State Ex Rel. McNary v. Hais

670 S.W.2d 494

• Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
• Decided: June 19, 1984
• Docket: 65426
• Status: Published

Opinions

PER CURIAM:

This is prohibition.

On March 3, 1983, relator, St. Louis County Council, authorized the issuance of a conditional use permit for the operation of a sanitary land fill in North St. Louis County. Twenty-nine days later, plaintiffs, Citizens Opposed to New Halls Ferry Sanitary Land Fill, petitioned the Circuit Court seeking review of the St. Louis County Council’s decision. Relators, St. Louis County Council and subsequent interve-nors, filed separate motions to dismiss, arguing that the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction because of § 49.230, RSMo 1978, which provides in pertinent part: “Appeals from the decisions, findings or orders of county courts of a quasi-judicial nature * * * shall be made within ten days from the date of the decision, findings or order * (Emphasis supplied.) Respondent overruled relators’ motions. Relators sought, and were denied, a writ of prohibition from the Court of Appeals. Relators petitioned for the same relief in this Court, which entered a provisional rule in prohibition.

Chapter 536, RSMo 1978, contains the general provisions for review of administrative agency determinations. Section 536.100, RSMo 1978, provides:

Any person who has exhausted all administrative remedies provided by law * * * shall be entitled to judicial review thereof, as provided in section 536.100 to 536.-140, unless some other provision for judicial review is provided by statute; * * *. (Emphasis supplied.)

Accord Rule 100.01. Section 536.110, RSMo 1978, provides a thirty day statute of limitations for appeals from administrative decisions. Relators argue that § 536.110 is inapplicable. Rather, they contend that § 49.230 applies because it constitutes an “other provision for judicial review” as provided in § 536.100. Thus, the essential questions on appeal are whether § 49.230 applies to county council actions (as opposed to county courts) and if so, then whether the St. Louis County Council’s decision was of a “quasi-judicial nature.”

Examining § 49.230, we presume that the legislature did not intend to enact an absurd law, State ex rel. Safety Ambulance Service, Inc. v. Kinder, 557 S.W.2d 242 (Mo. banc 1977), and we favor a construction that avoids unjust or unreasonable results. Maryland Casualty Co. v. General Electric Co., 418 S.W.2d 115 (Mo. banc 1967). While most Missouri counties are governed by county courts, St. Louis County has chosen to become a charter county governed by a county council. Although § 49.230 refers solely to county courts, it has been applied to the determinations of county councils when it is manifest that the General Assembly intended such an application. In re the Incorporation of the City of River Bend, 530 S.W.2d 704 (Mo.App.1975). While a “county council is not a county court under another name,” Schmoll v. Housing Authority of St. Louis County, 321 S.W.2d 494, 498 (Mo.1959), the St. Louis County Council “is charged with the duties normally performed by the county court in most counties.” State v. Champ, 393 S.W.2d 516, 521 (Mo. banc 1965). When a county council makes a determination that would normally be made by a county court in a non-charter county, the county council and the county court serve in the same capacity and no distinction can be drawn between them. River Bend, supra. In such a case we believe the legislature intended to include the decisions of the county council within the purview of § 49.230. Id. However, when a county council makes a determination that would not normally be made by a county court, § 49.230 is inapplicable and the administrative review provisions of Chapter 536 control.

In the case at hand the St. Louis County Council authorized the issuance of a conditional use permit. Had St. Louis County been a non-charter county, the permit would have been issued by a county court pursuant to § 64.281.3, RSMo 1978. Thus, the St. Louis County Council acted as would a county court in a non-charter county. Consequently, § 49.230 applies to the St. Louis County Council’s decision. We turn then to the question whether its decision was of a quasi-judicial nature.

