State ex rel. Barnett v. Comm.

2014 Ohio 311
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedJanuary 30, 2014
Docket13AP-161
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 2014 Ohio 311 (State ex rel. Barnett v. Comm.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State ex rel. Barnett v. Comm., 2014 Ohio 311 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014).

Opinion

[Cite as State ex rel. Barnett v. Comm., 2014-Ohio-311.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

[State of Ohio ex rel.] : Michelle Barnett, : Relator, : No. 13AP-161 v. : (REGULAR CALENDAR) The Industrial Commission of Ohio and Aspen Nursing : Services, Inc., : Respondents. :

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on January 30, 2014

Cox, Koltak, and Gibson, LLP, and Peter J. Gibson, for relator.

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Sandra E. Pinkerton, for respondent The Industrial Commission of Ohio.

IN MANDAMUS ON OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE'S DECISION

DORRIAN, J. {¶ 1} Relator, Michelle Barnett, has filed this original action requesting that this court issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio ("commission") to vacate its order terminating temporary total disability ("TTD") compensation effective August 1, 2012 based upon a finding that the industrial injury has reached maximum medical improvement ("MMI"). Relator asks us to order the commission to enter an order reinstating TTD compensation. No. 13AP-161 2

{¶ 2} Pursuant to Civ.R. 53(D) and Loc.R. 13(M) of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, this matter was referred to a magistrate who issued a decision, including findings of fact and conclusions of law, which is appended hereto. The magistrate recommends that this court grant the request for a writ of mandamus. The commission objects. {¶ 3} The commission presents two objections to the magistrate's decisions: first, that the magistrate erred in finding that the commission relied "exclusively" on Garcia's report; and second, that, by making this mistake, the magistrate incorrectly found Dr. Garcia's report was "premature." Generally, relator argues that the magistrate failed to acknowledge that the staff hearing officer ("SHO") considered Dr. Garcia's report in light of the subsequent treatment records that showed no functional improvement, and, in so doing, the magistrate failed to consider whether the evidence taken as a whole was some evidence on which the commission could base its decision. The commission argues its order was based on some evidence as the SHO considered not only Dr. Garcia's report but also subsequent treatment reports. We will discuss the two objections together. {¶ 4} The magistrate determined that Dr. Garcia's report does not provide some evidence upon which the commission could rely to support its finding that relator had reached MMI. Relying on State ex rel Sellards v. Indus. Comm., 108 Ohio St.3d 306, 2006-Ohio-1058, the magistrate reasoned that Dr. Garcia's April 27, 2012 report was premature, given the commission granted Dr. Altic's C-9 request for a course of treatment approximately one month after Dr. Garcia's report was issued. {¶ 5} The commission argues that the magistrate's reliance on Sellards is misplaced and notes that, in Sellards, the commission's approval of treatment was contemporaneous with its termination of TTD. The commission further argues the fact that Dr. Garcia was aware of the proposed treatment at the time he opined that MMI had been reached, coupled with the fact that the SHO considered subsequent treatment reports No. 13AP-161 3

and concluded there was no functional improvement, distinguishes this case from Sellards. {¶ 6} We find the magistrate did not err. First, the SHO did not state that it relied on the subsequent treatment reports in making it's determination that TTD should be terminated. Second, even if we were to construe the SHO's reference to the subsequent treatment reports to be a statement of reliance, the reports themselves do not contain a medical opinion that MMI had been reached. In other words, the SHO assessed the reports and offered his own opinion that MMI had been reached even with the subsequent treatments, upon which he apparently subsequently relied. {¶ 7} The SHO stated in his order that he had "reviewed the treatment notes on file regarding the approved physical medicine and trigger point injections the Injured Worker underwent and finds that the notes do not adequately support the contention that either course of treatment resulted in objective evidence of functional improvement in the allowed conditions." He thus concluded "the Staff Hearing Officer finds that Dr. Garcia's report remains probative on the maximum medical improvement issue." (Sept. 27, 2012 SHO order, 2.) In reviewing the subsequent treatment reports, the SHO apparently inferred that the treatment was not working and that relator had indeed reached MMI. Neither the commission nor this court has medical expertise. State ex rel. Cleveland Browns Football Co., L.L.C. v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 10AP-564, 2011-Ohio-5656, ¶ 51, citing State ex rel. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Indus. Comm., 81 Ohio St.3d 56 (1998). The commission, in effect, invites this court to read the subsequent treatment reports as supporting an opinion that the industrial injury is at MMI, even though the reports contain no such opinion. This court must decline the invitation. Furthermore, we disagree that Dr. Garcia's opinion that relator had reached MMI was premised on his assessment of subsequent treatment. Obviously, Dr. Garcia did not have these records available to him at the time of his April 27, 2012 opinion. Furthermore, although he was aware of the proposed treatment, he was under the No. 13AP-161 4

impression that such treatment had been denied. Additionally, Dr. Garcia was not asked to provide an addendum after the treatment was commenced. {¶ 8} "The commission is free to accept or reject medical opinions of record in determining disability. However, it cannot fashion its own medical opinion from the findings contained in the medical reports such as might be done by a non-examining physician who is asked by the commission to review the medical evidence of record." State ex rel. Valentine v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. No. 02AP-579, 2003-Ohio-1784, ¶ 105. See State ex rel. Wallace v. Indus. Comm, 57 Ohio St.2d 55, 59 (1979) (The non-examining physician is required to expressly accept all the findings of the examining physician but not the opinion drawn therefrom.). State ex rel. Blue v. Indus. Comm., 79 Ohio St.3d 466 (1997). Here, the SHO reviewed the subsequent treatment reports and fashioned his own medical opinion. The fashioning of such an opinion, to bolster the premature opinion of Dr. Garcia, was not proper. Therefore, we overrule the commission's objections. {¶ 9} Upon review of the magistrate's decision, an independent review of the record, and due consideration of the commission's objections, we find the magistrate has properly determined the pertinent facts and applied the appropriate law. We therefore overrule the commission's objections to the magistrate's decision and adopt the magistrate's decision as our own, including the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained therein. {¶ 10} Accordingly, the requested writ of mandamus is hereby granted, and the commission is ordered to vacate the September 27, 2012 order of its SHO that terminated TTD compensation, and to enter an order reinstating TTD compensation. Objections overruled; writ granted. SADLER, P.J., and McCORMAC, J., concur. McCORMAC, J., retired, of the Tenth Appellate District, assigned to active duty under the authority of the Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 6(C). No. 13AP-161 5

_____________ No. 13AP-161 6

APPENDIX

[State of Ohio ex rel.] : Michelle Barnett, : Relator, : No. 13AP-161 v. : (REGULAR CALENDAR) The Industrial Commission of Ohio and Aspen Nursing : Services, Inc., : Respondents. :

MAGISTRATE'S DECISION

Rendered on August 28, 2013

Cox, Koltak, and Gibson, LLP, and Peter J. Gibson, for relator.

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Bluebook (online)
2014 Ohio 311, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-barnett-v-comm-ohioctapp-2014.