State of Alaska v. Steven Ridenour

Opinion

2026 WL 2277266

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

NOTICE: THIS DECISION DOES NOT SERVE AS PRECEDENT. THE CASE WAS ENTERED IN THE WESTLAW DATABASE BEFORE THE TIME FOR REHEARING HAD EXPIRED. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT REHEARING HAS BEEN SOUGHT, GRANTED OR DENIED.

Supreme Court of Alaska.

STATE OF ALASKA, Petitioner,

v.

STEVEN RIDENOUR, Respondent.

Supreme Court No. S-18952Court of Appeals No. A-13282

August 7, 2026

Superior Court No. 3KO-16-00012 CR

Petition for Hearing from the Court of Appeals of the State of Alaska, on appeal from the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Kodiak, Steve W. Cole, Judge.

Attorneys and Law Firms

Appearances: Diane L. Wendlandt, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for Petitioner. Renee McFarland, Assistant Public Defender, and Terrence Haas, Public Defender, Anchorage, for Respondent. Jahna M. Lindemuth, Cashion Gilmore & Lindemuth, Anchorage, Lauren J. Gottesman, The Innocence Project, New York, New York, Matthew L. Mazur and Bert L. Wolff, Dechert LLP, New York, New York, for Amicus Curiae The Innocence Project.

Before: Carney, Chief Justice, and Borghesan, Henderson, Pate, and Oravec, Justices.

OPINION

ORAVEC, Justice.

I. INTRODUCTION

During a custodial interview, a murder suspect waived his Miranda rights and subsequently made an ambiguous request for counsel. Officers did not pause to clarify whether the suspect indeed sought counsel, and questioning continued. The suspect was arrested and brought to trial. Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress statements made after his ambiguous request for counsel. The superior court denied the motion to suppress, and statements from the interview were used as evidence at trial. The defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder and tampering with evidence.

The court of appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the interrogating officers were obligated to stop and clarify the defendant's ambiguous request for counsel before proceeding further with the interrogation as required by the right to remain silent in article I, section 9 of the Alaska Constitution. The State petitioned for hearing, arguing that we should adopt the federal standard, which does not impose a “stop and clarify” rule.

In light of the broader protections for individual rights recognized by the Alaska Constitution, we now adopt a “stop and clarify” rule under article I, sections 9 and 11: where a suspect has waived Miranda rights, and subsequently makes an ambiguous request for counsel, interrogating officers are required to stop questioning and clarify if the suspect is requesting a lawyer. Here, the officers did not appropriately clarify the ambiguous request for counsel. We affirm the court of appeals and reverse the conviction.

II. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

A. Facts

Steven Ridenour and Steven McCaulley were coworkers at a remote work site in the summer of 2015. In early November, after Ridenour returned to Anchorage, his brother called Ridenour's employer to report that McCaulley may have been shot at the work site.¹ The employer called the state troopers, who travelled to the site and found McCaulley's body with numerous gunshot wounds. Troopers in Anchorage located Ridenour and he was arrested on existing bench warrants for unrelated matters.

Once in custody, Ridenour was interviewed about McCaulley's death. Two troopers conducted the interview. At the beginning of the interview, one trooper read Ridenour his Miranda rights and asked if Ridenour understood them. Ridenour said that he did. When asked if he wanted to share “[his] side of it,” Ridenour responded “I don't have much to hide, man.” Ridenour then began to speak with the troopers about McCaulley. In recapping the events, Ridenour admitted that he shot McCaulley, but asserted he had acted in self-defense after McCaulley threw a wedge at his head. The interview continued:

Ridenour: So he pulls out of the tree and he starts fucking screaming and hollering. And, uh, well he comes at me with the chainsaw. I come over here. He just turns come out here with the chainsaw. So ... (sighs) ... should I do this without an attorney?

Trooper: What's that?

Ridenour: Should I do this without an attorney?

Trooper: Oh —

Ridenour: Am I hanging myself here?

Trooper: We can't advise you one way or the other what you can or should or shouldn't do legally. Uh, we talked to you before. You don't have to talk to us if you don't want to. You, you can, you can stop at any time. I mean the door's closed for privacy and we're here talking but, but.

Ridenour: Privacy don't matter. I, mean I, I don't have nothing to hide but I just want to, you know, this don't look good. It ain't going to look good.

Trooper: Well.

Ridenour: It wasn't pretty.

Trooper: Well you're the only one that can decide that. I mean, you're the only one that knows right now. I mean, all we'll have when we got out here is what we see on the scene. And if we don't get from you what happened we won't know where to look for what. You know, if you tell us you use the shotgun over here we need to know that so we can go over here and look for shotgun shells.

Ridenour then continued to discuss the incident, describing that even though McCaulley was down on his stomach, Ridenour kept shooting. Ridenour acknowledged that he “went overboard,” yet claimed he was “[t]rying to put [McCaulley] out of his misery.” Following the interview, Ridenour was incarcerated in Anchorage on unrelated misdemeanor charges. In December, while Ridenour was serving the misdemeanor sentence, he was again interviewed by one of the troopers from the previous interview and another trooper. During this interview, Ridenour discussed the shooting, the aftermath, and the communications he had with family and friends before and after the shooting. Ridenour maintained that he had shot McCaulley in self-defense.

