JOYCE, J.
¶ 1 In this declaratory judgment action, Appellant, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (State Farm)1 appeals from the judgment entered by the trial court following the court’s decision and verdict declaring that State Farm has a responsibility to pay the uninsured motorists benefits pursuant to an insurance policy purchased by Appellee, Randall P. Craley (Randall).2 For the reasons set forth below, we will quash this appeal as untimely. The pertinent facts and procedural history of this case are as follows:
1. On July 12, 1993, the decedent, Jay-neann Craley (Jayneann), was killed when the 1988 GMC Jimmy S15 Sport Wagon (Sport Wagon) which she was driving, and in which her mother-in-law, Gloria M. Craley (Mrs. Craley), and her minor son, Keith P. Craley (Keith), were passengers, collided with another vehicle being driven by Terry J. McFadden, who was uninsured.
2. Mrs. Craley and Keith also sustained multiple injuries as a result of the collision.
[783]*783B. At the time of this incident, Jay-neann and her husband, Randall P. Cra-ley (Randall), Keith, and Mrs. Craley, and Lawrence W. Craley, her father-in-law (Mr. Craley), all lived together in the same household at 106 Dogwood Drive, Narvon, Pennsylvania.
4. The Sport Wagon was registered in Jayneann’s name and was insured under a policy issued by State Farm, No. S56-1104-C17-38A.
5. Jayneann was the regular operator of the Sport Wagon.
6. At the time of this incident, Randall owned a 1986 Mazda pickup truck which was not involved in the collision and was insured under a separate insurance policy issued by State Farm, No. S56-1103-C17-38.
7. At the time of this incident, Mr. and Mrs. Craley owned a 1990 Dodge Caravan which was likewise not involved in the collision and was insured under a policy issued by Prudential, No. 282A-670586.
8. Jayneann’s Sport Wagon was not listed as an insured vehicle on either Randall’s State Farm [pjolicy or on Mr. and Mrs. Craley’s Prudential policy.
10. Mrs. Craley was neither a “named insured” nor a listed operator” of the Sport Wagon which was insured under Jayneann’s State Farm policy.
11. Each of the two State Farm policies provides for uninsured motorist benefits coverage in the maximum amount of $15,000.00 per person and $30,000.00 per accident.
12. Each of the two State Farm policies contains the following “waiver” signed by Jayneann and Randall entitled “Rejection of Stacked Uninsured Motorist Benefits”, indicating that each of them had waived the right to “stack” uninsured motorist benefits coverage otherwise available under each State Farm policy onto the other’s State Farm policy:
By signing this waiver, I am rejecting stacked limits of uninsured motorist coverage under the policy for myself and members of my household under which the limits of coverage available would be the sum of limits for each motor vehicle insured under the policy. Instead the limits of coverage that I am purchasing shall be reduced to the limits stated in the policy. I knowingly and voluntarily reject the stacked limits of coverage. I understand that my premium will be reduced if I reject this coverage.
13. Both Jayneann and Randall received a reduction in the premiums which each of them paid to State Farm for each policy in exchange for their waivers of their right to stack uninsured motorist benefits coverage.
14. Each State Farm policy also contains the following “household exclusion” clause:
THERE IS NO COVERAGE FOR BODILY INJURY TO AN INSURED UNDER COVERAGE U-3:
1. WHILE OCCUPYING A MOTOR VEHICLE OWNED BY YOU YOUR SPOUSE OR ANY RELATIVE IF IT IS NOT INSURED FOR THIS COVERAGE UNDER THIS POLICY; ...
15. The term “relative”, as set forth in this “household exclusion” clause is defined in each State Farm policy as a “person related to you or your spouse by blood, marriage or adoption who lives with you”.
23. Following the July 12, 1993 collision, the estate of Jayneann M. Craley [784]*784(Jayneann’s estate), Keith and Mrs. Cra-ley filed claims for uninsured motorist benefits under Jayneann’s State Farm policy, No. S56-1104-C17-38A ....
