State ex rel. Gibson v. Industrial Commission

Ohio Supreme Court

State ex rel. Gibson v. Industrial Commission

530 N.E.2d 916, 39 Ohio St. 3d 319, 1988 Ohio LEXIS 368

CourtOhio Supreme Court

DecidedNovember 16, 1988

DocketNo. 87-634

StatusPublished

Cited by34 cases

This text of 530 N.E.2d 916 (State ex rel. Gibson v. Industrial Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

State ex rel. Gibson v. Industrial Commission, 530 N.E.2d 916, 39 Ohio St. 3d 319, 1988 Ohio LEXIS 368 (Ohio 1988).

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Opinion

Per Curiam.

Appellant’s sole proposition before this court is that the commission’s assumption of jurisdiction over an issue that she did not intend to relitigate violated her right to due process of law. We hold that this issue was not raised previously, and therefore has been waived. See State v. Awan (1986), 22 Ohio St. 3d 120, 22 OBR 199, 489 N.E. 2d 277, syllabus; Blausey v. Stein (1980), 61 Ohio St. 2d 264, 15 O.O. 3d 268, 400 N.E. 2d 408; F. Enterprises v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. (1976), 47 Ohio St. 2d 154, 1 O.O. 3d 90, 351 N.E. 2d 121.

Appellant unsuccessfully attempts to distinguish these and similar cases cited by appellees, contending that the case at bar, unlike those noted above, is a mandamus action. She argues that the present issue is before this court as if originally filed here, and thus her due process argument is not waived. However, in State, ex rel. Kay, v. Cleveland (1971), 27 Ohio St. 2d 37, 56 O.O. 2d 21, 271 N.E. 2d 784, an appeal from a denial of a writ of mandamus, we relied on a waiver theory in refusing to consider a newly proffered free-speech argument.

Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals denying the writ is therefore affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

Moyer, C.J., Sweeney, Locher, Holmes, Douglas, Wright and H. Brown, JJ., concur.

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Per Curiam.

Appellant’s sole proposition before this court is that the commission’s assumption of jurisdiction over an issue that she did not intend to relitigate violated her right to due process of law. We hold that this issue was not raised previously, and therefore has been waived. See State v. Awan (1986), 22 Ohio St. 3d 120, 22 OBR 199, 489 N.E. 2d 277, syllabus; Blausey v. Stein (1980), 61 Ohio St. 2d 264, 15 O.O. 3d 268, 400 N.E. 2d 408; F. Enterprises v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. (1976), 47 Ohio St. 2d 154, 1 O.O. 3d 90, 351 N.E. 2d 121.

Appellant unsuccessfully attempts to distinguish these and similar cases cited by appellees, contending that the case at bar, unlike those noted above, is a mandamus action. She argues that the present issue is before this court as if originally filed here, and thus her due process argument is not waived. However, in State, ex rel. Kay, v. Cleveland (1971), 27 Ohio St. 2d 37, 56 O.O. 2d 21, 271 N.E. 2d 784, an appeal from a denial of a writ of mandamus, we relied on a waiver theory in refusing to consider a newly proffered free-speech argument.

Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals denying the writ is therefore affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

Moyer, C.J., Sweeney, Locher, Holmes, Douglas, Wright and H. Brown, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

530 N.E.2d 916, 39 Ohio St. 3d 319, 1988 Ohio LEXIS 368, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-gibson-v-industrial-commission-ohio-1988.

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