B. Proceedings

Ridenour was indicted on charges of first- and second-degree murder; attempted first-degree murder; first-degree assault; and tampering with evidence. Before trial, Ridenour filed a motion to suppress statements he made during the November and December interviews. Relevant to this appeal, he argued that in the November interview, he made an ambiguous request for counsel and that the interviewing trooper both failed to clarify Ridenour's request and dissuaded Ridenour from exercising his right to counsel. The superior court held an evidentiary hearing regarding the motion to suppress. Law enforcement officers testified about police interrogation training, noting that “lawyer” is a buzz word during interrogations, and stating a belief that “it's our obligation to clarify the nature of the comment” when a suspect refers to an attorney. The superior court ultimately denied the motion to suppress, explaining that for the November interview, Ridenour's initial response was “sufficiently affirmative” to constitute a knowing Miranda waiver, and the December interview did not require new Miranda warnings because it was not custodial.

At trial, the State presented evidence from both interviews. The jury found Ridenour guilty of first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, first-degree assault, and tampering with evidence.² Ridenour was sentenced to 75 years with 15 years suspended for the first-degree murder³ and a consecutive 2-year term for evidence tampering.

Ridenour appealed.⁴ The court of appeals considered whether the troopers violated Ridenour's right to counsel after he made an ambiguous request for counsel. The court noted that under federal law as stated in Davis v. United States, once a suspect has given a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may proceed with questioning unless the suspect subsequently makes a clear and unambiguous request for counsel.⁵ Under that standard, the court of appeals concluded that Ridenour's federal constitutional rights were not violated.⁶ However, the court of appeals noted that “Ridenour is also entitled to protection under the Alaska Constitution, and Alaska courts have interpreted Article I, Section 9 of the Alaska Constitution (the corollary to the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution) more broadly than its federal counterpart.”⁷

The court of appeals then examined Giacomazzi v. State, a case in which we considered a defendant's rights under the federal constitution and held that a clear request for counsel is not required in a custodial setting.⁸ There, we held that when an individual makes an ambiguous or equivocal statement about obtaining legal counsel, “the officer may seek clarification of the suspect's desires” but may not “utilize the guise of clarification as a subterfuge for coercion or intimidation.”⁹ Giacomazzi was issued long before the United States Supreme Court held in Davis that an ambiguous request is not sufficient to invoke the right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment, and that officers need not seek clarification from suspects.¹⁰ The court of appeals noted that although Giacomazzi was no longer applicable to federal constitutional rights, it “remains the correct rule to apply under our state constitution.”¹¹ After adopting a “stop and clarify” standard, the court of appeals independently reviewed the record of the November interview and held that the failure to grant the motion to suppress Ridenour's statements after his post-waiver reference to counsel necessitated the reversal of his convictions.¹²

The State petitioned for hearing, arguing that we should adopt the federal rule that once a suspect has waived Miranda rights, the suspect must make a clear and unambiguous request for counsel to revoke the waiver. We granted the State's petition for hearing and ordered full briefing. The Innocence Project filed an amicus brief in support of Ridenour.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Issues of constitutional interpretation are questions of law.¹³ We review questions of law de novo,¹⁴ applying our independent judgment and adopting “the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of precedent, reason, and policy.”¹⁵ Whether an individual invokes constitutional rights presents a mixed question of law and fact that we review using our independent judgment.¹⁶

IV. DISCUSSION

This appeal requires us to consider the right to counsel, which reinforces a suspect's right to remain silent. We first will examine Ridenour's rights under the federal constitution, and then we will do so under our state constitution. We agree with the court of appeals that under the federal constitution, police officers were not required to stop questioning and clarify Ridenour's intent to request counsel. However, when considering the right to counsel under the state constitution, our reasoning in Giacomazzi remains sound.¹⁷ We confirm that when a suspect ambiguously references legal counsel, a “stop and clarify” rule is the appropriate procedural safeguard to protect the right to counsel and the right to remain silent under the state constitution. Because the police did not stop and clarify Ridenour's intent when he made an ambiguous reference to counsel, we conclude that Ridenour's rights under the Alaska Constitution were violated. We affirm the court of appeals’ decision reversing Ridenour's conviction.

A. The United States Constitution Establishes Minimum Federal Standards For Safeguarding The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination In Custodial Interviews.

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution enumerates and protects the right against self-incrimination.¹⁸ In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court articulated procedural protections to ensure that suspects are informed by law enforcement of their rights under the Fifth Amendment while in custody or otherwise deprived of freedom.¹⁹ In the sixty years since Miranda was decided, these procedural protections have become known as the Miranda rights and are a familiar and expected part of the custodial process.²⁰ Among other formal warnings, officers must clearly notify suspects that they have a right to remain silent and to have an attorney present at interrogation,²¹ and questioning must cease if a suspect “indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney.”²² These warnings are considered prophylactic and intended to counteract the “inherently compelling pressures” of custodial interrogation.²³ Once these warnings have been given, a suspect may nonetheless “knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement.”²⁴

Essential to the matter presently before us is the procedural safeguard of the right to counsel during custodial interrogation, which the Supreme Court recognized as “indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege under the system we delineate today.”²⁵ Previously, the right to counsel had been recognized as attaching at the initiation of adversary criminal proceedings.²⁶ But beginning with Miranda, the Supreme Court acknowledged that:

The denial of the defendant's request for his attorney thus undermined his ability to exercise the privilege—to remain silent if he chose or to speak without any intimidation, blatant or subtle. The presence of counsel, in all the cases before us today, would be the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege. [Counsel's] presence would insure [sic] that statements made in the government-established atmosphere are not the product of compulsion.^[27]

Miranda thus recognized that the right to assistance of counsel protects the constitutional right to remain silent.

