Berry, Judge:
This proceeding involves a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by the petitioner, Regine Domico, a citizen of West Germany, invoking the original jurisdiction of this Court and praying that a writ be granted requiring the respondent, Pete Domico, her former husband, to produce the bodies of Martina Elizabeth and Angela Maria Domico, children of the parties, before the Court and to award the custody of said infant children to the petitioner.
This proceeding was instituted in this Court on February 27, 1967, and a writ was granted requiring the respondent to produce the two children before the Court on April 25, 1967, at which time the parties appeared before the Court with the children and the case was continued at the request of the parties in order to take depositions, both in this country and Germany. It was not until some three years later at the January regular term of Court that the case was submitted for decision on briefs and oral argument of counsel.
The petitioner and the respondent were married in Germany on November 20, 1958, while the respondent was in the United States Army stationed in Nuremberg, Germany. The petitioner was eighteen years old and pregnant at the time of the marriage. The parties lived together in Germany for about seven years; however, in 1963 the respondent was ordered to Fort Hood, Texas, and the peti[697]*697tioner later lived with him in Texas for five months in 1965 after coming to America with the children. Having received orders to report to Vietnam, the respondent retired from the Army in May, 1965, with the rank of first sergeant, after twenty-three years of service. He went soon thereafter with his wife and children to Germany, and the family lived there for a year and three months. He sought employment in Germany during this latter period. The respondent is about seventeen years older than the petitioner, and some difficulties arose between the parties after his retirement and his return to Germany. During the time the parties lived together, they apparently were affiliated with the Lutheran church in which they had been married. In 1966, as hereafter explained, respondent returned to America with the children and without his wife, after which he became affiliated with the Roman Catholic church, and the children are now attending a parochial school of that church.
The serious marital difficulties between the parties began in 1966, and there is some indication that they discussed both separation and divorce. The petitioner claims that the respondent agreed to give custody of the children to her, but the respondent denies that any such agreement was made.
The respondent testified that in the summer of 1966 he learned from his wife, her relatives, and her attorney that she intended to take legal action against him. He then consulted an attorney in Nuremberg who appeared to have been an American living in that area. The attorney advised him to leave the country and to take the children with him. On September 6, 1966, without the knowledge of the petitioner, he took Martina, who had been sick and was home in bed, and then went to Angela’s school where he took her from her classroom. Early on that same day, he left Germany for the United States with the two children, Martina, born on October 5, 1962, and Angela, born on January 23, 1959. Upon arriving in this country, he returned to his father’s home in Monongah, Marion County, West Virginia.
[698]*698The petitioner, after learning that the respondent had taken the children from their home and from school, immediately filed proceedings on September 6, 1966, in the District Court of Nuremberg, Court of Guardianship, Germany, and obtained an order for custody of the two children, preliminary to a divorce proceeding which was later instituted on September 19, 1966, in the District Court of Nuremberg-Furth. The petitioner was granted the divorce from the respondent in said court on August 15, 1967. The final judgment of the District Court in Germany in the divorce proceedings was brief and concise and contained the statement, “* * * the fault lies with the accused.” There was no mention of custody of the children in the divorce decree. However, there was a statement in connection with the decree, which would be considered an opinion or finding of facts in this country, reciting that certain witnesses testified under oath. The finding or opinion, states that the evidence showed that the accused had conducted himself in an immoral way toward the two small girls; that he had fondled them in an improper manner and used obscene motions with them at various times.
After the institution of the habeas corpus proceeding in this Court, depositions were taken from the petitioner and her brother in Charleston, West Virginia, in which she again testified about the suggestive and immoral conduct of the respondent toward the children. In addition she stated that he had acted improperly with her in front of the children, that he had engaged in improper sexual relations, and had used foul language in the presence of the children which they heard and repeated. Petitioner further testified in the depositions that the respondent had the reputation of being dishonest while he was in Germany and had been accused of stealing coins and stamps; that she had argued with people who had accused him of such actions and that she had settled and compromised certain matters to avoid prosecution. Also, she stated that after the respondent left Germany the “C.I.D.” [699]*699officers came to their house and recovered some government property contained in a tool box.
The petitioner further testified that the respondent had threatened to shoot her and burn down their house while he was in the Army; that she was in fear of bodily harm for both herself and the children and that he was highly nervous and neurotic. These statements were confirmed by her brother, Dr. Helmut Mad, who is a medical doctor in Germany with specialized training in psychiatry, although his principal practice is as a surgeon. Dr. Mad stated that although he had not treated the respondent, he had observed him as a doctor would observe a patient, while talking with him and noticing his reactions.
