State Ex Rel. A. E. v. Circuit Court for Green Lake County

288 N.W.2d 125, 94 Wis. 2d 98, 1980 Wisc. LEXIS 2483

• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
• Decided: February 7, 1980
• Docket: 79-1524-W
• Status: Published

Opinions

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.

This is a petition for a writ of prohibition by which the petitioner seeks to challenge an order entered under the provisions of sec. 48.18, Stats., waiving jurisdiction over the petitioner, a juvenile more than sixteen years of age, so that he might be tried as an adult for the offense of armed robbery as a party to the crime.¹ Petitioner previously petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of prohibition which the court of appeals denied on the ground that petitioner had an adequate remedy by appeal pursuant to sec. 48.47, Stats. See. 48.47, Stats., provides for an appeal to the court of appeals² in accordance with Rule 809.40,³ Stats., to review an adjudication of the court under the Children’s Code, ch. 48. The court of appeals did not state whether an appeal of a juvenile waiver was an appeal as of right or an appeal by permission of the court of appeals.

In its response to the petition in this court, the state argues that a juvenile waiver order is not an adjudication within the meaning of sec. 48.47. Furthermore, the State asserts that the petitioner cannot appeal the juvenile waiver order as a matter of right, because it is not a final order. See sec. 808.03(1), Stats.⁴ The State argues that the petitioner can appeal a juvenile waiver order only upon leave of the court of appeals pursuant to sec. 808.03 (2), Stats.⁵

As we said in State v. Jenich, 94 Wis.2d 74, 288 N.W.2d 114 (1980), the question of what orders and judgments are final for purposes of appellate review is a recurring question of statutory interpretation. The final judgment-final order rule is designed to prohibit piecemeal disposal of litigation and thus plays an important role in the movement of cases through the judicial system. However, this court will place qualifications on the rule where the need for immediate review outweighs the purposes of the rule.

In State v. Jenich, supra, this court held that an order may be appealable as of right under sec. 808.03(1), Stats., if it satisfies three criteria: the order finally and completely determines a claim of right; the claim is separable from, collateral to and independent of the principal issue at trial; and the claim asserted is too important to be denied review.

An order waiving juvenile court jurisdiction fulfills these three criteria. The juvenile court’s order disposes of the question of a ch. 48 disposition finally at the trial court level; the issue of waiver is separable from the main issue of a criminal trial in circuit court, namely that of the guilt of the accused of the crime charged; and if review of the waiver issue must await review of a final judgment of conviction or is resolved by an acquittal, the confidentiality associated with juvenile proceedings has been irreparably lost. The statutes and cases set forth the procedure for waiver proceedings and the findings required to be made by the circuit court. The record on review will be relatively brief and will involve a single issue; review can be accomplished expeditiously.

We recognize that interlocutory appeals are undesirable, especially in criminal prosecutions, because they cause delays which are inimical to an effective criminal justice system. At the same time we recognize that granting a juvenile immediate review of a waiver order fulfills the public policy expressed by the legislature in chapter 48.

In In Interest of D.H., 76 Wis.2d 286, 251 N.W.2d 196 (1977), a case which arose before the creation of the court of appeals, we similarly held that there are compelling reasons why there should be immediate appellate review as of right of an order of the juvenile court waiving jurisdiction.⁶

Accordingly we hold that an order waiving juvenile court jurisdiction over the juvenile is appealable as of right to the court of appeals pursuant to sec. 808.03(1), Stats.⁷ To prevent dilatory appeal tactics, the court of appeals should establish procedures requiring the parties and the court to give the appeal expedited treatment.

The petition for writ of prohibition to the court of appeals in the case at bar was to invoke the supervisory authority of the court of appeals.⁸ The court of appeals should have considered the petition for a writ of prohibition to be a notice of appeal,⁹ which was filed within the time set forth in Rule 809.40, Stats., and should have issued such orders as were necessary to obtain the record from the circuit court and to expedite review of the juvenile waiver order in issue in the case at bar. The court of appeals erred in dismissing the petition.

Accordingly, we deny the application for a supervisory writ and remand the matter to the court of appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

By the Court. — The petition is denied without costs.

