[1101]*1101OPINION
Per Curiam:
The sole issue on appeal is whether temporary total disability benefits may be suspended during the time in which a claimant is incarcerated. Absent legislation to the contrary, we hold that they may not.
THE FACTS
The facts in this case are undisputed. John Campbell sustained a compensable industrial injury on August 11, 1988, while working as a brick layer at Cedco, Inc. Campbell qualified for temporary total disability benefits and was referred to the Jean Hanna Clark Rehabilitation Center for treatment. On August 4, 1989, Campbell’s treating physician, William Harris, M.D., recommended that Campbell be discharged from the rehabilitation center and given a comprehensive integrated work-up (“CIW”) to evaluate the extent of his disability.
The State Industrial Insurance System (“SIIS”) notified Campbell by letter, dated October 12, 1989, that a CIW had been scheduled for him on October 30, 1989, in Reno, Nevada. Shortly thereafter, SIIS was advised that Campbell would be unable to attend the CIW because he had recently been incarcerated.1 SIIS subsequently advised Campbell that his temporary total disability benefits would be suspended pending completion of the CIW.
On May 1, 1990, a hearing officer entered a decision affirming the suspension of Campbell’s benefits. Campbell was released from prison on September 17, 1990, and testified as the only witness at the hearing before the appeals officer on October 8, [1102]*11021990. On November 9, 1990, the appeals officer reversed, and ordered SIIS to retroactively pay Campbell all suspended benefits. The district court agreed and denied a SIIS petition for judicial review.
DISCUSSION
In reviewing a decision by an administrative officer, an appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of the officer as to the weight of evidence on questions of fact. Nevada Indus. Comm’n v. Hildebrand, 100 Nev. 47, 52, 675 P.2d 401, 404 (1984); NRS 233B.135(3). However, this court may “undertake independent review of the administrative construction of a statute.” American Int’l Vacations v. McBride, 99 Nev. 324, 326, 661 P.2d 1301, 1302 (1983) (citations omitted); see also NRS 233B.135(3)(a).
This is a matter of first impression for this court. Chapter 616 of Nevada Revised Statutes does not address the issue of whether disability benefits may be suspended when a claimant is incarcerated. Nevada statutes provide only one specific condition whereby temporary total disability benefits may be suspended by SIIS: where a claimant voluntarily refuses to receive, or obstructs the completion of, a required examination. NRS 616.535(4).2 And the only circumstances provided by Nevada law allowing for the permanent discontinuance of disability benefits is “when any physician or chiropractor determines that the employee is capable of any gainful employment.” NRS 616.585(4)3; see also Chappaz [1103]*1103v. Golden Nugget, 107 Nev. 938, 822 P.2d 1114 (1991). The appeals officer concluded that Campbell had neither obstructed nor refused to submit to a CIW, and that no physician had discharged Campbell “to return to gainful employment.”
SIIS suggests that the term “obstruct,” as used in NRS 616.535(4), means any voluntary act which results in a claimant failing to submit to a required examination. However, we interpret “obstruct” as meaning a volitional act with intent to hinder a required examination. Such an interpretation is in harmony with our policy of construing workers’ compensation statutes liberally for the protection of the worker. Ransier v. SIIS, 104 Nev. 742, 746, 766 P.2d 274, 276 (1988) (citing Dep’t Ind. Relations v. Circus Circus, 101 Nev. 405, 411-12, 705 P.2d 645, 649 (1985)).
The general rule of liberal construction of the workers’ compensation statutes does not justify the inclusion or the exclusion “of a substantive right that cannot be supported by any fair reading of the statutory scheme.” Weaver v. SIIS, 104 Nev. 305, 306, 756 P.2d 1195, 1196 (1988). We have consistently held that “where a policy consideration advocates exclusion of coverage, the legislature is perfectly capable of implementing such policy.” Goldstine v. Jensen Pre-Cast, 102 Nev. 630, 631, 729 P.2d 1355, 1356 (1986) (emphasis added) (citing SIIS v. Conner, 102 Nev. 335, 721 P.2d 384 (1986)). “The purpose of the [workers’ compensation] system is to provide compensation for industrial injuries.” Id. at 631, 729 P.2d at 1356 (citing Breen v. Caesars Palace, 102 Nev. 79, 715 P.2d 1070 (1986)).
