STEWART, Judge.
The relator, State Highway Commission of Missouri (Commission) brought suit for breach of contract against the City of St. Louis, its Mayor, its Comptroller and Travelers Insurance Company as surety on the bond of the Comptroller. We shall refer to defendants as City. City filed a counterclaim for damages contending the contracts sued upon by Commission and other contracts of the same nature were the result of duress. The verdict of the jury was in favor of City on Commission’s action and in favor of City for $13,861,810.00 and $4,114,-647.25 interest on City’s counterclaim. Commission appeals from the judgment entered on the verdict. We reverse and remand as to Count IV of Commission’s petition and affirm in all other respects.
The Commission’s petition in four counts alleges that between 1958 and 1966 it entered into four contracts with City in which City agreed to pay a percentage of the acquisition costs of rights-of-way for that portion of urban highway construction projects within the City of St. Louis. The contracts alleged in Counts I and III called for payment of 50% of the acquisition costs and those alleged in Counts II and IV call for 10% of such costs.
The highways were being built in accordance with the provisions of the Federal-Aid Highway Act 23 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. The percentage of the acquisition costs required by the contracts represented the percentage of those costs which the Commission would not receive by way of reimbursement from the Federal Government.
City filed an answer and counterclaim. As pertinent to our discussion City’s answer raised the affirmative defenses of duress and ultra vires. We note at this point that at the time of submission the defense of ultra vires was abandoned as to Counts I, II and III. City’s counterclaim alleged that it had entered into the four contracts sued upon by Commission and other contracts 1 with the Commission under duress and [717]*717sought recovery of the sums paid by it to the Commission.
Many of the facts were admitted by the parties by way of stipulation. They agreed as to the identity of the four contracts sued upon by Commission; that the contracts were executed by persons generally authorized to execute such contracts; that the amounts sued for by the Commission were the amounts remaining unpaid under those contracts;2 that Commission had acquired and paid for all of the right-of-way referred to in the contracts and that all of the right-of-way acquired was within the City of St. Louis; that all of the highway projects involved had been completed and that Commission has complied with the terms of the contracts in all other respects.
The parties further stipulated that City had paid a total of $13,861,810.00 to Commission on the various projects. Of that amount the sum of $5,022,984.97 was paid on the four contracts sued upon by Commission.3
It was further stipulated that City was required by the Commission to comply with those regulations of the Commission that required City to pay the percentage of the cost of acquisition of right-of-way set out in the contracts on all projects as a condition precedent to the commencement of construction of the highway project. Commission drafted all of the contracts involved in this action and the terms with respect to the percentage of payment and the requirement that payment be made were not negotiable.
The additional facts which we set out hereafter will be viewed in the light most favorable to City, the prevailing party. Parker v. Stern Bros. & Co., 499 S.W.2d 397 (Mo.1973).
Prior to 1950 the Commission adopted a policy requiring cities having a population in excess of 5,000 to pay a portion of the cost of right-of-way acquisition. This policy prevailed with insubstantial modification until January 12, 1968.
The highway construction projects are based upon need. It is apparent, from the fact that the contracts presented to City had designated routes for acquisition, that the various highway projects underlying the contracts involved in this litigation had been planned before the contracts were submitted to City by Commission.
Commission urges eleven primary issues for our consideration. We consider the points raised in the posture in which they are presented to us.
Commission’s principal contentions are that the trial court should have directed a verdict in its favor on each count of its cause of action and in its favor on City’s counterclaim because “there was no substantial evidence to show coercion and duress by [Commission] against [City’s] legislative body, the Board of Aldermen, in obtaining the execution of the contracts sued on in . . [Commission’s] petition.”
We first consider the basic elements of “duress.” In Missouri it is said that the question of duress is one of fact in the particular case. As the court said in Coleman v. Crescent Insulated Wire & Cable Co., 350 Mo. 781, 168 S.W.2d 1060 (1943) 168 S.W.2d 1. c. 1066:
“The question is: Was the person so acted upon by threats by the person claiming the benefit of the contract, for the purpose of obtaining the contract, . and was the contract thereby obtained. So duress is to be tested, not by the nature of the threats, but rather by the state of mind induced thereby in the victim. The ultimate fact in issue is whether the alleged injured party was bereft of the free exercise of his will power; and of which, the means used to produce such state of mind, the age, sex, capacity, situation, and relation of the parties, are all evidentiary.”
[718]*718The court in Coleman also took note of the fact that the victim of duress “acts knowingly but unwillingly because of the coercion . and he may continue to be submissive to the threatened force which caused him to act after the action has accrued.