In Edwards v. Arizona, the Supreme Court further clarified that the right to counsel is essential to safeguarding Fifth Amendment protections.²⁸ There, the Court held that even where a suspect initially waives the right to counsel, he may later invoke the right during a custodial interrogation and may not be subjected “to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.”²⁹ Under Edwards, the key to exercising the right to counsel, once waived, was that the suspect had to make an unambiguous and unequivocal request.

Edwards required courts to “determine whether the accused actually invoked his right to counsel,”³⁰ and jurisdictions varied in how they construed what constituted a clear and unambiguous assertion of the right to counsel. After Edwards, three approaches emerged from the lower courts: one required the immediate cessation of interrogation; one permitted questions limited to clarifying whether the defendant intended to invoke this right; and one permitted interrogation to continue unless a sufficiently clear invocation of the right was made.³¹

The Supreme Court addressed this split among the courts in Davis v. United States.³² There, the defendant first signed a written waiver of his Miranda rights, but roughly an hour and a half into the interview, the defendant stated “[m]aybe I should talk to a lawyer.”³³ One of the agents stated that if Davis wanted a lawyer, they would stop questioning him, but Davis clarified that he was not asking for a lawyer and did not want one.³⁴ After this exchange, the questioning continued for another hour, at which time Davis said, “I think I want a lawyer before I say anything else,” and the interview ceased.³⁵ Davis moved to suppress the statements made after the agent clarified that Davis was not asking for a lawyer.³⁶ The trial court found that Davis had knowingly waived his right to counsel both in writing and verbally, and it denied Davis's motion to suppress because his subsequent “mention of a lawyer ... during the course of the interrogation [was] not in the form of a request for counsel,” and the interrogating agents “properly determined” that the defendant was not actually “indicating a desire for or invoking his right to counsel.”³⁷

On appeal, the Supreme Court held that “after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney.”³⁸ The Court acknowledged that it is often good police practice for interviewing authorities to stop and clarify a suspect's ambiguous references to an attorney, and that “[c]larifying questions help protect the rights of the suspect by ensuring that he gets an attorney if he wants one, and will minimize the chance of a confession being suppressed due to subsequent judicial second-guessing as to the meaning of the suspect's statement regarding counsel.”³⁹ Nonetheless, the Court was concerned with the impact on police investigations if a cease-questioning rule were adopted for ambiguous requests for counsel, observing:

[I]f we were to require questioning to cease if a suspect makes a statement that might be a request for an attorney, this clarity and ease of application would be lost. Police officers would be forced to make difficult judgment calls about whether the suspect in fact wants a lawyer even though he has not said so, with the threat of suppression if they guess wrong.^[40]

The Court further declined to establish a requirement to clarify ambiguous requests for counsel.⁴¹

Because the federal constitution does not require police officers to cease questioning, or to stop and clarify ambiguous requests for counsel, Ridenour's federal rights were not implicated in this case.

B. The Alaska Constitution Requires Interrogating Officers To Stop And Clarify A Suspect's Ambiguous Request For Counsel.

1. The right to counsel under the Alaska Constitution is more expansive than that under the U.S. Constitution.

In Giacomazzi v. State, we concluded that the federal constitution requires that a questioning officer should stop and clarify whether a suspect intends to request counsel.⁴² After the Supreme Court's decision in Davis, however, our holding in Giacomazzi was no longer consistent with U.S. Constitutional jurisprudence. The current case sets squarely before us the extent to which the Alaska Constitution provides for a more expansive right to counsel than recognized in the federal document.

In addressing the right to counsel under the Alaska Constitution, the State argues that our court should adopt the rule in Davis, and require a clear, unambiguous revocation of a waiver of the right to counsel.⁴³ Ridenour argues that the Alaska Constitution affords additional protection to a suspect in a custodial interview. While the starting point of analysis for “a question of constitutional law not squarely addressed by precedent is to consult the plain text of the Alaska Constitution as clarified through its drafting history,”⁴⁴ the question presented here is application of our prior precedent to a recognized right. Nonetheless, we have long recognized a “responsibility to depart whenever necessary from constitutional interpretations enunciated by the United States Supreme Court and to develop rights and privileges under the Alaska Constitution in accordance with our own unique legal background.”⁴⁵

In Baker v. City of Fairbanks, we held:

[W]e are at liberty to make constitutional progress in Alaska by our own interpretations, as long as we measure up to the national standards which are required by the United States Supreme Court. It is our duty to move forward in those areas of constitutional progress which we view as necessary to the development of a civilized way of life in Alaska.^[46]

