State Farm Fire & Casualty Company v. Morgan

Supreme Court of Georgia

State Farm Fire & Casualty Company v. Morgan

368 S.E.2d 509, 258 Ga. 276, 1988 Ga. LEXIS 238

CourtSupreme Court of Georgia

DecidedJune 3, 1988

Docket45382

StatusPublished

Cited by44 cases

This text of 368 S.E.2d 509 (State Farm Fire & Casualty Company v. Morgan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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State Farm Fire & Casualty Company v. Morgan, 368 S.E.2d 509, 258 Ga. 276, 1988 Ga. LEXIS 238 (Ga. 1988).

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Opinions

Clarke, Presiding Justice.

We must decide whether voluntary intoxication may render a person incapable of forming an intent or expectation of injuring another so as to place his act outside an exclusion in a homeowner’s insurance policy. The Court of Appeals held intent and expectation to be a question of fact and approved its submission to a jury. State Farm &c. Co. v. Morgan, 185 Ga. App. 377 (364 SE2d 62) (1987). We agree.

In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied heavily upon its earlier holding in Thrift-Mart, Inc. v. Commercial Union &c. Cos., 154 Ga. App. 344 (268 SE2d 397) (1980). In that case the court submitted the issue to the jury but the jury decided in favor of the insurance company. The Court of Appeals overruled Gaynor v. Travelers Ins. Co., 12 Ga. App. 601 (77 SE 1072) (1913).

This case began as a declaratory judgment action by State Farm and asked for an interpretation of the insurance policy which excludes coverage for injuries expected or intended by the insured. It is important to remember that the legal issues here rise from contract law and not tort or criminal law. Consequently, policy considerations differ from those in tort and criminal cases. Public policy does not prevent a party from assuming by contract duties more burdensome than those imposed by law because of a party’s right to refuse the contract. The fact that the insurer drafts the policy adds validity to this statement.

The question of intent or expectation here uniquely fits the pattern of those issues of material fact which are not appropriate issues for summary judgment but are decided by the trier of fact. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). Even in criminal cases the question of the ability to form intent because of voluntary intoxication can be a jury question. Blankenship v. State, 247 Ga. 590 (277 SE2d 505) (1981); Ely v. State, 159 Ga. App. 693 (285 SE2d 66) (1981).

The words of the contract express a plain and understandable meaning. We decline to overprint those words with limitations which they fail to express and by doing so deprive the jury of its right to decide facts. If the company desires to broaden the exclusion, it may do so. But this task falls to the policy drafter and not to the courts. The policy here deals simply with presence of intent or expectation [277]*277and not with factors contributing to or subtracting from intent or expectation..

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except Marshall, C. J., Weltner and Bell, JJ., who dissent.

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Clarke, Presiding Justice.

We must decide whether voluntary intoxication may render a person incapable of forming an intent or expectation of injuring another so as to place his act outside an exclusion in a homeowner’s insurance policy. The Court of Appeals held intent and expectation to be a question of fact and approved its submission to a jury. State Farm &c. Co. v. Morgan, 185 Ga. App. 377 (364 SE2d 62) (1987). We agree.

In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied heavily upon its earlier holding in Thrift-Mart, Inc. v. Commercial Union &c. Cos., 154 Ga. App. 344 (268 SE2d 397) (1980). In that case the court submitted the issue to the jury but the jury decided in favor of the insurance company. The Court of Appeals overruled Gaynor v. Travelers Ins. Co., 12 Ga. App. 601 (77 SE 1072) (1913).

This case began as a declaratory judgment action by State Farm and asked for an interpretation of the insurance policy which excludes coverage for injuries expected or intended by the insured. It is important to remember that the legal issues here rise from contract law and not tort or criminal law. Consequently, policy considerations differ from those in tort and criminal cases. Public policy does not prevent a party from assuming by contract duties more burdensome than those imposed by law because of a party’s right to refuse the contract. The fact that the insurer drafts the policy adds validity to this statement.

The question of intent or expectation here uniquely fits the pattern of those issues of material fact which are not appropriate issues for summary judgment but are decided by the trier of fact. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). Even in criminal cases the question of the ability to form intent because of voluntary intoxication can be a jury question. Blankenship v. State, 247 Ga. 590 (277 SE2d 505) (1981); Ely v. State, 159 Ga. App. 693 (285 SE2d 66) (1981).

The words of the contract express a plain and understandable meaning. We decline to overprint those words with limitations which they fail to express and by doing so deprive the jury of its right to decide facts. If the company desires to broaden the exclusion, it may do so. But this task falls to the policy drafter and not to the courts. The policy here deals simply with presence of intent or expectation [277]*277and not with factors contributing to or subtracting from intent or expectation..

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except Marshall, C. J., Weltner and Bell, JJ., who dissent.

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368 S.E.2d 509, 258 Ga. 276, 1988 Ga. LEXIS 238, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-farm-fire-casualty-company-v-morgan-ga-1988.

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