SIIS further argues that the phrase “capable of any gainful employment” in NRS 616.585(4) clearly implies a legislative intent to grant benefits for the replacement of lost wages. As a prisoner, Campbell’s daily necessities were provided for by the State at no cost to him. Consequently, SIIS maintains that since Campbell could not enter the work force while incarcerated he did not lose any wages. While we are sympathetic to this argument, the simple fact is that Chapter 616 of the Nevada Revised Statutes does not provide for the withholding of disability benefits while a claimant is incarcerated, and we will not attempt to create such a disability.4
[1104]*1104The dissent relies solely on Hansen v. Harrah’s, 100 Nev. 60, 675 P.2d 394 (1984), for the proposition that public policy dictates an outcome in favor of SIIS. The circumstances herein, however, are clearly distinguishable from Harrah’s. In Harrah’s, we adopted a remedy for employees discharged in retaliation for filing workers’ compensation claims. Harrah’s did not, as the dissent is well aware, involve the exclusion of workers’ compensation benefits. Our decision in favor of the employees in Har-rah’s was in accord with our “long-standing policy ...
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[1101]*1101OPINION
Per Curiam:
The sole issue on appeal is whether temporary total disability benefits may be suspended during the time in which a claimant is incarcerated. Absent legislation to the contrary, we hold that they may not.
THE FACTS
The facts in this case are undisputed. John Campbell sustained a compensable industrial injury on August 11, 1988, while working as a brick layer at Cedco, Inc. Campbell qualified for temporary total disability benefits and was referred to the Jean Hanna Clark Rehabilitation Center for treatment. On August 4, 1989, Campbell’s treating physician, William Harris, M.D., recommended that Campbell be discharged from the rehabilitation center and given a comprehensive integrated work-up (“CIW”) to evaluate the extent of his disability.
The State Industrial Insurance System (“SIIS”) notified Campbell by letter, dated October 12, 1989, that a CIW had been scheduled for him on October 30, 1989, in Reno, Nevada. Shortly thereafter, SIIS was advised that Campbell would be unable to attend the CIW because he had recently been incarcerated.1 SIIS subsequently advised Campbell that his temporary total disability benefits would be suspended pending completion of the CIW.
On May 1, 1990, a hearing officer entered a decision affirming the suspension of Campbell’s benefits. Campbell was released from prison on September 17, 1990, and testified as the only witness at the hearing before the appeals officer on October 8, [1102]*11021990. On November 9, 1990, the appeals officer reversed, and ordered SIIS to retroactively pay Campbell all suspended benefits. The district court agreed and denied a SIIS petition for judicial review.
DISCUSSION
In reviewing a decision by an administrative officer, an appellate court may not substitute its judgment for that of the officer as to the weight of evidence on questions of fact. Nevada Indus. Comm’n v. Hildebrand, 100 Nev. 47, 52, 675 P.2d 401, 404 (1984); NRS 233B.135(3). However, this court may “undertake independent review of the administrative construction of a statute.” American Int’l Vacations v. McBride, 99 Nev. 324, 326, 661 P.2d 1301, 1302 (1983) (citations omitted); see also NRS 233B.135(3)(a).
This is a matter of first impression for this court. Chapter 616 of Nevada Revised Statutes does not address the issue of whether disability benefits may be suspended when a claimant is incarcerated. Nevada statutes provide only one specific condition whereby temporary total disability benefits may be suspended by SIIS: where a claimant voluntarily refuses to receive, or obstructs the completion of, a required examination. NRS 616.535(4).2 And the only circumstances provided by Nevada law allowing for the permanent discontinuance of disability benefits is “when any physician or chiropractor determines that the employee is capable of any gainful employment.” NRS 616.585(4)3; see also Chappaz [1103]*1103v. Golden Nugget, 107 Nev. 938, 822 P.2d 1114 (1991). The appeals officer concluded that Campbell had neither obstructed nor refused to submit to a CIW, and that no physician had discharged Campbell “to return to gainful employment.”
