MR. JUSTICE CASTLES
delivered the Opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from a judgment and decree which denied the relator Burns any relief and ordered a writ of review-quashed, the Honorable Victor H. Pall, presiding. Relator Burns had sought review of proceedings of the City Council of Livingston which had discharged Burns from the Livingston Fire Department.
Respondents are the City of Livingston, its mayor and aldermen, hereafter collectively referred to as either Respondents or the City.
Appellant Burns (relator below) was a member of the organized fire department of the City for about twelve years, and for the last four or five years had been the Fire Chief.
On August 13, 1962, at a regular meeting of the City Council, the fire and police committee of the council reported a recommendation that appellant Burns be demoted from the position of fire chief to fireman, and that the mayor be instructed to [250]*250have the city attorney prepare the necessary charges and serve a copy on Burns, specifying September 4, 1962, as the hearing date. Subsequently, on August 27,1962, a written specification of charges was prepared and served on Burns. Burns, at the time and since June or July of 1962, had been on sick leave.
The written charges were general in character, charging essentially:
(1) Failure to keep proper and adequate records and accounts pertaining to the affairs of the Fire Department.
(2) Failure to exercise proper leadership and maintain discipline.
(3) Personal conduct unbecoming a fire chief.
The hearing on the projected demotion of the fire chief to fireman was not held on September 4, 1962, as scheduled because of illness of the city attorney.
The postponement was specifically waived by Burns’ counsel. On January 5, 1963, a notice of hearing was served on Burns of a hearing to be had on January 10, 1963.
Prior to the city council meeting of August 13, 1962, Bums had informed members of the fire and police committee that if he were not fit to be chief, he was not fit to be a fireman and informed the council that he would rather be discharged than demoted.
On January 10, 1963, a hearing was had by the city council. Burns and his counsel were present. Objection to proceedings were made by counsel for Bums on these grounds:
(1) Bums had not been “suspended” as fire chief and hence the council had no jurisdiction.
(2) The charges levied were so general that it was impossible to prepare a defense.
(3) Three members of the council who made the charges as members of the fire and police committee were sitting in judgment.
Bums had filed an answer generally denying the charges.
[251]*251The hearing was held and subsequently by vote of the council, Burns was discharged. Burns then sought a writ of review in the district court, where on an agreed statement of facts and upon stipulation as to the exhibits and record of proceedings before the city council, the district court quashed the writ and denied relief to Burns. Judgment was entered and this appeal followed.
The Specifications of Error are:
(1) The Livingston City Council was without jurisdiction to conduct the hearing on January 10, 1963, because the Mayor of the City of Livingston had not first suspended appellant, such suspension being a condition precedent required by section 11-1903, R.C.M.1947, thereby voiding the discharge of appellant.
(2) The Livingston City Council did not have before it “substantial evidence” to warrant discharging appellant from the Livingston Fire Department.
(3) Appellant has been deprived of his property right in his job and retirement benefits within the provisions of section 67-201, R.C.M.1947, defining property, and Article III, Section 27 of the Constitution of the State of Montana, providing that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law.
R.C.M.1947, § 11-1902, provides:
“Fire department to consist of what — compensation. Such fire department, when established, may consist of one chief of the fire department, as many assistant chiefs of the fire department, and such number of firemen as the council or commission may from time to time provide, and may also include a city electrician, and as many assistant electricians as the council or commission may from time to time provide. The compensation of the chief of the fire department and assistant chiefs of the fire department and firemen, in cities and towns where the council or commission shall establish a paid fire department, and said city electrician and assistant city electricians, shall be [252]*252fixed by ordinance. The mayor or manager shall nominate, and, with the consent of the council or commission, appoint the chief of the fire department, and assistant chief or chiefs of the fire department, and all firemen, and each appointment shall be first made for a probationary term of six (6) months, and thereafter the mayor or manager may nominate, and, with the consent of the council or commission, appoint such chief and assistant chief or chiefs of the fire department and firemen, who shall thereafter hold their respective appointments during good behavior, and while they have the physical ability to perform their duties. The chief of the fire department, and the assistant chief or chiefs of the fire department, and the firemen, shall not be deemed officers of the municipal corporation in which such fire department is established.”
