[Cite as State ex rel. Angelo v. Carroll, 2013-Ohio-5321.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION No. 100326
STATE OF OHIO EX REL. JOHN J. ANGELO
RELATOR
vs.
JUDGE PATRICK CARROLL RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT: COMPLAINT DISMISSED
Writ of Mandamus Motion No. 468701 Order No. 469610
RELEASE DATE: December 2, 2013 FOR RELATOR
John J. Angelo, pro se 31703 Lake Road Avon Lake, Ohio 44012
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT
Kevin M. Butler Law Director City of Lakewood 12650 Detroit Avenue Lakewood, Ohio 44107 MARY J. BOYLE, P.J.:
{¶1} Relator, John J. Angelo (“Angelo”), commenced this mandamus action
against the respondent, Judge Patrick Carroll, to compel the judge to terminate the no
contact order portion of his community control sanctions imposed in Lakewood M.C. No.
2012CRB1089. The respondent judge has moved to dismiss. Angelo has filed a
response thereto. After reviewing the filings, this court concludes that this matter is ripe
for resolution, and grants the respondent’s motion to dismiss.
{¶2} On July 19, 2012, the court imposed sentence for relator’s criminal
conviction. The court imposed one year of community control sanctions with conditions
that included that he have no contact with certain individuals. Angelo has represented
that the no contact order involves his spouse and children. On April 15, 2013, the court
issued a journal entry following a violation hearing where the court found Angelo to be in
violation of the conditions of his community control supervision. In the same entry, the
court “passed for sentencing to permit defense counsel to present evidence mitigation.”
Angelo attempted to appeal from that order but it was dismissed for lack of a final,
appealable order because no sentence had been imposed. Lakewood v. Angelo, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 99831.
{¶3} On May 17, 2013, Angelo filed an affidavit of disqualification against
relator, and the proceedings were stayed pursuant to R.C. 2701.031 pending resolution of the affidavit. On August 27, 2013, Angelo filed a motion to terminate the no contact
order. Two days later, Angelo filed this original action seeking to compel respondent to
terminate the no contact order portion of his community control sanction sentence. On
September 4, 2013, respondent issued an order explaining that he could not modify
Angelo’s community control sanctions during the pendency of the affidavit of
disqualification. Angelo appealed that order which was dismissed for failure to file the
record. Lakewood v. Angelo, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100389.
{¶4} The requisites for mandamus are well established: (1) the relator must have
a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) the respondent must have a clear legal duty
to perform the requested relief, and (3) there must be no adequate remedy at law.
Additionally, although mandamus may be used to compel a court to exercise judgment or
to discharge a function, it may not control judicial discretion, even if that discretion is
grossly abused. State ex rel. Ney v. Niehaus, 33 Ohio St.3d 118, 515 N.E.2d 914 (1987).
Furthermore, mandamus is not a substitute for appeal. State ex rel. Keenan v.
Calabrese, 69 Ohio St.3d 176, 631 N.E.2d 119 (1994); State ex rel. Daggett v. Gessaman,
34 Ohio St.2d 55, 295 N.E.2d 659 (1973); and State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm. of
Ohio, 11 Ohio St.2d 141, 228 N.E.2d 631 (1967), paragraph three of the syllabus. Thus,
mandamus does not lie to correct errors and procedural irregularities in the course of a
case. State ex rel. Jerninghan v. Gaughan, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 67787, 1994 Ohio
App. LEXIS 6227 (Sept. 26, 1994). If the relator had an adequate remedy, regardless of
whether it was used, relief in mandamus is precluded. State ex rel. Tran v. McGrath, 78 Ohio St.3d 45, 676 N.E.2d 108 (1997); State ex rel. Boardwalk Shopping Ctr., Inc. v.
Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga Cty., 56 Ohio St.3d 33, 564 N.E.2d 86 (1990).
Moreover, mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is to be exercised with caution and
only when the right is clear. It should not issue in doubtful cases. State ex rel. Taylor v.
Glasser, 50 Ohio St.2d 165, 364 N.E.2d 1 (1977); State ex rel. Shafer v. Ohio Turnpike
Comm., 159 Ohio St. 581, 113 N.E.2d 14 (1953); and State ex rel. Connole v. Cleveland
Bd. of Edn., 87 Ohio App.3d 43, 621 N.E.2d 850 (8th Dist.1993).
{¶5} Angelo does not dispute that he filed an affidavit of disqualification against
respondent. The affidavit deprives the judge of a municipal or county court against whom
the affidavit was filed of any authority to preside in the proceeding until the affidavit is
resolved. R.C. 2701.031(D)(1); State ex rel. Stern Pros. Atty. v. Mascio, 81 Ohio St.3d
297, 691 N.E.2d 253 (1998). However, a municipal court judge who is the subject of an
affidavit of disqualification “may determine a matter that does not affect a substantive
right of any of the parties.” R.C. 2701.031(D)(3); State v. Ross (In re Cirigliano), 105
Ohio St.3d 1223, 2004-Ohio-7352, 826 N.E.2d 287, ¶ 23 (“a judge against whom an
affidavit of disqualification is pending can still ‘act in a ministerial capacity.’”).