Quasi-judicial is “[a] term applied to the action * ⅜ ⅜ of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1121 (5th ed. 1979); State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Weinstein, 322 S.W.2d 778, 784 (Mo. banc 1959); 1 Am. Jur.2d Administrative Law § 161 (1962); 50 C.J.S. Judicial 562-65 (1947). In State ex rel. Police Retirement System of City of St. Louis v. Murphy, 359 Mo. 854, 224 S.W.2d 68 (banc 1949), this Court found the Board of Trustees of the Police Retirement System to be a quasi-judicial tribunal because it was “authorized upon a hearing to find and determine fact issues.” Id., 359 Mo. at 858, 224 S.W.2d at 70. Likewise, in Liechty v. Kansas City Bridge Co., 162 S.W.2d 275 (Mo.1942), this Court noted that the Missouri Workmen’s Compensation Commission was vested with the quasi-judicial powers of applying the law to its findings of fact. In the case at hand the St. Louis County Council examined the facts and exercised its discretion in making findings of fact and applying the law to those facts. Thus, the St. Louis County Council’s decision was of a quasi-judicial nature. [Accord Allison v. Washington County, 24 Or.App. 571, 548 P.2d 188 (1976), where the Oregon Court of Appeals found the issuance of a conditional use permit to be a quasi-judicial action.]

Respondent argues, however, that pursuant to State ex rel. St. Louis County v. Jones, 498 S.W.2d 294 (Mo.App.1973), the St. Louis County Council’s decision was administrative, not quasi-judicial. We disagree. The Eastern District in Jones, in distinguishing between legislative and administrative actions, noted that while “[t]he enactment of a comprehensive zoning ordinance is a legislative function * ’* * [a] determination by the [County] Council to grant or withhold a conditional use permit is administrative in nature and must be made reasonably and not arbitrarily.” Id. at 299. The Jones court was not confronted with the issue of whether the issuance of a conditional use permit constituted a quasi-judicial action. Seven years later, however, the Eastern District was faced with this issue in In the Matter of Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. The Missouri Department of Natural Resources, 608 S.W.2d 451 (Mo.App.1980). There the court relied on Jones to resolve the issue in the affirmative: “Jones * * * disposes of respondents’ contention that the issuance of the [conditional use] permit was a legislative, not a ‘quasi-judicial,’ act as contemplated by § 49.230.” Id. at 454 n. 1. As did the Eastern District in Alpha Portland, we disagree with respondent’s interpretation of Jones.

Respondent’s final contention is that relief by writ of prohibition is inappropriate because relators have an adequate remedy at law by way of appeal. This Court has” recently advised that we will “not continue the unfettered use of the writ of prohibition to allow interlocutory review of trial court error.” State ex rel. Morasch v. Kimberlin, 654 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Mo. banc 1983). It is well-established that “prohibition cannot be substituted for appeal.” State ex rel. Vogel v. Campbell, 505 S.W.2d 54, 58 (Mo. banc 1974). However, “the right of appeal must be a full and adequate remedy before its availability will preclude resort to prohibition.” Id.; State ex rel. Berbiglia, Inc. v. Randall, 423 S.W.2d 765, 770 (Mo. banc 1968).

“The chief purpose of the writ [of prohibition] is to prevent the lower court from acting without or in excess of its jurisdiction.” State ex rel. St. Louis County v. Stussie, 556 S.W.2d 186, 188 (Mo. banc 1977). As noted above, we have determined that § 49.230 applies to the St. Louis County Council’s decision. Because plaintiffs did not appeal within the ten-day period the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. Hartzfeld v. Taylor, 207 Mo. 236, 105 S.W. 599 (1907); Sidwell v. Jett, 213 Mo. 601, 112 S.W. 56 (1908).

Where * * * the [circuit] court is wholly wanting in jurisdiction to proceed in the case, appeal is not an adequate remedy because any action by the court is without authority and causes unwarranted expense and delay to the parties involved. (Emphasis supplied.)

State ex rel. T.J.H. v. Bills, 504 S.W.2d 76, 79 (Mo. banc 1974); see State ex rel. Ken Reynolds Pharmacies, Inc. v. Pyle, 564 S.W.2d 870 (Mo. banc 1978). Relators do not have adequate remedy by way of appeal.

The provisional rule in prohibition is made absolute.

WELLIVER, GUNN, BILLINGS and DONNELLY, JJ., concur. BLACKMAR, J., dissents in separate opinion filed. RENDLEN, C.J., and HIGGINS, J., dissent and concur in separate dissenting opinion of BLACKMAR, J.