R.C.M.1947, § 11-1903, provides:
“Powers of mayor or manager to suspend firemen. The mayor or manager may suspend the chief and assistant or any fireman of the fire department for neglect of duty or a violation of any of the rules and regulations of the fire department; the chief of the fire department may suspend the assistant chief of the fire department or any fireman, and the assistant chief of the fire department may suspend any fireman for a like cause. In all cases of suspension the person suspended must be furnished with a copy of the charge against him in writing, setting forth reasons for the suspension, and such charges must be presented to the next meeting of the council or commission and a hearing had thereon, when the suspended member of the fire department may appear in person or by counsel and make his defense to said charges; if such charges are found proven by the council or commission, the council or commission, by a vote of a majority of the whole council or commission, may impose such penalty as it shall determine the offense warrants, either in the continuation of the suspension for a time limited, or in the removal of the suspended person from the fire department; should the charges be not presented to the next meeting of the [253]*253council or commission after the suspension, or should the charges be found not proven by the council or commission, the suspended person shall be reinstated and be entitled to his usual compensation for the time so suspended. This act shall apply to organized fire departments in every city and town of the State of Montana regardless of the form of government under which said city or town may be operating or may at any time adopt.”
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MR. JUSTICE CASTLES
delivered the Opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from a judgment and decree which denied the relator Burns any relief and ordered a writ of review-quashed, the Honorable Victor H. Pall, presiding. Relator Burns had sought review of proceedings of the City Council of Livingston which had discharged Burns from the Livingston Fire Department.
Respondents are the City of Livingston, its mayor and aldermen, hereafter collectively referred to as either Respondents or the City.
Appellant Burns (relator below) was a member of the organized fire department of the City for about twelve years, and for the last four or five years had been the Fire Chief.
On August 13, 1962, at a regular meeting of the City Council, the fire and police committee of the council reported a recommendation that appellant Burns be demoted from the position of fire chief to fireman, and that the mayor be instructed to [250]*250have the city attorney prepare the necessary charges and serve a copy on Burns, specifying September 4, 1962, as the hearing date. Subsequently, on August 27,1962, a written specification of charges was prepared and served on Burns. Burns, at the time and since June or July of 1962, had been on sick leave.
The written charges were general in character, charging essentially:
(1) Failure to keep proper and adequate records and accounts pertaining to the affairs of the Fire Department.
(2) Failure to exercise proper leadership and maintain discipline.
(3) Personal conduct unbecoming a fire chief.
The hearing on the projected demotion of the fire chief to fireman was not held on September 4, 1962, as scheduled because of illness of the city attorney.
The postponement was specifically waived by Burns’ counsel. On January 5, 1963, a notice of hearing was served on Burns of a hearing to be had on January 10, 1963.
Prior to the city council meeting of August 13, 1962, Bums had informed members of the fire and police committee that if he were not fit to be chief, he was not fit to be a fireman and informed the council that he would rather be discharged than demoted.
On January 10, 1963, a hearing was had by the city council. Burns and his counsel were present. Objection to proceedings were made by counsel for Bums on these grounds:
(1) Bums had not been “suspended” as fire chief and hence the council had no jurisdiction.
(2) The charges levied were so general that it was impossible to prepare a defense.
(3) Three members of the council who made the charges as members of the fire and police committee were sitting in judgment.
Bums had filed an answer generally denying the charges.
[251]*251The hearing was held and subsequently by vote of the council, Burns was discharged. Burns then sought a writ of review in the district court, where on an agreed statement of facts and upon stipulation as to the exhibits and record of proceedings before the city council, the district court quashed the writ and denied relief to Burns. Judgment was entered and this appeal followed.