Similarly, in Scott v. State, we observed that we are “not bound to follow blindly a federal constitutional construction of a fundamental principle if we are convinced that the result is based on unsound reason or logic.”⁴⁷ Ultimately, we may depart from federal courts’ reading of a constitutional provision if it leads to a conclusion that is at odds with our state's unique interest in protecting broader extensions of individual rights.⁴⁸ It is with this context in mind that we consider whether to follow our earlier precedent — addressing the right to counsel under the federal constitution — and recognize a broader scope of protection under our state constitution.⁴⁹

We long have acknowledged that the privilege against self-incrimination under article I, section 9 of the Alaska Constitution is more expansive than required under the Fifth Amendment,⁵⁰ in part due to our recognition that “[t]he privilege ‘reflects a complex of our fundamental values and aspirations.’ ”⁵¹ And we also have held that the right to counsel under the Alaska Constitution is broader than that under the Sixth Amendment to the federal constitution.⁵² The right to counsel functions in part to protect a suspect's right to remain silent for purposes of avoiding self-incrimination, as some individuals may feel less inclined to exercise their right to remain silent without the assurance of legal counsel advising them that doing so is permissible.⁵³ We now consider whether this broader right to counsel under the Alaska Constitution may be invoked when a suspect makes an ambiguous reference to counsel during a custodial interview.

As discussed previously, the Davis court rejected a “stop and clarify” rule for post-waiver ambiguous requests for counsel.⁵⁴ We have not yet squarely confronted the question of whether, under our own constitution, officers are required to stop questioning and seek clarification in the context of an ambiguous, post-waiver request for counsel. We turn now to previous Alaska cases that provide guidance in support of adopting a “stop and clarify” rule.

In Giacomazzi v. State, we considered whether a suspect knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment.⁵⁵ There, we held that a suspect may invoke the right to remain silent by “means other than an express statement to that effect; no particular form of words or conduct is necessary.”⁵⁶ We also held that “a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that [the suspect] responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights.”⁵⁷ Recognizing that it may be difficult for an officer to determine a suspect's intent, we confirmed that an officer “may seek clarification of the suspect's desires [to waive the right].”⁵⁸

A few years after we decided Giacomazzi, the court of appeals considered the question of whether the defendant had made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to have counsel present at the time the defendant made incriminating statements in Hampel v. State.⁵⁹ The court of appeals was concerned with the need to prevent undue influence by interrogating officers in a custodial interview, as well as the likelihood that only those who are assertive and articulate would be able to exercise the right to counsel after waiver.⁶⁰ The court of appeals held:

In keeping with Giacomazzi, we hold that when the accused makes an ambiguous or equivocal reference to counsel during a custodial interrogation, the officer need not immediately terminate the interrogation. Further questioning, however, must be limited to clarifying the reference. Thus, any questioning on the subject matter of the investigation must be suspended until the intent of the accused is clarified.^[61]

Both Giacomazzi and Hampel were determined before the Supreme Court decided Davis, but we nonetheless continued a more expansive view of the right to remain silent. In Munson v. State,⁶² we addressed a court of appeals decision implying that after a waiver of rights, a suspect must invoke the right to remain silent for the purpose of avoiding self-incrimination. There, a murder suspect was interrogated after he waived his Miranda rights.⁶³ When he learned that his discussion with the police might be shared with one of his codefendants, Munson said “[w]ell, I'm done talkin’ then.”⁶⁴ The officers continued to interrogate him.⁶⁵ The superior court interpreted Munson's statements as an invocation of the right to remain silent, and the post-invocation statements were suppressed.⁶⁶

The court of appeals reversed the trial court, explaining that although Munson invoked the right to remain silent, it was not clear he was invoking it for the purpose of preventing self-incrimination; Munson seemed to have invoked his right because the police told him his interview might be shared with a codefendant.⁶⁷ In our decision reversing the court of appeal's holding, we held that the statement was not ambiguous at all, and clarified that “a suspect in a custodial interrogation can validly invoke his rights even if he may be motivated by a reason other than preventing self-incrimination.”⁶⁸

In Noyakuk v. State,⁶⁹ the state troopers interviewed a homicide suspect.⁷⁰ The troopers informed Noyakuk of some of his Miranda rights, but did not provide the full set of warnings before they immediately began questioning him.⁷¹ Noyakuk responded: “Shouldn't I just have my attorney with me, or something?”⁷² Throughout their responses to this question about counsel, the troopers raised substantive questions about the homicide.⁷³ Because the issue in Noyakuk was suppression of pre-Miranda statements, the court of appeals did not directly address the question of how to treat post-Miranda references to counsel. However, the court of appeals did observe:

It may be true, as the State suggests, that the Giacomazzi and Hampel rule should no longer be applied when a suspect makes an ambiguous or equivocal post-waiver, mid-interview statement about an attorney. We leave that issue for another day. But the Davis decision has not changed the law that applies to cases like Noyakuk's—cases where the question is whether a suspect ever validly waived the right to counsel to begin with.^[74]

The court of appeals then declined to decide how Davis changed the landscape of Alaska's post-waiver “stop and clarify” rule.⁷⁵ This question remained unaddressed until the court of appeals reversed Ridenour's conviction, holding that Giacomazzi/Hampel outlined the correct rule to apply under the Alaska Constitution.⁷⁶

These cases do not clearly define whether Giacomazzi remains good law in Alaska following Davis. Giacomazzi and Hampel were decided on federal grounds and before Davis, and Munson and Noyakuk applied to invocation of the right to remain silent. We next consider whether a suspect properly invokes the right to counsel under the Alaska Constitution when the reference to counsel is ambiguous and is made after the suspect has waived Miranda rights.