It is admitted that the provision of the contracts requiring City to make payment for the costs of right-of-way was part of the contract because of a policy of the Commission which was passed by resolution of the board. The policy has the effect of a rule or regulation of an administrative body. § 536.010(4) RSMo. The policy ostensibly had the force and effect of law. It was stipulated by the parties that City had to comply with the policy of the Commission or Commission would not commence construction of that portion of the highway project within the City of St. Louis. A number of letters to City from Commission indicate a reluctance on the part of City to enter into one of the contracts because of lack of funds. In one instance City sought a modification of the contract so as to provide that City make payments under the contract “when funds are available and appropriated for such purposes.” The Commission in reply requested that the “[c]on-tract be executed as submitted . . .” In another letter in answer to a statement by City that it was not in a position to sign one of the contracts because of lack of funds, Commission said that no construction would be started within the City limits until the agreement was signed. It reiterated, “[T]his policy will be adhered to . ,”
The contracts involved in this case extended over the terms of Mayors Tucker and Cervantes. Mayor Poelker was Comptroller, the fiscal officer of City, during this period and for most of the period Conway Briscoe was President of the Board of Public Service. Letters urging execution of the contracts and threatening to halt acquisition of the right-of-way and to withhold construction of the highways that were to be constructed within the City limits were sent to all of the above, with the exception of Mr. Poelker. Mr. Briscoe recommended that the contracts not be signed, but Mayor Tucker expressed the fear that if the contracts were not signed as presented the roads would not be built.
In addition to the Mayor, Mr. Poelker, as Comptroller, was required to sign all contracts. He was aware of the policy of Commission which required payment by the City for a portion of the cost of acquiring right-of-way. Mr. Poelker feared that if he did not sign the contract presented to him the roads would not be built.
It has been held that where a provision in a contract requires compliance with a statute which is unconstitutional that provision of the contract is unenforceable because it is not the result of the voluntary assent of the parties. City of Cleveland v. Clements Bros. Const. Co., 67 Ohio St. 197, 65 N.E. 885 (1902). We believe that the principle enunciated in that case to be sound and that it is applicable to the facts of this case. As we shall demonstrate, the policy requiring City to pay part of the cost for acquiring right-of-way was invalid.
In the case at bar Commission, one of the contracting parties, was in a position to adopt policies which could have the force of law. When it adopted the policy requiring cities with a population in excess of 5,000 to pay for the cost of acquisition of right-of-way this policy ostensibly had the force of law. In view of the fact that the route of the highways had been determined the threats to discontinue acquisition of right-of-way and to withhold construction was not based upon its discretionary power to determine the route according to its standards but to force City to pay for the cost of right-of-way. When the Commission demanded compliance with its policy as a condition precedent to construction of highways within the limits of the City the policy did not become part of the contract by the voluntary act of City, but because Commission insisted upon compliance with its policy-
Commission would argue (1) only the person upon whom duress was exercised may take advantage of it to void the contract. [719]*719Mississippi Valley Trust Company v. Begley, 298 Mo. 684, 252 S.W. 76, 79 (banc 1923); (2) that only the Board of Aldermen had authority to contract; and (3) that there is no evidence that duress was exercised upon the Board of Aldermen.
We are not dealing with individuals but with a corporate entity. The inhabitants of the locality are its incorporators. The officers of the municipal corporation, both executive and legislative, are the agents and servants of the corporation through which it acts. State ex rel, etc. Behrens v. Crismon, et aL, 354 Mo. 174, 188 S.W.2d 937, 939 (banc 1945). Commission in this case undertook to communicate with the mayor and the president of the Board of Public Service, the head of the department responsible for streets and highways within the City of St. Louis. The contracts required by Commission were sent to the mayor. When there was a delay in the enactment of the ordinances and execution of the contracts the correspondence was directed to the mayor and the president of the Board of Public Service. These persons are agents of the City. Each has a function with respect to the process of contracting with the City. By the charter of the City of St. Louis, it is provided that no ordinance for public works or improvements shall be adopted unless prepared and recommended by the Board of Public Service. Art. XXII, Sec. 1, Charter of the City of St. Louis. The mayor has the veto power over all ordinances. The executive branch of the municipal corporation can be said to be the alpha and omega of the contracting process. The policy enacted by Commission with respect to acquisition costs, and the contacts and threats made by Commission with the various officers of City were directed at the corporation. At the time the contract is presented to the legislative body the negotiations have been completed. The enactment of the ordinance by the Board of Aldermen is but one phase of the contracting process. There was ample evidence that the action of Commission had coerced the corporate entity to enter into the various contracts with Commission.
