Finley, J.
In this action, the relator is a citizen, resident,
freeholder, and taxpayer of the city of Vancouver, Washington. He applied to the Clark county superior court for an order directing the respondent, the county prosecuting attorney, to institute proceedings in the nature of quo warranto against seven individuals, purportedly acting as members of the city council of Vancouver, Washington. Relator’s objective was to oust the individuals from office. However, in effect, the lawsuit questions the validity of the “home rule” charter adopted by a substantial majority of the citi[719]*719zens of Vancouver at an election in February of 1952, and the legality of the subsisting city government. The trial court refused to issue the order, denied relator’s application, and dismissed the action. This appeal followed.
The facts are relatively simple. According to the 1950 census, the population of Vancouver, Washington, was then in excess of forty thousand. Under the authority of Art. XI, § 10, of the state constitution, the citizens of Vancouver had the right and were entitled to adopt a “home rule” charter for the government of their city. Pursuant to this authority, they enacted a city ordinance, which provided for the election of fifteen freeholders to formulate and draft a “home rule” charter. The freeholders were duly elected, and a charter was drafted. Among other things, Art. XI, § 10, of the state constitution provides that a proposed “home rule” charter
“. . . shall be published in two daily newspapers published in said city, for at least thirty days prior to the day of submitting the same to the electors for their approval, ...” (Italics ours.)
In 1951, two newspapers were being published in the city of Vancouver. Customarily, the Columbian and Sun was published five days a week. The proposed “home rule” charter was published in thirty daily editions or issues of the Columbian and Sun prior to the day of election.
Customarily, the Clark County News was published weekly. However, under a contract with the city, the Clark County News went into daily publication. Thereupon, the proposed “home rule” charter was published in thirty daily issues of the Clark County News. There was no distribution of the paper by mail. The city of Vancouver was divided into four areas or sections. One thousand copies of the Clark County News were distributed on successive days in one of the four areas or sections of the city. Every fifth day, the distribution pattern was again commenced and completed, until the proposed “home rule” charter had been published for thirty days in thirty such issues of the Clark County News, distributed in the above-described manner.
[720]*720In addition to the foregoing, wide and general publicity was given to the proposed “home rule” charter election by way of radio programs, newspaper stories, and articles appearing in both of the local newspapers and in the Oregon Journal and the Oregonian. The latter two large, modern, metropolitan newspapers are published daily in Portland, Oregon, and have a substantial and general circulation in Vancouver, and in Clark county, Washington. Notices of the special election were posted in the various polling precincts of Vancouver. There were numerous speeches and discussions of the proposed “home rule” charter before local civic and community groups.
Appellant concedes that the Columbian and Sun, although published only five days a week, is a daily newspaper within the meaning of the terms as used in Art. XI, § 10, of the state constitution. He urges that the Clark County News was not a daily newspaper, customarily published as such. In effect, he argues that the word customarily and the words as such should be inserted or read into Art. XI, § 10, of the state constitution. This interpretation, suggested by appellant, would have the pertinent provision read as follows:
“Said proposed charter shall be published in two daily newspapers [customarily] published [as such] in said city, for at least thirty days prior to the day of submitting the same to the electors for their approval, . . . ”
In short, appellant contends that the News, as published and circulated under the contract with the city of Vancouver, was not a daily newspaper within the meaning of these two words as used in the state constitution.
Relator’s petition sets forth the facts outlined above regarding the publication and distribution of the Clark County News. Paragraph six of his petition states that the Clark County News is a weekly newspaper at all times mentioned therein. Paragraph eight of the petition incorporates therein, by reference, Vancouver ordinance No. C-435. We note that § V of the ordinance characterizes the Columbian and Sun and the Clark County News as “Two daily newspapers, published in the city of Vancouver.” Respondent’s [721]*721answer does not deny, but admits the truth of paragraphs one through ten, inclusive, of relator’s petition.
After the petition, answer, and reply, the parties entered into a stipulation and an agreed statement of the facts involved in the litigation. Paragraph five of the stipulation and agreed statement of facts sets forth the facts, as outlined hereinbefore, regarding the publication and distribution of the Clark County News under the agreement with the city of Vancouver for publication of the charter in thirty issues of the newspaper preceding the election.
The pleadings, as well as the stipulation and the agreed statement of facts, are a part of the record, and are before us on this appeal. We are convinced that these raise and present to us the question of whether, under the facts stipulated, the proposed charter was published for thirty days preceding the election in two daily newspapers, within the meaning of these words as used in Art. XI, § 10, of the state constitution.
