State Ex Rel. Moyer v. Sharonville F.D., Unpublished Decision (2-15-2005)

2005 Ohio 587
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedFebruary 15, 2005
DocketNo. 04AP-92.
StatusUnpublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 2005 Ohio 587 (State Ex Rel. Moyer v. Sharonville F.D., Unpublished Decision (2-15-2005)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State Ex Rel. Moyer v. Sharonville F.D., Unpublished Decision (2-15-2005), 2005 Ohio 587 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).

Opinion

DECISION
{¶ 1} Relator, Lory Moyer, has filed this original action requesting that this court issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio ("commission") to vacate its order denying relator's application for permanent total disability ("PTD") compensation and ordering the commission pursuant to State ex rel. Gay v. Mihm (1994),69 Ohio St.3d 315 to enter an order granting relator's application.

{¶ 2} Pursuant to Civ.R. 53 and Loc.R. 12(M) of the Tenth Appellate District, this matter was referred to a magistrate. The magistrate has rendered a decision including findings of fact and conclusions of law, and has concluded that this court should deny the requested writ. (Attached as Appendix A.) Relator has filed objections to the magistrate's decision, and the matter is now before the court for independent review pursuant to Civ.R. 53(E).

{¶ 3} Relator's claim for a work-related injury sustained on June 22, 1981, was allowed for "broken left foot; left shoulder sprain; damage to sciatic nerve; injury to low back; peroneal distribution neuropathy; vascular changes on the leg; herniated lumbar disc."

{¶ 4} At the time of filing relator's PTD application he was 65 years old, a high school graduate, and stated that he could read, write, and perform basic math. He provided an affidavit that he was only able to walk about one block before having to rest for 15 or 20 minutes, that he could stand continuously for only five minutes and then must sit or lie down for 15 to 30 minutes, and that he is only able to sit continuously for between 15 and 20 minutes.

{¶ 5} Relator supported his application with the report of Peter J. Fagerland, D.C., who opined that relator suffered an 85 percent whole person impairment and should be considered permanently and totally disabled.

{¶ 6} Relator was examined by James T. Lutz, M.D., who opined that relator had reached maximum medical improvement. Dr. Lutz assessed a 38 percent whole person impairment, and opined that relator would be capable of performing some sustained remunerative employment, if sedentary in nature and provided that he be able to sit and stand as desired for comfort. Dr. Lutz provided an occupational activity assessment noting that relator could not reach overhead with the upper left extremity, could sit, stand and walk for zero to three hours; lift, carry, push, pull or otherwise move up to 10 pounds for zero to three hours; occasionally climb stairs and use foot controls; never climb ladders, crouch, stoop, bend or kneel, and that relator was unrestricted in his ability to handle objects and to reach at waist and knee level. In a subsequent deposition conducted on behalf of relator, Dr. Lutz testified that relator's subjective complaints of pain were consistent with the allowed conditions, and despite his sitting impairment relator would be able to sit for approximately three hours per day if allowed to take frequent breaks and stand up or walk around for five to 10 minutes.

{¶ 7} Relator also provided a vocational report prepared by Jennifer J. Stoeckel, Ph.D. Dr. Stoeckel concluded that, even based upon the report of Dr. Lutz, relator should be found to be permanently and totally disabled as there existed no jobs within his residual functional capacities that could accommodate the restrictions set forth by Dr. Lutz. Dr. Stoeckel further noted that relator had no transferable work skills, was approaching advanced age, that his high school diploma in contemporary academic terms equated to a seventh grade academic level, and had below average scores on most work aptitudes.

{¶ 8} The record contains another employability assessment prepared by G. Denver Risley, opining that relator could immediately perform the following jobs: "auction clerk, information clerk, maintenance scheduler, or procurement clerk," and could with additional training perform work as a "lumber estimator, credit authorizer, mail order clerk, jewelry preparer or engraver." Risley noted that relator possessed some vocational strengths because of his twelfth grade education, absence of psychological issues, fair walking and sitting capacity, and work history of semi-skilled work. Risley's report noted similar vocational limitations to the other reports in the record: limited standing capacity, approaching advanced age, lack of transferable supervisory skills, and absence of work history since 1982. At a subsequent deposition, Risley testified that, given the restriction regarding overhead lifting, relator could not perform the clerk positions previously set forth, and that Dr. Stoeckel's testing appeared to be accurate in that relator was performing substantially below a twelfth grade level.

{¶ 9} The commission's staff hearing officer ("SHO") issued an order denying the requested PTD compensation. The SHO relied primarily on the reports and deposition testimony of Dr. Lutz, finding that relator could engage in sedentary work activity, could draw upon a 28-year history of semi-skilled work as a forklift operator, and could, with accommodation for his inability to sit for extended periods, perform the clerking positions outlined above. The SHO accordingly found that relator was able to engage in sustained remunerative activity and is not permanently and totally disabled.

{¶ 10} The magistrate concluded that the commission had not abused its discretion by finding that relator was capable of performing sustained remunerative employment because the commission could properly rely upon the medical report of Dr. Lutz to find that relator was capable of working at least four hours per day by combining his abilities to sit, stand, and walk. The magistrate found that, although the commission did cite certain of the vocational evidence in the record, it was not, by doing so, obligated to necessarily agree with the ultimate conclusion reached by those vocational experts cited. With the job classifications proposed which could offer the option of changing positions as required by relator to accommodate his limitations, the commission's order is supported by some evidence of vocational aptitude meeting the requirements of State ex rel. Noll v. Indus. Comm. (1991),57 Ohio St.3d 203.

{¶ 11} Relator's objections to the magistrate's decision principally center on the magistrate's conclusion that recent Ohio Supreme Court decisions involving part-time work and the definition of sustained remunerative employment now define the availability of sedentary employment based upon the ability to work four hours per day. Relator also asserts that the magistrate improperly ignored testimony by Dr. Lutz that relator's frequent breaks from a sitting or standing position would need to be taken away from the work station. Relator argues that there is no evidence in the record that any jobs exist that can accommodate the changes of positions for relator as specified in the SHO's order.

{¶ 12} Despite the objections of relator, this court agrees with the magistrate's analysis of the facts and application of the law. In particular, we find that the magistrate has correctly analyzed State exrel. Libecap v. Indus. Comm. (Sept. 5, 1996), Franklin App. No. 96APD01-29, State ex rel. Toth v. Indus. Comm. (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 360, and State ex rel. DeSalvo v. May Co. (June 29, 1999), Franklin App. No. 98AP-986 (memorandum decision) affirmed (2000),

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825 N.E.2d 162 (Ohio Supreme Court, 2005)

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Bluebook (online)
2005 Ohio 587, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-moyer-v-sharonville-fd-unpublished-decision-2-15-2005-ohioctapp-2005.