State ex rel. Woznak v. Cuyahoga Cty. Prosecutor's Office

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 9, 2026
• Docket: 116089
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as State ex rel. Woznak v. Cuyahoga Cty. Prosecutor's Office, 2026-Ohio-2191.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE EX REL. GEORGE B. WOZNAK, :

Relator, : No. 116089

v. :

CUYAHOGA COUNTY : PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE, : Respondent.

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: PETITION DISMISSED DATED: June 9, 2026

Writ of Mandamus Motion No. 593345 Order No. 594412

Appearances:

George B. Woznak, pro se.

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Anthony T. Miranda, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent.

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J.:

Relator George Woznak, pro se, has filed an amended petition for a writ

of mandamus, seeking to compel respondent Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office “to investigate and prosecute” alleged criminal offenses described in an affidavit in

support of criminal complaint Woznak filed with the Cuyahoga County Common

Pleas Court pursuant to R.C. 2935.09(D) and 2935.10(A).

For the reasons that follow, we grant respondent’s motion to dismiss

Woznak’s amended petition.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Woznak’s wife, Diana Woznak (“Diana”), died in October 2019. On

June 20, 2025, Woznak filed an “affidavit in support of criminal complaint” in the

Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, In re [C.W.], Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-25-

703150-A, seeking the prosecution of C.W., a physician who had treated Diana (the

“affidavit of criminal complaint”).

Pursuant to R.C. 2935.09(D), “[a] private citizen having knowledge of

the facts who seeks to cause an arrest or prosecution . . . may file an affidavit charging

the offense committed . . . for the purpose of review to determine if a complaint

should be filed by the prosecuting attorney.” R.C. 2935.10(A) sets forth the

procedures that must be followed if a private citizen files an affidavit alleging a

felony offense. If the affidavit charges the commission of a felony, “unless the judge,

clerk, or magistrate has reason to believe that it was not filed in good faith, or the

claim is not meritorious,” he or she “shall forthwith issue a warrant for the arrest of

the person charged in the affidavit, and directed to a peace officer; otherwise the

judge, clerk, or magistrate shall forthwith refer the matter to the prosecuting attorney . . . for investigation prior to the issuance of warrant.” R.C. 2935.10(A);

State ex rel. Becker v. Faris, 2021-Ohio-1127, ¶ 19 (12th Dist.).

In his affidavit of criminal complaint, Woznak alleged that C.W.

committed involuntary manslaughter in violation of R.C. 2903.04(A) and reckless

homicide in violation of R.C. 2903.041 by, among other things, failing to alert Diana

that her EKG results revealed she had suffered an “ST elevation myocardial

infarction (STEMI), a severe and dangerous type of heart attack” and discharging

her without directing her to receive emergency medical care or other urgent cardiac

treatment when C.W. treated her at the Cleveland Clinic Independence Family

Health Center on October 22, 2019. Diana died five days later because of cardiac

arrest. In support of his affidavit, Woznak attached copies of excerpts from Diana’s

medical records, including “physician clinical notations” that the cardiologists who

later treated Diana allegedly “attributed her death to the delay in receiving urgent

medical treatment for the STEMI heart attack,” a text message he received from

Diana in which she reported to Woznak that her EKG on October 22 had been “good”

and “normal,” and an unnotarized “affidavit” from cardiologist Marc Cohen, M.D.,

who opined that C.W. deviated from the “reasonable accepted standard of care . . .

by failing to investigate and treat Diana” and that “as a consequence, [she] suffered

pain and suffering, incurred medical bills and ultimately died.”

On July 22, 2025, the Administrative Judge of the Cuyahoga County

Common Pleas Court referred the matter to the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s

Office “for further investigation” pursuant to R.C. 2935.10(A) (the “July 22, 2025 journal entry”). On September 23, 2025, an assistant prosecuting attorney and

supervisor of the major trial, homicide unit, with the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s

Office, sent a letter to Woznak, stating that, “[a]fter a thorough review of the

documents filed with the court pursuant to R.C. 2935.10(A) and speaking with the

Chief Medical Examiner, it has been determined that no felony charges have been

committed and therefore charges will not be pursued” (the “September 23, 2025

letter”).