The policy of Commission requiring City to pay a share of the cost of acquiring right-of-way unlawfully mandates payment by the cities. If the cities were to have the advantages contemplated by the Federal-Aid urban system of roads 23 U.S.C.A. § 103(d)(1) (Supp.1977), they were required by Commission to submit to the policy. The policy being mandatory acted upon every segment of the municipal corporation. It is thus apparent that even absent a direct personal contact with the Board of Aider-men the jury was warranted in finding that duress was exercised upon the Board of Aldermen by reason of the policy.
As previously stated the provisions of the contract respecting payments by City were not the result of the exercise of free will on the part of the City but by reason of the illegally enacted policy of the Commission coupled with the threat of depriving the City of highways which were determined to be needed by Commission. The payments made by City and the funds sought to be recovered were the result of terms of the contracts illegally imposed upon City as a condition to the construction of needed highways within City and constituted duress sufficient to nullify the provisions of the contract requiring payment for a portion of the cost of acquisition of right-of-way. City of Cleveland v. Clements Bros. Const. Co., supra. See Simmons Hardware Co. v. City of St. Louis, 192 S.W. 394, 396 (Mo.1916).
Commission further argues that a municipal corporation may not claim the benefit of the defense of duress relying on Dallasta v. Department of Highways of the State of Colorado, 153 Colo. 519, 387 P.2d 25 (banc 1963). The case does not stand for the sweeping declaration of law espoused by Commission. It merely holds that “the passage of an enactment by a body duly constituted and acting within its authority is not vitiated or rendered void by reason of well known ‘lobbying’ activities in the legislative halls.” Id. 387 P.2d at 26. That Dallasta is readily distinguishable needs no extended discussion. It is generally held that “[cjontracts made by a city, if autho[720]*720rized, are no different from other contracts and are measured by the same tests and subject to the same rights and liabilities.” Burger v. City of Springfield, 323 S.W.2d 777, 783 (Mo.1959). It is also said that “a municipal corporation may avail itself of any defense appropriate to the nature of the action and the facts of the case.” 63 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 1024 at 614. Under the facts of this case duress was available to City as a defense and presented a viable basis for its counterclaim.
We must next determine whether Commission unlawfully exceeded its powers in establishing the policy of requiring payment from City.
The State Highway Commission is vested only with such powers as are specifically conferred upon it by the constitution and statutes, as well as those implied powers which are necessary or proper to enable it to carry out fully and effectively the purposes of the act. State ex rel. St. Louis County v. State Highway Comm’n, 315 Mo. 707, 286 S.W. 1, 2 (banc 1926).
The Highway Commission is established by Article IV, Section 29, Const, of Mo. (1945) and is granted “authority over and power to locate, relocate, design and maintain all state highways . . . subject to limitations and conditions imposed by law as to the manner and means . . ” The source of Commission’s funds are enumerated in Art. IV, Section 30(b) as “revenue derived from highway users” and includes state license fees and taxes on motor vehicles, trailers and fuels. Commission is also empowered by Art. IV, Section 31 to enter into contracts with cities and other subdivisions “for and concerning the maintenance of, and regulation of traffic on any state highway within such cities, counties or subdivision.” We can find no express or implied provision in these sections of the constitution that would permit the exaction of funds from cities by Commission for the purpose of acquiring right-of-way.
Chapters 226 and 227 RSMo. implement the constitutional provisions discussed above. Section 226.220 established the
“state road fund” which is to receive money and credits in addition to those enumerated in Art. IV, Sec. 30(b) Const, of Mo. (1945). These include proceeds of the sale of state road bonds, monies received from the federal government for highway purposes and from “[a]ny other source if they are held for expenditure by or under the department of highways or the state highway commission . . . ” There is no grant of power in this provision to permit Commission to impose payment by a City for any highway purpose.
Commission relies upon § 227.170 and § 227.180 RSMo. As necessary to our consideration § 227.170 provides:
“Any civil subdivision . . . shall have the power, right and authority, through its proper officers, to contribute out of funds available for road purposes all or a part of the funds necessary for the purchase of right of ways for state highways, . . . ”
§ 227.180 authorizes Commission to receive the funds that may be contributed in accordance with § 227.170. We find no authority in these statutes that would permit Commission to mandate payment for the acquisition of right-of-way. The City, by § 227.170, is authorized to make contributions to the Commission for the purposes set out in its discretion and in the exercise of its free will.
