State, Dept. of Trans. & Dev. v. Boagni

509 So. 2d 471
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedApril 8, 1987
Docket86-425
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 509 So. 2d 471 (State, Dept. of Trans. & Dev. v. Boagni) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State, Dept. of Trans. & Dev. v. Boagni, 509 So. 2d 471 (La. Ct. App. 1987).

Opinion

509 So.2d 471 (1987)

STATE of Louisiana, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION & DEVELOPMENT, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Kenneth BOAGNI, Jr., et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 86-425.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.

April 8, 1987.

*472 Jo Fleming, Baton Rouge, for plaintiff-appellant.

Felix A. Dejean, Felix O. Pavy, of Thistlethwaite, Thistlethwaite and Pavy, Boagni, Genovese and Hebert, Donald Hebert, Opelousas, for defendants-appellees.

Before LABORDE, YELVERTON and CULPEPPER[*], JJ.

YELVERTON, Judge.

The State of Louisiana, through the Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD), the plaintiff in this expropriation suit, appeals complaining of the amounts awarded the thirteen defendant-landowners for just compensation and of the determination of severance damage to the remaining property. For the reasons set forth below, we amend the judgment of the trial court to reduce the award of just compensation, severance damages, and attorney's fees.

The trial court in its thorough and well-written reasons for judgment summarized the facts and testimony as follows:

"This is an expropriation case and involves the taking of approximately 10.892 acres from a larger tract for the construction of that portion of Interstate Highway-49 (I-49) just north of Washington, Louisiana. There are thirteen defendant landowners. The expropriating authority is the State of Louisiana, Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD). The DOTD deposited the sum of $10,700.00 as the fair market value for the full ownership of the property taken, subject to a mineral reservation as provided for [by] Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution and LSA-R.S. 48:441 et seq.
"The Defendant answered the petition and sought an increase to $54,460.00 for just compensation and $50,000.00 for severance damages because the parent tract had been severed into two smaller tracts. The DOTD denies there were any severage damages."

FACTS:

"The evidence established that the parent tract contained approximately 88 acres prior to the taking. It was an elongated tract that ran generally in a SE-SW direction. It was bounded on the NE by Jean Latiolais, Sr., on the SE by Lawrence Sandoz, Jr. et al; on the SW by Bayou Cocodrie; and on the SW by private landowners....
"Prior to and after the taking the defendants owned a servitude of passage across the Latiolais land on the NE. This was the only legal access that the owners had to get to their property. The taking severed the parent tract and left *473 14.692 acres on the NE side of I-49 and 62.416 acres on the SW side. The servitude of passage across the Latiolais land now provides access to the 14.692 acres, but the remaining 62.416 acres is isolated, and there is no servitude providing ingress to that acreage.
"I-49 is a `controlled access facility with no right of access to, from or across said facility to or from abutting lands except at the designated points at which access is permitted upon terms and conditions specified from time to time and upon the service, frontage or access provided...' [sic]
"In the 10.892 acres taken there is a recessed area which is part of the natural drainage across the subject tract. Initially the DOTD had intended to place large culverts in that area to provide for drainage, but later decided to build a bridge across the area. This change in construction plans was not communicated to the defendants until it was brought out in evidence at trial. At the request of the parties the Court visited the area where the bridge is being built, and it is obviously a drainage area, and water marks that were visible on area trees reflect seasonal high water of somewhere between six and eight feet."

The main issues presented at trial were 1) The determination of the highest and best use of the property for compensation purposes, and 2) The amount of severance damage, if any.

Four appraisers testified, two for DOTD and two for the landowners. All expert appraisers agreed that one of the best uses of the land would be timber, since over 90 percent of the tract was timberland at the time of the taking. However, the appraisers for the landowners also opined that the land could also be used for farming and agriculture. Based on the testimony of these experts and a local farmer the trial court found that the land was adaptable to agriculture at the time of the taking and that the property could be used for farming in the not too distant future, therefore he determined the highest and best use of the land was agricultural. The trial court also found that there had been a severance of the 62.416 acres from acess to a public road and that this acreage had suffered some severance damage.

Based on these findings the trial court concluded that the property was worth $925 an acre. He awarded the defendants $10,158.35 for the value of the land taken and $43,691.20 in severance damages.

The issues on appeal are 1) Whether the trial court erred in finding that the highest and best use of the land was agricultural, and 2) Whether he erred in concluding there was severance damages.

As this court stated in Louisiana Resources Co. v. Noel, 499 So.2d 1016 (La. App. 3rd Cir.1986), writ denied 501 So.2d 200 (La.1987):

"Highest and best use is the most favorable employment to which the property is adaptable and may reasonably be put in the not too distant future. See Faustina Pipe Line Co. v. Bernard, 458 So.2d 981 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1984). If potential future use of the property is shown to be within the reasonably near future, then the landowners are entitled to compensation on the basis of such use even though the property is not being so utilized at the time of taking. State Dept. of Highways v. Rapier, 246 La. 150, 164 So.2d 280 (1964). Market demand is an important factor in determining potential use. Louisiana Resources Co. v. Langlinais, 383 So.2d 1356 (La. App. 3rd Cir.1980), and Faustina Pipe Line Co. v. Bernard, supra. Other important factors include economic development in the area, specific plans of businesses and individuals, including action already taken to develop the land for that use, and the use to which the property is being put at the time of the taking. See Southwestern Electric Power Co. v. Scurlock, 485 So.2d 72 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1986), and Town of Rayville v. Thomason, 404 So.2d 1290 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1981)."

In determining what employment the property may have been put in in the not too distant future, the trial court stated:

*474 "... The second prong of the Rapier test (i.e., may be reasonably put to use in the not-too-distant-future) presents a much more difficult problem. The DOTD submitted that agricultural utilization was not a viable option in the not-too-far-future. Its witnesses testified as to the difficulty in securing a 404 Wetlands permit; the fact that the topography and soil type of the subject property was not well suited for farming; and the difficulty with drainage. While the defendants did not themselves testify as to their intent to convert the property into farm land, the evidence offered by them did establish that with a 404 permit the land could be cleared and drained and put into cultivation. In that context farming operations on the subject property could be

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Exxon Pipeline Co. v. LeBlanc
763 So. 2d 128 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2000)
Exxon Pipeline Co. v. Hill
763 So. 2d 144 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2000)
Natchitoches Parish Port Commission v. Deblieux & Kelley, Inc.
760 So. 2d 393 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 2000)
West Jefferson Levee D. v. Coast Quality
640 So. 2d 1258 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1994)
STATE, DEPT. OF TRANSP. AND DEV. v. Hammons
550 So. 2d 767 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1989)
STATE, DOTD v. Fakouri
541 So. 2d 291 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1989)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
509 So. 2d 471, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-dept-of-trans-dev-v-boagni-lactapp-1987.