24. Both Keith[’s] and Mrs. Craley’s claims were based on their status as “resident relatives” living in the same household.”
25. While State Farm paid the policy limits of $30,000.00 in uninsured motorist benefits available under Jayneann’s State Farm policy, No. S56-1104-C17-38A, it denied coverage under Randall’s State Farm policy, No. S56-1103-C17-38, to Jayneann’s estate, Keith and Mrs. Craley, on the basis of Randall’s waiver of his right to stack uninsured motorist benefits coverage and the “household exclusion” clause set forth herein at Finding of Fact # 14.
27. The value of the wrongful death/survival claim by Jayneann’s estate exceeds all possible ... uninsured motorist benefits coverage limits under ... the State Farm ... polic[y].
28. The value of Mrs. Craley’s claim for her personal injuries exceeds all possible ... uninsured motorist benefits coverage limits under ... the State Farm ... policfy].
29. The value of Keith’s claim for his personal injuries is $40,000.00.
Trial Court Opinion, Findings of Fact, 12/22/1998, at 3-9.3
¶ 2 The parties stipulated to the above findings of fact, which the trial court ultimately adopted. The parties also separately submitted proposed conclusions of law and briefs in support thereof, outlining their respective positions. On December 22, 1998, the trial court issued its decision and verdict. Thereafter, both State Farm and the Craleys filed post-trial motions. On April 26, 2000, the court issued an order denying State Farm’s motion and granting the motion filed by the Craleys. The court also amended the verdict to reflect the amount stipulated by the parties, ie., $15,000.00 per person or $30,000.00 per accident. At the request of the Craleys, the amended verdict was reduced to a judgment on May 25, 2000. This appeal by State Farm followed.
¶ 3 The questions presented for our review are as follows: (1) Whether the trial court committed an error of law in refusing, on public policy grounds, to enforce the “household exclusion” clause contained in the State Farm policy; (2) Whether the trial court committed an error of law in refusing to enforce Randall Craley’s waiver of stacking uninsured motorist coverage; and (3) Whether the trial court committed an error of law in converting the non-stacking uninsured motorist coverage purchased by Randall Craley into stacking coverage. See Brief for Appellant (State Farm), at 5.4
¶ 4 Before addressing the questions presented for our review, as a threshold matter, we must determine whether this appeal is properly before us as it implicates jurisdictional matters.5 We must de[785]*785termine if the instant appeal was timely filed pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 903.6
¶ 5 This matter was initiated by State Farm as a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration of its responsibility to provide uninsured motorist coverage under Randall’s policy. The parties stipulated to the underlying facts and agreed that the matter could be decided by the trial court on the basis of the stipulated facts without testimony. The trial court issued a decision and a verdict on December 22, 1998, declaring that State Farm owed uninsured motorist benefits under Randall’s policy and that the household exclusion clause contained in the policy was contrary to public policy. The parties then filed post-trial motions. Following the court’s disposition of these motions, State Farm appealed to this Court. The question then becomes whether in light of the Declaratory Judgment Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7532; Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wickett, 563 Pa. 595, 763 A.2d 813 (2000); Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Co. v. Gisler, 764 A.2d 1111 (Pa.Super.2000); and Miller v. Kramer, 424 Pa.Super. 48, 621 A.2d 1033 (1993), the trial court’s December 22, 1998 decision was a final and appealable order from which a direct appeal must be filed within thirty (30) days of its entry.
¶ 6 Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7532:
Courts of record, within their respective jurisdictions, shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect, and such declarations shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree.
42 Pa.C.S. § 7532.
¶ 7 It is undisputed that the instant case was initiated as a declaratory judgment action. Against this background, we must determine whether the trial court’s decision and verdict dated December 22, 1998 affirmatively or negatively declared the rights of the parties.
