KELLEY, Justice.
In this action against appellants Sports and Health Club, Inc. (Sports and Health)1, [846]*846the respondent, the acting Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Rights (Commissioner) sought to enjoin certain actions of the appellants. These actions consisted of questioning prospective employees about marital status and religion; terminating employees because of a difference in religious beliefs; refusing to promote employees because of differing religious beliefs; and failing to provide “open” public accommodations. The matter was heard by a hearing examiner who found that, in fact, appellants had engaged in the asserted practices in violation of Minn.Stat. ch. 363 (1983) (Minnesota Human Rights Act). The hearing examiner enjoined continuation of those practices. Throughout these proceedings, appellants have asserted that the Minnesota Human Rights Act, facially and as applied, unconstitutionally infringes upon their rights of freedom of speech, free exercise of religion, and freedom of association. In addition, appellants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the hearing officer’s findings and conclusions of law, and the hearing examiner’s order certifying classes, which they claim violates the same constitutional rights. The respondent Commissioner challenges the hearing examiner’s order refusing to certify certain classes. Since we conclude that the Minnesota Human Rights Act does not imper-missibly infringe upon appellants’ constitutional rights, either facially or as applied to appellants, we affirm the hearing examiner. Because the class certification was unduly narrow in scope, we reverse the class certification order.2
Arthur Owens, Marc Crevier and Forest Larson own and operate Sports and Health Club, Inc., a closely-held, for-profit Minnesota corporation. Sports and Health Club, Inc. operates seven sports and health club operations in the Twin Cities metropolitan area. Each provides recreational and exercise facilities as well as counseling regarding appropriate exercise programs for 18,000 members. Approximately 140 to 150 people are currently employed by the clubs. The parties agree that the clubs’ facilities are excellent, described by some as the “Cadillac of the industry,” and that membership dues are generally lower than those of the competition in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area.
Owens, Crevier and Larson are “born-again” Christians. Their fundamentalist religious convictions require them to act in accordance with the teachings of Jesus Christ and the will of God in their business as well as in their personal lives. These convictions are deeply held, supported in Biblical scripture, and sincere.3
The owners of Sports and Health admit their religious practices and beliefs spill over into, and in fact require, their employment practices. These practices consist of questioning prospective employees about marital status and religion, terminating other employees because of a difference in [847]*847religious beliefs; refusing to promote employees because of differing religious beliefs; and failing to provide “open” accommodations. In some instances the practices were found illegal by the hearing examiner. In other instances, no allegations of illegality were asserted. In the operation of the clubs, the owners share an evangelical fervor to proselytize or convert others to their beliefs. The owners place book racks in the entrance of each club containing Christian literature. The state claimed no illegal conduct based on this action.
Interviews of all prospective employees, with the exception of locker-room attendants and babysitters, are conducted in violation of Minn.Stat. § 363.03, subd. l(4)(a) (1982).4 In those interviews, applicants were asked whether they attend church, read the Bible, are married or divorced, pray, engage in pre-marital or extra-marital sexual relations, believe in God, heaven or hell, and other questions of a religious nature. Sports and Health explains this practice as an attempt to advise prospective employees, during the interview, of the existence of the owners’ fervent beliefs to determine whether their sincerely held beliefs may offend the prospective employee. Moreover, Sports and Health believes the answers to the questions will help the owners determine if the applicant (1) possesses a “teachable spirit” and (2) follows a “disciplined life style.”
Sports and Health admits that only born-again Christians are permitted to be managers or assistant managers. The hearing examiner found this practice to be illegal under the Human Rights Act. Sports and Health justifies this rigid policy by relying on their religious belief that they are forbidden by God, as set forth in the Bible, to work with “unbelievers.” (See 2 Corinthians 6:14-18). Sports and Health also admits that Bible studies are a substantial part of weekly meetings for managers. Voluntary Bible studies are also held for all sales personnel.