The Specifications of Error are:
(1) The Livingston City Council was without jurisdiction to conduct the hearing on January 10, 1963, because the Mayor of the City of Livingston had not first suspended appellant, such suspension being a condition precedent required by section 11-1903, R.C.M.1947, thereby voiding the discharge of appellant.
(2) The Livingston City Council did not have before it “substantial evidence” to warrant discharging appellant from the Livingston Fire Department.
(3) Appellant has been deprived of his property right in his job and retirement benefits within the provisions of section 67-201, R.C.M.1947, defining property, and Article III, Section 27 of the Constitution of the State of Montana, providing that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law.
R.C.M.1947, § 11-1902, provides:
“Fire department to consist of what — compensation. Such fire department, when established, may consist of one chief of the fire department, as many assistant chiefs of the fire department, and such number of firemen as the council or commission may from time to time provide, and may also include a city electrician, and as many assistant electricians as the council or commission may from time to time provide. The compensation of the chief of the fire department and assistant chiefs of the fire department and firemen, in cities and towns where the council or commission shall establish a paid fire department, and said city electrician and assistant city electricians, shall be [252]*252fixed by ordinance. The mayor or manager shall nominate, and, with the consent of the council or commission, appoint the chief of the fire department, and assistant chief or chiefs of the fire department, and all firemen, and each appointment shall be first made for a probationary term of six (6) months, and thereafter the mayor or manager may nominate, and, with the consent of the council or commission, appoint such chief and assistant chief or chiefs of the fire department and firemen, who shall thereafter hold their respective appointments during good behavior, and while they have the physical ability to perform their duties. The chief of the fire department, and the assistant chief or chiefs of the fire department, and the firemen, shall not be deemed officers of the municipal corporation in which such fire department is established.”
R.C.M.1947, § 11-1903, provides:
“Powers of mayor or manager to suspend firemen. The mayor or manager may suspend the chief and assistant or any fireman of the fire department for neglect of duty or a violation of any of the rules and regulations of the fire department; the chief of the fire department may suspend the assistant chief of the fire department or any fireman, and the assistant chief of the fire department may suspend any fireman for a like cause. In all cases of suspension the person suspended must be furnished with a copy of the charge against him in writing, setting forth reasons for the suspension, and such charges must be presented to the next meeting of the council or commission and a hearing had thereon, when the suspended member of the fire department may appear in person or by counsel and make his defense to said charges; if such charges are found proven by the council or commission, the council or commission, by a vote of a majority of the whole council or commission, may impose such penalty as it shall determine the offense warrants, either in the continuation of the suspension for a time limited, or in the removal of the suspended person from the fire department; should the charges be not presented to the next meeting of the [253]*253council or commission after the suspension, or should the charges be found not proven by the council or commission, the suspended person shall be reinstated and be entitled to his usual compensation for the time so suspended. This act shall apply to organized fire departments in every city and town of the State of Montana regardless of the form of government under which said city or town may be operating or may at any time adopt.”
It is appellant’s argument that the language appearing in section 11-1903, to the effect that the “mayor or manager may suspend the chief” and that in “all cases of suspension the person suspended must be furnished with a copy of the charge against him in writing,” sets up as a condition precedent that before a hearing or even formal charges can be had, the mayor must suspend. Such, of course, is not what the legislature has said. It used the word may, and logically this seems entirely proper. In the instant case, Burns was on sick leave, there was no cause to suspend, and in any event Burns certainly was not prejudiced by not being suspended. Of course, too, in instances that readily come to mind such as intoxication at the scene of a conflagration, the use of suspension might be required.