The Supreme Court in Pohl v. State Highway Commission, 431 S.W.2d 99, 103, n.4 (Mo. banc 1968) referred to the funds acquired by Commission under § 227.170 as donations made by political subdivisions. These statutes provide no authority for Commission’s policy. Whether or not the Commission has the implied power to exact a charge from a municipality for right-of-way costs under any of these provisions or under § 227.030 RSMo., which authorizes the Commission to make “all rules and regulations . . . necessary . . .for carrying out all of the provisions of this chapter . . .,” depends upon whether such a power is “necessary to the just and reasonable execution of the power expressly conferred . . State ex rel. State [721]*721Highway Comm’n v. Union Electric Co., 142 S.W.2d 1099, 1101[2] (Mo.App.1940). There the court held that the right to exact a charge from a public utility for placing a utility line along a public bridge could not be implied as necessary to the execution of the Commission’s duty to prevent interference with traffic and highway construction. The expressly conferred power to receive donations from a municipality does not imply the power to compel the municipality to make such a donation. This view is bolstered by the language of § 227.030 RSMo., which limits the authority of the Commission to those steps “consistent with . funds available.”
Commission next contends that the court should have directed a verdict for it because “[t]here was no evidence that Respondent has restored or offered to restore Appellant to the position existing prior to the execution of the contracts involved in Appellant’s Petition as required by law before a party may seek to void contractual obligations by reason of duress.”
In Bride v. City of Slater, 263 S.W.2d 22 (Mo.1953), relied upon by Commission, the City and Bride entered into a contract by which Bride was to furnish fuel oil to City. The contract was void for failure to state the consideration as required by § 432.070 RSMo. By counterclaim the City sought to recover the monies it had paid for fuel oil which was delivered to and consumed by City. The court quoted with approval remarks made by a text writer that to lay down broad principles with respect to the matter of recovery of payments by municipalities would be “an exceedingly dangerous undertaking.” Id. at 27. Stressing the fact that payments in that case were voluntarily made, there was no contention that the payments were not fair and reasonable or that there was fraud on the part of the contractor; the court said 1. c. 28: “In these circumstances (and limiting our decision to the circumstances of our case), we apply the recognized rule that a municipality cannot accept the benefits of a void contract and retain them and recover back the consideration paid.”
As distinguished from Bride, City did not voluntarily pay for the cost of acquisition of the right-of-way, but the contract, as found by the jury, was executed by City under duress. The route of the highways was not a commodity to be sold by Commission to City. While Commission has great discretion in selection of the route of a highway, as stated by Commission, the route is to be selected based upon need. The portion of the Federal Act under which the State was obtaining aid was directed toward the development of highways in urban areas.4 We may infer that Commission was acting to fulfill the purposes of the Act and its own policy of need in selecting routes and proceeding to acquire the right-of-way. It follows that once the route has been determined the Commission in constructing the highway was not parting with something it had a right to retain and City was receiving nothing but what it has a right to receive. Under such circumstances there is nothing to be restored to Commission or to be tendered as a condition to City’s right to recover the sums previously paid by City. The factual situation in this case calls for the application of the rule announced in Mack v. Acacia Mutual Life [722]*722Ass’n, 228 Mo.App. 212, 65 S.W.2d 1045[2] (1933), where it was said, 65 S.W.2d l.c. 1047: “if it appears that the party on the one hand parted with nothing that he had a right to retain, and the party on the other hand receives nothing but what he has a right to receive, it follows that restoration is not necessary to right to sue.” Commission’s contention on this point must fail.
Commission challenges the giving of instructions No. 7, 10 and 13. Instruction 7 submitted City’s defense of duress to each of the four counts of Commission’s cause of action. Instruction 10 submitted City’s counterclaim to recover for monies paid to Commission under the various contracts because the agreements to pay were the result of duress. Instruction 13 is City’s damage instruction. The basis of Commission’s complaint in each instance is that there was “insufficient evidence . of duress to justify submission [of the issue of duress] to the jury.” What we have said above with respect to Commission’s contentions that it was entitled to a directed verdict in its favor on its cause of action and upon City’s counterclaim effectively answers Commission’s present claims of error.
Instruction No. 12 defines duress. It reads:
“The term duress as used in these instructions means conduct by one party which so affects the state of mind of a second party that it prevents the exercise of free will by the second party.”
Commission complains that the instruction “does not clearly and adequately define the term duress.” ^hile Commission’s point relied on is vague in that it does not state wherein and why the definition is erroneous, we find that the definition is essentially that contained in Coleman v. Crescent Insulated Wire & Cable Co., 350 Mo. 781, 168 S.W.2d 1060, 1066 (1943) where the court stated, “The question is: Was the person so acted upon by threats by the person claiming the benefit of the contract, for the purpose of obtaining the contract and was the contract thereby obtained. . . . The ultimate fact in issue is whether the . . . injured party was bereft of the free exercise of his will power . . ”
The instruction clearly and succinctly defines the term “duress.” Commission’s contention is without merit.