2. The right to counsel under article I, section 11 of the Alaska Constitution supports the privilege against self-incrimination and requires a stop and clarify rule.

Section 9 of article I of the Alaska Constitution establishes the privilege against self-incrimination, while section 11 enumerates specific procedural rights for the accused, including the right to “have the assistance of counsel for his defense.”⁷⁷ Of concern in this case is the right to counsel within its role as a safeguard to protect the privilege against self-incrimination.⁷⁸ As the Supreme Court did in Miranda, we recognize there is a supportive relationship between the right to remain silent and the privilege against self-incrimination, and the right to counsel.⁷⁹ These bedrock principles have a shared purpose of safeguarding the rights of individuals in criminal proceedings.⁸⁰

We now turn to the State's argument that we should adopt the rule in Davis, and require that, once a suspect has waived Miranda rights, the suspect's request for counsel must be clear and unambiguous. At the outset, we note that we cannot ignore how requiring a clear and unambiguous statement would disadvantage a suspect, particularly in the context of a stressful interview with highly trained authority figures. Law enforcement agencies have a wide range of investigative tools at their disposal, including techniques that involve deception and psychological manipulation.⁸¹ Because law enforcement is permitted to employ coercive tactics, it is all the more important to err on the side of protecting a suspect's right to counsel and ensuring that constitutional safeguards remain meaningful. While the Davis court held that prior Miranda warnings may be sufficient to overcome such circumstances, we are not convinced that is the case under our own constitution.⁸² In his dissenting statement in Giacomazzi, Justice Jay Rabinowitz contended that “the police and courts [should] be more sensitive to what may be a fairly tentative or timid inquiry concerning access to counsel.... [T]he individual who remains passive loses his rights, and thus I think a lower threshold of vulnerability to intimidation is appropriate.”⁸³ We do not now discern a meaningful distinction between whether the right is invoked before or after it has been waived in a custodial interrogation. Instead, we hold that the right may be invoked whenever a suspect “indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult an attorney.”⁸⁴

The State suggests that, once a suspect has waived Miranda rights, the burden should shift to the suspect to clearly articulate intent to revoke the waiver. The State supports a bright line rule requiring a clear, unequivocal statement because otherwise the judgment of officers may be questioned in court and voluntary statements may be suppressed. The State justifies this approach as one of expedience, arguing that restricting the ability to question suspects who do not actually want counsel present is detrimental to public safety.

We are not persuaded to adopt this reasoning because it is contrary to our jurisprudence that the burden remains on the State to demonstrate waiver of a constitutional right. In Scott v. State, we acknowledged that “[o]ur form of government has imposed an extraordinary burden of proof upon the state in criminal litigation.”⁸⁵ We held it “more logical and better reasoned” to consider that our criminal procedure is “founded upon the principle that ascertainment of the facts is a ‘one-way street.’ It is the constitutional right of the defendant, who is presumed to be innocent, to stand silent while the state attempts to meet its burden of proof.”⁸⁶ The burden is and remains on the State — not the suspect — to demonstrate that a constitutional right has been waived.⁸⁷ If, by use of ambiguous language, the suspect muddies the waters as to whether rights were invoked, the burden remains on the State to prove the waiver is truly valid.

This is not to say that the State does not have an interest in expediency, but where individual rights under our constitution are concerned, the State's interest in expediency must be compelling to override constitutional dictates. In Baker v. City of Fairbanks, we observed:

[T]he overriding demands of governmental efficiency must be of a compelling nature and must be identifiable as flowing from some enumerated constitutional power. To allow expediency to be the basic principle would place the individual constitutional right in a secondary position, to be effectuated only if it accorded with expediency.^[88]

But here, the State does not build a case that expedience is sufficiently compelling to override individual constitutional rights. Nor does the State identify which “enumerated constitutional power” privileges expediency over the right to counsel.

The State argues that placing the burden of using clear and ambiguous language on the suspect will assist officers in their work without interfering with the gathering of information. The State is concerned that otherwise, officers may need to exercise judgment that may later be challenged. We recognize that our rule places a burden on law enforcement, but we disagree that the burden is a heavy one. We anticipate that articulating a “stop and clarify” rule will also assist the State in eliminating ambiguity at the optimal time — when the ambiguous statement is made, rather than after resources are committed to questions of waiver.⁸⁹

Absent a “stop and clarify” rule, officers may incorrectly conclude that a suspect failed to invoke their constitutional rights and proceed with an interrogation. If a court later determines that the suspect did adequately invoke their rights, then the State will have wasted resources on evidence subject to exclusion. In contrast, if an officer seeks clarification by asking if the suspect wishes to obtain legal counsel, and the suspect responds affirmatively, then the suspect will have invoked their right at no undue cost to public safety, but rather as a consequence of rights already recognized by our constitution. And if, as the State argues, individuals who initially choose to proceed without counsel are less likely to want counsel, clarification comes at no cost to public safety at all.