The discussion which follows will be limited to the above question, as we are convinced there is no merit in any other question raised by appellant, or in respondent’s motion to dismiss this appeal.
The pertinent constitutional provisions of Art. XI, § 10, and the pertinent statutory provisions of Rem. Rev. Stat., § 8953 [cf. RCW 35.22.050-35.22.100], are practically identical. In discussing the question involved in this appeal, we shall only refer to the constitutional provisions involved.
In construing constitutional, statutory, contractual, or other language or provisions of written documents, the cardinal rule of interpretation requires that the courts first determine whether the meaning of the particular language or provision is (a) unambiguous and clear, or (b) ambiguous and unclear. Some legal scholars have intimated that the process of interpretation and construction is inherent, even in the application of this primary or cardinal rule of interpretation. See Vol. 2 Horack’s Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction 316 (3rd ed. 1943), § 4502. However that may be, the authorities are numerous in [722]*722support of the proposition that interpretation is improper if'the particular constitutional language or provision is clear and unambiguous. In United States v. Sprague, 282 U. S. 716, 731, 75 L. Ed. 640, 51 S. Ct. 220, 71 A. L. R. 1381, the court said:
“The Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning; where the intention is clear there is no room for construction and no excuse for interpolation or addition.” (Italics ours.)
The cases applying the foregoing principle of interpretation to statutes are legion. No citation of authority is requisite.
In State ex rel. Troy v. Yelle, 27 Wn. (2d) 99, 110, 176 P. (2d) 459, 170 A. L. R. 1425, the question was whether the legislature could establish a commission on interstate cooperation, the members of which would be the elected state officials, who would be paid salaries as commissioners in addition to their constitutional salaries as state officials. This court referred to the very positive, clear, and unambiguous language of the state constitution, which, for example as to the superintendent of public instruction, provided in Art. Ill, § 22, that “He shall receive an annual salary of twenty-five hundred dollars, which may be increased by law, hut shall never exceed four thousand dollars per annum.” (Italics ours.) The court, in recognizing the practical implications of inflation, said:
“We may agree that the people, in framing the constitution, did not contemplate inflation or high prices. But the only recourse which relators have is to go to the people themselves for relief, and not to the legislature or the courts.”
In other words., the court found that the constitutional language was clear and unambiguous, and the legislation authorizing the commission on interstate co-operation and providing a special salary for state elected officials serving on the commission was invalidated. Recently, in State ex rel. Lemon v. Langlie, 45 Wn. (2d) 82, 273 P. (2d) 464, a majority of the court determined that the pertinent constitutional provisions were clear and unambiguous, and re[723]*723fused to resort to interpretation and construction of such language. The two cases specifically cited above, and many others that could be mentioned and quoted at great length, are applicable only when constitutional or statutory provisions are clear and unambiguous. On the other hand, if statutory, constitutional, or other language is unclear and ambiguous, the cases are numerous wherein it is held that interpretation by the courts is quite proper. Indeed, it is not only proper, but a responsibility of the judiciary, and an essential one. In connection with the general problem of constitutional application and interpretation, it has been reported that Mr. Justice Holmes once tersely remarked, with as much truth then as now, that the members of the United States supreme court could well keep in mind that it was a constitution which they were interpreting.
In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 71 L. Ed. 303, 47 S. Ct. 114, 54 A. L. R. 1016, the court was called upon to decide the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance. Mr. Justice Sutherland, in 1926, speaking of constitutional interpretation and construction, and for the majority (William Howard Taft, C. J., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Louis D. Brandéis, Edward T. Sanford, and Harlan Fiske Stone), said at p. 386:
“Building zone laws are of modern origin. They began in this country about twenty-five years ago. Until recent years, urban life was comparatively simple; but with the great increase and concentration of population, problems have developed, and constantly are developing, which require, and will continue to require, additional restrictions in respect of the use and occupation of private lands in urban communities. Regulations, the wisdom, necessity and validity of which, as applied to existing conditions, are so apparent that they are now uniformly sustained, a century ago, or even half a century ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive. Such regulations are sustained, under the complex conditions of our day, for reasons analogous to those which justify traffic regulations, which, before the advent of automobiles and rapid transit street railways, would have been condemned as fatally arbitrary and unreasonable. And in this there is no inconsistency, for while the meaning of constitutional guar[724]*724antees never varies, the scope of their application must expand or contract to meet the new and different conditions which are constantly coming within the field of their operation. In a changing world, it is impossible that it should be otherwise.” (Italics ours.)