¶ 8 The court’s decision and verdict concluded as a matter of law that the household vehicle exclusion contained in Randall’s policy issued by State Farm was unenforceable as against public policy. The court also concluded that the waiver of stacking provision signed by Randall was not applicable to “inter-policy” stacking. The court then determined that each of the three claimants was entitled to $30,000.00 in uninsured motorist benefits pursuant to Randall’s policy. We find that the above decision and verdict did in fact declare the rights of the parties affirmatively and negatively. The decision and verdict constitute an affirmative declaration of the Cra-leys’ right to recover uninsured motorist benefits from State Farm pursuant to Randall’s policy. It is also an affirmative declaration of State Farm’s responsibility to pay uninsured motorist benefits to the Craleys based on Randall’s policy. The decision negatively declared that some provisions of Randall’s policy are unenforceable. Therefore, pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, the court’s December 22, 1998 decision and verdict have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree.
¶ 9 Under Pa.R.A.P. 341(b):
[786]*786A final order is any order that:
(1) disposes of all claims and of all parties; or
(2) any order that is expressly defined as a final order by statute ...”
¶ 10 Pursuant to subsection (b)(2), an order can be expressly defined as a final order by statute. Applying the above rule to the Declaratory Judgment Act, orders issued in a declaratory judgment action that affirmatively or negatively declare the rights of the parties constitute final orders because they are defined as final by statute. Along the same lines, the December 22, 1998 decision and verdict rendered by the trial court in this declaratory judgment action constitute a final and appealable order.
¶ 11 The fact that the trial court titled its resolution of the parties’ dispute a “decision and a verdict” does not compel a different result. See Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wickett, 563 Pa. 595, 763 A.2d 813 (2000)(trial court orders in a declaratory judgment action granting preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer which affirmatively or negatively declared the rights of the parties are final and appealable orders); Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Co. v. Gisler, 764 A.2d 1111 (Pa.Super.2000)(a decree nisi issued by the trial court in a declaratory judgment action which effectively made a declaration in the negative has the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and will be treated as such despite its description as a decree nisi).
¶ 12 Pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7532 and Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(2), we conclude that the December 22, 1998 decision and verdict entered by the trial court in the case at bar constitute a final judgment or decree. As such, any appeals from that judgment must be filed within thirty (30) days of the entry of the judgment. See Pa.R.A.P. 903. The parties had thirty (30) days to appeal from the December 22, 1998 judgment (“decision” and “verdict”). The filing of post-trial motions did not extend or toll this thirty-day deadline. The instant appeal which was filed on May 26, 2000, was therefore untimely and we lack jurisdiction to review its merits.
¶ 13 Our conclusion is quite consistent with the decision of our Supreme Court in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wickett, 563 Pa. 595, 763 A.2d 813 (2000). In Wickett, an employee who was injured in an automobile accident and the estate of another employee who was killed in that same accident initiated separate declaratory judgment actions seeking a declaration of their rights with respect to the defendants as well as a declaration that the Workers’ Compensation Act did not prohibit them from recovering underinsured benefits from the employer’s automobile insurer. Some of the defendants filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer with respect to both actions. The trial court sustained these objections and dismissed the action with respect to these defendants. More than a year later, the court issued two separate orders, reversing its earlier order sustaining the preliminary objections. The court also amended these latest orders to permit immediate appeals. On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed the orders entered by the trial court.
¶ 14 The Supreme Court then granted allowance of appeal in order to consider whether the Superior Court erred in finding that the trial court’s order sustaining preliminary objections in the nature of demurrers in actions brought pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act were not immediately appealable final orders pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(2). The Supreme Court opined as follows:
[787]*787[The Declaratory Judgment Act, 42 Pa. C.S. § 7532,] simply states that an order in a declaratory judgment action that either affirmatively or negatively declares the rights and duties of the parties constitutes a final order.... [T]hat is exactly what the trial court’s September 9, 1996 orders [sustaining the preliminary objections] did. Therefore, the trial court’s orders constituted final orders pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(2), and the trial court was without jurisdiction to reconsider them more than thirty days after their entry.
Id. at 818.
