ROBERTS, J.
This case presents a challenge to commitment proceedings for mental deficiency under former ORS ch 427.
Defendant challenges the constitutionality of the commitment procedure, and argues that principles of double jeopardy and res judicata are applicable to this case. He further contends that the standard of proof required in the commitment hearing was proof "beyond a reasonable doubt” and that this standard was not met.
The trial court overruled defendant’s demurrer alleging the vagueness of the underlying statute and denied a motion to dismiss based on a previous commitment proceeding. We affirm the certification of mental deficiency and order of commitment.
Defendant is a 21-year-old man first admitted voluntarily to Fairview Hospital and Training Center at the age of 17. He was a resident there from August to November, 1976, and was again voluntarily admitted in February of 1977. In August, 1977, defendant turned 18, and was evaluated pursuant to former ORS 427.250 to determine whether he was still mentally deficient and in need of further residential care, treatment, training or education. The two psychologists who examined defendant in the spring and summer of 1978 found him not to be mentally deficient.
Fairview’s chief medical officer disagreed and filed a petition on behalf of the Mental Health Division alleging defendant was mentally deficient and in need of care and treatment. A full hearing was held in October, 1978. This proceeding was dismissed by the trial court when the representative of the Fairview Hospital administration testified it was the institution’s position that defendant was not mentally deficient.
In March, 1979, defendant entered a residential group home in.Portland. He reportedly had behavioral problems there, including failure to take medication to control his epileptic seizures, stealing money, failure to attend a work program or keep specified hours, and running away. Defendant’s father then filed a petition to commit him to the Mental Health Division, pursuant to former ORS 427.015. A precommitment examination was ordered, and defendant was found to be mentally deficient. The recommendation by the examining institution, Fairview Hospital, was that defendant be returned to its care. The trial judge certified that defendant was mentally deficient and ordered his commitment to the Mental Health Division in August, 1979.
Defendant alleges that the statutory procedure under which he was committed, former ORS 427.015
et seq,
was unconstitutionally vague and over-broad in that no definition of "mental deficiency” was contained in the statute. However, in commitment of the mentally deficient, the court does not play the same fact-finding role that it does in commitment of the mentally ill under ORS ch 426. In commitment of
the mentally ill the court is empowered to "determine” (ORS 426.130) whether a person is
"(2) * * * because of a mental disorder * * * either
"(a) [d]angerous to himself or others; or
"(b) [ujnable to provide for his basic personal needs and is not receiving such care as is necessary for his health or safety.
"* * * * *» QRS 426.005(2)(a) and (b).
Statutes for the commitment of the mentally ill, when strictly construed, were held not to be unconstitutional on the grounds of vagueness in
State v. O’Neill,
274 Or 59, 66, 545 P2d 97 (1976), the Supreme Court noting that the state has a legitimate interest in providing care and assistance to the unfortunate.
In commitment proceedings for the mentally deficient, the standard for commitment is set by scientific tests monitoring levels of intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior. This fact-finding authority was vested in the Mental Health Division. ORS 430.041(1). Under the former statute, the court was authorized to "certify” a person as mentally deficient only after the examining institution had so found.
A statutory and administrative scheme for the commitment of minors by their parents in the state of Georgia was recently found by the United States Supreme Court to be constitutionally sound.
Parham v. J. R.,
442 US 584, 99 S Ct 2493, 61 L Ed 2d 101 (1979). In
Parham,
the Georgia statute allowed for a determination by the superintendent of each institution as to whether a child showed evidence of mental illness and should be admitted. There were no administrative regulations defining procedures the superintendents should use in making such a determination. The Supreme Court held the lack of regulations did not vest unbridled discretion in the admitting physicians, even where procedures differed from institution to institution.
Unlike the Georgia scheme, Oregon’s former commitment statute for mental deficiency was supplemented by detailed administrative rules which provided a standard for finding a person mentally deficient.