Finally, based on an interpretation of the Bible, Sports and Health will not hire, and will fire, individuals living with but not married to a person of the opposite sex; a young, single woman working without her father’s consent or a married woman working without her husband’s consent; a person whose commitment to a non-Christian religion is strong; and someone who is “antagonistic to the Bible,” which according to Galations 5:19-21 includes fornicators and homosexuals. The hearing examiner found this practice to be in violation of Minn.Stat. § 363.03, subd. 1(2) (1984).5 Sports and Health defended its hiring and firing actions on individual violations of rigid work rules based on the Bible (requiring a high degree of discipline and submissiveness),6 “backbiting” and “non-joyful” attitude on the part of the employee, and in the case of applicants not hired, on the lack of a “teachable spirit” and “disciplined lifestyle,” which the owners maintain are more important than a technical background in sales, exercise and/or nutrition.
Appellants assert the sincere belief that their practices were proper and lawful exercises of the rights of free speech, free exercise of religion and freedom of association guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article [848]*8481, Section 16 of the Minnesota Constitution. This assertion forms the main contention in this case.
Despite all the discrimination allegations asserted in this case Sports and Health has employed, and continues to employ, married persons, male and female unmarried persons, and divorced males and females of various races. The Sports and Health clubs have also employed, and continue to employ, persons of various religious faiths —Jews, Roman Catholics, Protestants of various denominations, and others — so long as such other persons are not offended by the owners’ faith, are not antagonistic toward the Christian gospel and will comply with management’s work rules in a cheerful and obedient spirit.
(1) We address first the pending motions to dismiss.
(a) The Commissioner contends that Sports and Health’s appeal from the hearing examiner’s orders (C4-84-771) should be dismissed with respect to liability and class certification because the appeals are not from orders from which an appeal may be taken since they are not final within the meaning of Minn.R.Civ.App.P. 103.03. We need not address the issue in this case. We choose to grant discretionary review of the issues raised by Sports and Health’s appeal because this is one of those “appropriate cases where the interest of justice requires immediate review of liability determinations before the issue of damages has been litigated.” In re Commodore Hotel Fire & Explosion Case, 318 N.W.2d 244, 247, n. 2 (Minn.1982), see also Sigler v. First American National Bank, 325 N.W.2d 136, 137, n. 1 (Minn.1982). Sports and Health’s appeal is before this court because we granted accelerated review. Rulé 118 of Minn.R.Civ.App.P., providing for accelerated review, incorporates by reference the discretionary review found in Rule 117. The issues have been fully briefed in an adversarial proceeding. The interest of justice, in deciding all issues arising from the hearing examiner’s order in one proceeding, compels us to the conclusion that discretionary review should be granted, and, accordingly, the Commissioner’s motion to dismiss is denied.
(b) Sports and Health contends the Commissioner’s appeal (Case CX-84-936) should be dismissed because the Commissioner did not file her brief within 30 days as required by Minn.R.Civ.App.P. 131.01. In fact the Commissioner has never filed the relator’s brief in that appeal. However, the Commissioner did brief issues she raised in her appeal in her brief responding to the brief of Sports and Health in appeal C4-84-771. We note that Sports and Health’s dismissal motion is technically meritorious. Minn.R.Civ.App.P. 142.02. However, this court did grant the Commissioner’s petition for accelerated review and consolidation of her appeal (CX-84-936), with Sports and Health’s appeal (C4-84-771) and ordered counsel on oral argument to be prepared to discuss the substantive issues raised in each appeal. In fact, counsel did discuss all issues on oral argument, and, pursuant to leave of the court, Sports and Health did file a brief responding to issues raised by the Commissioner. Because no rights have been prejudiced, and since the parties have been given an opportunity to brief and argue the issues raised by the Commissioner, we will grant discretionary review of those issues in the interest of justice. In re Commodore Hotel Fire & Explosion Cases, supra.
