State ex rel. Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. Indus. Comm.

2014 Ohio 2072
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedMay 15, 2014
Docket13AP-306
StatusPublished

This text of 2014 Ohio 2072 (State ex rel. Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. Indus. Comm.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 2014 Ohio 2072 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014).

Opinion

[Cite as State ex rel. Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 2014-Ohio-2072.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State of Ohio, ex rel. : Daimler Chrysler Corp., : Relator, : v. No. 13AP-306 : The Industrial Commission (REGULAR CALENDAR) of Ohio and Michael A. Liles, :

Respondents. :

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on May 15, 2014

Coolidge Wall Co., L.P.A., David C. Korte, Michelle D. Bach, and Joshua R. Lounsbury, for relator.

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and LaTawnda N. Moore, for respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio.

Larrimer and Larrimer, and Thomas L. Reitz, for respondent Michael A. Liles.

IN MANDAMUS ON OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE'S DECISION

CONNOR, J. {¶ 1} Relator, Daimler Chrysler Corp., brings this original action seeking a writ of mandamus ordering respondent, Industrial Commission of Ohio ("commission"), to vacate its October 5, 2012 order awarding permanent total disability compensation ("PTD") to respondent, Michael A. Liles ("claimant"). {¶ 2} Pursuant to Civ.R. 53 and Loc.R. 13(M) of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, we referred this matter to a magistrate who rendered a decision and recommendation that includes findings of fact and conclusions of law, which is appended No. 13AP-306 2

hereto. The magistrate concluded that the commission abused its discretion in awarding PTD compensation when it expressly relied on the report of a vocational specialist that: (1) contains a medical opinion that the expert is not competent to render, and (2) conflicts with the opinion of the medical expert upon which the commission also relied. Specifically, the vocational expert opined that the pain medication prescribed to claimant effectively prevented him from participating in the training program needed to prepare him for sedentary work. Accordingly, the magistrate recommended that we issue the requested writ of mandamus. {¶ 3} In order for this court to issue a writ of mandamus as a remedy from a determination of the commission, relator must show a clear legal right to the relief sought and that the commission has a clear legal duty to provide such relief. State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm., 11 Ohio St.2d 141 (1967). A clear legal right to a writ of mandamus exists where the relator shows that the commission abused its discretion by entering an order which is not supported by any evidence in the record. State ex rel. Elliott v. Indus. Comm., 26 Ohio St.3d 76 (1986). {¶ 4} Claimant sets forth the following three objections to the magistrate's decision: Objection No. 1: The magistrate erred by holding that the Commission must rely on medical expertise to conclude that narcotic medication will hamper the ability to complete a retraining program.

Objection No. 2: The magistrate erred by holding that Unger[v. Indus. Comm., 70 Ohio St.3d 672 (1994)] and [State ex rel. Paraskevopoulus v. Indus. Comm., 83 Ohio St.3d 189 (1998)] stand for the legal precedent that effect of medication generally requires medical expertise.

Objection No. 3: The magistrate erred by holding that the Commission based its decision after conducting its own assessment of the claimant's pain.

{¶ 5} In each of his objections claimant argues, for a slightly different reason, that

the magistrate erred in concluding that the commission abused its discretion by relying on No. 13AP-306 3

the report of a vocational expert in granting PTD compensation. For the reasons that

follow, we agree with the magistrate.

{¶ 6} In our view, this court's decision in State ex rel. Lear Operations Corp. v.

Crispen, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-428, 2008-Ohio-5256, disposes of the objections. In

Crispen, the commission expressly relied on the report of a medical doctor who opined

that claimant could perform sedentary work. However, in concluding that claimant was

unable to perform sustained remunerative employment, the commission cited the report

of a vocational expert who opined that claimant's pain from the allowed condition

prevented her from performing sedentary work. We granted a writ of mandamus ordering

the commission to vacate its award of PTD compensation for the stated reason that the

commission improperly relied upon a medical opinion rendered by a vocational expert

who was not competent to render such an opinion. Id. at ¶ 5.