Commission next contends that the court erred in permitting Mayor Poelker, Conway Briscoe and Judge McGuire, who was formerly City Counselor, to testify that Mayor Tucker had expressed the fear that if the contracts involved in the action were not signed the Commission would stop acquisition of right-of-way and construction of the highways. Commission argues that this evidence is inadmissible hearsay because Missouri does not recognize the “state of mind” exception to the hearsay rule. In this Commission is mistaken. The state of mind of Mayor Tucker was relevant to the issues in this case. Weisert v. Bramman, 358 Mo. 636, 216 S.W.2d 430[1] (1948). It has been repeatedly held that statements by a deceased evidencing his state of mind, where relevant, though not admissible to prove the truth of the facts stated, are admissible to show his state of mind. State ex rel. Smith v. Hughes, 356 Mo. 1, 200 S.W.2d 360 (banc 1947). In Rackers & Baclesse, Inc. v. Kinstler, 497 S.W.2d 549, 554 (Mo.App.1973) it is said: “The hearsay rule, however, has no application where the extra-judicial utterance is offered, not as evidence of the truth of the facts asserted therein, but to show the reasons for the witnesses’ actions.” Ensign v. Home for the Jewish Aged, 274 S.W.2d 502 (Mo.App.1955) involved a case of duress in which the court quoted from White v. Scarritt, 341 Mo. 1004, 111 S.W.2d 18, 24 (1937): “It was proper to permit plaintiff and others to testify as to [plaintiff’s state of mind] after the filing of the suit and during the negotiations with reference to the same.” Id. 111 S.W.2d at 507.
The court did not err in admitting this evidence.
Commission contends that the court abused its discretion when it refused to permit it to amend its reply to City’s counterclaim so as to include the defenses of estoppel and statute of limitations.
[723]*723This action was commenced on October 24,1969. City’s counterclaim was filed July 13, 1970 and Commission’s reply was filed October 30, 1970. Summary judgment was entered in favor of City and the cause was appealed to the Supreme Court. That judgment was reversed and remanded for trial on May 14,1974. The court held that there were material factual issues that were unresolved. State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. City of St. Louis, 509 S.W.2d 126 (Mo.1974). The cause was set and trial was had on June 23, 1975. On May 13, 1975, Commission filed its motion for leave to file an amended reply.5 As argued by Commission, Rule 55.33 admonishes that “leave [to amend] shall be freely given when justice so requires. . . . ” V.A.M.R. 55.33(a). The rule also provides, among other things, that after a responsive pleading has been filed “a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party. . . . ”
In Kopff v. Miller, 501 S.W.2d 532, 535-36 (Mo.App.1973) this court said: “It has been consistently held that while courts should be liberal in permitting amendments to pleadings, whether a particular amendment should be permitted is primarily within the sound judicial discretion of the trial judge whose action will not be disturbed where there is no showing that such discretion has been palpably and obviously abused.”
In this case the counterclaim of City had been pending for about four and one-half years. The cause had been pending in the trial court for one year after remand by the Supreme Court. The cause was to be tried in a little over a month from the date that Commission first asked leave to amend. In this case Commission was represented by the same counsel from the beginning of the litigation. The court was not bound by a restrictive local rule in making its determination but did so in the exercise of its discretion. We find no abuse of that discretion in this case. See also Boling v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 466 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Mo.1971).
Commission complains that the court erred in giving Instruction 8 which reads: “Your verdict must be for defendants upon Counts I, II, III and IV of plaintiff’s petition if you do not believe the defendants agreed to pay the right-of-way costs.” It is contended that there was no evidence to warrant submission of this instruction.
Instruction 8 is a converse instruction. Commission’s verdict directing instructions required the jury to find, as to each of the four counts, that City agreed to pay the percentage of right-of-way costs set out in the contracts. Commission chose to require a finding of this issue by the jury and as said in McCarty v. Milgram Food Stores, Inc., 252 S.W.2d 343, 344 (Mo.1952), “It . . . added nothing to the burden assumed,by plaintiff ... no demonstrable prejudice could result from the giving of [the] instruction . . .” The court did not err in giving Instruction 8.
Commission urges that the court erred in permitting City to introduce evidence concerning payments made by City to Commission on contracts other than those contracts mentioned in the four counts of Commission’s petition because such evidence was beyond the scope of the pleadings.
Paragraph 5 of City’s counterclaim is singled out by Commission. It reads:
“5. That defendant City has paid sums of money amounting to $16,973,006.33 in total, to Relator under the mistaken belief that the aforesaid invalid contracts and payments made thereunder together with other payments made for right-of-way costs were required under the Constitution and laws of the State of Missouri as reimbursement to Relator of a portion of the cost of right-of-way acquisitions for highway construction within the confines of City.”
We shall also set out paragraph 6 which reads:
“6. That defendant City has paid said sums of money to Relator under duress in [724]*724that Relator required said payments to be made as a condition precedent to the construction by Relator of highways within the confines of City.”