In Meredith v. Kauffman, 293 Ky. 395, 169 S. W. (2d) 37, the court, interpreting a provision of the Kentucky constitution, said:
“The fundamental purpose in construing a constitutional provision is to ascertain the intention of the framers and the people in adopting it. People’s Transit Co. v. Louisville R. Co., 220 Ky. 728, 295 S. W. 1055. Words are but imperfect vehicles designed to convey thought and in gathering the thought intended to be conveyed the purpose behind the words should be kept in mind. The Constitution is concerned with substance and not with form and its framers did not intend to forbid a commonsense application of its provisions.”
In In re Morris’ Estate, 56 Cal. App. (2d) 715, 725, 133 P. (2d) 452, the California court said:
“The most important duty devolving upon a court in the construction of a written instrument, whether the same be a constitution, statute or a contract, is to discover the true meaning of the instrument and to glean therefrom the purposes and objects of the same.”
In State ex rel. Linn v. Superior Court, 20 Wn. (2d) 138, 146 P. (2d) 543, this court stated:
“Constitutions are designed to endure through the years, and constitutional provisions should be interpreted to meet and cover changing conditions of social and economic life.”
In the Linn case, supra, we cited and quoted with approval from In re Opinion of the Justices, 291 Mass. 572, 196 N. E. 260, as follows:
“ ‘The Constitution of the Commonwealth was designed to be an enduring instrument so comprehensive and fundamental in its terms that a free, intelligent and virtuous people may govern themselves under its beneficent provisions through vast changes in social and industrial conditions. In construing its regulations regard must be had to their spirit and purpose as well as to their letter. The great and underlying principles announced by the Constitution [725]*725and its Amendments must be kept in mind as well as possible narrow interpretations of particular phrases.’ ” (Italics ours.)
In State ex rel. Chamberlin v. Daniel, 17 Wash. 111, 115, 49 Pac. 243, the court quoted with approval from Sutherland on Statutory Construction, § 239, as follows:
“ ‘The practical inquiry is usually what a particular provision, clause or word means. To answer it one must proceed as he would with any other composition—construe it with reference to the leading idea or purpose of the whole instrument. The whole and every part must be considered. The general intent should be kept in view in determining the scope and meaning of any part. This survey and comparison are necessary to ascertain the purpose of the act and to make all the parts harmonious. They are to be brought into accord, if practicable, and thus, if possible, give a sensible and intelligible effect to each in furtherance of the general design. A statute should be so construed as a whole, and its several parts, as most reasonably to accomplish the legislative purpose. If practicable, effect must be given to all the language employed, and inconsistent expressions are to be harmonized to reach the real intent of the legislature.’ ” (Italics ours.)
In the same Chamberlin case, we further said, at p. 116:
“Another rule of interpretation is, that an act must be so construed that every part of the act and every legislative expression will, if possible, be given effect. And still another, that in case a proviso to an act is absolutely inconsistent with the provisions of the principal act and one cannot stand with the other, the proviso must be sacrificed to the life of the principal act. These canons of interpretation are, however, at the most, aids to construction, and after all it becomes the duty of the court to determine, if possible, what the real intention of the lawmakers was.
“There is, however, a principle of construction which applies to statutes, viz.: a principle of strict construction, that does not apply to the construction of constitutions.
“ ‘A constitution,’ says Mr. Endlich in his Interpretation of Statutes, § 526, ‘is “intended for the benefit of the people and must receive a liberal construction.” “The principle of strict construction would frustrate important provisions in every newly constructed frame of government.” Such is the general rule, the key note, as it were, of all interpretation of constitutional provisions, and is in harmony with the principles already discussed.’ ” (Italics ours.)
[726]*726With the fundamental or technical distinction between ambiguous and unambiguous language in mind, and considering the preceding principles regarding the application or interpretation of statutes and constitutional provisions, we come now to a consideration of the meaning of the two small but significant words, daily newspapers, as used in Art. XI, § 10, of the state constitution.
Words are the tools of constitutional and legislative draftsmen. It is a truism that often their meaning is clear or unclear, depending upon context, the manner and method in which the particular words are used. In Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418, 425, 62 L. Ed. 372, 38 S. Ct. 158 (1917), Mr. Justice Holmes said:
“A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used.”