(2) Turning to the merits, we address first Sports and Health’s contention that the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and orders of the hearing examiner are “unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as a whole.” Minn.Stat. § 14.69 (1982). In examining that contention, we are not permitted to substitute our view of the evidence for that adopted by the hearing examiner if substantial evidence in the record supports his decision. See Dakota County Abstract Co. v. Richardson, 312 Minn. 353, 356, 252 N.W.2d 124, 126-27 (1977). The test for determining whether a specific finding is supported by substantial evidence is whether the evidence, considered in its entirety, is (1) more than a scintilla of evidence; (2) [849]*849such that a reasonable mind might accept it as adequate to support a conclusion; or (3) more than “some evidence” and more than “any evidence”. Taylor v. Beltrami Electric Cooperative, Inc., 319 N.W.2d 52, 56 (Minn.1982). Where the evidence is conflicting or more than one inference may be drawn from it, the findings of the hearing examiner must be upheld. City of Minneapolis v. Richardson, 307 Minn. 80, 88, 239 N.W.2d 197, 202 (1976).
In a contested case such as this, the Commissioner must make a prima facie showing of discrimination as defined by Minn.Stat. 363.03 (1982). The employer then has the burden to establish legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the actions taken. The Commissioner then has the burden of establishing that the reasons stated are a mere pretext for discrimination. Hubbard v. United Press International Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 441, n. 12 (Minn.1983).
In this case there are numerous charging parties.7 In examining the claim of each charging party, the hearing examiner meticulously followed the procedure outlined in Hubbard. Several of the charges alleged that Sports and Health in its hiring practices violated the statute by making inquiry as to religious beliefs and practices and marital status. Other charges alleged that in promotion practices the same statutorily prohibited conduct occurred, while still others charged their employment was terminated because of their marital status and refusal to partake in religious classes at the place of business. Finally, one complainant, who was of the Jewish religious faith, alleges that she was forced to give up her membership in one of the clubs run by Sports and Health because Sports and Health, through its insistence upon displaying fundamentalist Christian religious literature in the literature racks and on the walls of the sports club, engaged in conduct that was offensive to her. In considering each complaint, the hearing examiner found a prima facie showing of discrimination. Sports and Health then presented evidence in an attempt to establish a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for the action taken. Sports and Health proferred evidence that the employees who were terminated had trouble with the “book system” (the basis of the clubs’ membership solicitation efforts); that they had a bad and uncooperative attitude, that they had violated rules such as the use of intoxicants on the premises or the unauthorized “borrowing” of money from certain club funds; or that they did personal business while on the job, contrary to company rules; as well as other claims of rule violations. In each instance, the hearing examiner held that Sports and Health had advanced legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for the discharges. Sports and Health likewise offered evidence articulating reasons why certain complainants were not hired such as their rejection of religion, their “bad attitude”, or that their personality was not such as to demonstrate an ability to get along with people.8 The hearing examiner found that these reasons for Sports and Health’s actions were generally legitimate. However, in considering both the claims of promotional discrimination and hiring discrimination, the hearing examiner found the articulated reasons for the actions taken were pretextual and the real reasons related to the employees’ or applicants’ religious beliefs, or lack thereof, and/or their marital status. Had we been the fact finder, we might have arrived at a different conclusion in some of these cases, but the record is replete in demonstrating that each of the charging parties had been questioned about marital status, religion, and, indeed, in several instances “preached at” by officers of Sports and Health at the time of their termination or application denial. We recognize that in order to make informed and intelligent employment decisions, employers must be per[850]*850mitted some leeway to question an employee or applicant about his or her background, upbringing and perspective.9 In this case, however, Sports and Health, in some instances, went far beyond legally permissible bounds in questioning applicants and employees. The evidence clearly substantiates the findings of the hearing examiner that questioning concerning religious beliefs, practices and concerning marital status permeated the employment process and were the true reasons for the actions taken by Sports and Health.10