1 Sec. 48.18(1), Stats., provides:

“48.18 Jurisdiction for criminal proceedings for children 16 or older; waiver hearing. (1) If a child is alleged to have violated a state criminal law on or after his or her 16th birthday, the child or district attorney may apply to the court to waive its jurisdiction under this chapter. The judge may initiate a petition for waiver if the judge disqualifies himself or herself from any future proceedings on the case.”

2 Sec. 48.47(1), Stats., provides:

“Appeal. (1) Any person aggrieved by an adjudication of the court under this chapter and directly affected thereby has the right to appeal to the court of appeals in accordance with s. 809.40. Appeal from an order granting or denying an adoption under s. 48.91 and from any circuit court review under s. 48.64 (4) (c) shall be to the court of appeals.”

3 Rule 809.40, Stats., provides:

“Rule (Applicability). (1) An appeal to the court of appeals from a judgment or order in a misdemeanor case or a chapter 48, 51 or 55 case, or a motion for posteonviction relief in a misdemeanor case must be initiated within the time periods specified in Rule 809.30 and are governed by the procedures specified in Rules 809.30 to 809.32.

“(2) The procedures under Rules 801.01 to 801.25 and 801.50 to 801.85 govern an appeal in a chapter 299, traffic regulation or municipal ordinance violation case under s. 752.31(2) unless a different procedure is expressly provided in Rules 809.41 to 809.43.”

4 “808.03 Appeals to the court of appeals. (1) Appeals as op Right. A final judgment or a final order of a circuit court or county court may be appealed as a matter of right to the court of appeals unless otherwise expressly provided by law. A final judgment or final order is a judgment or order entered in accordance with s. 806.06(1) (b) or 807.11(2) which disposes of the entire matter in litigation as to one or more of the parties, whether rendered in an action or special proceeding.”

For a discussion of a final order under sec. 808.03(1), Stats., see State v. Jenich, 94 Wis.2d 74, 288 N.W.2d 114 (1980).

5 “808.03 Appeals to the court of appeals.

“(2) Appeals by permission. A judgment or order not appeal-able as a matter of right under sub. (1) may be appealed to the court of appeals in advance of a final judgment or order upon leave granted by the court if it determines that an appeal will:

“(a) Materially advance the termination of the litigation or clarify further proceedings in the litigation;

“(b) Protect the petitioner from substantial or irreparable injury; or

“(c) Clarify an issue of general importance in the administration of justice.”

6 This petition presents issues substantially similar to those decided in In Interest of D.H., 76 Wis.2d 286, 261 N.W.2d 196 (1977), a case which arose before the creation of the court of appeals. We noted in D.H. that a juvenile waiver order did not fit comfortably within the concept of adjudication for purposes of appeal under sec. 48.47, Stats. An adjudication implies a decision on the merits, and a waiver order is not a decision on the merits of the ease. In D.H. we recognized that “[t]he transfer of the juvenile to the adult criminal process is a grave step, and there should be a way for the juvenile to obtain immediate review of the decision” (76 Wis.2d at 292), and we held that any appellate remedy provided under the former code of procedure was inadequate because of the time lapse between the taking of the appeal and the consideration of the appeal in the supreme court. We therefore fashioned a procedure for appeal as of right to the circuit court and further review by leave of this court on an application for a writ of prohibition.

Sec. 48.47, Stats. 1975, provided:

“. . . Any person aggrieved by an adjudication of the county court under this chapter and directly affected thereby has the right to appeal to the circuit court of the same county within 40 days of the entry of the order in the manner in which appeals are taken from judgments in civil actions. No undertaking shall be required on such appeal. The order of the county court shall stand, pending the determination of the appeal, but the circuit court may upon application stay such order. The appeal shall be on the record which the county court shall make and keep of the entire proceedings. Appeal from an order granting or denying an adoption under s. 879.27 and from any county court review under s. 48.64(4) (c) shall be to the supreme court.”

7 See also sec. 752.81, Stats., which provides that eases under eh. 48 shall be heard by one court of appeals judge.

8 Art. VII, sec. 5(3) of the Wisconsin Constitution provides that “The Appeals Court . . . shall have supervisory authority over all actions and proceedings in the courts in the district.”

9 The court should look through the form to the substance of the matter. McEwen v. Pierce County, 90 Wis.2d 256, 270, 279 N.W.2d 469 (1979).