Appellant cites as authority State ex rel. Driffill v. City of Anaconda, 41 Mont. 577, 111 P. 345, for the proposition that “suspension is a condition precedent” to the council having jurisdiction. What was said in that case at p. 581, 111 P. at p. 347 was:
“3. In order to dispense with the services of the relator against his will, it was incumbent upon the city to pursue the mode prescribed by section 3328 [Rev.Codes 1907, now section 11-1903, R.C.M.1947] or section 3329 [Rev.Codes 1907, now section 11-1904, R.C.M.1947]. Section 3328 is a disciplinary measure. It provides for the removal of a fireman for cause; but, as a condition precedent to such removal, charges in writing must be preferred to the council, a hearing had, and the accused found guilty.”
[254]*254Thus, we see there that the charges in writing and opportunity for hearing are required; not that any suspension must be made first. We find no merit in Specification of Error No. 1.
Next, appellant contends there was not sufficient “substantial evidence” to warrant being discharged. As to this contention, counsel for appellant terms the record, “at best it is silly.”
Excerpts of the minutes of the City Council show that on August 13, 1962, the following proceedings were had:
“Mayor Ommundsen then advised the City Council that it was the recommendation of the Pire and Police Committee that Mr. H. P. Burns be demoted from the position of Fire Chief to Fireman and that the Mayor be instructed to have the City Attorney prepare the necessary charges and a copy be served on Mr. Bums, specifying September 4, 1962, as time that public hearing will be heard.
“Discussion was had on this matter between the Mayor and Mr. Burns, who was present and also questions asked by members of the City Council were answered at this time as to what the charges would constitute. Mr. Burns was informed it was his prerogative and privilege to secure legal counsel so defense may be made by him as to whether the charges are justified.
“Motion was made by Alderman Waldum seconded by Aider-man Latseh that recommendation of the Fire and Police Committee be accepted. * * *
“At this time, Mr. David B. Fitzgerald, appeared on behalf of Mr. H. P. Bums and he stated he would consent to a continuation of hearing of charges upon five (5) days advance notice, by the City Council, and that the charges can be heard and he would waive all statutory requirements and that charges be heard at this meeting and he requested that charges be heard at a time to be fixed by the City Council on five (5) days written notice to Mr. H. P. Burns.
“Motion was then made by Waldum seconded by Alderman McG-onegal that the statement of Mr. David B. Fitzgerald be accepted. Motion carried.”
[255]*255Following this, and on August 27, 1962, Burns was served with Specifications of Charges in part as follows:
“* * * charge that Herbert P. Burns, presently Chief of the Fire Department * * * has been guilty of neglect of duty, misconduct in office, conduct unbecoming the Chief of the Fire Department, and conduct such as to bring reproach upon the Fire Department of the City of Livingston, Montana, in that:
“(I) That the said Herbert P. Bums, as Chief of the said Fire Department, has failed and neglected to keep proper and adequate records and accounts pertaining to the members of the Fire Department, and of himself, as Chief thereof.
“(II) That he has failed to exercise proper leadership and initiative in maintaining the discipline, morale, good order and proper conduct of the officers and firemen, constituting the Fire Department.
“ (III) That on numerous occasions his personal conduct has been such as to constitute conduct unbecoming a fire department chief, misconduct in office, and conduct such as to bring reproach upon the Fire Department of the City of Livingston, Montana.
“All of which is contrary to the form, force and effect of section 11-1902, R.C.M.,1947, and constitutes neglect of duty, misconduct in office, and conduct unbecoming a Fire Chief, and conduct such as to bring reproach upon the Fire Department of the City of Livingston, Montana.
“WHEREFORE, the undersigned, as such Fire and Police Committee # * * pray that the City Council * * * hold and conduct a hearing on the above charges * * * and that at such hearing the City Council take such action as it may deem necessary and proper.”
As previously related, Burns filed a general denial and objected to the proceedings as quoted. It is stated in respondents’ brief and during oral argument, without contradiction, that Burns had on several occasions stated he would rather be discharged than demoted. The charges pray for “such action as it [256]*256may deem necessary and proper” rather than just demotion as formerly contemplated at the meeting of August 13.