At bottom, we disagree that the State's interest in efficiently processing a case requires a suspect to clearly and unambiguously invoke their rights following a waiver.⁹⁰ If a defendant makes an ambiguous reference to counsel during questioning, it would take officers but a few moments to clarify that request. Here, officers agreed that a clarifying statement would not necessarily hinder an investigator's efforts to proceed with an interview. It is not clear that a “stop and clarify” rule would require law enforcement officers to do anything other than what they are already trained to do.

While asserting an interest in the efficiency of police investigations, the State does not contend with concerns raised about the burden on the suspect. Instead, the State argues that after a knowing and voluntary waiver has been made, the concerns about a suspect's lack of understanding, as well as the presence of coercion and manipulation, are no longer primary factors to consider in our analysis. For the reasons discussed above, we disagree with this proposition. We adopt a “stop and clarify” rule and affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

C. The Troopers Did Not Adequately Clarify Ridenour's Ambiguous Request For Counsel.

The State argues that even if we were to apply a “stop and clarify” rule, on the particular facts of this case, the troopers adequately clarified Ridenour's ambiguous request for counsel. The State notes that the troopers here informed Ridenour that he was in control of the interview, that only he could make the decision of whether to get an attorney, and that he did not have to talk. The State contends that in the absence of a requirement to clarify, such statements were both reasonable and responsive.

But Ridenour was never reminded that he had the right to counsel, nor was he asked whether he actually wanted a lawyer. Ridenour does not dispute the State's summary of the questioning, but characterizes the impact of the troopers’ responses differently. He observes that one trooper's comments were directed to Ridenour's right to remain silent, not his right to counsel, and that although they emphasized how Ridenour's information was key to the investigation, the statements suggested that if he did not talk, the troopers may not locate exculpatory evidence. Ridenour contends that the troopers not only failed to clarify, but also coerced him into speaking without counsel. Ridenour concludes that the troopers’ comments were inadequate responses to his statements referencing counsel.

Whether the troopers adequately clarified Ridenour's ambiguous request for counsel is a mixed question of fact and law that we review de novo. However, there is no factual dispute regarding the content of the troopers’ response to Ridenour's ambiguous request for counsel. Accordingly, we consider, as a matter of law, what type of clarification was required and whether the State appropriately clarified Ridenour's statements.

Police must seek clarification when a suspect makes an ambiguous or equivocal request for counsel. Under Hampel, the clarification must be both reasonable and responsive.⁹¹ Whether clarification is reasonable depends on the contextual pressures of the interrogation, “and full account must be taken of the understandable limitations on the scope of legal expertise that can reasonably be expected under the circumstances.”⁹²

The facts in Hampel are very similar to the facts in this case. There, the officer responded to the request for counsel by “ ‘emphasiz[ing] the obstacles to obtaining one’, by ‘focusing on the evidence [against] Hampel’, and by strongly implying that Hampel ‘would damage his case if he delayed talking until an attorney could be present.’ ”⁹³ Here, the trooper referred to the right to remain silent, but did not clarify whether Ridenour wanted the assistance of an attorney, and implied that without Ridenour's participation, evidence helpful to his defense might not be located.

We hold that when faced with an ambiguous request for counsel, law enforcement officers must clarify the intent of the suspect. Law enforcement may do so by asking ministerial and non-adversarial questions that do not seek to persuade the suspect to forgo counsel or the exercise of other constitutional rights.⁹⁴ Here, the troopers violated Ridenour's rights when they failed to clarify his intent to seek the assistance of counsel. Although the troopers attempted to clarify Ridenour's intent to remain silent, the troopers’ statements implied conditional willingness to develop exculpatory evidence. The statements made by the troopers in this case did not reasonably and responsively clarify Ridenour's intent.

We affirm the court of appeals’ holding that statements made by Ridenour after he ambiguously invoked his right to counsel should be suppressed.

V. CONCLUSION

The decision of the court of appeals is AFFIRMED.

Footnotes

1

Ridenour v. State, 539 P.3d 530, 531-32 (Alaska App. 2023).

2

The State dismissed the second-degree murder charge before trial.

3

The attempted murder and assault convictions were merged with first-degree murder.

4

Ridenour, 539 P.3d at 530.

5

Id. at 535 (citing Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994)).

6

Id. at 534.

7

Id. at 535.

8

See id. (citing Giacomazzi v. State, 633 P.2d 218, 222-23 (Alaska 1981)).

9

Giacomazzi, 633 P.2d at 222 (internal quotation marks omitted).

10

Davis, 512 U.S. at 461-62.

11

Ridenour, 539 P.3d at 535-36 (explaining “had the question been properly presented, [the Alaska] supreme court in Giacomazzi would have interpreted Article I, Section 9 of the Alaska Constitution as similarly requiring that police cease questioning when a suspect makes an ambiguous or equivocal request for counsel, except to clarify the suspect's request”).

12

Id. at 536-37.

13

State v. Malloy, 46 P.3d 949, 951 (Alaska 2002).

14

Id.