In addition, former ORS 427.059 and 427.062
provided for judicial review of the administrative finding, and an adversary hearing, including the appointment of counsel. Oregon’s commitment scheme thus vastly exceeds the procedural safeguards accepted by the United States Supreme Court in
Parham.
We hold that under the standards of
Parham
and
O’Neill,
former ORS 427.015
et seq
was neither constitutionally vague nor procedurally infirm and did not violate defendant’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss on the ground of a previous proceeding was proper. Defendant’s contentions that double jeopardy or res judicata operate as a bar to two consecutive mental commitment proceedings have no merit. First, a mental commitment proceeding, though it involves a serious deprivation of liberty, is not a criminal proceeding.
State v. O’Neill, supra,
274 Or at 72. Thus the principle of double jeopardy has no application.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
ROBERTS, J.
This case presents a challenge to commitment proceedings for mental deficiency under former ORS ch 427.
Defendant challenges the constitutionality of the commitment procedure, and argues that principles of double jeopardy and res judicata are applicable to this case. He further contends that the standard of proof required in the commitment hearing was proof "beyond a reasonable doubt” and that this standard was not met.
The trial court overruled defendant’s demurrer alleging the vagueness of the underlying statute and denied a motion to dismiss based on a previous commitment proceeding. We affirm the certification of mental deficiency and order of commitment.
Defendant is a 21-year-old man first admitted voluntarily to Fairview Hospital and Training Center at the age of 17. He was a resident there from August to November, 1976, and was again voluntarily admitted in February of 1977. In August, 1977, defendant turned 18, and was evaluated pursuant to former ORS 427.250 to determine whether he was still mentally deficient and in need of further residential care, treatment, training or education. The two psychologists who examined defendant in the spring and summer of 1978 found him not to be mentally deficient.
Fairview’s chief medical officer disagreed and filed a petition on behalf of the Mental Health Division alleging defendant was mentally deficient and in need of care and treatment. A full hearing was held in October, 1978. This proceeding was dismissed by the trial court when the representative of the Fairview Hospital administration testified it was the institution’s position that defendant was not mentally deficient.
In March, 1979, defendant entered a residential group home in.Portland. He reportedly had behavioral problems there, including failure to take medication to control his epileptic seizures, stealing money, failure to attend a work program or keep specified hours, and running away. Defendant’s father then filed a petition to commit him to the Mental Health Division, pursuant to former ORS 427.015. A precommitment examination was ordered, and defendant was found to be mentally deficient. The recommendation by the examining institution, Fairview Hospital, was that defendant be returned to its care. The trial judge certified that defendant was mentally deficient and ordered his commitment to the Mental Health Division in August, 1979.
Defendant alleges that the statutory procedure under which he was committed, former ORS 427.015
et seq,
was unconstitutionally vague and over-broad in that no definition of "mental deficiency” was contained in the statute. However, in commitment of the mentally deficient, the court does not play the same fact-finding role that it does in commitment of the mentally ill under ORS ch 426. In commitment of
the mentally ill the court is empowered to "determine” (ORS 426.130) whether a person is
"(2) * * * because of a mental disorder * * * either
"(a) [d]angerous to himself or others; or
"(b) [ujnable to provide for his basic personal needs and is not receiving such care as is necessary for his health or safety.
"* * * * *» QRS 426.005(2)(a) and (b).
Statutes for the commitment of the mentally ill, when strictly construed, were held not to be unconstitutional on the grounds of vagueness in
State v. O’Neill,
274 Or 59, 66, 545 P2d 97 (1976), the Supreme Court noting that the state has a legitimate interest in providing care and assistance to the unfortunate.
In commitment proceedings for the mentally deficient, the standard for commitment is set by scientific tests monitoring levels of intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior. This fact-finding authority was vested in the Mental Health Division. ORS 430.041(1). Under the former statute, the court was authorized to "certify” a person as mentally deficient only after the examining institution had so found.