It was stipulated by the parties that the sums paid by City under contracts sued upon by Commission were $5,022,984.97 as alleged in Commission’s petition. It was further stipulated that in addition to the $5,022,984.97, City paid Commission $8,838,-825.03 all of which was for right-of-way costs on projects within the City of St. Louis; that City was required by Commission to make such payments in accordance with Commission’s policy; that Commission “required defendant, City of St. Louis, to sign alleged contracts substantially similar to the alleged contracts . . . [sued upon by Commission] incorporating the requirement as to right of way costs to be paid by defendant, City of St. Louis, in regard to all of such projects as a condition precedent to the beginning of construction by relator, State Highway Commission of Missouri, on all of such projects.”; that all of the contracts were drawn by Commission and no modification of the terms of the contracts so far as the payment for right-of-way costs or the required percentage of payment was allowed by Commission.
Commission did not file a motion for more definite statement or a motion to strike and does not contend that the counterclaim does not state a claim.
It is generally held that when a pleading is first attacked by objection to the introduction of evidence it will be given “a most liberal construction.” Hawkins v. Paeben, 332 Mo. 479, 58 S.W.2d 437 (1933). There is no doubt that paragraph 5 was not pleaded with the particularity required of good pleading. However, Commission waived the defect by not filing a motion for more definite statement. Hamilton v. Linn, 355 Mo. 1178, 200 S.W.2d 69[10] (1947).
It is apparent in this case that Commission was not misled by the pleading as evidenced by the stipulation entered into by the parties in which it is stated that City made payments “other” than those under the contracts sued upon by Commission of over $8,000,000 for right-of-way costs, and that the payments were made under contracts similar to those sued upon by Commission. Paragraph 6 of the counterclaim alleges that the payments were the result of duress. In Chaffin v. County of Christian, 359 S.W.2d 730 (Mo. banc 1962) a stipulation of facts was filed. The court denied an attack upon the petition holding that the petition, being consistent with the facts stipulated, would be treated as if amended to embrace the issues made by the facts. We here also treat the counterclaim amended to embrace the facts stipulated. Commission was fully apprised of the issues it was required to face and suffered no prejudice by reason of the defect in City’s counterclaim. We find no merit in this issue.
Commission alleges that the trial court erred in permitting City’s counsel to engage in closing argument that was “highly prejudicial” and invited the jury to “consider the interests of its members” and “place itself in the role of a participant and advocate in the litigation.” Commission contends that City was allowed to argue to the jury that by its verdict it could demonstrate that the citizens of St. Louis would not be pushed around by the citizens of rural Missouri and to tell the jury that the citizens of St. Louis would be the direct beneficiaries of a verdict rendered in favor of the City.
Commission’s brief emphasizes the prejudicial impact of the statements and the effect they had on the ability of the jury to render an impartial verdict. The objections made by Commission to the argument were:
“I object, Your Honor, this is outside the record and improper argument.”
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“. . .1 object to this; it is improper argument.”
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“Objection, Your Honor, that’s totally outside the record and irrelevant.”
On this appeal Commission does not contend that the argument was outside the record. [725]*725Commission must therefore depend upon its objection of “irrelevant” or “improper argument” to preserve any issue for our consideration. We hold this general objection insufficient to preserve the alleged errors for review. Gilmore v. Union Construction Co., 439 S.W.2d 763, 767 (Mo.1969); Cassin v. Theodorow, 504 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Mo.App.1973).
An objection should be specific in identifying why an argument is improper and in asking the court for an appropriate curative measure. Larson v. Alton & Southern Railroad, 431 S.W.2d 687, 692 (Mo.App.1968); State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Drisko, 537 S.W.2d 645, 648 (Mo.App.1976). When a party fails to state a specific ground for an objection he improperly places the burden on the court to determine why an argument is improper and his objection may properly be overruled on that basis alone. When, as here, the court may have based its ruling on any number of grounds an appellate court will usually defer to the trial court’s discretion. Only when an argument is so clearly improper or so manifestly prejudicial that the court’s ruling constituted a clear abuse of discretion will such a general objection preserve an error for review. Dodd v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad, 353 Mo. 799, 184 S.W.2d 454, 458 (1945); Critcher v. Rudy Fick, Inc., 315 S.W.2d 421, 428 (Mo.1958); Cassin v. Theodorow, 504 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Mo.App.1973).
Considering respondent’s argument in its entirety, we are unable to conclude that it was infirm under such a standard. In this case respondents claimed that municipalities with populations in excess of 5,000 were required to execute contracts involving large sums of money on the threat that needed roads would not otherwise be built. In this context the remarks were not unduly prejudicial and merely repeated facts the jury was well aware of. Any possible prejudice resulting from the remark that the taxpayers’ money was involved was lessened because of counsel’s earlier statements to the same effect that had not been objected to. Carrel v. Wilkerson, 507 S.W.2d 82, 87 (Mo.App.1974). This point is ruled against Commission.