On February 2, 2026, Woznak, pro se, filed a petition for a writ of

mandamus against respondent. After respondent filed a motion to dismiss the

petition, Woznak was granted leave to file an amended petition.

In his amended petition for a writ of mandamus, filed, pro se, on

March 10, 2026, Woznak seeks a writ of mandamus to compel respondent “to fulfill

its statutory duty under Ohio law by conducting a thorough and proper investigation

and prosecuting the criminal offenses listed in Relator’s affidavit of criminal

complaint.” Woznak alleges that his affidavit of criminal complaint charges C.W.

with involuntary manslaughter under R.C. 2903.04(A) and reckless homicide under

R.C. 2903.041(A) based on C.W.’s violation of R.C. 2903.33(C)(1), 2903.34(A)(2),

and 4731.22(B)(6) and that respondent’s “refusal” to investigate and prosecute the

offenses described in Woznak’s affidavit of criminal complaint “constitutes abuse of

discretion, bias, and arbitrariness.”

Specifically, Woznak alleges that respondent did not perform its legal

duty to investigate because it “did not interview Relator to examine, evaluate, and discern the broad range of the undisputed evidence presented in the affidavit of

criminal complaint,” “[t]he substance of the extensive evidence presented in the

affidavit of criminal complaint was not addressed in the [September 23, 2025]

letter,” and that respondent’s “decision to seek input” from the Cuyahoga County

Chief Medical Examiner, Dr. Thomas Gilson, in determining that charges would not

be pursued, was “not rational and disregards and distorts relevant facts” because Dr.

Gilson’s medical training and experience are “solely in pathology” and he does not

“diagnose, treat, or manage patient care.”

Woznak further alleges that R.C. 4731.22(B)(6), which authorizes the

state medical board to take disciplinary action against a physician who fails to

conform to minimal standards of care, “codifies the physician’s legal duty to adhere

to the accepted standards of medical practice” and that “[a] willful or reckless failure

to meet these standards may give rise not only to administrative sanctions but also

to criminal liability if the breach results in patient harm or death”; that C.W.’s

“willful refusal to provide necessary and appropriate medical treatment for a life-

threatening condition constitutes a criminally culpable omission under Ohio law” in

violation of R.C. 2903.33(C)(1) and 2903.34(A)(2); and that “[w]hen a physician’s

omission violates a statutory duty under [R.C.] 2903.33(C)(1) and 2903.34(A)(2)

and that omission directly causes death, it may satisfy the elements of involuntary

manslaughter” and/or reckless homicide.

In support of his petition, Woznak attached copies of his affidavit of

criminal complaint, the July 22, 2025 journal entry, the September 23, 2025 letter, and documents he described as: (1) “Standards for immediate reperfusion therapy

for patients experiencing an acute myocardial infarction established by the

American Heart Association and the American College of Cardiology,” (2) “EKG

overread standards established by the Joint Commission for Accreditation of

Healthcare Organizations and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services,” and

(3) “Biography of Dr. Thomas Gilson, Cuyahoga County Chief Medical Examiner,

and a description of the pathology medical curriculum offered by the University of

Cincinnati Medical School, where Dr. Gilson received his medical training,” which

he incorporated by reference.

On March 13, 2026, respondent filed a motion to dismiss Woznak’s

amended petition pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim for which

relief can be granted. Respondent contends that Woznak’s amended petition should

be dismissed on the grounds that (1) the September 23, 2025 letter shows

respondent performed an investigation, (2) the decision whether or not to bring

criminal charges is discretionary, (3) Woznak failed to identify a predicate felony

offense that would support a charge of involuntary manslaughter, and (4)

prosecution for reckless homicide would be time-barred by the applicable statute of

limitations.1

1 Respondent also contends that to the extent Woznak “has attempted to have a

judge issue an arrest warrant pursuant to R.C. 2935.10,” he has an adequate remedy by appealing the denial of his request by the administrative judge, i.e., a judge’s decision not to issue an arrest warrant is reviewable on appeal. However, Woznak’s amended petition does not seek to compel a judge to issue an arrest warrant; he seeks to compel the prosecutor to conduct a “thorough and proper investigation” and to prosecute the criminal Woznak filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss in which he

argued that he had alleged sufficient facts in his amended petition to establish that

he is entitled to a writ of mandamus.