15

Munson v. State, 123 P.3d 1042, 1046 (Alaska 2005) (quoting Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1284 n.6 (Alaska 1979) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

16

Munson, 123 P.3d at 1045-46; cf. State v. Smith, 38 P.3d 1149, 1153 (Alaska 2002) (adopting rationale of Supreme Court that whether a defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes “presents a mixed question of law and fact qualifying for independent review” (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112-13 (1995))).

17

633 P.2d 218, 222-23 (Alaska 1981).

18

U.S. Const. amend. V (“No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”)

19

384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966).

20

Id. (“Procedural safeguards must be employed to protect the privilege.... He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.”); see also William W. Berry III, Magnifying Miranda, Texas Tech L. Rev. 97, 101 (2018) (arguing that Miranda “established a series of warnings now familiar to almost every American citizen”).

21

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469 (holding that right to counsel is “indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment”); see also State v. Cassell, 602 P.2d 410, 418 (Alaska 1979).

22

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45.

23

Id. at 467.

24

Id. at 479.

25

Id. at 469; see also Cassell, 602 P.2d at 418.

26

Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 456 (1994).

27

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 466.

28

451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981).

29

Id. (“[I]t is inconsistent with Miranda and its progeny for the authorities, at their instance, to reinterrogate an accused in custody if he has clearly asserted his right to counsel.”).

30

Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95 (1984).

31

Id. at 96 n.3.

32

512 U.S. 452, 455-56 (1994).

33

Id. at 455.

34

Id.

35

Id.

36

Id.

37

Id.

38

Id. at 461.

39

Id.

40

Id. (emphasis in original).

41

Id.

42

633 P.2d 218, 222-23 (Alaska 1981).

43

Citing State v. Zerkel, 900 P.2d 744, 758 n.8 (Alaska App. 1995), the State contends that when a party advocates for stronger protection under the state constitution than that provided by the federal constitution, that party must demonstrate “something in the text, context, or history of the Alaska Constitution” as justification. Although it did not reach the merits due to waiver, the Zerkel court did not contend with protective standards of recognized rights, as here, but whether the Alaska Constitution recognized a discrete right in the first instance. Id. (citing Abood v. League of Women Voters, 743 P.2d 333, 340-43 (Alaska 1987) (concluding state constitution did not require legislative meetings be conducted in public)). The remaining cases cited for this proposition in Zerkel either did not address a difference between the federal and state constitutions, or found that the standard was the same. Therefore, the Zerkel case is inapposite to our inquiry in this case.

44

Forrer v. State, 471 P.3d 569, 585 (Alaska 2020).

45

Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774, 783 (Alaska 1974).

46

471 P.2d 386, 401 (Alaska 1970) (citing Roberts v. State, 458 P.2d 340, 342-43 (Alaska 1969) (“[W]e are not limited by decisions of the United States Supreme Court or the United States Constitution when we expound our state constitution; the Alaska Constitution may have broader safeguards than the minimum federal standards.”)).

47

519 P.2d at 785.

48

Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1006 n.51 (Alaska 2008) (“[W]e have repeatedly explained that we are free, and we are under a duty, to develop additional constitutional rights and privileges under our Alaska Constitution if we find such fundamental rights and privileges to be within the intention and spirit ... which is at the core of our constitutional heritage.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Doe v. State, Dep't of Public Safety (Doe A), 92 P.3d 398, 404 (Alaska 2004))).

49

See Roberts v. State, 458 P.2d 340, 342-43 (Alaska 1969) (confirming right to counsel is not limited by decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court). See, e.g., Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1160-61 (Alaska 1985) (holding that State's obligation to show knowing and intelligent waiver of privilege against self-incrimination is no less burdensome under Alaska Constitution than under federal constitution).

50

Scott, 519 P.2d at 785 (“We are therefore persuaded to interpret article I, section 9, of the Alaska Constitution more broadly than the United States Supreme Court construed the fifth amendment in Williams. We hold that the privilege against compelled self-incrimination under the Alaska Constitution prohibits extensive pretrial prosecutorial discovery in criminal proceedings.”); see also Beavers v. State, 998 P.2d 1040, 1046 n.30 (Alaska 2000) (“Because this represents a step toward a literal interpretation of Bram’s injunction against the use of threats and away from complete reliance on a totality of circumstances approach, and may therefore be more demanding than federal constitutional law, we base this ruling on article 1, section 9 of the Alaska Constitution.”).

51

C.D. v. State, 458 P.3d 81, 87-89 (Alaska 2020) (quoting State v. Gonzalez, 825 P.2d 920, 933 (Alaska App. 1992) and adopting exclusionary rule as matter of fundamental fairness to balance minor's right to present defense at juvenile waiver proceeding against minor's privilege against self-incrimination).

52

Roberts, 458 P.2d at 342-43.

53

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471-73 (1966).

54

Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1994).

55

633 P.2d 218, 222-23 (Alaska 1981).

56

Id. at 221 (internal quotation marks omitted).

57

Id. (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

58

Id. at 222.

59

706 P.2d 1173, 1179-82 (Alaska App. 1985).

60

Id. The Supreme Court acknowledged this risk in Davis as well, but nonetheless, did not require clarification. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1994).

61

Hampel, 706 P.2d at 1180.

62

123 P.3d 1042, 1044-45, 1049 (Alaska 2005).

63

Id. at 1044.