Some four and one half months later the hearing was held. To describe the conduct of the hearing, the record reveals:
“Gentlemen, at this time this is not a court of law. This is a hearing that is accorded to hear the defense of Mr. Herbert P. Burns. I intend to conduct the meeting to the very best of my ability to be fair to bring out all the points pertinent to these questions. If at any time you gentlemen wish to call any witness to have anyone heard, that is your privilege. Mr. Yardley, do you want to make any statement? Mr. Fitzgerald?
“MR. FITZGERALD: Yes, if I might, at this time before we start. Mr. Mayor and gentlemen of the Council, in behalf of Mr. Herbert P. Burns I would like to object at this time to any hearing under this specifications of charges so called as filed here. They purport to be drawn under Section 11-1902 of the Revised Codes, and if I may just very briefly I’ll tell you what my point is and then I won’t labor it any further. That statute provides that the Mayor may suspend the chief and any assistant or firemen in the fire department for neglected duty. Further, that in all cases of suspension the person suspended must be furnished with a copy of the charges against him, in writing, setting forth reasons for the suspension, and such charges must be presented at the next meeting of the council and a hearing had thereon where the suspended member may appear in person and make his defense. If such charges are found proved by the council the council may by a vote of the majority of the whole council impose such penalty as it shall determine the offense warrants. There has been no suspension of Mr. Bums here and I don’t believe that there can be any charges heard by this council until there has been a suspension. The minutes of the council meeting relative to that on August 13th were that Mayor Ommundsen advised the City Council that it was a recommendation of the Fire and Police Committee that Mr. H. P. Bums be demoted from the position of Fire Chief to fireman and that the [257]*257Mayor instructed to have the City Attorney to prepare the necessary charges and a copy served on Mr. Burns specifying September 4th, 1962 as a time when the public hearing would be heard. I don’t believe that that is any compliance of a suspension made by the Mayor of Mr. Burns, and if that be the case, and if I am correct, there can be no charges heard at this meeting tonight.
“My second point in regard to the specifications of charges is that they are so general that they don’t advise in fact Mr. Burns of the charges against him. They are drawn on the terms of the statute and they are very general.
“My third point is that I don’t believe there is a quorum of the council present that is able to sit in judgment because the charges were made by three members of this council. And I don’t think that they can sign charges against a person and then sit in judgment of those charges. If that is true there are only four members of the council here. So we object further on that ground with proceeding with this matter tonight. In general those are my objections.
“MR. YARDLEY: We feel under the circumstances, Dave, that there was a suspension of the Fire Chief; and secondly, that the charges in writing — I mean, they are not necessarily the facts, but I don’t believe you are required to do that. The object is to present the facts of the situation, I think, and to allow Mr. Bums to produce his defense to that.
“MR. FITZGERALD: Might I ask this then, if this hearing, as it proceeds, will these charges be put in first so we know what we have to answer?
“MAYOR OMMUNDSEN: Yes.
“MR. YARDLEY: Thirdly, I believe there is no statute or anything in regards to the members of the Fire Commission depriving them of the right to sit here, at least under a police hearing under the Metropolitan Police Act. Our court has so held, I believe Dave; there is nothing to prevent them from doing it.
[258]*258“MR. FITZGERALD : I just wanted, to make these points for the record. Having made those, also, for the record I would like to file this answer to charges which constitutes just a specific denial of the charges in general language, just to get them in the record so we have an issue to work on here.
“MR. YARDLEY: Let me suggest this Mr. Mayor, you have certain charges that have come to your attention. I am going to suggest this, Dave, that the Mayor read certain information that has come to his attention, just to read it, and then we are going to produce certain witnesses to substantiate other portions of this.
“MR. FITZGERALD : I contemplated too here Jack not particularly going through this with Mr. Burns in question and answer form. He is here to answer, and any questions that you might have — I don’t plan to formally put in a particular ease.
