State Ex Rel. Bridge v. Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

Ohio Supreme Court

State Ex Rel. Bridge v. Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

2012 Ohio 3327, 132 Ohio St. 3d 494

CourtOhio Supreme Court

DecidedJuly 25, 2012

Docket2012-0206

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 2012 Ohio 3327 (State Ex Rel. Bridge v. Franklin County Court of Common Pleas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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State Ex Rel. Bridge v. Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, 2012 Ohio 3327, 132 Ohio St. 3d 494 (Ohio 2012).

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Opinion

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals denying the request of appellant, William W. Bridge III, for a writ of prohibition to prevent appellees, *495 Franklin County Court of Common Pleas and Judge Richard S. Sheward, from exercising jurisdiction in Speeds Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Nations Constr., L.L.C., Franklin C.P. No. 07 CVH-07-9820.

William W. Bridge III, pro se.

{¶ 2} Appellees do not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction in the underlying case, which was transferred to the common pleas court by the Franklin County Municipal Court. “[W]ithout a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court possessed of general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party contesting that jurisdiction has an adequate remedy by appeal.” State ex rel. Bell v. Pfeiffer, 131 Ohio St.3d 114, 2012-Ohio-54, 961 N.E.2d 181, ¶ 19. The municipal court was under no duty to dismiss the small-claims cases, which it subsequently transferred to the common pleas court, merely because the claims in the separate cases, when aggregated, exceeded the monetary jurisdiction of the small-claims division of the municipal court. See R.C. 1925.02(A)(1) (“a small claims division established under section 1925.01 of the Revised Code has jurisdiction in civil actions for the recovery of taxes and money only, for amounts not exceeding three thousand dollars, exclusive of interest and costs”). Thus, Bridge’s reliance on State ex rel. Natl. Emp. Benefit Servs., Inc. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 49 Ohio St.3d 49, 550 N.E.2d 941 (1990), and Lance Langan Water Jetting, Inc. v. Tiger Gen., Inc., 9th Dist. No. 05CA0018-M, 2005-Ohio-4541, 2005 WL 2087799, which each involved a single case that the municipal court lacked jurisdiction over, is misplaced.

{¶ 3} Moreover, res judicata barred Bridge from filing a successive prohibition action when he could have raised his claims in his previous prohibition action. Hughes v. Calabrese, 95 Ohio St.3d 334, 2002-Ohio-2217, 767 N.E.2d 725, ¶ 12.

{¶ 4} Therefore, the court of appeals properly denied Bridge’s claim for extraordinary relief in prohibition, and we affirm the court’s judgment.

Judgment affirmed.

O’Connor, C.J., and Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, O’Donnell, Lanzinger, Cupp, and McGee Brown, JJ., concur.

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Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals denying the request of appellant, William W. Bridge III, for a writ of prohibition to prevent appellees, *495 Franklin County Court of Common Pleas and Judge Richard S. Sheward, from exercising jurisdiction in Speeds Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Nations Constr., L.L.C., Franklin C.P. No. 07 CVH-07-9820.

William W. Bridge III, pro se.

{¶ 2} Appellees do not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction in the underlying case, which was transferred to the common pleas court by the Franklin County Municipal Court. “[W]ithout a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court possessed of general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party contesting that jurisdiction has an adequate remedy by appeal.” State ex rel. Bell v. Pfeiffer, 131 Ohio St.3d 114, 2012-Ohio-54, 961 N.E.2d 181, ¶ 19. The municipal court was under no duty to dismiss the small-claims cases, which it subsequently transferred to the common pleas court, merely because the claims in the separate cases, when aggregated, exceeded the monetary jurisdiction of the small-claims division of the municipal court. See R.C. 1925.02(A)(1) (“a small claims division established under section 1925.01 of the Revised Code has jurisdiction in civil actions for the recovery of taxes and money only, for amounts not exceeding three thousand dollars, exclusive of interest and costs”). Thus, Bridge’s reliance on State ex rel. Natl. Emp. Benefit Servs., Inc. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 49 Ohio St.3d 49, 550 N.E.2d 941 (1990), and Lance Langan Water Jetting, Inc. v. Tiger Gen., Inc., 9th Dist. No. 05CA0018-M, 2005-Ohio-4541, 2005 WL 2087799, which each involved a single case that the municipal court lacked jurisdiction over, is misplaced.

{¶ 3} Moreover, res judicata barred Bridge from filing a successive prohibition action when he could have raised his claims in his previous prohibition action. Hughes v. Calabrese, 95 Ohio St.3d 334, 2002-Ohio-2217, 767 N.E.2d 725, ¶ 12.

{¶ 4} Therefore, the court of appeals properly denied Bridge’s claim for extraordinary relief in prohibition, and we affirm the court’s judgment.

Judgment affirmed.

O’Connor, C.J., and Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, O’Donnell, Lanzinger, Cupp, and McGee Brown, JJ., concur.

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