On the other hand, there are some words or terms of art, the meaning of which may be relatively fixed. As to words of art, there are many examples; for instance, the words, eight cubic feet, or, eight lineal feet. It seems quite apparent to us that, under the circumstances in the case at bar, the words, daily newspaper, are not to be regarded as terms of art.
The Federal decennial census reports of 1890 show the population of the state as 349,390, and the population of several, then leading cities, as follows:
State .................................................... 349,390
Seattle .................................................. 42,837
Tacoma.................................................. 36,006
Spokane ................................................. 19,922
Yakima * (North Yakima).................................• 1,535
Vancouver............................................... 3,545
Everett (nonexistent as a municipality).........................
Bellingham ** (New Whatcom)............................ 4,827
(Fairhaven) ............................... 4,076
Olympia................................................. 4,698
Walla Walla ............................................. 4,709
* Yakima was known as North Yakima in 1890.
** New Whatcom and Fairhaven were separate municipalities in 1890. They were consolidated and named Bellingham in 1903.
[727]*727The nationally recognized publication, The Union List of Newspapers (1937), indicates that around the year 1889 the following newspapers were being published in the above-listed cities of the state of Washington:
Seattle:
Seattle Budget 1888-1890 (Weekly)
Seattle Index 1888-1904 (Weekly)
Seattle Post-Intelligencer 1876 (Daily)
Seattle Press 1886-1891 (Daily)
Seattle Sunday Star 1883-1890 (Weekly)
Seattle Telegraph 1890-1894 (Daily)
Seattle Times 1886 (Daily)
Spokane:
Spokane Weekly Chronicle 1881-1891 (Weekly)
Spokane Daily Chronicle 1886 (Daily)
Spokane Globe 1888-1891 (Weekly)
New Star News 1886-1890 (Started as daily, then weekly.)
Northwest Rural Tribune 1888-1898 (Weekly)
Spokane Record 1887 (Weekly)
Spokesman Review 1884 (Daily)
Tacoma:
Tacoma Evening Call 1891-1892 (Daily)
Every Sunday 1889-1892 (Weekly)
Tacoma Weekly Globe 1887- 1892 (Weekly)
Morning Globe 1888- 1895 (Daily)
Tacoma Herald 1891 (Weekly)
Tacoma Weekly Ledger 1880- 1904 (Weekly)
Tacoma Daily Ledger 1883 (Daily)
Tacoma News 1881- 1909 (Weekly)
Tacoma News Tribune 1883 (Daily)
Olympia:
Olympia Republican Partisan 1885- 1889 (Weekly)
Olympia State Capital 1886- 1908 (Weekly)
Olympia Tribune 1890-1893 (Daily)
Olympia Weekly Tribune 1890-1893 (Weekly)
Washington Standard 1860-1921 (Weekly)
Vancouver:
Vancouver Independent-Chronicle 1875-1913 (Weekly)
Vancouver Columbian 1889-1926 (Weekly)
Vancouver Register 1865-1890 (Weekly)
Bellingham:
Bellingham Bay Express 1890-1894 (Twice weekly; then daily)
Bellingham Herald 1890 (Daily)
Reveille 1883-1922 (Weekly; then semiweekly)
[728]*728Bellingham Reveille 1890-1927 (Daily)
World Herald 1889-1911 (Weekly)
Everett:
Everett Herald 1890-1919 (Weekly)
Walla Walla:
Morning Journal 1881-1890 (Daily)
Journal & Watchman 1883-1890 (Weekly)
1861-1910 (Weekly) Walla Walla Statesman
1880-1911 (Daily) Evening Statesman
1869-1908 (Weekly) Walla Walla Union
Yakima:
Yakima Weekly Herald 1889-1912 (Weekly)
Yakima Weekly Republic 1879-1919 (Weekly)
It is shown by the above list that there were four so-called daily newspapers in Seattle, two in Spokane, and four in Tacoma, together with a number of so-called weeklies published in each city. Olympia had four weeklies and one so-called daily from 1890 to 1893. Vancouver had no dailies, but three weeklies. Bellingham had three weeklies or semi-weeklies, and, beginning in 1890, the city had two dailies. Walla Walla had two dailies and three weeklies.