{¶ 7} The vocational expert relied on by the commission in this case is neither a

"licensed health professional authorized to prescribe drugs," nor is he engaged in the

"practice of pharmacy." See R.C. 4729.01(A) and (I). Pursuant to our reasoning in

Crispen, the commission abused its discretion when it relied on the opinion of a

vocational expert regarding the deleterious effects of prescribed pain medication. The

vocational expert was simply not qualified to render a medical opinion. Id.

{¶ 8} Moreover, the medical expert expressly relied upon by the commission

opined that claimant was capable of performing sedentary work. The medical expert was

clearly aware of the effects of the prescribed pain medication at the recommended dosage.

By ruling that claimant was unable to participate in sustained remunerative employment,

the commission concluded that the deleterious effects of pain medication, even when

taken in the prescribed dosage, rendered claimant incapable of participating in the No. 13AP-306 4

training program needed to prepare him for sedentary work. The commission does not

have the medical expertise necessary to reach such a conclusion. Indeed, while it is well-

settled law that the commission is the expert on non-medical factors, including vocational

evidence, State ex rel. Jackson v. Indus. Comm., 79 Ohio St.3d 266 (1997), it is just as

well-settled that neither the commission nor its hearing officers have medical expertise.

State ex rel. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 81 Ohio St.3d 56, 58 (1998).

{¶ 9} In short, for the reasons set forth by the magistrate and the additional

reasons set forth herein, the objections shall be overruled.

{¶ 10} Following an independent review of the magistrate's decision and the

objections filed by claimant, we find that the magistrate has determined the pertinent

facts and properly applied the relevant law. Accordingly, we adopt the magistrate's

decision as our own, including the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained

therein. For the reasons set forth in the magistrate's decision and those expressed herein,

claimant's objections are overruled.

{¶ 11} We hereby issue a writ of mandamus ordering the commission to vacate its

October 5, 2012 order awarding permanent total disability compensation to claimant and

to issue a new order denying such compensation.

Objections overruled; writ granted.

KLATT and T. BRYANT, JJ., concur.

T. BRYANT, J., retired, of the Third Appellate District, assigned to active duty under authority of the Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 6(C). _________________ No. 13AP-306 5

APPENDIX IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

State of Ohio, ex rel. : Daimler Chrysler Corp., : Relator, No. 13AP-306 : v. (REGULAR CALENDAR) : The Industrial Commission of Ohio and Michael A. Liles, :

MAGISTRATE'S DECISION

Rendered on December 20, 2013

Coolidge Wall Co., L.P.A., David C. Korte, Michelle D. Bach, and Joshua R. Lounsbury, for relator.

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and LaTawnda N. Moore, for respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio.

Larrimer and Larrimer, and Thomas L. Reitz, for respondent Michael A. Liles.

IN MANDAMUS

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Related

State ex rel. Daimler Chrysler v. Indus. Comm.
2011 Ohio 4895 (Ohio Supreme Court, 2011)
Lear Operations Corporation v. Crispen, 07ap-428 (10-9-2008)
2008 Ohio 5256 (Ohio Court of Appeals, 2008)
State ex rel. Pressley v. Industrial Commission
228 N.E.2d 631 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1967)
State ex rel. Mitchell v. Robbins & Myers, Inc.
453 N.E.2d 721 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1983)
State ex rel. Elliott v. Industrial Commission
497 N.E.2d 70 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1986)
State ex rel. Unger v. Industrial Commission
640 N.E.2d 833 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1994)
State ex rel. Jackson v. Industrial Commission
680 N.E.2d 1233 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1997)
State ex rel. Paraskevopoulos v. Industrial Commission
699 N.E.2d 72 (Ohio Supreme Court, 1998)

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2014 Ohio 2072, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-daimler-chrysler-corp-v-indus-comm-ohioctapp-2014.