“MR. YARDLEY: Also, it is our thought that any member of the Council that has any questions to direct to any witnesses they should do that, and if there is no witness produced that they think should be here that they should request that. Now, that’s a little bit similar to a coroner’s jury. Also, the Mayor is authorized to give oaths. If there are any objections he’ll have to rule upon them, but he will administer oaths to any witness. I would suggest, Mr. Mayor, that you read the information you have and then we will develop this case with our other witnesses.
“MAYOR OMMUNDSEN: Under numerous occasions his personal conduct has been such as to constitute conduct unbecoming a fire department chief, misconduct in office, and conduct such as to bring reproach upon the fire department of the City of Livingston, Montana. I find that you did permit your driver’s license to lapse.
“MR. FITZGERALD: I am going to have to object to this form, if the council is going to testify to facts, I’d have to ask that they be sworn, Mr. Yardley.
“MR. YARDLEY: We have the problem of who would ad[259]*259minister the oath to him, Dave. I don’t know who is qualified to do that. The only one I know that is present here that is qualified to administer oaths is the Mayor and he is the one under our position that made the suspension, and actually it will have to be something he has developed through his own investigation.
“MR. FITZGERALD : Subject to my objecting, you go ahead. I wan the objection noted.
“MAYOR OMMUNDSEN: That your birth date is February 21, 1922. You had a driver’s license issued to you on November 20, 1953; your driver’s license expired — not necessarily that one, but it expired February 21, 1961. Your new license, you took a test on that January 24, 1962. The license was mailed to you on February 6, 1962. You were without a valid driver’s license from February 21, 1961 until February 6, 1962, or 15 days short of one year. This is substantiated by a letter from the Montana Highway Patrol. It’s also from records from our Police Department. Your defense?
“MR. FITZGERALD: Would it be simpler as each one of these comes up to let the defense go into it?
“MR. YARDLEY: If you will administer an oath to Mr. Burns.
“HERBERT P. BURNS, testifying in his own behalf, being first duly sworn, saith as follows:
“MR. BURNS: I have no defense against that, no. I know I didn’t have a driver’s license. I had a permit for about three months of that time but I admit I didn’t have a driver’s license.
“MR. YARDLEY: May I suggest if any of the councilmen have any questions to present them too at this time. I recognize this is rather informal, but there is no procedure set up for it to my knowledge. If you have any questions if you would, for the benefit of the court reporter, if he does not know you if you would identify yourselves and ask your questions
“MAYOR OMMUNDSEN: Are there any questions?
“MR. BURNS: I have a question before we go on.
[260]*260“MAYOR OMMUNDSEN: Yes.
“MR. BURNS: The specifications they are right. Might I ask you a question of what has this directly to do with the Fire Department or the running of the Fire Department?
“MAYOR OMMUNDSEN: It has quite a bit. You were during that time operating equipment in the name of the Fire Department. Your own car, you were paid $600.00 a year for the use which put it in city use. Also, the operation of the city trucks, and had something gone wrong the city would have been in a bad position.
“MR. BURNS: The ear belonged to me, it didn’t belong to the city.
“MAYOR OMMUNDSEN: We were paying you and you were in the hire of the city and it would have put us in a bad light, and it is indicative of poor conduct by allowing your license to lapse. If anyone else happened to get in an accident, and without a driver’s license, they are in violation of the law and it’s more so of a supervisor of a city department.
“You were and are a part owner of the Cave Bar that has twice been convicted by the State Liquor Board of selling liquor to minors and also has been closed for a period of time on each offense, which is, we maintain, not conduct for a fire chief or a city supervisor.
“MR. BURNS: My defense on that now?
“MAYOR OMMUNDSEN: Yes.
“MR. BURNS: I am not part owner of the Cave.
“MAYOR OMMUNDSEN: You were at that time.
“MR. BURNS: No, I was not, I never have been.
“MR. YARDLEY: You are a licensee though.
“MR. BURNS: That’s right, but I’m not an owner of it; anybody can go on the license.
