State Ex Rel. Plaia v. Louisiana State Board of Health

296 So. 2d 809, 1974 La. LEXIS 3586
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedJune 10, 1974
Docket54269
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 296 So. 2d 809 (State Ex Rel. Plaia v. Louisiana State Board of Health) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State Ex Rel. Plaia v. Louisiana State Board of Health, 296 So. 2d 809, 1974 La. LEXIS 3586 (La. 1974).

Opinion

296 So.2d 809 (1974)

STATE of Louisiana ex rel. Frank PLAIA
v.
LOUISIANA STATE BOARD OF HEALTH.

No. 54269.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

June 10, 1974.

William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Warren E. Mouledoux, First Asst. Atty. Gen., Paul J. Ferlita, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant-appellant.

James P. Screen, New Orleans, for La. Bd. of Health, defendant-appellee.

Harry A. Burglass, Metairie, for plaintiff-appellant.

DIXON, Justice.

In litigation commenced in June of 1971, the Louisiana Board of Health was ordered to issue a birth certificate to Elizabeth Maria Plaia designating her race as "white." State ex rel. Plaia v. Louisiana State Board of Health, La.App., 275 So.2d 201 (1973). Subsequently, alleging that only a "short form" birth registration card *810 had been issued instead of a regular birth certificate, Plaia sought to compel compliance with the judgment of the Court of Appeal. In answer to the rule, defendant argues that it is obligated to enforce Act 46 of 1970 (R.S. 42:267) until it is declared unconstitutional, and that its compliance be adjudged sufficient. Plaintiff then filed a supplemental petition asking that Act 46 of 1970 be declared unconstitutional because it provided no definitions for the terms used in the statute, and because it was unconstitutionally discriminatory because it referred only to persons of Negro blood.

The statute involved states:

"In signifying race, a person having one-thirty second or less of Negro blood shall not be deemed, described or designated by any public official in the state of Louisiana as `colored,' a `mulatto,' a `black,' a `negro,' a `griffe,' an `Afro-American,' a `quardroon,' a `mestizo,' a `colored person' or a `person of color.'"

In brief and argument before us the defendant board agrees with the plaintiff that the statute is unconstitutional. The attorney general, however, argues that the statute is constitutional, in that there are legitimate governmental reasons for racial classification, and that the statute can be administered.

None of the parties before us take the position that there is no legitimate governmental interest in racial designation on birth certificates. That question is not before us. We are only required to decide whether R.S. 42:267 is so vague that it cannot be administered, or whether it is null because of invidious racial discrimination.

It is neither.

The act prohibits "any public official" from describing or designating any person as a Negro (or as any of the listed terms sometimes used to refer to persons of Negro blood) unless that person has more than one-thirty-second of Negro blood. The act is clear and simple. It does not require the racial designation of any person. "In signifying race, a person having one-thirty second (sic) or less of Negro blood shall not be deemed, described or designated by any public official in the state of Louisiana as `colored' . . ."

A reasonable explanation of the legislative purpose of the act is that it was a definition, not of the terms indicated in the title, but of the phrase "traceable amount," formerly of legal significance in racial designation in this State. Sunseri v. Cassagne, 195 La. 19, 196 So. 7 (1940). Louisiana is now prohibited, by R.S. 42:267, from designating as "Negro" those persons with only a "traceable amount" of Negro blood.

The district judge was persuaded by opinions of the Court of Appeal which found that terms used in the act (colored, mulatto, black, griffe, Afro-American, etc.) were vague and not sufficiently defined. State, ex rel. Plaia, supra; Thomas v. Louisiana State Board of Health, La.App. 278 So.2d 915 (1973). In those cases the court assumed, as does the defendant, that the defendant is required to take some action in racial designation based on the terms used in the act. That assumption is unwarranted. The act merely prohibits the use of such racial terms unless the person described has more than one-thirty-second Negro blood.

R.S. 40:242-40:245 govern the registration of child births in Orleans Parish. The physician, midwife or parent is required to file the certificate with the local registrar. R.S. 40:243. The required information to be shown on this certificate is detailed in R.S. 40:244. Certificates on file may not be altered except on receipt of acceptable evidence, pursuant to regulations of the board. R.S. 40:266, 40:322. In order to justify a change in birth registration, the evidence must leave no room for doubt. State, ex rel. Schlumbrecht v. Louisiana State Board of Health, La.App., *811 231 So.2d 730 (1970). Except as provided in R.S. 40:158, the registrar "shall, upon request, furnish to any applicant a certified copy of any birth . . . certificate filed in his office . . ." R.S. 40:156.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. That part of the judgment holding Act 46 of 1970 unconstitutional is reversed. That part of the judgment ordering the Louisiana State Board of Health, through the local registrar for the Parish of Orleans, to issue a certified copy of the certificate of live birth of Elizabeth Maria Plaia, born March 10, 1965 at Ochsner Foundation Hospital to Grace Lucille Raphiel, wife of Frank Joseph Plaia, Jr., is affirmed.

BARHAM, J., dissents for reasons assigned.

BARHAM, Justice (dissenting).

I am of the opinion that the majority errs in holding La.R.S. 42:267 constitutional. While this statute fixes an inflexible mathematical test, no legislative attempt has been made to establish how the test is to be met, the burden of proof to be applied, or the type of evidence needed to establish the required percentage of racial ancestry. The problems of the statute in this regard were amply discussed in the appellate decision in this case on the merits. 275 So.2d 201, 203 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1973).

"The Act does not purport to provide the Registrar with any guide as to his mode of computation or as to the meaning of words in the Act and may be considered quite vague in this regard. The Registrar's problem is, therefore, two-fold. First of all, he must undertake to produce a mathematical result by using an equation consisting of many unknown, namely, the terms used on old documents in his possession classifying the ancestors of the child as "colored," "mulatto," "French," "mixed race," "brown," which terms are uncertain insofar as they call for any specific fractions of Negro blood in the individuals so designated. The other part of the Registrar's problem is that as he tries to prove what each of these various terms means in terms of percentage of Negro blood he is operating within the stringent framework of the Schlumbrecht burden of proof."

The enforceability of the act and the problems thereunder were also considered in Thomas v. Louisiana State Board of Health, 278 So.2d 915 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1973) and Messina v. Ciaccio, Director of the Bureau of Vital Statistics, Louisiana State Health Department, 290 So.2d 339 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1974).

The act is drawn as unworkable and unenforceable. If enforceability were the only question, I might agree with the majority's declaration of constitutionality, since the statute does not require anyone to do anything, but merely prohibits certain action. However, the administrative regulations[1] promulgated to enforce this *812 act do require positive action that leads to a denial of equal protection of the law.

The act only applies to one race, the Negro race.

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Related

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