¶ 15 Based on the above rationale, the Supreme Court reversed the orders of the Superior Court. Before arriving at its conclusion, the Supreme Court noted that in a determining the finality of orders in declaratory judgment actions, the inquiry must focus on whether the orders in question affirmatively or negatively declared the rights of the parties. According to the Court,
[i]f the orders at issue did in fact affirmatively or negatively declare the rights of the parties, then they constituted immediately appealable final orders pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(2). If no such declarations were made, then the orders were merely interlocutory, and the trial court retained jurisdiction to reconsider them.
Id. at 817.
¶ 16 Also consistent with Wickett, supra, is a recent decision by a panel of this Court in Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Co. v. Gisler, 764 A.2d 1111 (Pa.Super.2000). In Gisler, the appellee, a police officer, was injured in an automobile accident while operating his patrol car. The officer then made a claim against his automobile insurer seeking benefits under his underinsured motorist policy. The automobile insurer denied the claim on the basis of the “regularly used non-owned car” exclusion contained in the policy. The insurer then filed a declaratory judgment action, seeking a determination of the parties’ rights under the policy. The case was submitted to the trial court on stipulated facts. The trial court issued a decree nisi invalidating the exclusion on the grounds that it was contrary to public policy. The court also determined that the appellant (insurer) was responsible for providing benefits to the police officer pursuant to his underinsured motorist policy. No post-trial motions were filed.
¶ 17 On appeal, a panel of this Court determined that the trial court’s “decree nisi ” was indeed a final and appealable order. The panel stated as follows:
In the instant case, [the][a]ppellant sought a declaratory judgment from the trial court. After submission of the facts and legal arguments, the trial court, in issuing the decree nisi effectively made a declaration in the negative in its decree. Because the statute [42 Pa.C.S. § 7532] gives such a declaration the force and effect of a final judgment or decree, we will treat it as such under Pa.R.A.P. 341(b) and consider the trial court’s decree appealable, despite its description as a decree nisi.
Id. at 1113.
¶ 18 Based on Wickett, and Gisler, supra, it is clear that that regardless of the term used, by the trial court to describe its order in a declaratory judgment action (such as a decision, verdict, decree nisi etc.), if such an order affirmatively or negatively declared the rights of the parties, it is final and immediately appealable.
¶ 19 Both State Farm and the Craleys try to distinguish Wickett and Gisler from [788]*788the instant case on procedural grounds.7 State Farm argues that unlike the instant case, the orders involved in Wickett sustained preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, while the order involved in Gisler was in the nature of a decree nisi. The parties argue that Wickett and Gisler solely involved declaratory relief while the instant case involves both a request for declaratory relief and the entry of a monetary award as part of the verdict.
¶ 20 The parties also attempt to distinguish Wickett and Gisler from the instant case by noting that in the instant case, from the outset, the trial court stated that the proceedings were being conducted pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1038.1 (dealing with cases submitted on stipulated facts). The parties also point to the Note to Rule 1038.1, which refers the reader to Rules 1038 (governing trial without jury) and Rule 227.1 et seq. (governing post-trial practice). The parties argue that pursuant to the above rules, the filing of post trial motions is permitted and required in order to obtain post-trial relief. In other words, since the above rules and notes thereto (dealing with non-jury trials and cases submitted on stipulated facts) permit and require the filing of post-trial motions, the parties argue that they were permitted and required to file post-trial motions in order to obtain relief from the trial court’s December 22, 1998 decision and verdict.
¶ 21 We find the parties’ attempt to distinguish Wickett and Gisler from the instant case to be unpersuasive. We find no authority that restricts the application of the Declaratory Judgment Aet to cases involving preliminary objections and/or to cases involving an entry of a decree nisi. Wickett and Gisler do not restrict the statute in such a manner. Neither is there any reason to believe that the General Assembly intended such a restriction. Conversely, there is no exemption from the application of the statute for cases involving a request for declaratory relief and the entry of a monetary award as part of the verdict. The General Assembly did not create such an exemption. Neither shall we.