Only Seattle and Tacoma had the requisite population in 1890 to qualify for the adoption of a “home rule” charter under Art. XI, § 10, of the state constitution. Spokane was just barely short of the required population. As to population, several of the next largest cities were short of qualifying by a wide margin. In 1889, the dissemination of public and other information to the citizenry was accomplished largely through the medium of newspapers. In cities with populations of twenty to forty thousand, or, in some instances, in cities with considerably less population, there was certainly no dearth of newspapers, either those published daily or weekly.
Apparently, the right of citizens to make changes in the form of their city governments through the adoption of “home rule” charters was regarded as a serious and important matter by the framers of the state constitution, and properly so. Adequate notice to the citizenry of any proposed changes in city government, seemingly, was regarded [729]*729as equally important, and properly so. Under the circumstances, daily publication in two newspapers for thirty days of proposed changes in city government was easily possible, and, at the time, was the most efficient and desirable means of providing adequate notice to the voters.
Unquestionably, these considerations governed the intention of the framers of the constitution in connection with the promulgation of Art. XI, § 10. Obviously, there were no radio or television stations, and no other media or agencies for the dissemination of news and information to the public. The competitive effect of radio and television, and the effect of national advertising agencies and of national news-gathering agencies, such as the Associated Press, did not exist. Modern transportation facilities, which permit contemporary metropolitan newspapers to distribute their editions promptly and effectively over a large geographical area in competition with local news and advertising media, was, of course, also nonexistent in 1889. Consequently, the competitive restrictions on the number of newspapers resulting from these modern innovations were unknown and not anticipated in 1889, when the state constitution was formulated and adopted.
An examination of the files of the Seattle Post-Intelligencer for the months of January through March, 1889, indicates that it was a paper of four and eight pages on alternate days, with a Sunday edition of eight pages. There was no organization of the paper into special or different sections. About one half of the paper consisted of classified advertising; the other half contained local and national news. An examination of the files of the Vancouver Independent Chronicle, a weekly newspaper, for a period of six months (January through June, 1889), indicates that it was consistently a newspaper of only four pages—one large sheet, folded in the middle, with pages numbered one to four, inclusive. The pages of the 1889 Chronicle were divided about equally between advertising and local gossip, with merely a sprinkling of national news. The paper also carried a serialized novel within the confines of its four pages.
[730]*730These statistics give some indication of what newspapers were like around the year 1889. Such publications were a far cry from, and were, undoubtedly, quite different from today’s metropolitan newspapers, such as the Seattle PostIntelligencer and the Seattle Times. The latter modern newspapers, with six or seven regular daily editions, divided into special sections and nationally syndicated columns, and their large special Sunday editions with comic strips of several pages, might very well not be regarded as daily newspapers as such were known to the readers or publishers of those which existed in the year 1889.
In Fairhaven Publishing Co. v. Bellingham, 51 Wash. 108, 98 Pac. 97, two newspapers submitted bids for all of the official advertising of the city of Bellingham. The Belling-ham Herald was printed six days a week, but not on Sunday. The Morning Reveille was printed five days a week, but not on Sunday or Monday. The latter newspaper was the low bidder, and was awarded the contract. The Bellingham Herald objected, and instituted a lawsuit on the ground that its competitor, the Morning Reveille, was not a daily newspaper as these words were used in the city charter. On appeal, this court said that the term daily, as applied to the publication of newspapers, is relative, and held that the Morning Reveille, printed five days a week, was a daily newspaper. See Bellingham v. Bellingham Publishing Co., 116 Wash. 65, 198 Pac. 369; Hansen v. Havre, 112 Mont. 207, 114 P. (2d) 1053, 135 A. L. R. 1278; State ex rel. Winn v. San Antonio (Tex. Civ. App.), 259 S.W. (2d) 248 (1953).
In People ex rel. Utica Sunday Tribune Co. v. Hugo, 93 Misc. 618, 625, 158 N. Y. S. 490 (affirmed 174 App. Div. 901, 159 N. Y. S. 1136), the court said:
“It is also urged that because the county treasurer is required to publish notices of delinquent sales for unpaid taxes twice each week in the same newspapers which are designated to publish the Session Laws and concurrent resolutions (Laws of 1902, c. 559), and, because the Boonville Herald is a weekly newspaper, that paper was for that reason improperly designated. The defendant’s answering affidavits show that it is his intention to publish a semiweekly edition of the Boonville Herald during the period [731]*731when such notices are required to be published and to send the same to all its subscribers. This, it seems to me, will fully satisfy the requirements of the statute with respect to a publication of notices of tax sales twice in each week.” (Italics ours.)