“MR. YARDLEY: For the record I’ll say this, you have to have an interest in that to get on the license I believe.
“MR. BURNS: No, sir, you do not.
[261]*261“MB. YARDLEY: Well then, you haven’t any business on that license.
“MR. BURNS: Anyone can go on a license. There is nothing that says in your liquor laws that a man that is on the license has to own any particular part of that business whatsoever.
“MR. YARDLEY: Well then, let’s put it this way, that is immaterial then. Again, it is not my part to be arguing with you, you were on that license, you were convicted of a violation and you certainly owed a duty there, that is what I think the Mayor is developing here. There is a duty as a licensee on the liquor or beer license, that is what he is attempting to show.
“MR. BURNS: That’s true. I’ll admit that, we were convicted of two cases of it. But now, wait a minute, let me put this here, at no time, Mr. Mayor, the Fire Committee, or any fire people or any councilman had ever come to me personally and told me he did not want me working at that Cave, or that they did not want me having anything to do with the bar business. You haven’t got a letter, you haven’t got one person on this council, or on the previous council when you were a councilman, that come to me personally and told me to quit working over there.
“MAYOR OMMUNDSEN: Mr. Burns, I would like to get something clear right now, this Council is not on trial, we are hearing charges on you.
“MR. BURNS: Don’t I have a right to answer?
“MAYOR OMMUNDSEN: You have a right to answer, but do not start intimidating anyone. Just as long as we understand that.
“MR. BURNS: Yes. As I said I have not ever been at any time told that I was not to.
“MAYOR OMMUNDSEN: That is the charge and that is your defense.
“MR. BURNS: That’s my defense, yes sir.
“MAYOR OMMUNDSEN: You are also charged—
[262]*262“MR. FITZGERALD: May I inquire here, who is making these charges, the Police and Fire Committee or you?
“MAYOR OMMUNDSEN: Since this is an informal hearing—
“MR. FITZGERALD: I just wondered.
“MAYOR OMMUNDSEN: We felt that you had made your ■objection, that the Fire Committee had entered these charges.
“MR. FITZGERALD: They are actually the charges of the Fire Committee?
“MR. YARDLEY: May I interpose this, the record shows that the 'charges were made by the Fire Committee. This is a personal investigation that was conducted by the Mayor.
“MR. FITZGERALD: Was this done before or after the charges were filed?
“MR.' YARDLEY: These, I assume, had been substantiated .since that time.
“MR. FITZGERALD: Since the charges?
“MAYOR OMMUNDSEN: I had most of these charges, the facts, before at the time of the filing of the charges. I can almost — I have a letter here August the 27th, that was the date that I wrote and got those dates you see; and also the 27th, that is- from- the Liquor Control Board, and from the Highway Patrol also.
“You were in a bar known as the Deluxe Bar after the required closing hour of 2:00 a. m., which was conduct unbecoming a Fire Chief in our estimation.
“MR. BURNS: That, as I can tell you, and I told you already before, at that time there wasn’t a bar in this town that knew the ordinance that you were to have everyone out of the bar at 2:00 o’clock. And at that time if I had known that I could have gone out the back door, George. I went and answered the door and let the policeman in. I was sitting in there waiting to go for breakfast. There wasn’t a drink served after 2:00 o’clock and at that time I can assure you there wasn’t a bar in town that knew the — the ones that I know of anyhow, that knew that that [263]*263ordinance was actually in effect, that you couldn’t have anybody in there after 2:00 o’clock. We always went on the assumption that you could not serve a drink after 2:00 o’clock and I assure you if I had known this I either wouldn’t have been in there or when they knocked at the door I could have gone out the back door. I was there, I admit it.”
