State Ex Rel. Munch v. Davis

196 So. 491, 143 Fla. 236
CourtSupreme Court of Florida
DecidedMay 28, 1940
StatusPublished
Cited by28 cases

This text of 196 So. 491 (State Ex Rel. Munch v. Davis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State Ex Rel. Munch v. Davis, 196 So. 491, 143 Fla. 236 (Fla. 1940).

Opinion

Chapman, J.

On petition of Dr. George A. Munch an alternative writ of mandamus issued by this Court directed to the State Board of Medical Examiners, commanding said Board to restore the name of relator George A. Munch to the roll as a legally licensed physician and surgeon in the State of Florida and to reinstate his name and to vacate an order previously made by said Board revoking the license of the relator to practice medicine in Florida.

The alternative writ further alleged that on June 16, 1930, the Board of Medical Examiners, at Lakeland, Florida, without notice, without having served a summons on him, without any proper basis for charges against him, and without opportunity to be heard or answer certain alleged charges, made and entered an order revoking relator’s license to practice medicine in Florida.

The return of the Board of Medical Examiners to the alternative writ of mandamus in effect denied that the order made by the Board to revoke the license of the relator was without notice, but states that summons or notice was served upon him and the relator had full opportunity to appear, answer and refute the charges prior to the entry of the order on June 16, 1930.

Attached to the return is a photostatic copy of summons dated May 30, 1930, requiring relator to appear at the Thelma. Flotel, Lakeland, Polk County, Florida, on June *239 16, 1930, and show cause why the license to practice medicine should not be revoked.

The charge preferred by the Board against the relator was that George A. Munch was convicted in' the Federal Courts of the United States at Tampa, of a felony, to-wit: using the United States mail to defraud, having sold bogus diplomas and license through the United States mail contrary to law. The relator was confined to the Federal Prison in Atlanta and was serving a sentence when notice to appear and copy of information was sent through the United States mail addressed to the relator at Atlanta, Georgia, and the said George A. Munch signed a receipt for such notice on May 31, 1930, and the certificate of delivery by the Warden is, viz.:

“I certify that the record as shown by this photostatic copy is a record of registered mail received in the United States Penitentiary, and that I am the keeper of such record.
“The record shows the receipt of a registered letter, Post Office No. 55978, as evidenced by the signature of prisoner George A. Mun'ch, Reg. No. 33312, United States Penitentiary, said letter being received at this institution June 2, 1930.
“(s) Joseph W. Sanford
“Joseph W. Sanford,
“Warden.”

The return further shows that the registered letter Post Office No. 55978 was receipted for and acknowledged on June 2, 1930, at the United States Penitentiary at Atlanta, Georgia, by George A. Munch, whose regulation number was 33312, and that the aforesaid' registered letter contained a copy of the summons issued by the Board requiring the relator to appear at Lakeland, Florida, on June 16, 1930, *240 together with a copy of tire charge or information against the relator as preferred by the Board.

It is contended by the relator that the registered letter containing a copy of the charges preferred and the notice of the hearing to be held at Lakeland, Florida, on June 16, 1930, and received by the relator at the Federal Prison at Atlanta when a prisoner on June 2, 1930, was not due process of law within the meaning of the State and Federal Constitutions.

In the case of State ex rel. Tullidge v. Hollingsworth, 108 Fla. 607, 146 So. 660, this Court when considering the notice as provided for by Subsection (i) of Section 3415 C. G. L., said:

“We do not ¡hold that legal services on the accused cannot be made by registered mail or that the accused can ignore or run' away from such service with impunity, but we do hold that the Board has no right to proceed to the examination of a cause till it has positive proof that service was made on the accused and reasonable time must be given to employ counsel and prepare his defense. Failure to observe any of these requirements and to leave the accused in position to have his case reviewed by the courts is a violation of the plain mandate of the law.”

See State ex rel. Tullidge v. Hollingsworth, 103 Fla. 801, 138 So. 372.

It will be observed that Subsection (i) of Section 3415 C. G. L. provides that when charges are filed, a time and place for the hearing of said charges shall be fixed by the Board and a copy of the charges, together with a notice of the time and place when they will be heard and determined shall be served upon the accused at least ten days before the date actually fixed for the hearing. The date of the hearing in the case at bar was June 16, 1930, at the *241 Thelma Hotel in Lakeland, Florida, and the notice of the hearing was served upon the relator more than ten days prior to the date of the hearing.

On the question of the sufficiency of the notice 16 C. J. Secundum at page 1256, in' part, said:

“The legislature may prescribe what notice shall be given, subject to the condition that the notice prescribed must conform to the requirement of due process of law by affording an' opportunity to be heard, and in certain cases the character of notice may rest in the discretion of the court. A method of service, although prescribed by statute, is not sufficient if it does not amount to due process of law; but due process is satisfied by timely and sufficient notice of proceedings with an adequate hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction, and no matter what its character, a notice is sufficient if it actually results in bringing the party into court in due time to protect his interests.”

See Western Life Indemnity Co. v. Rupp, 235 U. S. 261, 59 L. Ed. 220, 35 Sup. Ct. 37; 12 C. J. 1230, 1232, 1233; 12 Am. Jur. 289, par. 594.

We therefore hold that there is no merit in the assignment presented.

The relator contends further that his conviction' in the Federal Court in Hillsborough County, Florida, during the year 1929 of a felony and a sentence therefor in the Federal Prison for a period of. five years was not a conviction of a felony as contemplated by Subsection (b) of Section 3415 C. G. L. as would authorize the Board to revoke, suspend or annul the license to practice medicine under the laws of Florida. One of the exhibits attached to the return' discloses that the relator was convicted for using the United States mails to defraud, having sold bogus diplomas *242 and licenses through the United States mail’s, and the same is made a felony by a Federal Statute.

The law provides for the annulment or revocation of a physician’s license when' he has been convicted in a court of competent jurisdiction of a felony. The conviction of a felony for any offense which if committed.

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Bluebook (online)
196 So. 491, 143 Fla. 236, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-munch-v-davis-fla-1940.