State ex rel. Alford v. Montgomery Cty. Child Support Enforcement Agency
This text of 2023 Ohio 1163 (State ex rel. Alford v. Montgomery Cty. Child Support Enforcement Agency) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
[Cite as State ex rel. Alford v. Montgomery Cty. Child Support Enforcement Agency, 2023-Ohio-1163.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE EX RE. BRIAN KEITH C.A. No. 29661 ALFORD
Relator
v. DECISION AND FINAL JUDGMENT MONTGOMERY COUNTY CSEA ENTRY
Respondent
______________________________________________________________________ PER CURIAM:
{¶ 1} This matter is before the court on relator Brian Keith Alford’s February 21,
2023, “Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or In the Alternative Motion for Summary
Judgment.” Respondent, the Montgomery County Child Support Enforcement Agency
(“CSEA”), did not file a response to the motion. For the reasons set forth in this decision,
Alford’s motion will be overruled, and his petition will be dismissed.
Factual Background
{¶ 2} On December 6, 2022, Alford, an inmate at Chillicothe Correctional
Institution, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to compel the CSEA to return
$1,887.32 in “Economic Impact Payments” that it seized through its federal income tax
refund offset program. Although the CSEA moved to dismiss Alford’s petition for failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, on February 7, 2023, this court
overruled the motion. {¶ 3} For purposes of Civ.R. 12(B)(6), we accepted as true Alford’s claim of
entitlement to the $1,887.32 under the Coronavirus Aid Relief and Economic Security Act
of 2020, Pub. L. 116-136, and the Coronavirus Response and Relief Supplemental
Appropriations Act of 2021, Pub. L. 116-260. Economic Impact Payments are considered
advance payments of “Recovery Rebate Credits” claimed on a taxpayer’s 2020 federal
income tax return. We reasoned that if Alford did not meet the requirements of the CSEA’s
federal income tax refund offset program, the agency would have a legal obligation to
return the Economic Impact Payments to him. Further, it was unclear whether Alford had
an adequate remedy at law to dispute the CSEA’s seizure of the Economic Impact
Payments. Accordingly, it appeared to this court that there was a set of facts under which
Alford might prevail on his mandamus claim. We ordered the CSEA to file an answer to
the petition.
{¶ 4} On February 21, 2023, the CSEA filed a “Response” to the petition, which
we construe as an answer. Thus, the pleadings are closed in this matter. We proceed to
review Alford’s motion on its merits.
Law and Analysis
{¶ 5} We begin with the observation that Alford seeks alternative relief: judgment
on the pleadings or summary judgment. The evidence we may use to evaluate each
motion differs. Our review of a Civ.R. 12(C) motion is “restricted solely to the allegations
in the pleadings and any writings attached to the [petition].” Dearth v. Stanley, 2d Dist.
Montgomery No. 22180, 2008-Ohio-487, ¶ 24, citing Peterson v. Teodosio, 34 Ohio St.2d
161, 166, 297 N.E.2d 113 (1973). In contrast, when reviewing a motion for summary
judgment, this court may consider “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence in the pending case, and written
stipulations of fact.” Civ.R. 56(C). We may also consider evidence other than that listed
in Civ.R. 56(C) when there is no objection. State ex rel. Spencer v. E. Liverpool Planning
Comm., 80 Ohio St.3d 297, 301, 685 N.E.2d 1251 (1997).
{¶ 6} Alford’s motion presents matters outside his petition. Because Alford has
invited us to consider the broader evidentiary record, which includes an affidavit
supporting his motion, see Civ.R. 56(E), we will evaluate the motion under the summary
judgment standard.
Summary Judgment
{¶ 7} Summary judgment should be granted when (1) there is no genuine issue
of material fact, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3)
reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the
nonmoving party. Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 66, 375
N.E.2d 46 (1978). The moving party bears the burden of proving there is no genuine issue
of material fact. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293, 662 N.E.2d 664 (1996). If the
moving party satisfies its burden, the nonmoving party has a reciprocal burden to set forth
specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Id.; Civ.R. 56(E).
Elements of Mandamus
{¶ 8} In a mandamus action, the relator must establish that he or she has a clear
legal right to the requested relief, the respondent has a clear legal duty to provide it, and
the relator lacks an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Norris
v. Wainwright, 158 Ohio St.3d 20, 2019-Ohio-4138, 139 N.E.3d 867, ¶ 13, citing State ex
rel. Waters v. Spaeth, 131 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-69, 960 N.E.2d 452, ¶ 6. The January 3, 2023, IRS Letter
{¶ 9} As evidence in support of his motion for summary judgment, Alford has
attached a January 3, 2023, form letter addressed to him from the United States
Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”). Although the letter is not
Civ.R. 56(C) evidence, the CSEA did not object to its authenticity or admissibility. Further,
we have no reason to doubt that it is what it appears to be or that it would be admissible
at a trial. Thus, we consider the letter as evidence for summary judgment purposes.
{¶ 10} The letter, IRS Letter 105C, informs Alford that the IRS “disallowed [his]
claim for credit for the tax period listed at the top of this letter [Dec. 31, 2020].” Further,
the letter reflects that the amount of the disallowed claim is $1,887.32 and that the claim
relates to his income tax return. The letter concludes with information regarding Alford’s
ability to appeal the IRS’s decision to disallow his claim.
{¶ 11} The IRS’s letter, which this court lacked when we overruled the CSEA’s
motion to dismiss, is significant. It demonstrates that any legal right Alford may have to
the Economic Impact Payments he seeks to recover from the CSEA is contingent at best.
Alford’s entitlement to the Economic Impact Payments depends on a future IRS
determination that the agency erred in disallowing his claim. If the IRS does not reverse
its determination, Alford would need to file an administrative appeal before the IRS
Independent Office of Appeal to secure a legal entitlement to the funds. And, if an
administrative appeal did not resolve the matter in Alford’s favor, he would need to appeal
to the United States District Court or Court of Federal Claims.
{¶ 12} All of this is to say, the absence of a genuine issue of material fact does not
favor Alford. The IRS has disallowed Alford’s claim to the Economic Impact Payments. Given the IRS’s determination, Alford cannot, as a matter of law, prevail in a mandamus
action to compel the recovery of those payments from a third-party such as the CSEA.
He is not entitled to receive them. Therefore, his mandamus claim must fail.
Conclusion
{¶ 13} For all the foregoing reasons, relator Brian Keith Alford’s “Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings or In the Alternative Summary Judgment” is OVERRULED.
Further, Alford’s March 8, 2023, “Request for Permission to File a Reply to Respondent’s
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2023 Ohio 1163, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-ex-rel-alford-v-montgomery-cty-child-support-enforcement-agency-ohioctapp-2023.