II. Law and Analysis

A. Standard for Dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(6)

“‘Dismissal of a mandamus action under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) is appropriate

if, after presuming all factual allegations in the complaint to be true and drawing all

reasonable inferences in the relator’s favor, it appears beyond doubt that he can

prove no set of facts entitling him to a writ of mandamus.’” State ex rel. Roush v.

Hickson, 2024-Ohio-4741, ¶ 8, quoting State ex rel. A.N. v. Cuyahoga Cty.

Prosecutor’s Office, 2021-Ohio-2071, ¶ 8. “‘However, unsupported legal

conclusions, even when cast as factual assertions, are not presumed true for

purposes of a motion to dismiss.’” State ex rel. Roush at ¶ 8, quoting State ex rel.

Martre v. Reed, 2020-Ohio-4777, ¶ 12.

B. Standard for a Writ of Mandamus

A writ of mandamus is “a writ, issued in the name of the state to an

inferior tribunal, a corporation, board, or person, commanding the performance of

an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or

station.” R.C. 2731.01. It is “an extraordinary remedy that is to be exercised with

caution and only when the right is clear.” State ex rel. Tobias v. Fuerst, 2022-Ohio-

offenses alleged in his affidavit of criminal complaint. Accordingly, we do not address that issue further here. 3556, ¶ 5 (8th Dist.). Mandamus “should not issue in doubtful cases.” Id. To be

entitled to mandamus relief, the relator must establish by clear and convincing

evidence that (1) he or she has a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) the

respondent has a clear legal duty to provide that relief, and (3) the lack of an

adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Schwarzmer v.

Mazzone, 2025-Ohio-1246, ¶ 10; State ex rel. Duncan v. Chambers-Smith, 2025-

Ohio-978, ¶ 10.

Because, for the reasons that follow, it appears beyond doubt that

Woznak cannot prevail on his mandamus claim, we grant respondent’s motion to

dismiss Woznak’s amended petition.

Woznak asserts that he is entitled to a writ of mandamus because

respondent did not conduct “a thorough and proper investigation” into the

allegations against C.W. He argues that because “[t]here were no witness interviews,

no medical expert reviews, no medical record analysis . . . no communication with

Relator regarding the broad range of undisputed evidence contained in the affidavit

o[f] criminal complaint,” and no “investigative records” or “documentary evidence

reflecting substantive evaluation,” respondent did not comply with its statutory duty

under R.C. 2935.10(A) to “meaningfully evaluate the matter.”

R.C. 2935.09 does not mandate prosecution of all offenses charged by

affidavit. Nikooyi v. Affidavit of Criminal Complaint, 2020-Ohio-192, ¶ 9 (8th

Dist.), citing State ex rel. Boylen v. Harmon, 2006-Ohio-7, ¶ 6; State ex rel. Evans

v. Columbus Dept. of Law, 83 Ohio St.3d 174, 175 (1998). “In general, a prosecutor has no clear duty to prosecute an offense alleged in a charging affidavit.” State ex

rel. A.N. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 2021-Ohio-2071, ¶ 9. “Prosecutors

have wide discretion in deciding whether to prosecute a particular matter.” State ex

rel. Bunting v. Styer, 2016-Ohio-5781, ¶ 18; see also State ex rel. Master v.

Cleveland, 75 Ohio St.3d 23, 27 (1996) (“[T]he decision whether to prosecute is

discretionary, and not generally subject to judicial review.”). “There are numerous

factors that contribute to the decision to prosecute, including causation, culpability,

possible defenses, the motives of the complainant, attempts to use the criminal

justice system to enhance civil actions, the seriousness of the offense, the harm

caused by the offense, priorities, more pressing matters and the limited resources of

the governmental office.” State ex rel. April Mgmt., Ltd v. Mayfield Hts., 2013-

Ohio-5465, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.).

