State ex rel. K. C., St. J. & C. B. R. R. v. Severance

55 Mo. 378
CourtSupreme Court of Missouri
DecidedFebruary 15, 1874
StatusPublished
Cited by26 cases

This text of 55 Mo. 378 (State ex rel. K. C., St. J. & C. B. R. R. v. Severance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. K. C., St. J. & C. B. R. R. v. Severance, 55 Mo. 378 (Mo. 1874).

Opinion

Wa&ner, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court.

The main questions in this case are whether the act approved March 10, 1871, (Sess. Acts 1871, p. 56.) entitled “an act to provide for a uniform -system of assessing and collecting taxes on railroads ” applies to the city of St. Joseph, and whether it is a valid, and constitutional law ?

After the board of equalization provided for in said act had made their assessment on the property of the relator, and apportioned the amount on the same within the limits of the [384]*384city, and duly certified their return, the city authorities proceeded to make a new and additional assessment greatly increasing the amount, claiming that they were not bound by the assessment made by the state board, and that the act in question had no application to the city.

The relator, after appealing unsuccessfully to the city court of revision and appeals, obtained a writ of mandamus to compel the city authorities to change the city assessment to the amount assessed by the state board of equalization.

Upon the hearing of the cause the writ was made absolute, and the defendants appealed.

At 'the threshold of this case we are met with the objection that the plaintiff has misconceived its remedy, and that mandamus will not lie. But as the matters in issue have been regularly passed upon, and they have been brought here,we think it will be more consonant to justice, to examine the case and put it at rest than to turn the party out of court for such' a reason, although we might be of the opinion that the defendant’s counsel were correct in their position.

The first section of the act of 1871 provides that all railroads now constructed, in course of construction, or which shall hereafter be constructed in this state, and all other property, real, personal or mixed, owned by any railroad company or corporation in this state, shall be subject to taxation, for state, county and other municipal or local purposes, to the extent and in the manner thereinafter set forth.

Section 2 provides, that on or before the first day of February in each and every year, the president or other chief officer of every railroad company whose road is now, or which shall hereafter become so far complete and in operation as to run locomotive engines, with freight or passenger cars thereon, shall furnish to the state auditor a statement duly subscribed and sworn to by said president or other chief officer, before some officer authorized to administer oaths, setting out in detail all the property of said company, including the roadbed, buildings, machinery, engines, cars, lands, workshops, depot and all other property of whatsoever kind,with the loca[385]*385tion thereof, and the actual value thereof, in each county, in cash. ^

By section 4, in addition to the statement required by the preceding section, it is made the duty of the president or other chief officer, on or before the first day of February, in each and every year, to furnish the state auditor with a statement duly subscribed and sworn to, setting out the length of such road that may bo so far complete and in operation as to run locomotive engines, with freight or passenger cars thereon, and the number of miles in length of such road in each county, city or incorporated town in which said road may be located.

By section 5 the state auditor, state treasurer and the' register of lands are constituted a special board of equalization of railroad property, with all the powers, and entitled to discharge the same duties with reference to railroad property as the state board of equalization with reference to all other property.

Section 6 requires the board to meet at the office of the state auditor on the first Monday in May, in each and every year; when the state auditor is commanded to lay before the board all the returns which have been made to him in compliance with the law.

By section 7 it is provided as follows: “The board shall thereupon proceed to adjust and equalize the aggregate valuation of the property of each one of the railroad companies liable to taxation under the foregoing sections of this act. The board shall have power to summon witnesses by process issued to any officer authorized to serve subpoenas, and shall have the powers of a circuit court to compel the attendance of sucffiwitnesses and compel them to testify. They shall have power to increase or reduce the aggregate valuation of the property of any railroad company in accordance with the evidence produced before them, and as they may deem just and right. If the said board should deem personal inspection of the property of any railroad company necessary to a thorough understanding of its value and a just decision, they shall [386]*386have power to visit such road, and may adjourn from time to time for that purpose.”

Section 8 declares: “The board shall apportion the value of all lands, work-shops, depots and other buildings belonging to each railroad company to the counties, cities or incorporated towns in which such lands, work-shops, depots and other buildings are situate, and the aggregate value of all other property of each railroad company shall be apportioned to each county, city or incorporated town in which such road shall be located, according to the ratio which the number of miles of road completed in such county shall bear to the whole length of such railroad.”

It is now contended that this law, general in its character, does not apply to the Oity of St. Joseph, whose charter, passed prior thereto, gave it. express power to tax the property of railroad companies within the corporate limits. There is no question concerning the now generally admitted rule, that a general affirmative statute will not repeal a former one, which is special or particular in its nature, unless negative words are used, or the acts be so entirely inconsistent that they cannot stand together. In such cases there is nothing but an implication of repeal, and repeals in that manner are not favored. But it is really a question of intention, and where' the legislative intent is manifest or apparent it must prevail. The statute says, that all railroads now constructed, in course of construction, or which shall hereafter be constructed, and all other property, real, personal or mixed, owned by any railroad company or corporation, shall be subject to taxation for State, county, or other municipal or local purposes. A board of equalization is then organized with full and complete power to assess the roads and all their property. Not only does the board complete' and ascertain the value in their assessment, but it is made their duty when the assessment is arrived at; to apportion the value of all lands, work-shops, depots and other buildings belonging to each railroad company to the counties, cities or incorporated towns in which such property is situate. If it were intended that the cities and towns should still have the privi[387]*387lege and power of again assessing the property under their municipal ordinances, for wliat purpose was the law enacted? The provision apportioning the lands, work-shops, depots and other buildings to the municipalities, under such a construction, would be a mere nullity and amount to nothing more than unmeaning verbiage.

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Bluebook (online)
55 Mo. 378, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-k-c-st-j-c-b-r-r-v-severance-mo-1874.