State Ex Rel. Plaia v. Louisiana State Bd. of Health

275 So. 2d 201, 1973 La. App. LEXIS 6151
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedMarch 13, 1973
Docket5269
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 275 So. 2d 201 (State Ex Rel. Plaia v. Louisiana State Bd. of Health) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State Ex Rel. Plaia v. Louisiana State Bd. of Health, 275 So. 2d 201, 1973 La. App. LEXIS 6151 (La. Ct. App. 1973).

Opinion

275 So.2d 201 (1973)

STATE of Louisiana, ex rel. Frank PLAIA
v.
LOUISIANA STATE BOARD OF HEALTH.

No. 5269.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.

March 13, 1973.

*202 Harry A. Burglass, Metairie, for plaintiff-appellant.

James P. Screen, New Orleans, for defendant-appellee.

Before SAMUEL, GULOTTA and SCHOTT, JJ.

GULOTTA, Judge.

This is a mandamus proceeding brought by relator, a parent of Elizabeth Maria Plia[1] (five years of age) to issue a birth certificate designating thereon the child to be of the white or Caucasian, race. There does not appear to be any problem or question as to race on the paternal side of the child's ancestry. The problem lies on the mother's side. From a dismissal of her action, relator appeals.

The facts are that upon the birth of the child on March 10, 1965, in Jefferson Parish, the mother filed a certificate of live birth indicating the child to be white. Error was detected by the Registrar, and the birth registration was "flagged". No certificate was issued pursuant to regulations of July 29, 1966,[2] of the Registrar which provides that the State Registrar is authorized in behalf of the Board to investigate all errors, irregularities, or violations of the law and regulations, including all conflicts and information which he may discover or may be brought to his attention. During such investigation, according to the regulation, the Registrar shall suspend the issuance of any questionable certificate pending clarification or correction. This was done by the Registrar in this case. No birth certificate was issued because, according to the Registrar's records, there was some question as to the race of the child. This mandamus suit followed.

It is plaintiff's contention that the recent case of State ex rel. Schlumbrecht v. Louisiana State Board of Health, 231 So.2d 730 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1970), writs refused, 256 La. 69, 235 So.2d 97, decided by this court, is controlling in our case. In that case the court points out that there were inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the words "mulatto", "free persons of color", and "colored" and that such designations in the record of the Registrar are incorrectly used, and, therefore, are suspect and inaccurate. The opinion further adopts the rule that the records of the Registrar of Vital Statistics can be changed only when *203 there is "no room for doubt".[3] In the Schlumbrecht case, the factual situation is similar to ours. It is appellant's contention, therefore, that we are controlled by the holding and language in Schlumbrecht. He asserts we are compelled in this case to apply the standard of proof set out in that case. Since, according to relator, a serious doubt exists, the certificate should be issued showing the race designation "white".

On the other hand, it is the contention of the Registrar that Act 46 of 1970[4] provides when a person has more than 1/32 Negro blood, that person is black. He asserts that according to the information in his possession, this child has 5.75/32 Negro blood and accordingly, he cannot issue a certificate indicating the race designation to be white.

According to the terms of Act, in this case the Registrar can be required to issue a certificate with the classification of white unless the child can be shown to possess more than 1/32 Negro blood. Conversely, he declares that the Act by implication authorizes him to issue a certificate classifying the child as black in such cases.

The Act does not purport to provide the Registrar with any guide as to his mode of computation or as to the meaning of words in the Act and may be considered quite vague in this regard. The Registrar's problem is, therefore, two-fold. First of all, he must undertake to produce a mathematical result by using an equation consisting of many unknowns, namely, the terms used on old documents in his possession classifying the ancestors of the child as "colored," "mulatto," "French," "mixed race," "brown," which terms are uncertain insofar as they call for any specific fractions of Negro blood in the individuals so designated. The other part of the Registrar's problem is that as he tries to prove what each of these various terms means in terms of percentage of Negro blood he is operating within the stringent framework of the Schlumbrecht burden of proof.

Nevertheless, the Registrar concludes that Elizabeth Plaia has more than 1/32 Negro blood by defining a "mulatto," "free person of color," and "colored" as one who possesses ½ Negro blood. We decline to accept this premise. We fail to find authority which would allow a conclusion as suggested by the Registrar that a mulatto or colored as ½ black. A reading of the case of State v. Treadaway et al., 126 La. 300, 52 So. 500 (1910), wherein the court made an exhaustive review of the terminology relating to race, leads to a conclusion that the definition of the terms mulatto, colored, and Negro do not include any definitive or specific mathematical percentage of Negro blood in proportion to white blood.

In the instant case, were we to use the term mulatto to include ½ black, we would conclude that he possesses more than 1/32 Negro blood. On the other hand, were we to use the term mulatto to include 1/8 black, or 1/16 black, a different result would follow. In the absence of clear legislative expression and intent of the definition of the terms, we cannot supply those percentages with any degree of reliability. We agree with that part of Schlumbrecht as pointed out by plaintiff, which indicates that the race designations used are questionable.

As an example, the Registrar relies wholly on census records to determine *204 the classification of an individual[5] even though the law is settled to the effect that census exhibits are to be considered as a part of the whole picture but are not in themselves conclusive. State ex rel. Schlumbrecht v. Louisiana State Board of Health, supra; State ex rel. Francis v. Louisiana State Board of Health, 179 So.2d 681 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965); State ex rel. Soulet v. City of New Orleans, 94 So.2d 108 (La. App.Orl.App.1957).

In the census records which are on file in this case, they show that the form provided to the person making the census allowed only five options to designate color, namely, white, black, mulatto, Chinese or Indian. When the census taker filled in that part of the form he certainly did not intend the entry of mulatto to mean that the person was half black because it would then follow that anyone who was anything less than ½ Negro would have been placed on the census record as white, a conclusion which hardly seems realistic. It would be more logical to conclude that the census taker inserted the term "mulatto" to designate anyone who did not appear all white or all black, and if the Negro blood is still traceable to the 1/16[6], it is a fair conclusion that some of those so listed on the census reports had as little as 1/16 Negro blood and certainly many did not have as much as ½ Negro blood.

Furthermore, a review of the record shows additionally the unreliability of the race designations used by the Registrar. The brothers and sisters of Lucille Grace Raphial Plaia, the mother of Elizabeth and wife of relator appear in the records of the Registrar as "French," "mulatto," and "colored". Lucille Plaia's birth is registered as mixed. The Registrar, for the purpose of his calculations, considers her to be 11.5/32 black.

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Related

Doe v. STATE, DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN RES.
479 So. 2d 369 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1985)
State Ex Rel. Plaia v. Louisiana State Board of Health
296 So. 2d 809 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1974)

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Bluebook (online)
275 So. 2d 201, 1973 La. App. LEXIS 6151, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-plaia-v-louisiana-state-bd-of-health-lactapp-1973.