{¶6} Angelo argues that the modification of his community control sanctions is
essentially a ministerial act that does not affect a substantive right. Ruling on a motion to
modify the terms of Angelo’s community control sanctions is beyond a ministerial act and
does affect the substantive rights of the parties. Howard v. Spore, 91 Ohio St.3d 131, 742
N.E.2d 649 (2001) (“affidavit of disqualification prevented [judge] from ruling on [litigant’s] substantive motions in the underlying case until the presiding judge of the
common pleas court decided the affidavit.”). The modification of community control
supervision pursuant to R.C. 2929.25(B) is “in the court’s sole discretion” and is not
equivalent to a ministerial act.
{¶7} Angelo also suggests that his community control term has expired. In the
underlying case, the community control violation proceedings were commenced before
the term expired. The Ohio Supreme Court has held that courts are “authorized to
conduct proceedings on the alleged community-control violations even though they were
conducted after the expiration of the term of community control, provided that the notice
of violations was properly given and the revocation proceedings were commenced before
the expiration.” State ex rel. Hemsley v. Unruh, 128 Ohio St.3d 307, 2011-Ohio-226,
943 N.E.2d 1014, ¶ 11.
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[Cite as State ex rel. Angelo v. Carroll, 2013-Ohio-5321.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION No. 100326
STATE OF OHIO EX REL. JOHN J. ANGELO
RELATOR
vs.
JUDGE PATRICK CARROLL RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT: COMPLAINT DISMISSED
Writ of Mandamus Motion No. 468701 Order No. 469610
RELEASE DATE: December 2, 2013 FOR RELATOR
John J. Angelo, pro se 31703 Lake Road Avon Lake, Ohio 44012
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT
Kevin M. Butler Law Director City of Lakewood 12650 Detroit Avenue Lakewood, Ohio 44107 MARY J. BOYLE, P.J.:
{¶1} Relator, John J. Angelo (“Angelo”), commenced this mandamus action
against the respondent, Judge Patrick Carroll, to compel the judge to terminate the no
contact order portion of his community control sanctions imposed in Lakewood M.C. No.
2012CRB1089. The respondent judge has moved to dismiss. Angelo has filed a
response thereto. After reviewing the filings, this court concludes that this matter is ripe
for resolution, and grants the respondent’s motion to dismiss.
{¶2} On July 19, 2012, the court imposed sentence for relator’s criminal
conviction. The court imposed one year of community control sanctions with conditions
that included that he have no contact with certain individuals. Angelo has represented
that the no contact order involves his spouse and children. On April 15, 2013, the court
issued a journal entry following a violation hearing where the court found Angelo to be in
violation of the conditions of his community control supervision. In the same entry, the
court “passed for sentencing to permit defense counsel to present evidence mitigation.”
Angelo attempted to appeal from that order but it was dismissed for lack of a final,
appealable order because no sentence had been imposed. Lakewood v. Angelo, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 99831.
{¶3} On May 17, 2013, Angelo filed an affidavit of disqualification against
relator, and the proceedings were stayed pursuant to R.C. 2701.031 pending resolution of the affidavit. On August 27, 2013, Angelo filed a motion to terminate the no contact
order. Two days later, Angelo filed this original action seeking to compel respondent to
terminate the no contact order portion of his community control sanction sentence. On
September 4, 2013, respondent issued an order explaining that he could not modify
Angelo’s community control sanctions during the pendency of the affidavit of
disqualification. Angelo appealed that order which was dismissed for failure to file the
record. Lakewood v. Angelo, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100389.
{¶4} The requisites for mandamus are well established: (1) the relator must have
a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) the respondent must have a clear legal duty
to perform the requested relief, and (3) there must be no adequate remedy at law.
Additionally, although mandamus may be used to compel a court to exercise judgment or
to discharge a function, it may not control judicial discretion, even if that discretion is
grossly abused. State ex rel. Ney v. Niehaus, 33 Ohio St.3d 118, 515 N.E.2d 914 (1987).
Furthermore, mandamus is not a substitute for appeal. State ex rel. Keenan v.
Calabrese, 69 Ohio St.3d 176, 631 N.E.2d 119 (1994); State ex rel. Daggett v. Gessaman,
34 Ohio St.2d 55, 295 N.E.2d 659 (1973); and State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm. of
Ohio, 11 Ohio St.2d 141, 228 N.E.2d 631 (1967), paragraph three of the syllabus. Thus,
mandamus does not lie to correct errors and procedural irregularities in the course of a
case. State ex rel. Jerninghan v. Gaughan, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 67787, 1994 Ohio
App. LEXIS 6227 (Sept. 26, 1994). If the relator had an adequate remedy, regardless of
whether it was used, relief in mandamus is precluded. State ex rel. Tran v. McGrath, 78 Ohio St.3d 45, 676 N.E.2d 108 (1997); State ex rel. Boardwalk Shopping Ctr., Inc. v.
Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga Cty., 56 Ohio St.3d 33, 564 N.E.2d 86 (1990).
Moreover, mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is to be exercised with caution and
only when the right is clear. It should not issue in doubtful cases. State ex rel. Taylor v.
