State ex rel. Laborers International Union of North America, AFL-CIO & CIC-Laborers Building & General Construction Local 237 v. Circuit Court for Kenosha County

332 N.W.2d 832, 112 Wis. 2d 337, 1983 Wisc. App. LEXIS 3295
CourtCourt of Appeals of Wisconsin
DecidedMarch 16, 1983
DocketNo. 83-073-W
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 332 N.W.2d 832 (State ex rel. Laborers International Union of North America, AFL-CIO & CIC-Laborers Building & General Construction Local 237 v. Circuit Court for Kenosha County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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State ex rel. Laborers International Union of North America, AFL-CIO & CIC-Laborers Building & General Construction Local 237 v. Circuit Court for Kenosha County, 332 N.W.2d 832, 112 Wis. 2d 337, 1983 Wisc. App. LEXIS 3295 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983).

Opinion

VOSS, P.J.

Laborers International Union of North America, AFL-CIO & CIC-Laborers Building and General Construction Local #237, and the Home Insurance Company have petitioned for a supervisory writ to prohibit the Honorable John E. Malloy from proceeding as trial judge in an underlying case and to compel Judge Malloy to request the assignment of a new judge pursuant to sec. 801.58, Stats.1

[339]*339The petition, memoranda, and responses before us reveal that the case was originally assigned to Judge Michael S. Fisher. On December 11, 1981, Judge Fisher denied a motion for summary judgment. The next corn-[340]*340munication from the court was a scheduling order alerting petitioners to a conference to be held before a court commissioner on December 7, 1982. At that hearing, the petitioners allege that they learned for the first time that Judge Malloy had been assigned to the case.

In pertinent part, sec. 801.58(1), Stats., provides that: “If a new judge is assigned to the trial of a case, a request for substitution must be made within 10 days of receipt of notice of assignment . . . .” The petitioners made their request to substitute Judge Malloy within ten days of the December 7 conference. The request was denied by a letter of January 4, 1983 which, without elaboration, stated that the request did not comply with the provisions of sec. 801.58. '

Because it appeared that the petition for supervisory writ presented a prima facie case for relief, this court ordered responses pursuant to Rule 809.51(2), Stats. Judge Malloy filed no response. Therefore, we have no idea why he felt the request for substitution was improper.

[341]*341However, a response filed by one of the parties in the underlying case asserts the request was untimely because the petitioners had constructive notice of Judge Malloy’s assignment, which was apparently due to rotation, well before December 7, 1982. We conclude that the ten day period of sec. 801.58(1), Stats., is triggered by actual notice, and, because it is not alleged that the petitioners had actual notice prior to December 7, we grant the petition.

Although sec. 801.58(1), Stats., is silent as to the nature or manner of the required notice, the general rule is that a notice required to be given by statute must be actual notice. 58 Am. Jur. 2d Notice §22 (1971). A requirement of actual notice is consistent with the legislative policy of allowing a substitution and with the court’s practice of interpreting the substitution statutes in a reasonable manner so as to advance the right to a substitution. See State ex rel. Tarney v. McCormack, 99 Wis. 2d 220, 235, 298 N.W.2d 552, 559-60 (1980).

Additionally, we recognize that a number of problems would arise if constructive notice were deemed sufficient. For example, it is argued that because the petitioners’ counsel frequently practices in Kenosha county, he should have known of the rotation. Should attorneys who frequently practice in a given county be held to a different standard than those who do so only occasionally? How often must an attorney practice in a county before he may be held to constructive knowledge of the judicial administrative practices of that county? From a practical viewpoint, constructive notice is a less workable and more onerous concept than actual notice. In terms of fairness and reasonableness, actual notice is clearly preferable to constructive notice and more consistent with the legislative policy of preemptory substitution.

[342]*342We do not determine how actual notice must be given. There is no requirement that the clerk of circuit court give notice under sec. 801.58, Stats.2 We merely hold that the ten day period for substitution under sec. 801.58(1) is triggered by the receipt of actual notice that a new judge has been assigned.

Because the substitution request in this case was timely made within ten days of actual notice of Judge Malloy’s assignment and appears to be proper as to form, the trial court was disqualified and had a clear duty to request assignment of a new judge. The criteria for supervisory relief are satisfied. See Law Enforcement Standards Board v. Lyndon Station, 101 Wis. 2d 472, 494, 305 N.W.2d 89, 99 (1981) ; State ex rel. Prentice v. County Court of Milwaukee County, 70 Wis. 2d 230, 234, 234 N.W.2d 283, 285 (1975).

By the Court. — The petition is granted pursuant to Rule 809.51, Stats. Judge Malloy is prohibited from further action in the underlying case and is directed to request assignment of a new judge.

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332 N.W.2d 832, 112 Wis. 2d 337, 1983 Wisc. App. LEXIS 3295, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-laborers-international-union-of-north-america-afl-cio-wisctapp-1983.