SIIS suggests that the term “obstruct,” as used in NRS 616.535(4), means any voluntary act which results in a claimant failing to submit to a required examination. However, we interpret “obstruct” as meaning a volitional act with intent to hinder a required examination. Such an interpretation is in harmony with our policy of construing workers’ compensation statutes liberally for the protection of the worker. Ransier v. SIIS, 104 Nev. 742, 746, 766 P.2d 274, 276 (1988) (citing Dep’t Ind. Relations v. Circus Circus, 101 Nev. 405, 411-12, 705 P.2d 645, 649 (1985)).
The general rule of liberal construction of the workers’ compensation statutes does not justify the inclusion or the exclusion “of a substantive right that cannot be supported by any fair reading of the statutory scheme.” Weaver v. SIIS, 104 Nev. 305, 306, 756 P.2d 1195, 1196 (1988). We have consistently held that “where a policy consideration advocates exclusion of coverage, the legislature is perfectly capable of implementing such policy.” Goldstine v. Jensen Pre-Cast, 102 Nev. 630, 631, 729 P.2d 1355, 1356 (1986) (emphasis added) (citing SIIS v. Conner, 102 Nev. 335, 721 P.2d 384 (1986)). “The purpose of the [workers’ compensation] system is to provide compensation for industrial injuries.” Id. at 631, 729 P.2d at 1356 (citing Breen v. Caesars Palace, 102 Nev. 79, 715 P.2d 1070 (1986)).
SIIS further argues that the phrase “capable of any gainful employment” in NRS 616.585(4) clearly implies a legislative intent to grant benefits for the replacement of lost wages. As a prisoner, Campbell’s daily necessities were provided for by the State at no cost to him. Consequently, SIIS maintains that since Campbell could not enter the work force while incarcerated he did not lose any wages. While we are sympathetic to this argument, the simple fact is that Chapter 616 of the Nevada Revised Statutes does not provide for the withholding of disability benefits while a claimant is incarcerated, and we will not attempt to create such a disability.4
[1104]*1104The dissent relies solely on Hansen v. Harrah’s, 100 Nev. 60, 675 P.2d 394 (1984), for the proposition that public policy dictates an outcome in favor of SIIS. The circumstances herein, however, are clearly distinguishable from Harrah’s. In Harrah’s, we adopted a remedy for employees discharged in retaliation for filing workers’ compensation claims. Harrah’s did not, as the dissent is well aware, involve the exclusion of workers’ compensation benefits. Our decision in favor of the employees in Har-rah’s was in accord with our “long-standing policy ... to liberally construe [Nevada’s workers’ compensation laws] to protect injured workers and their families.” Id. at 63, 675 P.2d at 396. We are not persuaded by the dissent to depart from that policy today.
The rule of exclusion proposed herein by SIIS, so zealously and religiously embraced by the dissent, is simply “not properly adopted by the courts.” Goldstine, 102 Nev. at 632, 729 P.2d at 1357 (1986) (footnote omitted). A clear majority of other jurisdictions considering this identical issue agree. See Matter of Injury to Spera, 713 P.2d 1155 (Wyo. 1986) (emphasis added); United Riggers Erectors v. Industrial Com’n, 640 P.2d 189, 191 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1981); Crawford v. Midwest Steel Company, 517 So.2d 918, 923-924 (La.Ct.App. 1987); DeMars v. Roadway Express, 298 N.W.2d 645 (Mich.Ct.App. 1980). While we are sympathetic to the dissenter’s view and applaud his enthusiasm, we, as judges, are constrained to follow the law.
[1105]*1105The dissent’s insinuation that this court is somehow responsible for the “financial trials” of “our state and our nation” is bewildering and alarmingly nonsensical. While we share the dissent’s concern over the state treasury, it is clearly not within our province to remedy the state’s fiscal problems as the dissent absurdly implies. For example, how long must a recipient of workers’ compensation benefits be incarcerated before benefits may be denied? One year? One month? One week? Twenty-four hours? The dissent offers nothing but useless and unsupported rhetoric, which only reinforces our view that this issue is clearly one for the legislature to resolve. Since we share the dissent’s opposition “to judicial intrusion on the realm of the legislative branch of government,” we must affirm the decision in favor of Campbell’s receipt of the suspended benefits.
Mowbray, C. J.