(3) We come then to the crucial issue: do the findings of fact, conclusions of law and orders of the hearing examiner unconstitutionally infringe upon Sports and Health’s freedom of speech, free exercise of religious beliefs, and freedom of association as provided by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 16 of the Minnesota Constitution?11
(a) We address first a preliminary matter. The Commissioner, in her brief to this court, for the first time in this litigation raises the issue of whether Sports and Health has “standing” to raise the freedom to exercise religion issue. It is well settled that an issue not litigated below may not be asserted for the first time on appeal. Matter of Welfare of K.T., 327 N.W.2d 13, 16-17 (Minn.1982); Republic National Life Insurance Co. v. Lorraine Realty Corp., 279 N.W.2d 349, 355 n. 2 (Minn.1979). However, an objection to want of “standing” goes to the existence of a cause of action, is jurisdictional, and may be raised at any time, Matter of Welfare of Mullins, 298 N.W.2d 56, 61 n. 7 (Minn.1980). In this case, however, we conclude that Sports and Health (the corporation) has “standing” to assert its constitutional arguments. The issue here is not whether a corporation has “standing” to litigate, but rather whether Sports and Health has “standing” to assert the first amendment as a defense to the claims of discrimination. The Commissioner’s conclusory assertion that a corporation has no constitutional right to free exercise of religion is unsupported by any cited authority. Though not precisely on point, the United States Supreme Court has permitted employers, corporate as well as individuals, to assert first amendment rights. See e.g. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978) (freedom to speak on a referendum issue); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,102 S.Ct. 1051, 71 L.Ed.2d 127 (1982) (individual employer claimed that his rights of free exercise of religion were violated by a facially neutral governmental law — the Social Security Act). See also Donovan v. Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation, 722 F.2d 397 (8th Cir.1983), aff'd, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 1953, 85 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985) (corporation asserted first amendment right of free exercise of religion in defense of alleged violation of minimum wage, overtime, and record keeping provisions of 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.).
In this case, however, it is unnecessary to decide whether Sports and Health, a corporation, has a first amendment right to free exercise of religion. The hearing examiner pierced the “corporate veil” to make the respondents (Owens, Crevier and Larson), who own all the stock and assets of the corporation, liable for the illegal actions of it. Whether the hearing examiner had legal authority to pierce the “corporate veil” is not before us on this review.12 [851]*851The fact remains that he did. By so doing, Owens', Crevier and Larson, in reality, are the ones asserting the first amendment right to the free exercise of religion. Thus, we conclude the Commissioner’s “standing” argument presents no impediment to allowing the constitutional issue to be asserted in this case.
(b) Sports and Health argues that if the violations of the employment discrimination and public accommodation sections of the Minnesota Human Rights Act are sustained, such conduct is protected under the right to exercise religion under the United States and Minnesota Constitutions.13
Because the Staté of Minnesota is neither attempting to regulate religious beliefs or to single out any particular religious belief for adverse treatment, the Minnesota Human Rights Act is a facially-neutral regulation. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1535, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972).
But that does not resolve the issue. When an individual’s action, exercised under first amendment guarantees, violates a facially neutral regulation such as the Minnesota Human Rights Act, the courts follow a three step analysis to determine whether a constitutional exemption is required. Using that analysis, we first must determine whether the requirements of the Human Rights Act actually impose a burden upon Sports and Health’s free exercise of religion. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257, 102 S.Ct. 1051, 1055, 71 L.Ed.2d 127 (1982). Second, if such a burden is found to exist, it must be determined whether the burden is justified by a compelling government interest. Bob Jones University v. United States, — U.S.-, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 2035, 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983). Third, the court must determine whether the questioned regulation is the least restrictive means to achieve the state’s goals. Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security, 450 U.S. 707, 718, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 1432, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981).14 [852]*852Accordingly, while the freedom to exercise religious beliefs is an absolute constitutional right, an individual’s right to practice his or her religion, in certain circumstances, may be subject to reasonable governmental regulations if the government has an overriding compelling interest. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-4, 60 S.Ct. 900, 903, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940).
