SHEPARD, Chief Justice.
This is an appeal and a cross-appeal from a judgment of the district court in an action wherein the Idaho Department of Parks, pursuant to statute, sought to appropriate in trust for the people of Idaho cer[441]*441tain unappropriated waters of the Malad Canyon. The case presents for consideration three primary questions:
1. May an agency of the State of Idaho, without express constitutional authority, appropriate waters and obtain a priority water right;
2. Does the appropriation of water for the purposes of recreation and the preservation of scenic views constitute a “beneficial use”;
3. In Idaho may there be created a valid appropriative water right in the absence of an actual physical diversion of the water from its natural locus or condition.
In 1971 the Idaho Legislature enacted I. C. § 67-4307.1 In essence the statute directs the Department of Parks of the State of Idaho to appropriate in trust for the people of Idaho certain unappropriated natural waters of the Malad Canyon in Gooding County, Idaho. Additionally, it declares (1) that the preservation of the waters for scenic beauty and recreation uses is a beneficial use of water; (2) that the public use of those waters is of greater priority than any other use save domestic consumption, and (3) that the unappropriated state land located between the highwater marks on either bank of these waters is to be used and preserved in its present condition as a recreational site for the people of Idaho.
Pursuant to the statute the Idaho Department of Parks filed an application for a permit to appropriate the waters specified by the statute. The waters in question arise in part at least from springs in the canyon and are natural waters. There appears no argument but that there is unappropriated water available for appropriation.
That application was protested by the Idaho Water Users Association, Twin Falls Canal Company, and the North Side Canal Company under the provisions of I.C. § 42-203. Those parties are cross-appellants herein and are hereafter designated “Water Users.” The parties stipulated that the answers to the following legal issues were dispositive of the matter.
1. Is it constitutional for an Idaho State agency to appropriate, without express constitutional authorization, the waters of a natural stream, thereby obtaining a water right having priority over water rights on the same stream which may be subsequently appropriated by private parties?
[442]*4422. Are the uses described in I.C. § 67-4307 (scenic beauty and recreational purposes) “beneficial uses” which support a water appropriation under the Idaho Constitution ?
3. Can there be created in Idaho a valid appropriative water right without an actual physical reduction to possession of the claimed water through an actual diversion of the water from, or artificial control of the water in, the water’s natural locus or condition ?
The Department of Water Administration issued a decision July 6, 1972 holding that a state agency can lawfully appropriate waters of a natural stream and that recreation and aesthetic uses are beneficial uses of water, but found that in Idaho there can be no valid appropriation of water without at least a proposed physical diversion or reduction of water to possession. Finding that there was no proposed physical diversion or reduction to possession intended on the part of the Department of Parks, the Department of Water Administration refused to issue the permit.
The Department of Parks appealed this decision as to issue 3 to the district court, and the Water Users cross-appealed upon issues 1 and 2. The parties filed motions for summary judgment. The district court held that a valid appropriation can be effected without actual physical diversion or reduction of water to possession and granted the motion of Parks as to issue 3. The motions of the Department of Water Administration and Water Users as to issues 1 and 2 were denied. The Department of Water Administration has appealed the decision of the district court and the Water Users have cross-appealed.
I.
The Water Users are the only parties which assert that the district court erred when it held that a state agency can constitutionally appropriate unappropriated waters of natural streams. The Water Users argue that to allow such an appropriation would eliminate the availability of that water for appropriation by private parties, thus violating article 15, section 3 of the Idaho Constitution. In pertinent part it is stated therein:
“The right to divert and appropriate the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses, shall never be denied * *
Authority for the assertion of the Water Users is not found in the plain language of that constitutional provision since there is no limitation therein to “private parties” as distinguished from the state or a state agency. We deem it common knowledge and it is pointed out in the decision of the Department of Water Administration that in Idaho and throughout the western states, state agencies frequently appropriate water, i. e., the Fish and Game Department appropriates water for pisciculture, state universities appropriate and consume water, the Department of Parks utilizes water to maintain state parks. See also 1 W. A. Hutchins, Water Rights Laws in the Nineteen Western States, ch. 7, pp. 250-251 (1971). It is true, as argued, that if a state agency is allowed to appropriate water the quantity of unappropriated water is thereby reduced. Nevertheless, the same is true of any appropriation regardless of the identity of the appropriator. We have not been supplied, nor has our research discovered, any authority from our sister states having constitutional provisions analogous to ours which supports this contention of the Water Users.
