State ex rel. Boynton v. Board of Education

21 P.2d 295, 137 Kan. 451, 1933 Kan. LEXIS 275
CourtSupreme Court of Kansas
DecidedApril 29, 1933
DocketNo. 31,363
StatusPublished
Cited by37 cases

This text of 21 P.2d 295 (State ex rel. Boynton v. Board of Education) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. Boynton v. Board of Education, 21 P.2d 295, 137 Kan. 451, 1933 Kan. LEXIS 275 (kan 1933).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Harvey, J.:

This is an original proceeding in mandamus to compel defendant to take the necessary steps to comply with a recent act of the legislature, House bill No. 745, which went into [452]*452effect March 31, 1933, and is printed in the footnotes. Defendant has demurred and thereby raised questions as to the validity of the act; also, some questions are presented about its construction.

The act pertains to the indebtedness of subdivisions of the state authorized by law to raise money by taxation and to expend the money so raised in performing their respective governmental functions. Broadly speaking, it is designed to have such governmental units operate their respective functions on a cash basis — not to spend money they do not have or incur obligations they cannot meet promptly. Some of them, for one reason or another, had not been doing that, but had conducted their business somewhat on a credit basis. In some, proper books had not been kept, or sufficient publicity given, so that its citizens could know its financial status. It was thought waste, extravagance and an undue burden on taxpayers resulted from such methods of doing business, and the legislature deemed it prudent to change such practices and put all such governmental units on a cash basis. To do this it was necessary to have a starting point. So a date was named — the close of business April 30, 1933 — when each of the governmental units was required to take stock, as it were, of its financial status; determine •its then valid existing indebtedness (not counting bonds issued, indebtedness of municipally owned utilities, and unliquidated claims in tort); also, to determine moneys on hand or accruing, and estimate taxes which should be received by July 1, 1933. If it finds it does not have sufficient money available to pay its valid existing indebtedness it is authorized to issue bonds in an amount sufficient to pay such indebtedness. All of this is the exercise of valid legislative functions. It remains to be determined whether the statute is invalid for any of the reasons soon to be mentioned. Defendant contends it is invalid for the reasons:

First. That the provisions (sections 4 and 5) for the summary hearing' on the allowance of claims by the district court, without a jury, violates our constitution (bill of rights, § 5) — “The right of trial by jury shall be inviolate.” There may be several answers to this, but one good one is enough. All controversies over allowing, or refusing to allow, claims against a governmental unit “shall be docketed in one composite cause” in the district court. The real matter to be determined by the court is the amount of the valid existing indebtedness of the governmental unit on the date of April [453]*45330, 1933, in so far as any controversy respecting such indebtedness has arisen. The proceeding is equitable in its nature, much like a hearing in an insolvency proceeding. In fact, the act is predicated upon the view that some of our governmental units owe more than they can pay from their income under existing statutes, and are in a situation comparable to insolvency. Hence, a procedure of that nature was provided for the determination of their financial status, when a controversy arose concerning it. More than that, it is suggested this manner of establishing a claim is not made exclusive by the act. But we need not determine that question now. It is sufficient to hold, as we do, that the act of the legislature in question is not invalid, on the ground that it provides for the hearing of controversies over questioned claims against a governmental unit in a composite cause by the district court without a jury.

Second. That the provision (sec. 10) by which the governmental unit may pay an indebtedness by giving the one to whom it is indebted a bond for the amount of the debt is bad,’ on the ground that it violated contract obligations. Creditors of such governmental units are bound to know the statutory provision relating to their incomes, and when they exhaust their incomes and incur additional indebtedness, the legislature may in some way provide for their relief, and a common way to provide such relief is by a bond issue. Since no one is before us who had refused to take bonds in payment of an indebtedness to him, his right to so refuse cannot be determined. As a purely academic question, and as to some debts by reason of the circumstances under which they accrued or are evidenced, perhaps the statute may be said to violate his contract rights, unless the creditor consented thereto. We apprehend, however, that most of the debts to be paid by bonds, or the proceeds of bonds, are current obligations which have accrued recently, and that the question concerning them would not arise. No doubt the legislature contemplated that both the officers of the governmental unit and its creditors would cooperate in a spirit of good faith to carry out the beneficial purposes of the act. If a creditor — and perhaps there may be some — were in position to do so and were to insist on his strict legal rights, perhaps he would be entitled to payment instead of bonds, and could not be required to take bonds unless he consented thereto. The presumption is the legislature intended to pass a valid act, and if there is a reasonable way to construe it so that it is valid instead of invalid, that construction will be given [454]*454it by the court. By construing the statute that the consent of the creditor to take bonds is necessary in the instances where he could, under the law, decline to take them, there is no invalidity in the statute. More than that, the entire section is optional and is only a substitute for other provisions for the issuing and sale of bonds and the payment of debts from the proceeds thereof.

Third. That the act (sec. 11) authorizes a wrongful diversion of money raised by taxation, in violation of our constitution (art. 11, §4), which provides that a tax shall be applied to the object for which it was levied. This section provides that money derived from taxes payable prior to July ], 1933, distributable to the funds against which indebtedness has been refunded, may be applied to the retirement of such bonds, or set up in the fund for which it was levied and used for current expenses thereof. It is argued that the taxes so received might not have been levied for the fund for which bonds were issued and if applied to retire bonds would be a wrongful diversion. That would be a strained construction of the statute, and obviously one not contemplated by the legislature. As we construe it the section simply means that if taxes, say from the general fund, were received from April 30 to July 1, they might be set up in that fund and used for current expenses, or if bonds had been issued for debts owing from the general fund, the money so received, or a part of it, could be applied on retiring such bonds. If no bonds had been issued because of debts in the general fund the_ money could not be applied to retire such bonds.

Fourth. R. S. 72-1705 provides a limit on the amount of bonds issued under the authority of the 'vote of the people in certain governmental units to three per cent of the value of the taxable property. It is argued this act may authorize bonds to be issued in such an amount that, together with bonds now outstanding, the total will exceed three per cent of the taxable property in the governmental unit, and this will affect the value of bonds already issued. The point lacks substantial merit, for the reason that a limitation on the amount of bonds a governmental unit may issue is a statutory limitation, not a constitutional one.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
21 P.2d 295, 137 Kan. 451, 1933 Kan. LEXIS 275, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-boynton-v-board-of-education-kan-1933.