¶22 Similarly, we reject the suggestion and/or argument that the instant case should be exempt from the dictates of the Declaratory Judgment Act simply because it proceeded as a non-jury trial upon stipulated facts pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1038.1, 1038, 227.1 et seq. and Notes thereto. Nothing in the Declaratory Judgment Act or its legislative history indicates or suggests such an exemption. A careful reading of the statute and cases interpreting the statute leads to the inescapable conclusion that regardless of whether a case involves a jury or a non-jury trial, regardless of whether a case involves testimonial evidence or was submitted on stipulated facts, in a declaratory judgment action, if a trial court issues an order that affirmatively or negatively declares the rights of the parties, such an order is final and immediately appealable.
¶ 23 It is also noteworthy that in their attempts to distinguish the case at bar from Gisler, the parties ignore the fact that just like the instant case, Gisler was submitted to the trial court upon stipulated facts. The parties also ignore or fail to address Gisler’s conclusion that regardless of the trial court’s description of its order in a declaratory judgment action, if it affirmatively or negatively declares the rights of the parties, it is a final and appealable order. As we agree with Gis-[789]*789ler, we find it of little consequence that the trial court in the case at bar issued a “decision” and a “verdict” on December 22, 1998, as opposed to an “order” or “judgment.”
¶ 24 In arriving at our conclusion in this case, we are cognizant of the fact that our courts have not specifically addressed the interplay between Pa.R.C.P. 1038.1, 1038, 227.1 et seq. and the Declaratory Judgment Act, especially with regard to the finality of orders and whether or not post-trial motions are permitted or required. From this standpoint, it may seem unfair to penalize the parties for adhering only to the rules governing cases submitted on stipulated facts and the rules governing non-jury trials. Also, the fact that the trial court erroneously accepted and ruled on the parties’ post trial motions although it lacked the jurisdiction to do so lends credence to the unfairness argument. However, reviewing the merits of the instant appeal despite the untimeliness would be tantamount to creating or recognizing an exception to the Declaratory Judgment Act in cases submitted on stipulated facts — an exception not authorized by statute or case law.
¶ 25 It is also noteworthy that although Wickett and Gisler were decided while the instant case was pending on appeal, these cases did not create new law nor did they adopt novel interpretations of an existing statute: both cases applied the express language of the Declaratory Judgment Act, namely, that when a trial court order in a declaratory judgment action affirmatively or negatively declares the rights of the parties, it is a final and appealable order. As such, it is quite proper to consider these two recent cases in reviewing the case sub judice. Moreover, we gave the parties an opportunity to address the applicability of these cases to the present case in letter briefs, which they did.
¶ 26 We also recognize the apparent inconsistency between our conclusion in this case and the decision rendered by a panel of this Court in Miller v. Kramer, 424 Pa.Super. 48, 621 A.2d 1033 (1993), which stated that post-trial motions must be filed following the entry of a decree nisi in a non-jury trial on stipulated facts in a declaratory judgment action. Our disagreement with the Miller panel stems from the fact that it did not consider or apply the Declaratory Judgment Act. The panel did not consider whether the decree at issue in that case affirmatively or negatively declared the rights of the parties. We resolve this apparent conflict by relying on the Supreme Court decision in Wickett, which stated that in a declaratory judgment action, a trial court order or decision which affirmatively or negatively declares the rights of the parties is final and immediately appealable.
¶ 27 Based on our conclusion that the trial court’s “decision” and “verdict” of December 22, 1998, constituted final and ap-pealable order, we need not review the merits of the instant appeal, which was untimely filed on May 26, 2000. Accordingly, we will quash this appeal as untimely-
¶ 28 Appeal quashed.
¶ 29 DEL SOLE, President Judge, files Dissenting Opinion.
¶ 30 McEWEN, President Judge Emeritus, files Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in which MUSMANNO, J. joins.
¶31 MUSMANNO, J. files Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in which TODD, J. joins.