“The prosecutor has the discretion to determine whether he [or she]

could prove the alleged offense beyond a reasonable doubt with the evidence

provided.” State ex rel. Bunting at ¶ 19. Further, prosecutors, in their discretion,

“‘“may decide, for a myriad of reasons, not to prosecute on certain charges

notwithstanding that sufficient evidence exists to support a conviction.”’” State ex

rel. Becker, 2021-Ohio-1127, at ¶ 29 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Conklin, 1995 Ohio

App. LEXIS 1126, *8-9 (12th Dist. Mar. 27, 1995), quoting State ex rel. Tipton v.

Schisler, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 4510, *10 (4th Dist. Sept. 25, 1991). “‘Only when the

failure to prosecute constitutes an abuse of discretion will a prosecutor be compelled

to prosecute.’” State ex rel. A.N. at ¶ 9, quoting State ex rel. Capron v. Dattilio, 2016-Ohio-1504, ¶ 4. An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is

unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. State ex rel. Master, 75 Ohio St.3d at

27.

Once the Administrative Judge referred Woznak’s affidavit of

criminal complaint to respondent for review, respondent was required to conduct

an “investigation” into the allegations contained therein. R.C. 2935.10 does not

define “investigation.” In State ex rel. Becker, 2021-Ohio-1127 (12th Dist.), the

Twelfth District considered the meaning of the term as used in R.C. 2935.10(A) as

follows:

The term “investigation” has been defined as “the action or process of investigating.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1189 (1993). The term has also been defined as a “detailed examination” and a “searching inquiry.” Id. Similarly, the term “investigate” has been defined to mean “to observe or study closely,” as well as to “inquire into systematically.” Id. The term “investigate” has also been defined as “to observe or study by close examination and systematic inquiry.” Merriam-Webster’s Online: Dictionary and Thesaurus, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/investigate (accessed Mar. 18, 2021). The term “investigate” has further been defined as “to make an official inquiry.” Black’s Law Dictionary 844 (8th Ed.2004).

The term “inquiry” has been defined to mean “[a] request for information, either procedural or substantive.” Id. at 808. The term “inquiry” has also been defined to mean “the act or an instance of seeking truth, information, or knowledge about something” and the “examination into facts and principles.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1167 (1993). The term “inquiry” has further been defined as “a systematic investigation often of a matter of public interest.” Merriam-Webster’s Online: Dictionary and Thesaurus, https: //www.meriam-webster.com/dictionary/inquiry (accessed Mar. 18, 2021).

State ex rel. Becker at ¶ 24-25. In State ex rel. Becker, the relator filed a complaint for a writ of

mandamus to compel the Clermont County Prosecutor to “act in accordance with

his clear legal duty” under R.C. 2935.10(A) and conduct a “formal and/or systematic

investigation” into purported “criminal behavior” by Ohio Governor Mike DeWine

in his handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. Id. at ¶ 3, 6.

The relator argued that the prosecutor did not conduct an

“investigation” into the allegations against Governor DeWine because the

prosecutor’s investigation was (1) completed within five hours, an “extremely short

time frame,” and (2) did not produce any “investigatory records” from the

prosecutor’s office, the Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigation, or the Clermont

County Sheriff’s Office. Id. at ¶ 21. The Twelfth District held that because “no

private citizen affidavit is, or should be, exactly the same,” “the time and energy a

prosecutor must exert to investigate one private citizen affidavit could, and

oftentimes will, vary greatly from the time and energy needed to investigate the

allegations set forth in a different private citizen affidavit.” Id. at ¶ 26. The court

further indicated that the prosecutor’s “investigation” into the allegations set forth

in relator’s private citizen affidavit did not have to last any set period of time and did

not have to result in the creation of any investigatory records. Id. Given the nature

of the relator’s allegations in that case, i.e., alleging crimes such as terrorism, making

a terroristic threat, inducing panic, and bribery against Governor DeWine for his

handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, the court held that the statutorily required

“investigation” into the allegations of relator’s private citizen affidavit “required nothing more than a cursory review of the affidavit, coupled with the applicable

criminal statutes,” to determine that relator’s claims against Governor DeWine were

“wholly meritless and lacked probable cause.” Id. at ¶ 26-27.