Similarly, the Missouri court of appeals said, in State ex rel. Law & Credit Co. v. Thomas, 203 Mo. App. 452, 457, 220 S. W. 702:
“The question as to whether the contract was properly let to a newspaper that was not a daily newspaper either at the time of the submission of the bids or at the time of the letting of the contract, is one that' requires serious consideration. While the statute provides that the board shall publish a notice designating when and where said board will ‘receive sealed proposals from daily newspapers published in said city for the publication of all advertisements,’ etc. and ‘shall award the printing of all said publications to the newspaper naming the lowest and best bid,’ its terms are not definite and explicit as to whether the newspapers shall be a daily at the time it submits its bids or at the time of the publication of the advertisements, etc. In this situation it is proper to ascertain the intention of the Legislature which framed the statute. . . .
“Whether that newspaper should be a daily newspaper at the time the bids are submitted and when the contract is let was not material. The material consideration was whether the newspaper is a daily newspaper at the time the notices are to be inserted. It, manifestly, would not be material whether the paper was a newspaper before the work was actually to be done by it for the reason that it might be a daily newspaper at the time the bids were submitted or the contract let and might not be one during the time the insertions were to be made in it. We do not think that the Legislature was concerned with the question as to whether the newspaper should be a daily newspaper at any 'time other than when the work of publishing the notices was to be performed.” (Italics ours.)
In 2 Merrill on Notice 16, § 656' (1952), the author states:
“Command for publication in a newspaper of a certain frequency must be followed. The effectiveness of compliance is not destroyed by the fact that the new schedule of appearance was commenced after the award of the printing, solely to qualify therefor, or that it was temporary in character.” (Italics ours.)
[732]*732Respondent urges affirmance of the trial court on the basis of the doctrine of substantial compliance. He relies, in part, upon Seymour v. Tacoma, 6 Wash. 427, 431, 33 Pac. 1059, wherein the court said:
“Certain rules as to notice of elections have become well settled, and none of them are better settled than that the formalities of giving notice, although prescribed by statute, are directory merely, unless there is a declaration that unless the formalities are observed the election shall be void.
“ ‘It is a canon of election law that an election is not to be set aside for a mere informality or irregularity which cannot be said in any manner to have affected the result of the election.’ Dillon, Mun. Corp., § 197, n. 3, and cases cited.”
In support of the theory of substantial compliance, respondent further relies upon State ex rel. Billington v. Sinclair, 28 Wn. (2d) 575, 583, 183 P. (2d) 813, in which the court said:
“It will be noticed that the constitutional provision is that ‘. . . Any city containing a population of twenty thousand inhabitants or more shall be permitted to frame a charter . . . ’ (Italics ours.) The framers of the constitution could not have used more emphatic language in granting a right to the inhabitants of a city containing a population of twenty thousand or more. There is no qualification or reservation of this right. . . .
“Although this particular question has never been directly passed upon, we have at least indirectly held that the right of a city, with a population of more than twenty thousand people, to adopt a charter and become a city of the first class is inviolate.”
A report of the Washington state census board, published August 1,1954, shows as follows the approximate dates when the population of Washington cities reached a figure of twenty thousand:
Seattle .... Prior to 1900
Tacoma ditto
Spokane ... ditto
Bellingham About 1907
Everett ____ About 1908
Yakima ____ About 1925
Vancouver . About 1941
Bremerton . About 1944
Walla Walla About 1945
Aberdeen . (No data)
[733]*733The following table shows the dates when Washington cities have adopted “home rule” charters pursuant to the right given their citizens to do so under Art. XI, § 10, of the state constitution:
City: Dates of adoption
of city charter:
Seattle................................. October 1, 1890 (1st)
March 3, 1896 (2d)
March 12, 1946 (3d)
Spokane ............................... December 28, 1910
Tacoma ................................ June 1, 1927 (1st)
June 1, 1953 (2d)
Everett ................................ April 16, 1912
Bellingham ............................ July 29, 1904
Yakima ................................ June 8, 1931
Aberdeen .............................. December 12, 1929
Vancouver ............................. February 11, 1952
Bremerton ............................. October 19, 1942
Walla Walla has not to date adopted a “home rule” charter. However, with this one exception, the citizens of other Washington cities have adopted such charters fairly promptly when such cities have been able to qualify as to the requisite population of twenty thousand. This appears to support the view expressed by the court in State ex rel. Billington v. Sinclair, supra, that the right to adopt “home rule” charters is an important and fundamental one under our constitution. Furthermore, it seems to be so regarded by a majority of the voting citizens of Washington cities.