A statutory and administrative scheme for the commitment of minors by their parents in the state of Georgia was recently found by the United States Supreme Court to be constitutionally sound.
Parham v. J. R.,
442 US 584, 99 S Ct 2493, 61 L Ed 2d 101 (1979). In
Parham,
the Georgia statute allowed for a determination by the superintendent of each institution as to whether a child showed evidence of mental illness and should be admitted. There were no administrative regulations defining procedures the superintendents should use in making such a determination. The Supreme Court held the lack of regulations did not vest unbridled discretion in the admitting physicians, even where procedures differed from institution to institution.
Unlike the Georgia scheme, Oregon’s former commitment statute for mental deficiency was supplemented by detailed administrative rules which provided a standard for finding a person mentally deficient.
In addition, former ORS 427.059 and 427.062
provided for judicial review of the administrative finding, and an adversary hearing, including the appointment of counsel. Oregon’s commitment scheme thus vastly exceeds the procedural safeguards accepted by the United States Supreme Court in
Parham.
We hold that under the standards of
Parham
and
O’Neill,
former ORS 427.015
et seq
was neither constitutionally vague nor procedurally infirm and did not violate defendant’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss on the ground of a previous proceeding was proper. Defendant’s contentions that double jeopardy or res judicata operate as a bar to two consecutive mental commitment proceedings have no merit. First, a mental commitment proceeding, though it involves a serious deprivation of liberty, is not a criminal proceeding.
State v. O’Neill, supra,
274 Or at 72. Thus the principle of double jeopardy has no application.
The principle of res judicata likewise has no application in this particular case. In order for the doctrine of res judicata to apply, the prior lawsuit must have ended in an adjudication of issues which culminated in a final decree.
McAllister v. Charter First Mortg., Inc., 279
Or 279, 285, 567 P2d 539 (1977),
Huszar v. Certified Realty Co., 272
Or 517, 523, 524, 538 P2d 57 (1975). Defendant’s prior commitment proceeding was dismissed by the court, without findings, after an administrative determination that the defendant was not mentally deficient.
See
n 3,
supra.
At the close of the testimony in the August, 1979, hearing, the trial judge found he had been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant suffered from mild mental retardation. We believe this was the proper standard to apply and we believe it was met.
Prior to the 1979 revisions, ORS ch 427 did not specify any standard of proof for a determination of mental deficiency. Since, however, the deprivation of liberty involved in a commitment for mental deficiency is at least as great as that in mental illness,
the standard the court should have used in evaluating evidence relied upon by Fairview should have been that required for commitment as a mentally ill person. The standard then was proof "beyond a reasonable doubt.”
In determining whether this standard of proof was met, we review de novo as in commitments of the mentally ill.
State v. O’Neill, supra, State v. Arnold,
36 Or App 869, 586 P2d 93 (1978). However, substantial weight is accorded the findings of the trial court, which had an opportunity to observe and question the
defendant.
State v. Watkins,
35 Or App 87, 581 P2d 90 (1978).
Under OAR 309-42-000(3)(c), certification for mental deficiency requires a showing of three elements: (1) a significantly subaverage performance on general intelligence tests, (2) a failure to meet the standards of personal independence and social responsibility expected for the age and cultural group, and (3) manifestation of these conditions during the time period before the subject’s 18th birthday.
The record below, which incorporates the transcript from the October, 1978 hearing, shows that five doctors testified as to defendant’s condition. A physician, a psychiatrist and two psychologists testified that defendant’s IQ was significantly subaverage. His adaptive behavior was found to be impaired by every doctor except the two psychologists who examined defendant before his discharge from Fairview and the behavioral incidents which took place thereafter, during defendant’s stay at the Portland group home. Thirdly, defendant was diagnosed as retarded on three separate occasions before his 18th birthday. This places the first recognition of defendant’s condition within the developmental period.
The evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant suffers from mild mental retardation. The certification of mental deficiency and order of commitment were proper. We affirm.
Affirmed.