Glasser, 50 Ohio St.2d 165, 364 N.E.2d 1 (1977); State ex rel. Shafer v. Ohio Turnpike
Comm., 159 Ohio St. 581, 113 N.E.2d 14 (1953); and State ex rel. Connole v. Cleveland
Bd. of Edn., 87 Ohio App.3d 43, 621 N.E.2d 850 (8th Dist.1993).
{¶5} Angelo does not dispute that he filed an affidavit of disqualification against
respondent. The affidavit deprives the judge of a municipal or county court against whom
the affidavit was filed of any authority to preside in the proceeding until the affidavit is
resolved. R.C. 2701.031(D)(1); State ex rel. Stern Pros. Atty. v. Mascio, 81 Ohio St.3d
297, 691 N.E.2d 253 (1998). However, a municipal court judge who is the subject of an
affidavit of disqualification “may determine a matter that does not affect a substantive
right of any of the parties.” R.C. 2701.031(D)(3); State v. Ross (In re Cirigliano), 105
Ohio St.3d 1223, 2004-Ohio-7352, 826 N.E.2d 287, ¶ 23 (“a judge against whom an
affidavit of disqualification is pending can still ‘act in a ministerial capacity.’”).
{¶6} Angelo argues that the modification of his community control sanctions is
essentially a ministerial act that does not affect a substantive right. Ruling on a motion to
modify the terms of Angelo’s community control sanctions is beyond a ministerial act and
does affect the substantive rights of the parties. Howard v. Spore, 91 Ohio St.3d 131, 742
N.E.2d 649 (2001) (“affidavit of disqualification prevented [judge] from ruling on [litigant’s] substantive motions in the underlying case until the presiding judge of the
common pleas court decided the affidavit.”). The modification of community control
supervision pursuant to R.C. 2929.25(B) is “in the court’s sole discretion” and is not
equivalent to a ministerial act.
{¶7} Angelo also suggests that his community control term has expired. In the
underlying case, the community control violation proceedings were commenced before
the term expired. The Ohio Supreme Court has held that courts are “authorized to
conduct proceedings on the alleged community-control violations even though they were
conducted after the expiration of the term of community control, provided that the notice
of violations was properly given and the revocation proceedings were commenced before
the expiration.” State ex rel. Hemsley v. Unruh, 128 Ohio St.3d 307, 2011-Ohio-226,
943 N.E.2d 1014, ¶ 11.
{¶8} Angelo maintains that a consent agreement and civil order of protection that
he and his spouse entered with the approval of the Lake County Domestic Relations
Court supersedes the community control sanctions no contact condition that was imposed
upon him for his criminal conviction in Lakewood Municipal Court. This argument is
incorrect. The Lake County Domestic Relations Court has no jurisdiction to alter the
terms of Angelo’s criminal sentence. See Toledo v. Parra, 6th Dist. Lucas No.
L-12-1261, 2013-Ohio-3182 (finding municipal court had jurisdiction over criminal
offense arising from violation of a domestic relation court’s visitation order). {¶9} Relator has failed to establish a clear legal right to the requested relief and
has failed to establish that respondent has any legal authority to perform the requested
relief. Failure to establish a clear legal right to the requested relief and a clear legal duty
to perform the requested relief merits dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). State ex
rel. Lindenschmidt v. Bd. of Commrs., 72 Ohio St.3d 464, 468-469, 650 N.E.2d 1343
(1995). Angelo also had an adequate remedy at law and did appeal the trial court’s order
that found it lacked authority to proceed on the motion to terminate the no contact order.
Therefore, relief in mandamus is precluded. State ex rel. Tran, 78 Ohio St.3d 45, 676
N.E.2d 108 (1997); State ex rel. Boardwalk Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Court of Appeals for
Cuyahoga Cty., 56 Ohio St.3d 33, 35, 564 N.E.2d 86 (1990) (“It is firmly established that
the writ of mandamus will not issue ‘* * * where the relator has or had available a clear,
plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.’”).
{¶10} Finally, relator has not disputed respondent’s alternative reason for seeking
dismissal of this action, which is that he failed to provide an affidavit specifying the
details of his claim as required by Loc.App.R. 45(B)(1)(a). State ex rel. Leon v.
Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 123 Ohio St.3d 124, 2009-Ohio-4688, 914
N.E.2d 402; State ex rel. Wilson v. Calabrese, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 70077, 1996 Ohio
App. LEXIS 6213 (Jan. 18, 1996). In Leon, the Supreme Court of Ohio upheld this
court’s ruling that merely stating in an affidavit that the complaint was true and correct
was insufficient to comply with the local rule. {¶11} The court grants the respondent’s motion to dismiss the complaint. Costs
assessed against the relator. This court directs the clerk of the Eighth District Court of
Appeals to serve upon the parties notice of this judgment and its date of entry upon the
journal. Civ.R. 58(B).
{¶12} Complaint dismissed.
_______________________________________ MARY J. BOYLE, PRESIDING JUDGE
LARRY A. JONES, SR., J., and KENNETH A. ROCCO, J., CONCUR