The Water Users assert that their position is supported by State Water Conservation Board v. Enking, 56 Idaho 722, 58 P.2d 779 (1936). In Enking a state statute creating the State Water Conservation Board and defining its duties and powers was declared unconstitutional. We deem the dispositive issue in that case to be that the act in question had in effect created a corporation and was thus invalid under either article 3, section 19, or article 11, section 2 of the Idaho Constitution. In candor, however, we must state that Enking contains language supportive of the Water [443]*443Users position herein. Nevertheless we deem such language to be arguably dictum and only supportive of the court’s conclusion that the Water Conservation Board therein was a corporation. Certain of the language from Enking, albeit probably dictum, could be construed to indicate that our constitution imposes an absolute prohibition against the state’s appropriating water. The Water Users have adopted this view, asserting that the constitution must be amended prior to state agencies being allowed to appropriate water.
It is our opinion that the fears of the Enking court which prompted its construction of article 15, section 3, are totally inapplicable to the case at bar. The court in Enking speaks of that Board’s power “to appropriate any or all the unappropriated public waters of the state” and “the settler [being] thereby forced to ultimately pay arbitrarily fixed water rates for the use of water.” The court in Enking
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SHEPARD, Chief Justice.
This is an appeal and a cross-appeal from a judgment of the district court in an action wherein the Idaho Department of Parks, pursuant to statute, sought to appropriate in trust for the people of Idaho cer[441]*441tain unappropriated waters of the Malad Canyon. The case presents for consideration three primary questions:
1. May an agency of the State of Idaho, without express constitutional authority, appropriate waters and obtain a priority water right;
2. Does the appropriation of water for the purposes of recreation and the preservation of scenic views constitute a “beneficial use”;
3. In Idaho may there be created a valid appropriative water right in the absence of an actual physical diversion of the water from its natural locus or condition.
In 1971 the Idaho Legislature enacted I. C. § 67-4307.1 In essence the statute directs the Department of Parks of the State of Idaho to appropriate in trust for the people of Idaho certain unappropriated natural waters of the Malad Canyon in Gooding County, Idaho. Additionally, it declares (1) that the preservation of the waters for scenic beauty and recreation uses is a beneficial use of water; (2) that the public use of those waters is of greater priority than any other use save domestic consumption, and (3) that the unappropriated state land located between the highwater marks on either bank of these waters is to be used and preserved in its present condition as a recreational site for the people of Idaho.
Pursuant to the statute the Idaho Department of Parks filed an application for a permit to appropriate the waters specified by the statute. The waters in question arise in part at least from springs in the canyon and are natural waters. There appears no argument but that there is unappropriated water available for appropriation.
That application was protested by the Idaho Water Users Association, Twin Falls Canal Company, and the North Side Canal Company under the provisions of I.C. § 42-203. Those parties are cross-appellants herein and are hereafter designated “Water Users.” The parties stipulated that the answers to the following legal issues were dispositive of the matter.
1. Is it constitutional for an Idaho State agency to appropriate, without express constitutional authorization, the waters of a natural stream, thereby obtaining a water right having priority over water rights on the same stream which may be subsequently appropriated by private parties?
[442]*4422. Are the uses described in I.C. § 67-4307 (scenic beauty and recreational purposes) “beneficial uses” which support a water appropriation under the Idaho Constitution ?
3. Can there be created in Idaho a valid appropriative water right without an actual physical reduction to possession of the claimed water through an actual diversion of the water from, or artificial control of the water in, the water’s natural locus or condition ?
The Department of Water Administration issued a decision July 6, 1972 holding that a state agency can lawfully appropriate waters of a natural stream and that recreation and aesthetic uses are beneficial uses of water, but found that in Idaho there can be no valid appropriation of water without at least a proposed physical diversion or reduction of water to possession. Finding that there was no proposed physical diversion or reduction to possession intended on the part of the Department of Parks, the Department of Water Administration refused to issue the permit.
The Department of Parks appealed this decision as to issue 3 to the district court, and the Water Users cross-appealed upon issues 1 and 2. The parties filed motions for summary judgment. The district court held that a valid appropriation can be effected without actual physical diversion or reduction of water to possession and granted the motion of Parks as to issue 3. The motions of the Department of Water Administration and Water Users as to issues 1 and 2 were denied. The Department of Water Administration has appealed the decision of the district court and the Water Users have cross-appealed.
I.
The Water Users are the only parties which assert that the district court erred when it held that a state agency can constitutionally appropriate unappropriated waters of natural streams. The Water Users argue that to allow such an appropriation would eliminate the availability of that water for appropriation by private parties, thus violating article 15, section 3 of the Idaho Constitution. In pertinent part it is stated therein:
“The right to divert and appropriate the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses, shall never be denied * *
Authority for the assertion of the Water Users is not found in the plain language of that constitutional provision since there is no limitation therein to “private parties” as distinguished from the state or a state agency. We deem it common knowledge and it is pointed out in the decision of the Department of Water Administration that in Idaho and throughout the western states, state agencies frequently appropriate water, i. e., the Fish and Game Department appropriates water for pisciculture, state universities appropriate and consume water, the Department of Parks utilizes water to maintain state parks. See also 1 W. A. Hutchins, Water Rights Laws in the Nineteen Western States, ch. 7, pp. 250-251 (1971). It is true, as argued, that if a state agency is allowed to appropriate water the quantity of unappropriated water is thereby reduced. Nevertheless, the same is true of any appropriation regardless of the identity of the appropriator. We have not been supplied, nor has our research discovered, any authority from our sister states having constitutional provisions analogous to ours which supports this contention of the Water Users.