Commission in two of its points takes issue with City’s defense of ultra vires as submitted. This issue is directed solely to City’s defense to Count IV of Commission’s petition. City pleaded that the contract alleged in Count IV of Commission’s petition had been entered into as a result of duress on the part of Commission and that the contract was ultra vires in that it violated Article VI, Section 26(a) of the Missouri Constitution 1945, which reads:
“No county, city, incorporated town or village, school district or other political corporation or subdivision of the state shall become indebted in an amount exceeding in any year the income and revenue provided for such year plus any unencumbered balances from previous years, except as otherwise provided in this constitution.”
City submitted the following instruction based upon the defense of ultra vires:
“Your verdict must be for defendants upon Count IV of plaintiff’s petition if you believe that the defendant City of St. Louis had no unencumbered funds from the fiscal years prior to the fiscal year beginning April 1, 1966, with which to pay the claimed right-of-way costs for Highway 1 — 44 and that other expenditures in the defendant City of St. Louis’ budget beginning April 1, 1966, had a priority status over the amount for the claimed right-of-way costs of Highway 1-44.”
As we read Commission’s claims on this issue it contends that there was no substantial evidence that expenditures budgeted by City, other than the obligation of the contract sued upon, exceeded the income and revenue provided for the fiscal year 1966-67.6 Commission does not claim that there [726]*726were unencumbered funds from fiscal years prior to fiscal year 1966-67 available for payments called for under the contract.
Commission relies upon Webb City & C. Waterworks Co. v. City of Carterville, 142 Mo. 101, 43 S.W. 625 (1897). In that case the City of Carterville entered into a contract with plaintiff’s assignor for rental of hydrants for the supply of water to the City. Suit was filed for monies due under the contract. Carterville interposed the defense of ultra vires. It claimed that the income and revenue of the City for any one year was not sufficient to pay the hydrant rental after paying its current expenses for the maintenance of the City government. The trial court, in ruling that the contract was ultra vires, considered keeping streets in repair, expenses of City elections, publishing City ordinances, boarding of prisoners and supplies for the City jail, cost of preparing tax books, and necessary supplies for City officials as “necessary expenses.”
On appeal the court opined that a determination of what should be included in “current and necessary expenses,” was pivotal to the question of whether indebtedness exceeded income and revenue provided for any given year. For this determination it turned to Section 4977, Rev.St.1889, the predecessor to Section 513.410 Rev.St.1969, which read:
“Whenever an execution, issued out of any court of record in this state, against any incorporated town or city, shall be returned unsatisfied, in whole or in part, for want of property whereon to levy, such court at the return term or any subsequent term thereof shall, by writ of mandamus, order and compel the chief officer, trustees, council and all other proper officers of such city or town, to levy, assess and collect the annual taxes in such town or city from year to year, as occasion may require, within the constitutional limits, and order the same, when collected by the proper officer or officers, to be paid to the execution creditor, his agent or assigns, except such amount as may be necessary to pay the reasonable salary allowed by law to the mayor, council, assessor, marshal, constable, attorney and a reasonable police force of any such town or city. (R.S. 1939, § 1397)”
The court then held 43 S.W. l. c. 629:
“It will be seen by this statute that the necessary current expenses of such cities are restricted to the salaries of its officers, and of a reasonable police force, and it would seem that the same rule should apply in an action to recover a judgment under the circumstances disclosed by the record in this case that would apply in proceeding to collect the judgment in the event of one being rendered.”
The opinion in Webb City is authority for the proposition urged by Commission that expenses of a municipality for the purposes of determining whether there was a violation of Art. VI, Section 26(a) include only the salaries of certain of its officers and of a reasonable police force.
Our search of the record reveals that the evidence on this issue consisted of the ordinance providing for the appropriations for the fiscal year in question which was approved April 27,1966, the Annual Report of the Comptroller City of St. Louis for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1967 and the testimony of Mayor Poelker, who was comptroller during that year. The comptroller’s report showed that there was a deficit of $447,000 for the fiscal year under consideration.
Mayor Poelker testified that eighty percent of the operating budget was allocated to pay salaries and fringe benefits of employees and that the remaining twenty percent of the budget items had priority over highway acquisition costs.
The burden of showing that the indebtedness is void is upon the political subdivision and a mere showing of indebtedness is not sufficient. Clarence Special School District v. School District No. 67, 341 Mo. 178, 107 S.W.2d 5 (1937).