Here, the Commissioner concedes, and the record amply supports, that the employment actions taken by Sports and Health, through its sole owners, was the result of deeply held and sincere religious beliefs. Moreover, the Commissioner concedes that the Minnesota Human Rights Act abridges those beliefs. The Commissioner, however, contends that the abridgment is justified by the state’s compelling interest in eliminating all forms of discrimination.15
The state’s contention is buttressed by a number of recent decisions of the federal courts. See Bob Jones University, 103 S.Ct. at 2034-35 (fundamental overriding governmental interest in eradicating race discrimination can outweigh a person’s right to exercise religious beliefs); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 3253, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984) (state’s compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against women justifies the impact that the Human Rights Act may have on male members’ associational freedoms); Dayton Christian Schools v. Ohio Civil Rights Commission, 578 F.Supp. 1004, 1034-35 (S.D.Ohio 1984) (intrusion on school’s free exercise rights by investigation and potential administrative hearing justified by state’s compelling interest in eradication of sex discrimination and employment); Grosz v. Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729, (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 108, 83 L.Ed.2d 52 (1984) (city’s interest in compliance with zoning ordinance sufficiently compelling to outweigh constitutional right to free exercise of religion). See also United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 102 S.Ct. 1051, 71 L.Ed.2d 127 (1982); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Pacific Press Publishing Association, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir.1982). In each case the court balanced asserted constitutional rights against the governmental interest in seeking enhancement of civil rights of its citizens. This balancing most recently occurred in Hi-shon v. King and Spaulding, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984). In Hishon a law associate sued her former employer alleging that sex-biased discrimination caused the decision denying her elevation to partnership status in a law firm. In holding that Hishon’s complaint stated a claim cognizable under Title VII, the court rejected the law firm’s defense that application of Title VII would infringe upon the firm’s constitutional first amendment rights of expression and association. In doing so the majority stated:
Moreover, as we have held in another context, “[ijnvidious private discrimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections.” There is no constitutional right, for example, to discriminate in the selection of who may attend a private school or join a labor union.
Id. 104 S.Ct. at 2235 (citations omitted). Justice Powell, in concurrence, emphasized that laws banning discrimination may well infringe upon first amendment rights:
The Court’s opinion properly reminds us that “invidious private discrimination * * has never been afforded affirmative con[853]*853stitutional protections.” This is not to say, however, that enforcement of laws that ban discrimination will always be without cost to other values, including constitutional rights. Such laws may impede the exercise of personal judgment in choosing one’s associates or colleagues.
Id. at 2236, n. 4 (Powell, J., concurring) (citations omitted and emphasis added). An examination of the foregoing cases clearly demonstrates that the government has an overriding compelling interest in prohibiting discrimination in employment and public accommodation. Each of the cited cases supports our balancing analysis. The rationale of those cases clearly undermines the claim that Sports and Health can hire and promote only “born again” Christians in management positions. See also, Roberts v. United States Jaycees, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984). In a pluralistic and democratic society, government has a responsibility to insure that all its citizens have equal opportunity for employment, promotion, and job retention without having to overcome the artificial and largely irrelevant barriers occurring from gender, status, or beliefs to the main decision of competence to perform the work. Likewise, the government has a responsibility to afford its citizens equal access to all accommodations open to the general public.