It may be of some interest to note that our research indicates that Tacoma, Bellingham, Everett, Aberdeen, Bremerton, Vancouver, and Walla Walla, at the present time, have only one daily newspaper, customarily published as such. Furthermore, our research seems to indicate that Aberdeen, Bremerton, and Vancouver had only one daily newspaper, customarily published as such, at the time such cities adopted their “home rule” charters.
In urging the doctrine of substantial compliance, respondent, in essence, argues that significant substantive provisions of the constitution should not, in effect, be canceled out by other provisions of the constitution, merely procedural in nature, which concern publication of notices of [734]*734elections—in other words, that procedural provisions should be interpreted in a manner to give full effect to more fundamentally important substantive provisions whenever reasonably possible.
In the Seymour case, supra, and in subsequent cases, this court has unquestionably approved and applied the doctrine of substantial compliance in the application and interpretation of statutes. Respondent’s argument relative to the doctrine of substantial compliance is persuasive. This latter is true, particularly in view of the historical record showing the importance the citizens of Washington cities have attached to the constitutional right to adopt “home rule” charters. However, at this time, we are reluctant to dispose of this appeal on the basis of the doctrine of substantial compliance. It is not necessary to do so, because, as we view the facts and circumstances involved in the instant case and the question submitted to this court for determination, we think that the Clark County News, under its contract with the city of Vancouver, was published as, and was, a daily newspaper for the period of thirty days during which the proposed “home rule” charter was published in the newspaper. Under the reasoning of the Missouri court of appeals in State ex rel. v. Thomas, supra, the proper test is whether the News was a daily newspaper at the time or during the period the proposed Vancouver “home rule” charter was published in it.. We are convinced that, under the facts and circumstances involved, it was possible for the city of Vancouver to comply precisely with the provision of Art. XI, § 10, of the state constitution. The relator suggests only one possible interpretation of the pertinent constitutional language. This, as indicated above, requires, in effect, an insertion or reading into the constitution the words, customarily published as such. The interpretation suggested by the respondent is a more reasonable one. We think it does less violence to the language of the constitution, and is more in accord with the spirit and the intent of such language and with the intention of the framers of the constitution.
In State ex rel. Chamberlin v. Daniel, supra, at page 119, we stated that the courts must,
[735]*735“ . . . if possible, adopt that construction which will give force and effect to every part of the law, to every clause in a section and every word in a clause, rather than a construction which will destroy or render meaningless any portion of the law.”
The constitution makers were wise, far-sighted men. However, they were not infallible. No group of men of comparable wisdom and integrity could foresee every possible future contingency with respect to which a particular constitutional provision might be applicable. The very nature of any constitution, whether of government or of some local fraternal club, is that it is a basic document. Its function and purpose is to set forth general basic truths and guides. It is not legislative in character. If that were true, the basic documents of government would run to thousands of words and pages wherein minute legislative details would be spelled out as accurately as possible, considering, of course, expressional ambiguities inherent in the words of the English language, or in any other language used by mankind as a media for the transmission of thoughts and ideas. Perhaps not so incidentally, it could be observed here that basic truths and ideas, or the intent of the constitutional fathers, should be controlling rather than the particular words or language symbols used to convey a thought or an idea from the mind or intellect of the draftsman to the mind of another person; for example, a subsequent reader of the document, or persons interested or affected by its provisions.
Unquestionably, the primary purpose of the constitution framers respecting Art. XI, § 10, was to permit the citizens of a city such as Vancouver to adopt a “home rule” charter for their own government. Notice and information to the voters of a city regarding a proposed charter and its provisions was the only purpose of the procedural details written into the constitution regarding publication in two daily newspapers. Of course, this latter factor is important, and the importance of notice to the voters should in no way be underemphasized or disregarded. There were few cities of twenty thousand people in this state over sixty years ago. It is quite reasonable that the draftsmen of the constitution [736]*736must have felt certain that two daily newspapers, customarily published as such, could always be found in any city of twenty thousand people. That such a city would have only one daily newspaper, or none at all, but that it might have an excellent radio or television station for the dissemination of news and information to the public, simply did not occur to the constitutional fathers. Obviously, as mentioned above, radio and other modern innovations relative to advertising and the dissemination of news were unknown. Their limiting, competitive effect on the number of newspapers a city of twenty thousand could support was not anticipated. Such a minor error in judgment by the constitutional draftsmen, if it be one, appears to be understandable.