64

Id

65

Id. at 1045.

66

Id

67

Id. at 1044-45.

68

Id. at 1049.

69

127 P.3d 856, 858-59 (Alaska App. 2006).

70

Id.

71

Id. at 860-61.

72

Id. at 861.

73

See id. at 866-68.

74

Id. at 869.

75

Id

76

Ridenour v. State, 539 P.3d 530, 535 (Alaska App. 2023) (“In light of our history of interpreting Article 1, Section 9 more broadly than its federal counterpart, we now hold that the rule announced in Giacomazzi, although no longer valid under the federal constitution, remains the correct rule to apply under our state constitution.”).

77

Alaska Const. art I, § 11 (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of twelve, except that the legislature may provide for a jury of not more than twelve nor less than six in courts not of record. The accused is entitled to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be released on bail, except for capital offenses when the proof is evidence or the presumption great; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.”).

78

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 465-66 (1966).

79

Id. at 481-82. See also U.S. Const. amend. V; U.S. Const. amend. VI.

80

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45.

81

See, e.g., Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 308 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that “the pressures unique to custody allow the police to use deceptive interrogation tactics to compel a suspect to make an incriminating statement.”); Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 122-23 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“But if an indigent suspect requests a lawyer, ‘any further interrogation’ (even 14 days later) ‘without having counsel having been provided will surely exacerbate whatever compulsion to speak the suspect may be feeling.’ ”); Beavers v. State, 998 P.2d 1040, 1054 n.27 (Alaska 2000) (recognizing that it is “well established” that “use of trickery does not per se render a confession involuntary”).

82

See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 476 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring) (agreeing that a “stop and clarify” rule would protect constitutional right to counsel “without requiring criminal suspects to speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don”).

83

Giacomazzi v. State, 633 P.2d 218, 226 (Alaska 1981) (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting). See Hampel v. State, 706 P.2d 1173, 1180-81 (Alaska App. 1985) (recognizing that only assertive individuals would raise right to counsel after waiver during interrogation); see also Rachel King, Bush Justice: The Intersection of Alaska Natives and the Criminal Justice System, 77 Oregon L. Rev. 1, 10 (1998) (describing legal practice in Alaska's bush, suggesting cross-cultural communication differences and potential impact of cultural influence on outcomes).

84

Giacomazzi, 633 P.2d at 221 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469-70 (1966)).

85

519 P.2d 774, 784 (Alaska 1974).

86

Id. at 785 (quoting with approval Jones v. Superior Ct. of Nev. Cnty., 58 Cal.2d 56 (1962) (dissenting opinion)).

87

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 (discussing Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 n.14 (1964), stating that “a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel.” (emphasis added)).

88

471 P.2d 386, 394 (Alaska 1970).

89

Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461 (1994) (expressing concern that a stop and clarify rule would require law enforcement to “make difficult judgment calls about whether the suspect in fact wants a lawyer even though he has not said so, with the threat of suppression if they guess wrong”).

90

We are not the first to consider the disconnect between a state's interest in efficiency and a rule requiring a clear invocation of rights. Taking guidance from other states’ broader interpretation of rights under their respective constitutions, we recognize that waiver and invocation are necessarily related because a suspect may waive his right to remain silent, but can retract that waiver with an invocation of the right at any time. See e.g., State v. McLain, 345 A.3d 141, 152-61(Me. 2025) (holding that Maine's state constitution require officers to “stop and clarify” when a suspect invokes his right to silence after waiver). While “we do not follow other courts blindly,” we may consider such decisions “as persuasive for their reasoning” in light of precedent, reason, and policy. Wassilie v. State, 411 P.3d 595, 613 (Alaska 2018); Ito v. Copper River Native Ass'n, 547 P.3d 1003, 1022 n.129 (Alaska 2024) (recognizing that we may look to other state's decisions as persuasive for their reasoning). See also Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999, 1007 (Alaska 2008) (supporting our ability to interpret our state constitution without mere reliance on federal construction).

91

Hampel v. State, 706 P.2d 1173, 1181 (Alaska App. 1985).

92

Id.

93

Noyakuk v. State, 127 P.3d 856, 869 (Alaska App. 2006) (distinguishing circumstances in Hampel from those of Noyakuk).

94

Hampel, 706 P.2d at 1180 (holding that questioning should be limited and should not include subject matter of investigation). See also State v. McLain, 345 A.3d 141, 152-161 (Me. 2025) (adopting a “stop and clarify” rule where the suspect makes ambiguous invocation of privilege against self-incrimination even after initial waiver); State v. Purcell, 203 A.3d 542, 567-68 (Conn. 2019) (holding that right to counsel violated where officer did not seek clarification of intent but sought to “convince the defendant that it was against his interests not to continue the interview”) (citing with approval United States v. March, 999 F.2d 456, 461-62 (10th Cir. 1993) (“clarifying questions must be purely ministerial, not adversarial, and cannot be designed to influence the subject not to invoke his rights”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 983 (1993)); Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 768, 772 (5th Cir. 1979) (elucidating “the limited inquiry permissible after an equivocal request for legal counsel may not take the form of an argument between interrogators and suspect about whether having counsel would be in the suspect's best interests”).

End of Document