is ‘especially heinous’”). Accordingly,
Arizona’s capital cases addressing this aggravating factor provide useful guidance to our
juries and judges in assessing what features of such crimes appropriately support an
aggravated sentence—a judgment requiring a determination whether the crime truly has
been committed in a fashion more blameworthy than other second-degree murders.
Assuming without deciding that the more rigorous standards set forth in the capital cases
apply here, there is sufficient evidence to support the factor.
¶6 “A murder is especially cruel . . . when the victim consciously ‘suffered
physical pain or mental anguish during at least some portion of the crime and . . . the
defendant knew or should have known that the victim would suffer.’” State v. Dixon, 226
Ariz. 545, ¶ 61, 250 P.3d 1174, 1185 (2011), quoting State v. Morris, 215 Ariz. 324, ¶ 61,
160 P.3d 203, 217 (2007); accord State v. Smith, 146 Ariz. 491, 504, 707 P.2d 289, 302 5 (1985). The victim need not have been conscious for every wound inflicted, State v.
Sansing, 206 Ariz. 232, ¶ 7, 77 P.3d 30, 33 (2003), and there is no required period of
suffering to prove the murder was especially cruel. State v. Cropper, 223 Ariz. 522, ¶ 13,
225 P.3d 579, 583 (2010).
¶7 The state presented evidence that Johnson had inflicted at least thirty-seven
stab wounds to the victim’s face, neck, chest, back, and upper extremities. She had
defensive wounds on her hands and arms and had been moving during at least some of the
attack; this constitutes evidence of a struggle, which can support a finding of cruelty. See
State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, ¶¶ 223, 225, 94 P.3d 1119, 1167 (2004) (evidence of
blood throughout house, victim’s defensive wound, broken fingernail, and lost contact
lens supported finding of violent struggle and supported finding “‘murder . . . was
especially cruel’”); see also Morris, 215 Ariz. 324, ¶ 61, 160 P.3d at 217 (evidence of
victims’ struggle with attacker part of “overwhelming evidence of cruelty”).
¶8 Moreover, a police detective testified the attack would have lasted between
thirty to ninety seconds or longer. And, the forensic pathologist opined the victim’s death
was not instantaneous. See Sansing, 206 Ariz. 232, ¶ 12, 77 P.3d at 34 (several minutes
necessary for victim to lose enough blood to die separately established physical pain
component of cruelty factor); State v. Herrera, 176 Ariz. 21, 34, 859 P.2d 131, 144
(1993) (suffering from eighteen seconds to two or three minutes supported finding of
cruelty). The foregoing was sufficient evidence from which a jury could have found that
6 the victim consciously suffered physical pain or mental anguish for some of the attack
and that Johnson knew or should have known he was making her suffer.
¶9 Johnson contends “[t]he State produced no evidence to support the
conclusion that [the victim] was conscious at the time of the incident or whether she was
conscious of the pain,” while conceding the evidence of defensive wounds on her hands
was “evidence that [she] was conscious and suffering.” Although he argues the defensive
wounds could have resulted from “a reflexive act,” and did not show consciousness, that
is but one interpretation of the evidence. If reasonable people “could differ as to whether
the evidence establishes a fact in issue, then the evidence is substantial,” and a trial court
does not err in denying a Rule 20 motion. State v. McCurdy, 216 Ariz. 567, ¶ 14, 169
P.3d 931, 937 (App. 2007). The trial court properly denied Johnson’s motion for a
judgment of acquittal insofar as there was substantial evidence he committed the murder
in an especially cruel manner. Only one of the three subfactors listed in § 13-701(D)(5)
must be proven in order for a sentence to be aggravated under this provision. See State v.