A strict interpretation in the instant case stresses, honors, and heaps confusion upon the two words, daily newspaper, and upon the application and operation of Art. XI, § 10, of the state constitution. A broad, and it might be said reasonable, interpretation recognizes reality and emphasizes the real purpose of the constitution makers, which was the giving of reasonable notice to voting citizens. It is certainly not a disregard of the real purpose of the constitution to approve adequate means of notice aside from those narrowly specified by a strict interpretation of the words, daily newspaper. Except for a narrow, extreme definition of daily newspaper, the Clark County News, when published five days a week for thirty issues during a period of more than thirty days, should be regarded as a daily newspaper; i.e., during the period when it was published five days per week and carried the proposed “home rule” charter in thirty issues. State ex rel. Law & Credit Co. v. Thomas, supra. At that time it certainly was not a weekly paper. It is the idea of whether it was customarily published daily that gives trouble in a narrow, strict approach to the problem.
The constitution does not use the word customarily. It does not require publication in a newspaper customarily published daily. The constitution is not that precise and exacting. It would seem to be not even a slight exaggeration [737]*737that the constitution makers, and certainly lay minds and voting citizens, would agree that publication of the. charter for five days per week for over thirty issues during a period of more than thirty days in the Clark County News would constitute daily publication in a newspaper; and that such notice of the charter and its provisions would constitute (a) adequate notice and information to the interested voters of Vancouver, and (b) compliance with the provisions of Art. XI, § 10, of the constitution. In other words, it is a sound position that the publication of the charter by the city in the Columbian and in the News constituted compliance with the publication requirements of the constitution, and provided effective and adequate notice to the citizens concerning the proposed charter election, the new charter, and its provisions. We are reassured in this conclusion by the fact that widespread publicity was also given to the proposed charter by radio, by articles in the large dailies of the Portland, Oregon, metropolitan district, by speeches and discussion in local, civic and community clubs.
In almost any case involving the interpretation of constitutional provisions, the arguments are available, and either of the opposing parties litigant may contend, and sometimes do in intemperate language, that the particular construction asserted by the opposition distorts or perverts and wrecks the constitution; that it thwarts its noble purposes, is inimical to the best interests of the people, and is destructive of the basic design of our form of government. When there is some basic truth in such superlatives, a case then becomes one of great judicial concern, and the winnowing of the wheat from the chaff is a grave judicial responsibility. But in any event, histrionics are beside the point. They may have their place elsewhere; if so, it would be in another forum.
Undoubtedly, the outcome of the instant case is of considerable importance to the particular parties litigant. However, the legal principles and the judicial problem involved are hardly ones of history-making, world-shaking consequence. Indeed, the problem before us is a very simple [738]*738one; histrionics, or even the garden variety of superlatives, should not make it appear to be otherwise. It involves the interpretation of constitutional language which is certainly not crystal clear. Two possible, but distinctly different interpretations of Art. XI, § 10, of our state constitution are asserted by the opposing parties in the lawsuit. We are simply called upon to consider the two interpretations suggested by the parties, and to determine in our best collective judicial judgment which interpretation is the more reasonable and the more consistent with the intent of the founding fathers and the citizens of this state as to the meaning and purpose of Art. XI, § 10, when the constitution was drafted and adopted as our basic charter of government.
There should be nothing surprising or of a particularly shocking nature in this, because, under our form of government, and in our way of life in this country, it is accepted and well understood in lay circles—and it has long been recognized in respectable and competent legal circles—that the interpretation of constitutional provisions is not only a proper and a very necessary function, but also is a duty and a responsibility of the judicial branch of our government. In some countries this is not the case. There, the executive, or perhaps the legislative branch, performs the function and assumes the duty and the responsibility of constitutional interpretation. To reiterate: The procedure is different in our beloved country, and this has been true, certainly, since the time of Chief Justice John Marshall and his decision in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U. S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60. Here, judicial interpretation of constitutional provisions has become a proper, an important, and we daresay a fortunate distinction under our American form of government.
For the reasons indicated hereinbefore, the judgment of the trial court should be and is in all respects hereby affirmed.
Mallery, Rosellini, and Ott, JJ., concur.