State Ex Rel. Morris v. Clymer

8 Del. 20
CourtSuperior Court of Delaware
DecidedJuly 5, 1864
StatusPublished

This text of 8 Del. 20 (State Ex Rel. Morris v. Clymer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State Ex Rel. Morris v. Clymer, 8 Del. 20 (Del. Ct. App. 1864).

Opinion

*23 By the Court.

The venditioni exponas offered in evidence cannot be admitted until after the writ of fi. fa., which it followed and upon which it was issued, has been produced and put in evidence, or its absence lias been duly accounted for and it has been supplied by the usual and proper proof ''Hts loss and contents, which cannot be done by the mere Profoxetion of the venditioni itself.

Z'fffíom. The action could be maintained although it had ^een 80 d*¿ded i11 ti-16 courts of this State, but it had jMn in the courts of other States. The same rules of law r jF Jwhich govern sheriffs in the execution of process from the higher courts, apply to constables in the execution of process from justices of the peace, except where some statute intervenes. Pixley v. Butts, 2 Cow. 421. But in England sheriffs do not enter into such bonds or recognizances, as they do in this State and in this country. The condition of a sheriffs official obligation in that country is very different and contains no such provision as we find prescribed by law in -this state, that he shall well and diligently execute all process which shall duly come to his hands as such officer, and punctually apply and pay over, according to law, all money which he shall receive pursuant to any legal process, but it has been held that an action of trover mil lie against a sheriff there at the suit of a defendant in an execution whose goods have been sold on it, to recover the excess or surplus of the sale remaining in his hands after satisfying the execution.—Seic. on Shffs. 46 Law Libr. 195. Wats, on Shffs. 7. Law Libr. 14, 15, 16. But in this State and in the States of this country, the defendant in the execution may maintain an action on his bond against the sheriff' and his sureties for such an excess or surplus. —14 Smead f Marsh. 54. 4 Littel 335. 12 TJ. S. Dig. 99, •sec.33. 4 Louis. 730. • 3 Ohio 464. 4 Dana. 194. 2 Wend. 281. 9 Wend. 233. 10 Wend. 371. 1 Harr. 126. 3 Dev. f Bat. 55. 5 Iredell 357. 2 McMul. 327. And if the same rules of law which govern sheriffs govern constables, as he had before stated, in such cases, there could be no doubt of the right of the plaintiff to maintain the action.

*24 Eli Saulsbury for the defendants.

One of the issues to be tried in the case was whether there had been a legal sale of the goods in question by Clymer, the constable. He denied that there had been such a sale by him, first, because there was no legal process in his hands to warrant the sale. In the case of Hines’ judgment and ji. fa. and venditioni thereon against Morris, there was no inventory and appraisement of the goods seized and levied on "üjider the ji. fa., proved or exhibited on the trial and in the evÜ¿ence before the jury, as the statute required in every such cFseThe inventory and appraisement produced and offered\i-n evidence, it was distinctly proved by the officer who mao'6 the levy, was the original which he prepared when he* made the levy and enclosed in the fi. fa. when he returned it to the justice ; but the. statute expressly provided and required that whenever it became necessary in any case to issue a venditioni exponas to sell property taken in execution under a fi. fa., a copy of the inventory and appraisement of the goods returned with the fi. fa. should accompany it, and the meaning of that was that such' a copy should be made by the justice who issues the venditioni. Rev. Code 348, sec, 19. And in the second place, because there was no proof before the jury that the sale was advertized by him as required by the statute, which, was equally positive in that particular. Rev. Code 347, sec. 17. And in the next place, because on the writ of venditioni exponas upon Hines’ judgment, on which the counsel for the plaintiff had said the goods of Morris had been sold, Clymer, the constable, could only sell such of them as were embraced in the inventory which accompanied it, but that inventory included only a part of the goods sold by him, and not the whole of them ; and if he sold under that venditioni alone, the goods and chattels generally of Morris, it was a void sale as to every article not included in the inventory which accompanied it.

Comegys on the same side.

At common law, and under the statutes, a sheriff is not liable to an action at the suit of the plaintiff for not returning a fi. fa. Wats, on shffs. 82, *25 198, 64, sec. 3. Rev. Code 348, secs. 19, 20, 22. Although sheriffs and constables in this State and country were required by statutory provisions to enter into bonds or recognizances with conditions very different in their tenor and effect from what was usual in England, there was nothing in the legislation of this State or of any other State in the Union, to give a defendant in a writ of execution, any remedy or action on the bond of a sheriff or constable against him and his sureties, to recover the money or any part of it, received or collected by him on such execution. For the statutes on the subject which prescribed the conditions of such bonds and the duties and liabilities of such officers and their sureties, clearly contemplate that they shall be responsible only to the creditor of the defendant in the writ, the plaintiff in the execution, and not to the defendant in it, or any other person. The officer himself was individually liable at common law and in another form of action to the defendant in the writ and to airy other persons for any unlawful act, wrong, injury or injustice done to them in the exeution of it, or in the application or disposition of the money arising from it. But neither he, nor his sureties were liable on his bond for it, in the present, or any other form of action. He had glanced at the cases which had been cited on the other side, and although some of them seemed to be imperfectly reported and failed to disclose with sufficient certainty for whose use and benefit the suit had been instituted, he thought it might be fairly inferred from what was stated, even in the cases in which the action was on the official bond or recognizance of the officer for any part of the money received by him on the execution, it was in every instance at the suit of the ereditors, and not of the defendant in it.

Layton, replied.

The Court, Gilpin, C. J.,

charged the jury, that the statutory provisions requiring sheriffs and constables in this State to return writs of execution are designed for the *26

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Related

Pixley v. Butts
2 Cow. 421 (New York Supreme Court, 1823)
People v. Holmes & Caswell
2 Wend. 281 (New York Supreme Court, 1829)
Lawton v. Erwin
9 Wend. 233 (New York Supreme Court, 1832)

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Bluebook (online)
8 Del. 20, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-morris-v-clymer-delsuperct-1864.