Hinchey, 165 Ariz. 432, 438-39, 799 P.2d 352, 358-59 (1990) (“We consider the terms
‘especially heinous, cruel or depraved’ in the disjunctive[,] and a finding beyond a
reasonable doubt of any one of the three alternative elements is sufficient to find this
circumstance exists.”). Therefore, because we have found sufficient evidence supports
7 the jury’s finding that the murder was especially cruel, we need not address Johnson’s
argument that the state also failed to prove it was especially heinous or depraved.5
Diminished Capacity Evidence
¶10 Johnson argues the trial court erred when it precluded him from presenting
a psychiatrist’s testimony to rebut the alleged aggravating factor that he had committed
the murder in an especially cruel, heinous, or depraved manner. Specifically, Johnson
sought to present evidence through the testimony of Dr. Lauro Amezcua-Patino that
Johnson has bipolar disorder, and on the night of the homicide he had ingested too much
prescription medication, which in turn caused an amnestic dissociative state in which he
committed the homicide. Johnson’s purpose in presenting the evidence was to rebut the
state’s allegation that his actions were cruel, heinous, or depraved. We generally review a
court’s evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion, see State v. Dann, 220 Ariz. 351,
¶ 117, 207 P.3d 604, 625 (2009), but we review de novo questions of statutory
5 As already noted, we do not decide in this appeal whether we must apply the standards found in our capital sentencing jurisprudence to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to prove the aggravating circumstance that the offense had been carried out in an especially cruel, heinous, or depraved manner. Under those standards, Johnson makes a strong argument that the state has presented insufficient evidence of gratuitous violence, which was one of the necessary components of the jury’s finding of heinousness or depravity in this case. See State v. Wallace, 229 Ariz. 155, ¶¶ 27-28, 33-35, 272 P.3d 1046, 1052-53, 1053-54 (2012); State v. Bocharski, 218 Ariz. 476, ¶¶ 85-91, 189 P.3d 403, 421-22 (2008); see also infra n.8 (discussing standards set forth in Bocharski). However, as stated above, we need not address that argument further because we have found sufficient evidence of cruelty, and, therefore, our review of this issue does not require us also to find sufficient evidence of heinousness and depravity. See Hinchey, 165 Ariz. at 438-39, 799 P.2d at 358-59. 8 interpretation or constitutional law. See State ex rel. Thomas v. Klein, 214 Ariz. 205, ¶ 5,
150 P.3d 778, 780 (App. 2007).
¶11 Johnson had given the state notice before the aggravation trial that he
intended to call Patino as a witness. The state did not object at that time, but on the day
of trial asked for “an avowal as to what [Johnson] expect[s] Doctor Patino to testify
about.” Johnson contended Patino’s testimony would be relevant in the aggravation trial
to rebut the state’s evidence about Johnson’s state of mind as to the cruel, heinous, or
depraved factor. The trial court, while expressing some reservation, ruled it would allow
Patino to testify. Based on that ruling, Johnson asked the prospective jurors during voir
dire questions about psychiatric testimony in a criminal trial and engaged one particular
juror in a lengthy discussion about the topic.
¶12 After the jury had been excused for the day, the state complained that it did
not know what Patino would testify about and also implied that any testimony he offered
would be irrelevant. The trial court reconsidered the issue and, based on a lack of case
law specifically authorizing the use of the testimony to rebut the state’s aggravation
evidence, precluded Patino from testifying. Johnson moved the court to reconsider its
ruling and the court denied the motion.6
6 In the alternative, Johnson moved for a mistrial based on the fact he already had told the jury a psychiatrist would be testifying. The trial court denied the motion and, although he argues the court erred in that denial, we need not address the issue in this appeal in light of our resolution of the evidentiary issue. 9 ¶13 The state contends this evidence constitutes diminished capacity evidence
that is prohibited from admission because Johnson “introduced it to negate the relevant
mens rea.” Diminished capacity evidence has been defined in its broadest sense as
“‘showing that the defendant’s mental capacity was reduced by mental illness, mental
defect or intoxication.’” Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 772 n.41 (2006), quoting People
v. Berry, 556 P.2d 777, 781 (Cal. 1976). In Arizona, our legislature expressly has
precluded it from being used “either as an affirmative defense or to negate the mens rea
element of a crime.” State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 541, 931 P.2d 1046, 1051 (1997)
(second emphasis added).
¶14 And, the language of the relevant statute discussed in Mott, A.R.S. § 13-
502(A), provides that insanity is a defense to a “criminal act.” That statute does not
address whether evidence of diminished capacity can be used to determine the appropriate
range of sentence once a defendant’s guilt has been established. Had the legislature
intended to apply a similar prohibition to the sentencing phase, we presume it would have
so stated. Subsection (A) of § 13-502 was passed in its current form in 1993, before
Mott, and has not been amended since. Compare 1993 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 256, § 3,
with 2008 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 301, § 14. Thus, we can presume the legislature has
approved the supreme court’s interpretation of the statute as precluding diminished
capacity evidence to defend against the mens rea element of an offense. See Hause v.
City of Tucson, 199 Ariz. 499, ¶ 10, 19 P.3d 640, 643 (App. 2001) (“[W]hen the
legislature reenacts without change a statute that has been interpreted by our supreme 10 court, we presume the legislature has adopted the supreme court’s interpretation . . . .”).