Depositions were taken from four persons in Germany which supported the petitioner’s contentions. These depositions were translated in narrative form and were, therefore, objected to in the brief filed in behalf of the respondent because of the form used and on the ground that no right to cross-examination was allowed. There is no indication that there was anyone present in behalf of the respondent to cross-examine the witnesses in Germany, and no objection was contained in the depositions indicating that they were not in proper form in accordance with German law.
The deposition of the respondent categorically denied all the accusations made by his wife and her witnesses against him. He stated that the petitioner often left the children in his custody, while they were living in Germany, when she attended various meetings and made trips to visit her sister in another city in Germany and that there was no indication, at any time, on these occasions, that she was apprehensive of his treatment of the children.
It further appears that the respondent had given $8,000 of his own money to his mother-in-law to buy the property in which they all lived in Nuremberg, and also that he had helped her pay off a loan, equivalent to several thousand dollars, in connection with the property, such [700]
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Berry, Judge:
This proceeding involves a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by the petitioner, Regine Domico, a citizen of West Germany, invoking the original jurisdiction of this Court and praying that a writ be granted requiring the respondent, Pete Domico, her former husband, to produce the bodies of Martina Elizabeth and Angela Maria Domico, children of the parties, before the Court and to award the custody of said infant children to the petitioner.
This proceeding was instituted in this Court on February 27, 1967, and a writ was granted requiring the respondent to produce the two children before the Court on April 25, 1967, at which time the parties appeared before the Court with the children and the case was continued at the request of the parties in order to take depositions, both in this country and Germany. It was not until some three years later at the January regular term of Court that the case was submitted for decision on briefs and oral argument of counsel.
The petitioner and the respondent were married in Germany on November 20, 1958, while the respondent was in the United States Army stationed in Nuremberg, Germany. The petitioner was eighteen years old and pregnant at the time of the marriage. The parties lived together in Germany for about seven years; however, in 1963 the respondent was ordered to Fort Hood, Texas, and the peti[697]*697tioner later lived with him in Texas for five months in 1965 after coming to America with the children. Having received orders to report to Vietnam, the respondent retired from the Army in May, 1965, with the rank of first sergeant, after twenty-three years of service. He went soon thereafter with his wife and children to Germany, and the family lived there for a year and three months. He sought employment in Germany during this latter period. The respondent is about seventeen years older than the petitioner, and some difficulties arose between the parties after his retirement and his return to Germany. During the time the parties lived together, they apparently were affiliated with the Lutheran church in which they had been married. In 1966, as hereafter explained, respondent returned to America with the children and without his wife, after which he became affiliated with the Roman Catholic church, and the children are now attending a parochial school of that church.
The serious marital difficulties between the parties began in 1966, and there is some indication that they discussed both separation and divorce. The petitioner claims that the respondent agreed to give custody of the children to her, but the respondent denies that any such agreement was made.
The respondent testified that in the summer of 1966 he learned from his wife, her relatives, and her attorney that she intended to take legal action against him. He then consulted an attorney in Nuremberg who appeared to have been an American living in that area. The attorney advised him to leave the country and to take the children with him. On September 6, 1966, without the knowledge of the petitioner, he took Martina, who had been sick and was home in bed, and then went to Angela’s school where he took her from her classroom. Early on that same day, he left Germany for the United States with the two children, Martina, born on October 5, 1962, and Angela, born on January 23, 1959. Upon arriving in this country, he returned to his father’s home in Monongah, Marion County, West Virginia.
[698]*698The petitioner, after learning that the respondent had taken the children from their home and from school, immediately filed proceedings on September 6, 1966, in the District Court of Nuremberg, Court of Guardianship, Germany, and obtained an order for custody of the two children, preliminary to a divorce proceeding which was later instituted on September 19, 1966, in the District Court of Nuremberg-Furth. The petitioner was granted the divorce from the respondent in said court on August 15, 1967. The final judgment of the District Court in Germany in the divorce proceedings was brief and concise and contained the statement, “* * * the fault lies with the accused.” There was no mention of custody of the children in the divorce decree. However, there was a statement in connection with the decree, which would be considered an opinion or finding of facts in this country, reciting that certain witnesses testified under oath. The finding or opinion, states that the evidence showed that the accused had conducted himself in an immoral way toward the two small girls; that he had fondled them in an improper manner and used obscene motions with them at various times.
After the institution of the habeas corpus proceeding in this Court, depositions were taken from the petitioner and her brother in Charleston, West Virginia, in which she again testified about the suggestive and immoral conduct of the respondent toward the children. In addition she stated that he had acted improperly with her in front of the children, that he had engaged in improper sexual relations, and had used foul language in the presence of the children which they heard and repeated. Petitioner further testified in the depositions that the respondent had the reputation of being dishonest while he was in Germany and had been accused of stealing coins and stamps; that she had argued with people who had accused him of such actions and that she had settled and compromised certain matters to avoid prosecution. Also, she stated that after the respondent left Germany the “C.I.D.” [699]*699officers came to their house and recovered some government property contained in a tool box.