But are there “less restrictive” means available to achieve this overriding governmental interest? The Commissioner asserts that this compelling state interest can only be advanced by enjoining Sports and Health and its sole owners from continuing the discriminatory practices. A less restrictive alternative might be to grant persons who deeply and sincerely hold sincere religious beliefs an exemption from the statutes, and, in essence, that is what appellants argue. At the outset we note that the Minnesota Human Rights Act does contain exemptions, and, in particular, an exemption for religious corporations when religious beliefs shall be a bona fide occupational qualification for employment. Minn.Stat. § 363.02, subd. 1(2) (1984). Sports and Health, however, is not a religious corporation — it is a Minnesota business corporation engaged in business for profit. By engaging in this secular endeav- or, appellants have passed over the line that affords them absolute freedom to exercise religious beliefs. The state’s overriding compelling interest of eliminating discrimination based upon sex, race, marital status, or religion could be substantially frustrated if employers, professing as deep and sincere religious beliefs as those held by appellants, could discriminate against the protected classes. Other employers in the state engaged in secular business activities would be bound by the law, but those professing such convictions would not. We agree with the Commissioner that the state’s overriding interest permits of no exemption to appellants in this case. Notwithstanding the fact that the Minnesota Human Rights Act as applied here infringes upon sincerely held religious beliefs and imposes upon the free exercise thereof, when appellants entered into the economic arena and began trafficking in the market place, they have subjected themselves to the standards the legislature has prescribed not only for the benefit of prospective and existing employees, but also for the benefit of the citizens of the state as a whole in an effort to eliminate pernicious discrimination.16
(4) In her appeal the Commissioner contends the hearing examiner erred in dismissing Owens, Crevier, and Larson, the sole owners of Sports and Health, from the [854]*854action. Originally, these three were named parties to this action on the theory that they aided and abetted Sports and Health in engaging in the discriminatory practices. See e.g. Minn.Stat. § 363.03, subd. 6 (1984). Although the hearing examiner did give as one reason for the dismissal what might be called a “good faith” exception based upon the sincerity of the beliefs of these three individuals, a ruling which is questionable, he also based the dismissal on the ground that the Commissioner had proved that the three individuals were, in fact, the corporation. He then pierced the “corporate veil,” to hold them liable for the illegal actions of Sports and Health. Having done that, he held it was inappropriate to hold those individuals separately liable under the aiding and abetting subdivision of the Human Rights Act for actions which the corporation and they had already been held liable. By his act of piercing the “corporate veil” the legal basis for an aiding and abetting claim is nonexistent. Cf. State v. Strimling, 265 N.W.2d 423, 430 (Minn.1978). With that conclusion, we agree.
(5) The Commissioner sought class certification for all persons who had applied for employment with one of the clubs run by Sports and Health and who were required to furnish information regarding sex, marital status and religion. The hearing examiner refused to certify the class on the ground “it would be unduly burdensome and unfair to [Sports and Health and Owens, Crevier, and Larson] to include in the class any [such] persons * * * who cannot further prove that they were not hired because of one of those reasons.” The Commissioner argues that insertion of a “fairness” consideration into the text for class certification under the Human Rights Act is an error of law.17
The appropriate test for class certification under the Human Rights Act is contained in Minn.Rule 5000.1100 (1983) (formerly Hum.Rts.Rule 107(e)). That rule, substantially like Minn.R.Civ.P. 23.01, provides that class certification is proper when there are questions of law or fact common to the class, there exists sufficient similarity of claims among class members, there is adequate representation of the class, and the respondent acted on grounds generally applicable to the class making injunctive relief appropriate. The hearing examiner ruled that the state established these criteria relative to all classes for which certification was sought. Therefore, a class of persons required to furnish prohibited information must be certified.
Rule 5000.1100 provides the hearing examiner no room for exercising discretion. Moreover, it is not in the province of the hearing examiner’s power to determine what claims cannot be proven further. Had the examiner pinned his refusal to certify the class required to furnish information on one of the factors found in Minn. Rule 5000.1100, we might be faced with a different question. We conclude, on remand, the requested class should be certified.
We deny the Commissioner’s motion to dismiss the appeal of Sports and Health. We deny Sports and Health’s motion to dismiss the Commissioner’s appeal. We affirm the hearing examiner’s rulings that the alleged violations were proved by substantial evidence. We conclude that the Human Rights Act is not facially unconstitutional and that the state’s overriding compelling interest in prohibiting discrimination in employment, while it does infringe upon the appellant’s exercise of religious beliefs, is constitutionally permissible. We reverse the hearing examiner’s order refusing to certify the class and remand for further certification proceedings consistent with this opinion.
COYNE, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.