And even after the United States Supreme Court ruled defendants have a right to have
aggravating factors decided by a jury in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301,
303-04 (2004), the legislature did not amend the statute to expressly limit diminished
capacity evidence from being presented in a jury trial on aggravating factors. See State v.
Garcia, 227 Ariz. 377, ¶ 15, 258 P.3d 195, 198-99 (App. 2011) (legislature “free to
amend” statute to reflect its intent).
¶15 Thus, as demonstrated by the language of the statute and our supreme
court’s interpretation of it, to the extent the evidence here constitutes evidence of
diminished capacity, the legislature only intended to preclude such evidence when a
defendant attempts to use it to negate his or her responsibility for a crime in the
guilt/innocence phase of the trial. Nothing about § 13-502 or Mott precludes diminished
capacity evidence from being presented in the aggravation phase of sentencing when a
defendant already has been found criminally responsible. See State v. Denny, 116 Ariz.
361, 365, 569 P.2d 303, 307 (App. 1977) (“We will not extend a statute to include matters
not within its express provisions.”); accord City of Phx. v. Donofrio, 99 Ariz. 130, 133,
407 P.2d 91, 93 (1965).
¶16 To the contrary, a defendant at an aggravation hearing is “free to dispute
[the state’s evidence of aggravators] or produce any witness or other documentation to
dispute the state’s evidence.” State v. Thomas, 110 Ariz. 106, 109-10, 515 P.2d 851,
854-55 (1973). Moreover, whether we analyze the proffered psychiatric testimony here 11 under our evidentiary rules for jury trials or under the more relaxed standards for the
presentation of evidence in sentencing proceedings, the evidence would be admissible.
The proffered evidence was relevant to the issues in dispute and offered through the
testimony of a live expert witness who had foundation for his opinions. Compare Ariz.
R. Evid. 402 (“[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible” unless otherwise precluded by rules,
constitutions, or statutes),7 with Ariz. R. Crim. P. 26.7(b) (broadly allowing “any party” at
presentence hearing to “introduce any reliable, relevant evidence, including hearsay, in
order to show aggravating or mitigating circumstances”). And, the state has presented no
technical evidentiary challenge to the admissibility of the testimony under either standard,
apart from its incorrect contention that such evidence would violate § 13-502 and Mott.
¶17 Here, to prove the aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed
in an especially cruel, heinous, or depraved manner, the state presented evidence about
Johnson’s state of mind as he killed his former wife.8 The state’s forensic pathologist
testified that “this [wa]s a very personal crime,” a “crime of passion,” and that Johnson
7 We cite the version of the rule in effect during Johnson’s 2010 aggravation trial. The current rule differs only in style. See Ariz. R. Evid. 402 cmt. to 2012 amend. 8 As set forth above in the discussion of the sufficiency of the evidence, to prove cruelty, the state needed to show Johnson knew or should have known he was causing his victim mental or physical anguish. See State v. Bocharski, 218 Ariz. 476, n.15, 189 P.3d 403, 421 n.15 (2008); State v. Smith, 146 Ariz. 491, 504, 707 P.2d 289, 302 (1985). Proof of heinousness and depravity focuses on Johnson’s state of mind, see Bocharski, 218 Ariz. 476, ¶ 83, 189 P.3d at 420, and at least one of the five specific factors considered in determining whether a killing was heinous or depraved—the infliction of gratuitous violence, which the state alleged here—requires a determination that Johnson “intentionally inflicted violence after he knew or should have known of a fatal occurrence.” Id. ¶¶ 83, 91. 12 must have committed the crime with “an enormous amount of rage” and “anger.” The
state then emphasized that evidence in its closing argument by stating Johnson was “so
angry and enraged that he brutally butcher[ed] his former wife.” The state further
described Johnson as “a guy that hates [the victim]. . . . He’s trying to punish her. He’s
trying to inflict pain and suffering on her. That’s what he wants. That’s why he’s doing
it.”
¶18 Clearly, Johnson was entitled to present evidence rebutting the state’s
characterization of the killing.9 In that context, Patino’s testimony was squarely relevant
to the extent it suggested Johnson was too debilitated by mental illness and prescription
medication either to formulate any intention to be especially cruel or to knowingly inflict
gratuitous violence beyond the fatal acts. Thus, the trial court abused its discretion in
precluding the evidence. And, because we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the
jury would have reached the same conclusion had the evidence been presented, see State
9 Johnson argues he was denied his constitutional right to present a complete defense. See State v. Machado, 224 Ariz. 343, ¶ 12, 230 P.3d 1158, 1166 (App. 2010), aff’d, 226 Ariz. 281, 246 P.3d 632 (2011). Because we have decided the trial court abused its discretion in precluding the evidence, we need not decide the constitutional question. See State v. Korzuch, 186 Ariz. 190, 195, 920 P.2d 312, 317 (1996) (“In general, . . . we should resolve cases on non-constitutional grounds in all cases where it is possible and prudent to do so.”).
