State Ex Rel. Moore v. Scroggie
Opinions
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the result except as to the question whether Jesse Scroggie was correctly precluded from presenting evidence on the value of the condemned property. On that point, I respectfully dissent.
Idaho Code § 7-709 provides, in pertinent part, that all persons “having or claiming an interest in [the condemned property] or in the damages for the taking thereof, though not named, may appear, plead and. defend, each in respect to his own property or interest, or that claimed by him____” The majority takes the position Jesse Scroggie had no such “interest” because he deeded the property to attorneys representing him in a criminal case, as a retainer for their services. However, as the majority acknowledges, Scroggie still was entitled to an accounting and refund of any difference between the value of the property transferred and the value of professional services rendered. This residual interest in the property is one that Scroggie alone possessed and had a financial incentive to assert. Such an interest, in my view, was sufficient to confer standing under I.C. § 7-709.
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704 P.2d 364 (State Ex Rel. Moore v. Scroggie) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.