In his affidavit of criminal complaint, Woznak sought to have C.W.

investigated and prosecuted for involuntary manslaughter under R.C. 2903.04(A)

and reckless homicide under R.C. 2903.041(A). As alleged in Woznak’s amended

petition, respondent declined to prosecute after reviewing the documents filed with

the common pleas court pursuant to R.C. 2935.10(A), speaking with the chief

medical examiner, and determining that no felony charges had been committed.2

In his opposition to respondent’s motion to dismiss, Woznak

concedes that any prosecution for reckless homicide would be barred by the

2 Woznak cites State ex rel. Ney v. Niehaus, 33 Ohio St.3d 118, 119 (1987), State ex

rel. Levin v. Sheffield Lake, 70 Ohio St.3d 104, 110 (1994), and “State ex rel. Evans v. Columbus Dept. of Law, 83 Ohio App.3d 174, 176-77 (10th Dist. 1992),” for the propositions that (1) “[a] complete failure to thoroughly and properly examine and evaluate the evidence, interview witnesses, consult relevant medical experts, or otherwise evaluate the matter constitutes a failure to perform a legally mandated function,” (2) “Ohio law recognizes that mandamus may issue to compel performance of such duty,” and (3) “[a] conclusory claim of ‘internal review’ unsupported by any indicia of decision-making is legally indistinguishable from a failure to act and constitutes constructive nonfeasance.” These cases do not support such propositions. State ex rel. Ney involved the denial of a writ of mandamus seeking to compel a trial judge to grant the prosecutor’s request for transactional immunity for a witness under R.C. 2945.44. State ex rel. Levin involved the denial of writs of mandamus, prohibition, and procedendo to compel a city to commence appropriation proceedings against relators’ property. And “State ex rel. Evans v. Columbus Dept. of Law, 83 Ohio App.3d 174, 176-77 (10th Dist. 1992)” is not a valid citation. In State ex rel. Evans v. Columbus Dept. of Law, 83 Ohio St.3d 174 (1998), the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ judgment dismissing a complaint for a writ of mandamus on the grounds that (1) R.C. 2935.10 does not place any duty upon city prosecutors to prosecute misdemeanors charged by affidavit filed under R.C. 2935.09 and (2) the complaint did not allege sufficient facts evidencing that the prosecutor abused her discretion by determining that the charges lacked probable cause. applicable statute of limitations. Accordingly, we do not further address that issue

here. See, e.g., State ex rel. Dominguez v. State, 2011-Ohio-3091, ¶ 3

(“‘[M]andamus will not issue to compel a vain act.’”), quoting State ex rel. Strothers

v. Turner, 79 Ohio St.3d 272, 274 (1997).

With respect to his claim that C.W. is subject to prosecution for

involuntary manslaughter, Woznak alleges that R.C. 2903.33(C)(1), 2903.34(A)(2),

and 4731.22(B)(6) provide a basis for prosecuting C.W. for involuntary

manslaughter under R.C. 2903.04(A), i.e., that R.C. 2903.04(A) “translate[s] the

omissions of duty into potential criminal offenses.”

R.C. 2903.04(A) states: “No person shall cause the death of another

or the unlawful termination of another’s pregnancy as a proximate result of the

offender’s committing or attempting to commit a felony.” (Emphasis added.)3

However, Woznak has not identified any predicate felony C.W. is alleged to have

committed.

R.C. 4731.22(B)(6) authorizes the state medical board to take

disciplinary action against a physician who fails to conform to minimal standards of

care; it does not set forth a criminal offense.4

3 In his amended petition, Woznak asserts that “Ohio Rev. Code § 2903.04(A)

defines involuntary manslaughter as causing the death of another as a proximate result of committing or attempting to commit an unlawful act.” (Emphasis added.) That is not correct. 4 R.C. 4731.22(B)(6) states:

Except as provided in division (P) of this section, the [state medical] board, by an affirmative vote of not fewer than six members, shall, to the extent R.C. 2903.34(A)(2) states: “No person who owns, operates, or

administers, or who is an agent or employee of, a care facility shall . . . [c]ommit

gross neglect against a resident or patient of the facility.”5 R.C. 2903.33(C)(1)

defines “[g]ross neglect” as “knowingly failing to provide a person with any

treatment, care, goods, or service that is necessary to maintain the health or safety

permitted by law, limit, revoke, or suspend a license or certificate to practice or certificate to recommend, refuse to issue a license or certificate, refuse to renew a license or certificate, refuse to reinstate a license or certificate, or reprimand or place on probation the holder of a license or certificate for one or more of the following reasons . . . (6) A departure from, or the failure to conform to, minimal standards of care of similar practitioners under the same or similar circumstances, whether or not actual injury to a patient is established[.] 5 “Care facility” is defined in R.C. 2903.33(A) as:

(1) Any “home” as defined in section 3721.10 of the Revised Code;

(2) Any “residential facility” as defined in section 5123.19 of the Revised Code;

(3) Any institution or facility operated or provided by the department of mental health and addiction services or by the department of developmental disabilities pursuant to sections 5119.14 and 5123.03 of the Revised Code;

(4) Any “residential facility” as defined in section 5119.34 of the Revised Code;

(5) Any unit of any hospital, as defined in section 3701.01 of the Revised Code, that provides the same services as a nursing home, as defined in section 3721.01 of the Revised Code;

(6) Any institution, residence, or facility that provides, for a period of more than twenty-four hours, whether for a consideration or not, accommodations to one individual or two unrelated individuals who are dependent upon the services of others.

Accordingly, it is not clear whether R.C. 2903.34(A)(2) would apply to the treatment Diana received from C.W. at the Cleveland Clinic Independence Family Health Center. of the person when the failure results in physical harm or serious physical harm to

the person.”

R.C. 2903.34(D) states that a violation of R.C. 2903.34(A)(2) is

generally a first-degree misdemeanor. Only if an offender has previously been

convicted of, or pleaded guilty to, a violation of R.C. 2903.34, is gross patient neglect

a fifth-degree felony. R.C. 2903.34(D). There is, however, no allegation that C.W.

had previously pleaded guilty to, or had otherwise been convicted of, a violation of

R.C. 2903.34. Further, R.C. 2935.10 does not place a duty on prosecutors to

investigate and prosecute misdemeanors charged by affidavit filed under R.C.

2935.09. State ex rel. Evans, 83 Ohio St.3d at 175.

Woznak has not alleged facts in his amended petition that would

support a finding that respondent acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or

unconscionably with respect to its investigation of, and decision not to prosecute

C.W. for, the crimes alleged in Woznak’s affidavit of criminal complaint. In this case,

after presuming the truth of all the material factual allegations of Woznak’s

amended petition and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, it appears

beyond doubt that Woznak cannot prevail on his mandamus claim. See, e.g., State

ex rel. Evans at 174-175 (affirming court of appeals’ judgment granting prosecutor’s

Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss on the grounds that “R.C. 2935.10 does not place

any duty upon city prosecutors to prosecute misdemeanors charged by affidavit filed

under R.C. 2935.09” and relator “did not allege sufficient facts in his complaint

evidencing that the city prosecutor abused her discretion by determining that the charges lacked probable cause”); State ex rel. Bunting, 2016-Ohio-5781, at ¶ 19-20

(affirming court of appeals’ sua sponte dismissal of complaint in mandamus that

was based on claim that prosecutor had not fulfilled his duty to investigate and

prosecute where (1) “the investigation was not so lacking as to constitute an abuse

of discretion” and (2) because prosecutor had the discretion to determine whether

he could prove the alleged offense beyond a reasonable doubt with the evidence

provided and R.C. 2935.09 does not mandate prosecution of all offenses charged by

affidavit, prosecutor had no clear duty to prosecute).

Accordingly, we grant respondent’s motion to dismiss Woznak’s

amended petition for a writ of mandamus. Costs assessed against relator. The clerk

is directed to serve on all parties notice of this judgment and its date of entry upon

the journal. Civ.R. 58(B).

Petition dismissed.

_________________________ EMANUELLA D. GROVES, JUDGE

LISA B. FORBES, P.J., and MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J., CONCUR