State Highway Board v. Jackson

258 A.2d 575, 128 Vt. 17, 1969 Vt. LEXIS 197
CourtSupreme Court of Vermont
DecidedJuly 15, 1969
Docket6-69
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 258 A.2d 575 (State Highway Board v. Jackson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Vermont primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State Highway Board v. Jackson, 258 A.2d 575, 128 Vt. 17, 1969 Vt. LEXIS 197 (Vt. 1969).

Opinions

Shangraw, J.

On March 3, 1965 a judgment order was issued by the Rutland County Court relocating a section of U.S. Route 7 and Route 103 in the Towns- of Wallingford and Clarendon, Vermont. This relocated route is divided four lane highway. It runs approximately parallel with the old route and has 18 points of private access and 8 public grade intersections in the area here involved. The new highway consists of about five miles of state highway and was opened for general traffic on November 15, 1967.

By virtue of 19 V.S.A. Section 1861a, the State Highway Board, with the approval of the Governor, has designed and established certain portions of the new U.S. Route 7 and Vt. Route 103, in the Towns of Wallingford and Clarendon, as a limited access highway facility.

The pertinent provisions of section 1861a, supra, provide:

The board with approval of the governor, *** may plan, designate, establish, .construct, .regulate, vacate, alter, improve,-maintain and provide limited access facilities for public use wherever the board, with the approval of the governor decides that the protection of existing businesses or traffic conditions, present or future, will justify the special facilities.

In the construction of the new highway, and by agreement with the abutting land owners, the State Highway Board, at the State’s expense graded or constructed the 18 private driveways, each to serve as an access to and from the new highway involved.

' In its petition, the State Highway Board represents that all lands presently abutting the new highway, and all property rights and other interests on and in such lands, presently have rights of access to and from said highways and such rights of access are property rights. In connection with the designation and establishment of the new route as a limited access facility, petitioner also represents, that it is necessary to. acquire, on behalf of the State of Vermont, the rights of access to and from said highways, which presently exist in favor of the lands and .other property interests abutting' these highways.

[19]*19..'It is conceded by the petitioner that the 8 public grade intersections will not be shut off from the general circulation of traffic.

'■ By virtue of the designation and-establishment of the new route by the State -Highway Board, with the approval of the Governor, as a limited access highway facility, petitioner alleges that traffic conditions, present and future, justify the designation and establishment of portions of the highway as limited access highway facilities, and that the acquisition of access rights is necessary.

Under the provisions of section 1861a, the designation and establishment of the new route as a limited access highway facility is dependent upon whether “the protection of existing businesses or traffic conditions, present or future, will justify the special facilities.”

The court, and parties, considered that the proceeding was brought pursuant to the provisions of 19 V.S.A. section 1861a. A contested hearing was held, following which findings of fact were made, and the petition dismissed by a judgment order dated December 27, 1968.

Petitioner has appealed to this Court for review; It urges the following errors in support of a reversal of the judgment, or in the alternative, a remand for a new hearing.

1. The Court’s findings that existing businesses would not be protected by making this section of U.S. 7 and Route 103 a limited access facility is not supported by the evidence.

2. The Court’s findings that traffic conditions either present or future, do not justify a limited access facility is not supported by the evidence.

3. The Court failed to make findings on the critical element of public Safety as requested by Petitioner, and the failure to so find, in view of the evidence on said issue, is error.

Exclusive of farms, there is only one business, known as “The Sugar House” situated on the northern end of the project involved. This business has a one-way access to the new highway. On this new route there are two rest areas together with acceleration and deceleration lanes. ,

[20]*20As of July 25,1968 there were 25 businesses on the old Route #7 in the area here involved which advertised their businesses on the property. Twelve of these were located in the village of North Clarendon which is immediately north of the project now considered.

The source of business on old Route #7 is primarily traffic volume. These businesses lost a substantial amount of traffic business when the new highway opened in November, 1967.

The court, by its findings, places considerable emphasis on the fact that after the new highway was constructed, and in use, a large portion of the traffic has been diverted from the businesses located on the old route.

In the present aspect of the case we are now concerned with what unfavorable effect, if any, will result, in the future, on these businesses provided the new highway is made a limited access facility. It is the appellants claim that the limited access facility on the new highway will protect the existing businesses on the old Route #7 by preventing competition on the new highway.

Appellant calls attention to finding No. 17 which reads:

That the Court is unable to find by a preponderance of the evidence, and hence, does not find, that the making of a new Route #7 as a limited access facility will protect the existing businesses on old Route #7, but rather the Court finds that the traffic on old Route #7 will remain as at the present, or be reduced substantially if the public grade intersections are closed and substituted by two interchanges, one at Pierce’s Corner, so-called, and one at the southern end of the project.

We also refer to finding No. 33 which states:

That the Court is unable to find by a preponderance of the evidence, hence does not find, that the existing businesses on new Route #7 or old Route #7 would be protected by the establishment of a limited access facility on new Route #7.

By finding No. 17 the court took into consideration the possibility that the existing public grade intersections would be closed and substituted by two interchanges. This finding is inconsistent with finding No. 6 which reads:

[21]*21That the State Highway Board, the petitioner, concedes and agrees that in the event limited access facility were granted in this case, that the 8 public grade intersections would not be shut off from the general circulation of traffic. (Stipulation.)

The appellant next challenges Findings of Fact No. 34 wherein the court states that it was unable to, and did not find, that traffic conditions, either present or future, justify the limited access facility now considered. It is claimed that this finding is not supported by the evidence. In Finding Nos. 24 and 25, the court found as follows:

24) That new Route 7 was designed as a non-limited access highway, and was designed for a capacity of 9 and 10 thousand vehicles per day north of the intersection of 103 and 4,700 vehicles south of the intersection.

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Bluebook (online)
258 A.2d 575, 128 Vt. 17, 1969 Vt. LEXIS 197, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-highway-board-v-jackson-vt-1969.