The Water Users assert that their position is supported by State Water Conservation Board v. Enking, 56 Idaho 722, 58 P.2d 779 (1936). In Enking a state statute creating the State Water Conservation Board and defining its duties and powers was declared unconstitutional. We deem the dispositive issue in that case to be that the act in question had in effect created a corporation and was thus invalid under either article 3, section 19, or article 11, section 2 of the Idaho Constitution. In candor, however, we must state that Enking contains language supportive of the Water [443]*443Users position herein. Nevertheless we deem such language to be arguably dictum and only supportive of the court’s conclusion that the Water Conservation Board therein was a corporation. Certain of the language from Enking, albeit probably dictum, could be construed to indicate that our constitution imposes an absolute prohibition against the state’s appropriating water. The Water Users have adopted this view, asserting that the constitution must be amended prior to state agencies being allowed to appropriate water.
It is our opinion that the fears of the Enking court which prompted its construction of article 15, section 3, are totally inapplicable to the case at bar. The court in Enking speaks of that Board’s power “to appropriate any or all the unappropriated public waters of the state” and “the settler [being] thereby forced to ultimately pay arbitrarily fixed water rates for the use of water.” The court in Enking also expressed considerable alarm at the Board’s authority to “condemn private water rights,” to “monopolize” water rights, and to “appropriate and sell the unappropriated waters of the state.” In contrast with the situation in Enking and the fears of the court expressed therein, I.C. § 67-4307, at issue herein, only authorizes the Department of Parks to appropriate, in trust for the public, certain clearly designated waters for nonconsumptive use. We are of the opinion that the legislature in the instant case has not adopted an insidious scheme in an attempt to monopolize the state’s unappropriated waters or to condemn already appropriated waters. Only in a geographical sense can there be said to be any interference with a future private appropriative right since the legislatively authorized use is nonconsumptive and once the waters have left the area delineated by the statute they are and will be subject to routine private appropriation.
We hold that I.C. § 67-4307 does not constitute a disobedience of the constitutional mandate that the “right to divert and appropriate the unappropriated waters * * * to beneficial uses, shall never be denied. The only authority contrary to that holding is the language we determine to be arguably dictum in Enking, and to the extent that this opinion is inconsistent with that language we overrule the latter.
II.
The Water Users also assert error in the trial court’s determination that the preservation of aesthetic values and recreational opportunities for the citizens of this state is a beneficial use in the sense that they will support an appropriative water right under the Idaho Constitution.
The foundation of the Water Users’ argument is that the five uses specified in article 15, section 3 of the Constitution, i. e., domestic, agriculture, mining, manufacturing and power are exclusive and thus are the only uses that are cognizable beneficial uses under our Constitution. We reject that argument.
We find no support for the position of the Water Users in the discussions reported in II Idaho Constitutional Convention, Proceedings and Debate 1889 (1912), as pertaining to article 15, section 3. It appears that insofar as particular uses were mentioned in the debates, discussion was confined to the establishment of preferences for certain uses over others under certain circumstances. Such establishment of preferences appears to be a common feature of water law in the west. See 1 W. A. Hutchins, Water Rights Laws in the Nineteen Western States, supra. While it is well established in western water law that an appropriation of water must be made for a “beneficial use,” nevertheless in Idaho at least the generic term “beneficial use” has never been judicially or statutorily defined. Our research does not disclose any case in which any court has attempted to define the term “beneficial use.” Comment, Water Appropriation for Recreation, I Land and Water Law Review 209, 210 (1966).
Consideration of the statute in question herein indicates clearly that the legislature has declared that “[t]he preservation of [444]*444water in the area described for its scenic beauty and recreational purposes necessary and desirable for all citizens of the state * * * is hereby declared to be a beneficial use of such water.” We note that numerous other western states have recognized through legislation that utilization of water for scenic or recreational purposes is a beneficial use. 1 W. A. Hutchins, Water Rights Laws in the Nineteen Western States, ch. 8, pp. 542 (1971). Such legislation in other states carries no binding effect on this court but, in the absence of persuasive case law to the contrary, it would appear to indicate that the use of water for providing recreational and aesthetic pleasure represents an emerging recognition in this and other states of social values and benefits from the use of water. See Final Report to the President and to the Congress of the United States by the National Water Commission, Ch. 7, sec. E, p. 271 et seq. (1973). The statute in question herein recognizes aesthetic and recreational values and benefits which will accrue to the people of the state in respect to the waters of Malad Canyon. We find no basis upon which to disturb that declaration of the legislature that in this instance those values and benefits constitute “beneficial uses.” The decision of the district court upon this issue is affirmed.