The petitioner further testified that the respondent had threatened to shoot her and burn down their house while he was in the Army; that she was in fear of bodily harm for both herself and the children and that he was highly nervous and neurotic. These statements were confirmed by her brother, Dr. Helmut Mad, who is a medical doctor in Germany with specialized training in psychiatry, although his principal practice is as a surgeon. Dr. Mad stated that although he had not treated the respondent, he had observed him as a doctor would observe a patient, while talking with him and noticing his reactions.
Depositions were taken from four persons in Germany which supported the petitioner’s contentions. These depositions were translated in narrative form and were, therefore, objected to in the brief filed in behalf of the respondent because of the form used and on the ground that no right to cross-examination was allowed. There is no indication that there was anyone present in behalf of the respondent to cross-examine the witnesses in Germany, and no objection was contained in the depositions indicating that they were not in proper form in accordance with German law.
The deposition of the respondent categorically denied all the accusations made by his wife and her witnesses against him. He stated that the petitioner often left the children in his custody, while they were living in Germany, when she attended various meetings and made trips to visit her sister in another city in Germany and that there was no indication, at any time, on these occasions, that she was apprehensive of his treatment of the children.
It further appears that the respondent had given $8,000 of his own money to his mother-in-law to buy the property in which they all lived in Nuremberg, and also that he had helped her pay off a loan, equivalent to several thousand dollars, in connection with the property, such [700]*700loan having been obtained for the purpose of making repairs to the building which had been bombed during World War II. He denied that he had ever stolen any coins or stamps but claimed he had paid for certain coins that he was interested in and had obtained while in Germany.
Depositions were taken from the parish priest in Mo-nongah, from the nuns who taught school where the children attended, from a state policeman and a welfare worker, all of whom are well-acquainted with the respondent and the two children. Their testimony was to the effect that the respondent was of good moral character and that he was well-thought of in the community where he lived; that the children lived with him and his second wife in a comfortable home, which the respondent had built in Monongah at a cost of about $25,000; that the children were happy and getting along well in school, had become well-adjusted and were participating in extra curricular activities such as singing in the choir of the Catholic church, taking ballet lessons and belonging to the Girl Scouts. They further testified that the respondent’s second wife treated the two children with loving care, the same as if they were her own. It is contended that the advantages afforded the children in this country are superior to those that would be afforded to them in Germany.
There was uncontradicted testimony in behalf of the respondent, such testimony being that after returning to this country with the children, and before the divorce, the defendant requested that the petitioner come to this country and live with him and their children in a home which he was providing for them but that she had refused to do so.
The petitioner is employed as a secretary in Nuremberg and receives a salary of about $187 per month in American money. She is a high school graduate and attended one year of schooling in what would be comparable to a commercial college in this country. The respondent attended one year of high school and is employed as a blacksmith [701]*701in connection with the coal mine in Monongah and makes about $500 a month in this work. He also receives about $300 retirement pay from the Army, making his income more than $800 a month.
The respondent did not appear in the German divorce proceedings but admits that he knew about it by virtue of being served with a notice which would be equivalent to an order of publication.
After the petitioner obtained the divorce, the respondent instituted proceedings in the Roman Catholic church and had the marriage annulled. After this had taken place, he married Loretta Bienkoski on October 30, 1968, in Clarksburg, West Virginia, because they had been advised of unfavorable reactions to such marriage if it were performed in Monongah. The present Mrs. Domico was twenty-eight years old at the time of the marriage and had previously borne illegitimate twins. At the time the evidence was taken, Mrs. Domico was again pregnant. This would make a total of five children who would be living with the respondent and his present wife in their home in Monongah. The evidence, however, indicates that the new home, containing four bedrooms and two bathrooms, is entirely adequate for the comfortable living of the respondent, his wife and the children.