The foregoing verbatim record reveals a hearing informal indeed. However, it also reveals a number of things. Burns entered into the discussion, stated under oath that he did the three things charged by the Mayor as being conduct unbecoming a fire department chief. As to the failure to have a driver’s: license, standing alone it might be a simple neglect of duty, but probably not such a conduct as to substantiate the charge. The quoted exchange concerning the Fire Chief’s status as a licensee of a bar, the licensees being convicted twice of selling liquor to minors is most revealing. First of all, our law requires as follows :
R.C.M.1947, § 4-412, states in part:
“No license shall be issued by the board to: * * *
“(7) A person who is not the owner and operator of the business.”
R.C.M.1947, § 4-407, requires a verified application and provides a criminal penalty for false statements.
Yet, is is seen from Burn’s statements under oath at one place denying ownership, and yet at another admitting that “we” were convicted, and still another no one “told me he did not want me working at that Cave, or that they did not want me having anything to do with the bar business.” The exchange reveals conduct unbecoming a fire department chief in his own words: the record reveals that the second conviction for selling liquor to minors resulting in suspension of the liquor license occurred just prior to the initiation of council action.
We shall not dwell further on this other than to say that the City Council had substantial evidence bearing on the written charge previously quoted in the general charge of conduct [264]*264unbecoming the Chief of the Fire Department and misconduct in office.
Too, we do not go further in) the two general charges of failure to keep proper records and failing to exercise proper leadership. These were simply not proven.
As to specification of Error 2 we find no merit.
Next the specification of error as to lack of due process. The appellant in this category asserts that the “hearing” was not a hearing at all. To understand what appellant asserts, we shall quote from his brief:
“The three charging members of the fire and police committee sat in judgment on his ease. The charges levied against him were so broad as to preclude the preparation of an effective defense. At the hearing before the City Council the Mayor functioned as prosecutor and hearing officer. Appellant was given just barely five days notice of the hearing by the calendar and was precluded from employing the attorney of his choice. The statute setting forth the procedure to be followed was not complied with. The evidence against appellant is not substantial.”
We shall answer these assertions sentence by sentence, although not in the same sequence.
As to the three members sitting, section 11-1903 provides the City Council with exclusive jurisdiction. No provision for disqualification is made. See State ex rel. Mueller v. District Court, 87 Mont. 108, 285 P. 928; State ex rel. Holt v. District Court, 103 Mont. 438, 63 P.2d 1026; State ex rel. Yuhas v. Board of Medical Examiners, 135 Mont. 381, 339 P.2d 981.
As to the second point that the charges are so broad as to preclude the preparation of an effective defense, this court has said in State ex rel. Griffiths v. Mayor of City of Butte, 57 Mont. 368, 371, 188 P. 367, 368:
“* * # While the pleading may not have been as accurate in its statements or as artistically drawn as is desirable in a complaint filed in court, such technical accuracy is not required in proceedings had before a body of laymen.”
[265]*265As previously noted under Specification of Error 2, the fire chief actively participated, took over the examination, was fully aware of the proceedings, and was in no way prejudiced.. We point out, that of course, this is not a criminal proceeding, nor even a judicial proceeding in any particular. The only requirements here are those provided by statutes previously set forth. We look here to see whether the removed officer was given an opportunity for explanation. He was, and in attempting to explain, spelled out the behavior, or lack of good behavior set forth in section 11-1902.
The assertion that appellant was given just barely five days notice and precluded from employing the attorney of his choice simply is not borne out by the record. He stipulated to the five-day notice. He was represented by counsel. The only basis for such an assertion is a letter from one of counsel from Billings to one of counsel from Livingston advising him that Billings counsel could not be present because of a conflict and asking for 15 days notice. No point appears to have been made of this by counsel for Bums at the hearing, the only objection being those hereinbefore set forth.
As to the last two points made that the statute was not complied with, or that sufficient substantial evidence was not had, we have already answered. Finding no lack of due process, Specification of Error 3 is without merit.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
MB. CHIEF JUSTICE JAMES T. HABEISON and ME. JUS-' TICES JOHN CONWAY HABEISON and DOYLE concur.