III.
We now reach the final issue as to whether there must be an actual physical diversion of the water in order to support an appropriation. This issue was raised upon appeal by both the Department of Water Administration and the Water Users, both of whom assert error in the trial court’s determination that such physical diversion was not necessary.
The precise language of article 15, section 3, does not bear on this question but merely declares “[t]he right to divert and appropriate the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial use, shall never be denied * * Certain language in the late case of Glenn Dale Ranches, Inc. v. Shaub, 94 Idaho 585, 494 P.2d 1029 (1972) and the earlier cases of Sandpoint Water and Light Company v. Panhandle Development Company, 11 Idaho 405, 83 P. 347 (1905), and Hutchinson v. Watson Slough Ditch Co., 16 Idaho 484, 101 P. 1059 (1909) can be read as suggesting that our constitution requires an actual physical diversion of water in order to claim an appropriative right. However, a close reading of those cases indicates that the actual holdings of the cases insofar as they relate to the necessity of an actual physical diversion are based on statutory requirements.
We hold that our Constitution does not require actual physical diversion. We deem it clear that until the time of the enactment of the statute in question herein Idaho’s statutory scheme regulating the appropriation of water has contemplated an actual physical diversion. See I.C. § 42-101, 42-201, 42-202. See however Comment, The Prerequisite of a Man-Made Diversion in the Appropriation of Water Rights- — State ex rel. Reynolds v. Miranda, 83 N.M. 443, 493 P.2d 409 (1972); 13 Natural Resources J. 170 (1973).
We note that the Colorado constitution is similar to Idaho’s article 15, section 3, and provides:
“Diverting unappropriated water * * * — The right to divert the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses shall never be denied * * *” Article XVI, sec. 6, Constitution of Colorado.
In Genoa v. Westfall, 141 Colo. 533, 349 P.2d 370 (1960) the Colorado court held that an actual physical diversion was not necessary to a water appropriation so long as the appropriator intends to apply the waters to a beneficial use and actually applies them to that use. The rationale of Genoa became suspect after the decision of the Colorado court in Lamont v. Riverside Irrigation District, 498 P.2d 1150 (Colo. 1972), but the matter appears to have been now laid at rest following the 1973 Colorado legislation wherein its statutory law of appropriation was amended so as to permit [445]*445appropriation without actual diversion. 2 Colorado Session Laws, 1973, ch. 442. Further it does not appear that Colorado courts have relied upon their constitution to establish an actual physical diversion requirement.
An examination of the statutory law of Idaho however reveals a different problem. As a general proposition one must set forth the location and description of a proposed physical diversion of water in an application for a permit to appropriate water. I.C. § 42-202. The Idaho legislature in 1971 made compliance with the statutory permit procedure mandatory. Idaho Session Laws, Ch. 177 (1971); See I.C. § 42-103, 42-201.
In the statute before us, I.C. § 67-4307, the Idaho legislature has clearly stated a policy at odds with its previous general statutory scheme of water appropriation. I.C. § 67-4307 directs parks “to appropriate [not 'divert and appropriate’] the unappropriated natural spring flow” of the Malad Canyon and declares the “preservation of water in the area described for its scenic beauty and recreational purposes” is a beneficial use. Furthermore, the statute states that “license shall issue at any time upon proof of beneficial use to which said waters are now dedicated.” We deem it clear that the legislature intended no physical diversion of water be required in the appropriation of the subject waters.
It is axiomatic that where a general statute and a specific statute deal with the same subject matter and are in conflict, the provisions of the specific statute must control. State v. Roderick, 85 Idaho 80, 375 P.2d 1005 (1962); State ex rel. Taylor v. Taylor, 58 Idaho 656, 78 P.2d 125 (1938). It is also clear that where two statutes conflict the latest expression of the legislative will must prevail. Employment Security Agency v. Joint Class “A” School District No. 151, 88 Idaho 384, 400 P.2d 377 (1965).
We deem it to be the intent of the Idaho Legislature to dispense with any physical diversion requirement in the case of the appropriation directed in I.C. § 67-4307. Any other construction would nullify the obvious purpose of I.C. § 67-4307. Courts should if possible in construing a statute give it an interpretation which does not in effect nullify the statute. DeRousse v. Higginson, 95 Idaho 173, 505 P.2d 321 (1973).
The judgment of the district court is affirmed and the case is remanded to the Department of Water Administration for further proceedings consistent with the views contained herein. Costs to respondent.
DONALDSON, J., concurs.
BAKES, J., concurs specially in an opinion to follow.