State Ex Rel. Juvenile Department v. Garrett

91 P.3d 830, 193 Or. App. 629, 2004 Ore. App. LEXIS 681
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
DecidedJune 9, 2004
DocketJ890668; A121099
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 91 P.3d 830 (State Ex Rel. Juvenile Department v. Garrett) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State Ex Rel. Juvenile Department v. Garrett, 91 P.3d 830, 193 Or. App. 629, 2004 Ore. App. LEXIS 681 (Or. Ct. App. 2004).

Opinion

*631 LANDAU, P. J.

Youth appeals an order of disposition that found that he had committed acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute unlawful manufacturing of a destructive device. ORS 166.384. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed a “destructive device.” According to youth, at best, he possessed a lawful firework, which is expressly excluded from the statutory definition of “destructive device.” On de novo review, ORS 419A.200(6)(b), we affirm.

The relevant facts are not in dispute. Youth, while an eighth-grade student, possessed a lawful firework, commonly known as a “Piccolo Pete.” He hammered the firework flat and wrapped it in duct tape. He then brought the device to school, where one of his teachers discovered it and contacted the police.

The state alleged that youth was within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court because his acts constituted the unlawful manufacture of a destructive device, in violation of ORS 166.384, which provides, in part:

“(1) A person commits the crime of unlawful manufacture of a destructive device if the person assembles, produces or otherwise manufactures:
“(a) A destructive device, as defined in ORS 166.382 [.]”

A “destructive device” is defined to include, among other things, a “[b]omb.” ORS 166.382(l)(a)(A). It is, however, also defined to exclude “any device which is designed primarily or redesigned primarily for use as a * * * pyrotechnic * * * device.” ORS 166.382(2)(a). A “pyrotechnic device” is not defined by statute. The term generally refers to what are commonly known as “fireworks.” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 1854 (unabridged ed 1993). “Fireworks” are defined as combustible or explosive substances, including “bombs,” that are “prepared for the purpose of providing a visible or audible effect.” ORS 480.110(1). They, too, are unlawful to possess, subject to exceptions not pertinent to *632 this case. ORS 480.120. A “firework,” however, does not include a “cylindrical fountain,” which is a tube of not more than three-quarters of an inch in diameter that contains not more than a specified amount of combustible material and is designed to produce a shower of colored sparks when ignited. ORS 480.127(4)(c).

In this case, the state alleged that youth manufactured a destructive device. Youth’s defense, stated in his trial memorandum, was that the device that he possessed was not a “destructive device” within the meaning of ORS 166.384. He expressly disclaimed any reliance on the exclusion from the definition of “destructive device” for “pyrotechnic device [s]” contained in ORS 166.382(2)(a). He likewise expressly contended that the device he possessed was not a “firework” within the meaning of ORS 480.110. Instead, his argument was that (1) the device lacked sufficient destructive capacity to qualify as a “bomb,” and (2) the device was instead a legally permissible “cylindrical fountain” within the meaning of ORS 480.127(4)(c).

At trial, the state put on evidence that, by pounding the Piccolo Pete, youth had increased the density of the explosive powder that it contained, which would change the “burn rate” and allow the resulting gases to escape at a much higher velocity. The state’s witness also explained that the duct tape wrapping could contain those gases until the pressure built up to a point that the device could explode. The state’s witness explained that the result was a bomb and that the bomb, if ignited, would have dangerous destructive capacity.

At the close of the evidence, youth argued that the state had not demonstrated that the modified Piccolo Pete was a “bomb” and that, as a result, the state had failed in its proof. The trial court rejected youth’s argument.

On appeal, youth once again argues that the state failed to demonstrate that the modified Piccolo Pete was a “destructive device.” In his brief, he argues that (1) the modified Piccolo Pete does not have sufficient destructive capacity to qualify as a “destructive device,” (2) the device is a lawful “cylindrical fountain” within the meaning of ORS 480.127(4), and (3), even if not a “cylindrical fountain,” the *633 device still is a “pyrotechnic device” that is excluded from the definition of impermissible “destructive devices” under ORS 166.382(2)(a).

We take each of the arguments in turn. We begin with the issue whether the state proved that the modified Piccolo Pete was a “destructive device.” According to youth, the fact that a device is capable of exploding does not make it a “destructive device.” He argues that some significant amount of destructive capacity is required. He does not identify what level of destructive capacity is required, but he insists that the device in this case does not qualify. The state argues that its witness testified that the device is a “bomb,” and that ends the matter.

The state is correct, although not for the reason that it advances. Merely because a witness has testified that a device is a bomb does not necessarily establish that the device is a “bomb” within the meaning of ORS 166.382(l)(a)(A). That is a matter of statutory construction.

The statute in this case does not define what constitutes a “bomb.” The ordinary meaning of the term, at least as pertinent to this case, is a “device carrying an explosive charge fused to detonate under certain conditions,” such as by impact or by a timer. Webster’s at 249. Nothing in the wording of the statute suggests that the legislature intended a different meaning for the term.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
91 P.3d 830, 193 Or. App. 629, 2004 Ore. App. LEXIS 681, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-juvenile-department-v-garrett-orctapp-2004.