13 v. Bass, 198 Ariz. 571, ¶ 40, 12 P.3d 796, 806 (2000), we vacate the jury’s findings that
Johnson committed the murder in an especially cruel, heinous, or depraved manner.10
¶19 However, we do not remand the case for another jury trial on the
aggravating circumstances because at least one other aggravating circumstance was
proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. As we explain below, Johnson’s challenge
to the jury’s findings on those aggravators has not been successful in this appeal. Thus,
Johnson’s right to have a jury find the facts “legally essential to the punishment” has been
adequately protected, Blakely, 542 U.S. at 313, and in the next resentencing proceeding
the trial court may consider any of the other alleged aggravators and find whether they
exist by a preponderance of the evidence.11 See State v. Martinez, 210 Ariz. 578, ¶ 26,
115 P.3d 618, 625 (2005) (“[O]nce a jury finds or a defendant admits a single aggravating
factor, the Sixth Amendment permits the sentencing judge to find and consider additional
factors relevant to the imposition of a sentence up to the maximum prescribed in that
statute.”).
10 For the first time at oral argument, the state argued that the standard for proving the mental state of the cruel, heinous, or depraved aggravating factor is an objective, “reasonable person” standard, which, in its view, would render the diminished capacity evidence irrelevant. However, our supreme court has addressed the issue squarely in State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, ¶ 226, 94 P.3d 1119, 1167 (2004), and reached a contrary conclusion. See id. (finding evidence of defendant’s “dissociated state” at time of murder relevant to rebut requirement he knew or should have known victim would suffer). 11 In accordance with this decision, when considering the cruel, heinous, or depraved factor, the trial court should take into account any relevant, reliable evidence Johnson presents to rebut the state’s evidence of his mental state. 14 ¶20 The state contends any error here does not require the case to be remanded
for resentencing of any kind because the trial court twice has given the same sentence and
it “outright reject[ed]” Johnson’s mitigation evidence based on Patino’s opinions at the
second sentencing. It thus maintains the court would impose the same sentence in any
further proceeding.12 See State v. Ojeda, 159 Ariz. 560, 561-62, 769 P.2d 1006, 1007-08
(1989) (if judge relies on inappropriate sentencing factor, we “affirm without remand
only where the record clearly shows the trial court would have reached the same result
even without consideration of the improper factors”). But the court only “outright
reject[ed]” two of his mitigating factors, and it is only when a court finds no mitigating
factors in the presence of at least one aggravating factor that it has no discretion but to
impose an aggravated sentence. See A.R.S. § 13-701(F). Moreover, it is not clear
whether the court would find as an aggravating factor that the offense was committed in
an especially cruel, heinous, or depraved manner when considering Patino’s expert
opinion in that context. Thus, the record does not demonstrate that the court would
necessarily impose the same sentence after appropriately reconsidering the erroneously
found aggravating factors, and we remand the case for further proceedings. See State v.
Hardwick, 183 Ariz. 649, 656-57, 905 P.2d 1384, 1391-92 (App. 1995) (necessary to
12 The state also argues that any error was harmless because the court considered the evidence in mitigation. But the use of evidence to rebut aggravating factors is distinct from its use as mitigation evidence. For example, the consideration of the evidence in the aggravation stage could yield a determination that the aggravating circumstance did not exist at all, while the consideration of the evidence solely in mitigation never could have that effect. Moreover, some features of the psychiatric evaluation might be considered pertinent to rebut aggravation while other features might be more relevant in mitigation. 15 remand for resentencing when “record does not reveal” whether sentencing judge would
have imposed different sentence when not considering improper factor); cf. State v. Lehr,
205 Ariz. 107, ¶¶ 8-9, 67 P.3d 703, 705-06 (2003) (remanding for resentencing in capital
case when reversal of basis for one aggravating factor meant “sentencing calculus” had
changed and finding error harmless would be “too speculative”).