The only issue in this proceeding is who shall have custody of the children, Martina and Angela. It is the contention of the petitioner that this Court should recognize the judgments of the courts of Germany with regard to the status and custody of the infant children. It appears from the evidence that the respondent had left Germany with the children before the Court of Guardianship in Nuremberg, Germany, entered the order giving custody of the children to the petitioner. In such case it appears that there may be some question whether the German court had jurisdiction to award custody of the children. See 24 Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce and Separation, Section 774 and 27B C.J.S., Divorce, Section 392. The petitioner refused to agree to a reconciliation and live with the respondent in this country. It is a well-known principle [702]*702of law that a wife’s domicile follows the husband and the husband has the right to fix the domicile. Brinkley v. Brinkley, 147 W. Va. 557, 129 S. E.2d 436; Hartman v. Hartman, 132 W. Va. 728, 53 S. E.2d 407. However, in any event, the order of the German court with regard to the custody of the children does not bar the courts in this state from making a later order or decree with respect to the custody of the children. Cantrell v. Cantrell, 143 W. Va. 826, 106 S. E.2d 768; Pugh v. Pugh, 133 W. Va. 501, 56 S. E.2d 901; Suter v. Suter, 128 W. Va. 511, 37 S. E.2d 474; Stapler v. Leamons, 101 W. Va. 235, 132 S. E. 507. The law covering the matter in the case at bar is succinctly stated in the syllabus of the Stapler case in the following language: “A foreign decree or order awarding the custody of a minor child in a divorce suit is not res judicata in a subsequent proceeding in this State, involving the custody of the infant, where there has been such change in the conditions since the rendition of the foreign judgment as to render its modification desirable for the welfare and protection of the child.”
Full faith and credit under the Constitution of the United States is not required to be given to judgments of foreign countries; however, such judgments are frequently recognized and given force and effect through comity. 15A C.J.S., Conflict of Laws, Section 3 (3); 27B C.J.S., Divorce, Section 329, 24 Am. Jur. 2d, Divorce, Section 964. In custody cases full faith and credit with regard to custody decrees of any sister state in this country is not required in a custody proceeding in another state. Suter v. Suter, supra; Stapler v. Leamons, supra; Pugh v. Pugh, supra; and Cantrell v. Cantrell, supra. The reason for this principle of law is that the welfare of the child is the polar star in such cases; and the only issue for determination in habeas corpus proceedings involving the rights of the parents to the custody of their children is the welfare and best interests of the children in connection with awarding of proper custody. State ex rel. Lipscomb v. Joplin, 131 W. Va. 302, 47 S. E.2d 221; Pugh v. Pugh, supra. This is true with regard to awarding of [703]*703custody of children in this country where former decrees with regard to custody are involved and is doubly true of decrees of courts of foreign countries under comity. The respondent and the children in this instant case are citizens of this country and comity will never be extended in any case which might injuriously affect our own citizens. Stevens v. Brown, 20 W. Va. 450.
The case of Pugh v. Pugh, supra, is quite similar to the case at bar. In that case the husband obtained custody of the children from the wife and brought them to West Virginia from another state. The wife brought a habeas corpus proceeding in this state and it was held that, although the manner in which the husband obtained the custody was not commendable, the action in that respect did not transcend or exceed his right as a parent to the possession of his children. However, his right to the custody of the children was subject to judicial determination in the event of a contest between him and the mother of the children. To entitle the petitioner to the custody of the children, it is incumbent upon her, in such proceeding, to show that a change of the existing custody of the children by the respondent would materially promote the welfare of the children. This principle is set out in the case of Cantrell v. Cantrell, supra, wherein it is stated that, “It is clear that whatever may be the rule adopted, a foreign decree or order is not a bar to a subsequent proceeding looking to its modification because of altered conditions since the time of its rendition, and where such altered conditions make a modification desirable and for the better welfare of the child.” The Cantrell case also states that, in cases such as the case at bar, since a foreign custody decree is usually regarded as controlling as to conditions as they existed at the time the foreign decree was rendered, only matters that have occurred subsequent to the foreign custody decree can be litigated in the new decision. Therefore, upon a habeas corpus hearing in a custody case, the Court should disregard the voluminous allegations of misconduct and unfitness of either of the parents prior to rendition of the [704]*704previous custody decree, and should limit the present inquiry to relevant facts and circumstances which may be shown to have occurred since that time affecting the welfare of the children, and which may or may not justify a change in their custody. In any event, evidence of misconduct prior to any custody hearing may be admitted only as it tends to show present unfitness. 24 Am. Jur. 2d. Divorce and Separation, Section 823.
It appears from the evidence in this case that the children of the parties are well cared for by the respondent in an adequate home in Monongah, West Virginia; that the children are well-clothed and well-fed and healthy; that they are completely adjusted to life in this country and that it would be detrimental to their welfare to change the custody of these children at the present time. There is no evidence that the children would be benefited by removing them from the custody of the respondent in Monongah, West Virginia, and returning them to Germany under the custody of the petitioner. It is true that it appears they would be adequately cared for in Germany but not as well as they would be in this country. The petitioner owns no property in Germany, and the house in which she lives is owned by her mother. She is not as well off financially as the respondent, since his income is four or five times more than her income and he owns the home in which they live, free of encum-berances. To remove the children from one country to another, to change their religion, and to subject them to different customs in this formative period of their lives would appear, from the evidence in this case, to weigh against their welfare and best interest. For the reasons stated herein, the change of custody prayed for by the petitioner is denied.
Change of custody prayed for denied.