Neither party has undertaken an analysis of the exhibits that are material to our [727]*727consideration. Our search reveals that, among other items, the comptroller’s report lists expenditures for “Election and Registration.” Under this category, in addition to provision for salaries, there is an item listed as materials and expenses in the sum of $312,107.73. Other categories showing “material and expenses” are “City Workhouse”—$95,904.08; “St. Louis Chronic Hospital”—$607,082.94; “City Hospital No. 1”—$1,548,829.18; “Maintenance, Municipal Buildings”—$817,665.17; “Street Lighting” —$556,304.64.
We have not undertaken to set out all of the amounts expended upon “materials and expenses” in the numerous departments of the City government. The exhibits also reveal that funds were appropriated and expended for a large number of officers and employees who are not listed in § 513.-410. If all of the expenditures except salaries for the officers enumerated in § 513.410 were excluded the indebtedness of City would not exceed the income and revenues for the fiscal year 1966-67. It is apparent that under the authority of Webb City there was insufficient evidence of the defense of ultra vires as submitted by the instruction in this case.
We are constrained to follow Webb City as the last controlling decision of the Supreme Court although we have difficulty in comprehending its rationale. The court used § 4977 as its guide for determining whether a municipal obligation was valid. We question this approach because the statute presupposes a valid obligation and is intended to provide the means by which a judgment creditor can collect the debt. It should not be the guide for the determination of ultra vires under Art. VI, Section 26(a). Neither the constitutional provision nor the statute considered by the court in Webb City uses the words “necessary expenses.”
The purpose of Art. VI, Section 26(a) is “to abolish the credit system and to put counties and other political subdivisions on a cash basis by limiting the legal expenditures of any given year to the income and revenue of that year in the absence of some special authorization.” Missouri Toncan Culvert Co. v. Butler County, 352 Mo. 1184, 181 S.W.2d 506, 507 (1944). This constitutional provision should be strictly enforced. Id.
It would appear that once legally authorized expenditures have been budgeted to the full extent of anticipated income and revenue provided for a fiscal year it is beyond the power of the political subdivision to incur further obligations. To hold otherwise would be to permit cities to incur obligations for materials and supplies to an unlimited amount and defeat the purpose of Article VI, Section 26(a), as discussed in Missouri Toncan Culvert Company v. Butler County, supra.
To fulfill the requirement that budget items have priority it would seem reasonable to require that they be expenditures that the political subdivision is authorized by law to make. As indicated by the court in State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. City of St. Louis, 509 S.W.2d 126, 127 (Mo.1974) there should not be expenditures which are made to deplete the funds of the political subdivision for the purpose of defeating the claim being made by the creditor. State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. City of St. Louis, supra, does not, however, discuss or overrule Webb City. As previously stated we must follow Webb City.
City urges that the contract violates Art. VI, Section 26(a) in that it requires payments to be made over a period of years. In Grand River Tp., De Kalb County v. Cooke Sales & Serv., 267 S.W.2d 322 (Mo. 1954) the court said l. c. 325:
“[T]he Constitution prohibits any political subdivision of the state from becoming ‘indebted in an amount exceeding in any year the income and revenue provided for such year’, 26(a), except ‘by vote of two-thirds of the qualified electors thereof voting thereon’. 26(b). It has been well established that this means no contract of such a political subdivision is valid which obligates it to make payments in subsequent calendar years.”
[728]*728The position which City now urges was not the theory upon which the ease was tried and submitted to the trial court. Corning Truck & Radiator Service v. J.W.M., Inc., 542 S.W.2d 520, 527 (Mo.App.1976).
We have reviewed the transcript and we cannot say as a matter of law that the contract called for payments to be made over a period of years. Commission’s petition alleges that it made billings for sums due under the contract in November 1966, January 1967, February 1968 and April 1969. These allegations were denied by City although City did stipulate that the total sum prayed for in Count IV was $2,227,327.18. We can thus find no admission by Commission that would warrant a finding as a matter of law that there was a .violation of Art. VI, Section 26(a) of the Constitution of Missouri.
The court erred in its submission of the issue of ultra vires and that portion of the judgment in favor of City on Count IV of Commission’s petition must be reversed and remanded for a new trial.
In conclusion we note that Commission has urged that the duress necessary in this case was that referred to as “Business Compulsion or Economic Duress” which would require that the victim be put at such disadvantage as to destroy the business. This was not the theory of City’s defense or counterclaim. What we have heretofore said sufficiently disposes of this issue.
We have reviewed all other matters raised by the parties and find they are without merit and require no further discussion.
For the reasons stated, Count IV of Commission’s cause of action is reversed and remanded for a new trial. The judgment in all other respects is affirmed.7
REINHARD, J., concurs.
APPENDIX