¶21 We vacate the jury’s findings on the cruel, heinous, or depraved aggravator
and remand the case for resentencing. We do not address any additional claims Johnson
has raised that, even if valid, would not have affected the jury’s findings on the
emotional-harm or open-casket factors.
Double Jeopardy
¶22 Johnson argues his sentence violated double jeopardy principles because the
state did not allege any aggravating factors until after jeopardy had attached in his first
trial. The state responds that the law of the case bars this court from reaching the issue’s
merits because Johnson had raised it in his first appeal and it was rejected. See State v.
King, 180 Ariz. 268, 278, 883 P.2d 1024, 1034 (1994) (under law of case doctrine, “‘no
question necessarily involved and decided on . . . appeal will be considered on a second
appeal . . . in the same case, provided the facts and issues are substantially the same as
those on which the first decision rested’”), quoting In re Monaghan’s Estate, 71 Ariz.
334, 336, 227 P.2d 227, 228 (1951). The state is correct: Johnson made the same
argument in his first appeal, this court rejected it, and the facts and issues have not
changed since then. State v. Johnson, No. 2 CA-CR 2007-0268, ¶¶ 1-2, 12-19 16 (memorandum decision filed May 29, 2008). Johnson has not persuaded us that we
should disturb our decision in the first appeal on that issue.
¶23 Johnson also contends we should revisit our first decision because it is in
conflict with State v. Cretens, No. 2 CA-CR 2008-0155 (memorandum decision filed Apr.
8, 2009), and “[a]ll of the published case law on this issue.” Although Johnson
emphasized in oral argument that he was citing Cretens only to demonstrate there was a
conflict between two panels of this court, his extensive focus on the reasoning of Cretens
in his opening brief suggests he also was citing it as persuasive authority. First, to the
extent Johnson uses Cretens to support his argument on appeal, this is impermissible
under Rule 31.24, Ariz. R. Crim. P. Second, to the extent he attempts to incorporate the
authorities or arguments found in Cretens in lieu of setting them forth and developing
them in his opening brief, such practice is prohibited by Rule 31.13(c)(1)(vi), Ariz. R.
Crim. P. See State v. Walden, 183 Ariz. 595, 605, 905 P.2d 974, 984 (1995) (“[a]rgument
must be in the body of the brief,” and text in appendix stricken), overruled on other
grounds by State v. Ives, 187 Ariz. 102, 927 P.2d 762 (1996); State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz.
290, 298, 896 P.2d 830, 838 (1995) (argument not within body of brief procedurally
defaulted). Accordingly, we decline to reconsider Johnson’s double jeopardy argument.
Double-Counted Factors
¶24 Johnson argues the trial court erred by double-counting the cruel, heinous,
or depraved factor because the jury found it as two separate aggravating factors. The
state concedes the trial court erroneously double-counted the factor, and the statute is 17 clear that it constitutes but one factor. See A.R.S. § 13-701(D)(5). Thus, on remand, if
the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the murder was committed in an
especially cruel, heinous, or depraved manner, we trust the court will consider it as only
one factor when weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See § 13-
701(F).
¶25 Noting that the trial court had found emotional harm to the family as a
separate aggravating factor, Johnson argues the trial court essentially double-counted the
open casket factor because it is “really just a different way of saying the victim’s family
suffered tremendous emotional harm.” “Whether a trial court may employ a given factor
to aggravate a sentence presents a question of law we review de novo.” State v. Alvarez,
205 Ariz. 110, ¶ 6, 67 P.3d 706, 709 (App. 2003). Johnson does not develop this
argument other than to cite State v. Styers, 177 Ariz. 104, 116, 865 P.2d 765, 777 (1993),
a case in which our supreme court found it improper to use one fact to prove more than
one aggravating factor if the court weighs that particular fact twice. There is no evidence
the court here weighed the fact twice.
¶26 To the extent Johnson is arguing there was insufficient evidence to support
both factors, the state presented evidence the victim’s family suffered harm in addition to
the harm from being denied an open-casket funeral. Thus, even if the denial of an open-
casket funeral was part of the family’s emotional harm, each factor was supported by
independent evidence.
18 Disposition
¶27 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the jury’s finding that the murder was
committed in an especially cruel, heinous, or depraved manner and remand the case to the
trial court to conduct a new sentencing proceeding consistent with this opinion.
/s/ Peter J. Eckerstrom PETER J. ECKERSTROM, Presiding Judge
CONCURRING:
/s/ Joseph W. Howard JOSEPH W. HOWARD, Chief Judge
/s/ J. William Brammer, Jr. J. WILLIAM BRAMMER, JR., Judge