KAHN, Judge.
Appellants, in these four consolidated cases,2 challenge circuit court orders granting summary judgment for reinsurers Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company (Provident) and State Mutual Life Assurance Company of America (State Mutual), denying the motions for summary judgment filed by health care providers and dismissing the second amended complaint of the Department of Insurance. The issue in all four cases is whether the circuit court erred in interpreting the term “unaffiliated provider” in health maintenance organization (HMO) insolvency endorsements as [507] providers without contracts. The State Mutual case also raises a second issue regarding the validity of its Endorsement No. 3 which defined the term “unaffiliated provider.” 3 The reinsurance agreements in the Provident cases do not have any endorsements defining the term “unaffiliated provider.”
This appeal is the result of the collapse of three separate HMOs. The three HMOs are International Medical Centers, Inc. (IMC), a Miami based HMO with about 175,000 members, many of whom are on medicare; Sunshine Health Plan, Inc. (Sunshine), an HMO operating in Brevard, Volu-sia and Flagler counties; and Suncoast Health Plan, Inc. (Suncoast), an HMO operating in Sarasota and Manatee counties. Appellee State Mutual Life Assurance Company of America (State Mutual) was the reinsurer of IMC and appellee Provident Life & Accident Insurance Company, Inc. (Provident) was the reinsurer of the other two HMOs. All three of the reinsurance agreements between the HMOs and the reinsurers included a provision requiring the reinsurer, in the event of the HMO’s insolvency, to provide payment to “unaffiliated providers.”4
[508] There is substantial dispute as to the definition of “unaffiliated provider.” Each of the HMOs utilized three classes of health care providers from whom HMO members could obtain health care. One group of providers had “affiliated provider contracts” which established procedures, practices and policies which the provider agreed to follow. The providers who had affiliated provider contracts were paid a capitated amount for providing primary health care services to the IMC members assigned to the affiliated provider’s clinic and were responsible for providing and [509] paying for all physician services including specialists from the monthly capitation payment. They thereby shared in the HMO’s profits or losses depending upon the costs of providing services to HMO members assigned to his or her clinic in relation to the capitation payment. The second class of providers had contracts with the HMO to furnish the necessary medical services at a pre-established rate but did not have “affiliated provider contracts” with the HMO. The third category of providers were those without any type of contract. HMO members used them in cases of emergency, when they were out of town or when they needed a specialist not within the HMO’s network.
After the HMOs became insolvent, the reinsurers contended that only the third class of provider, providers without contracts, were unaffiliated providers afforded protection under the reinsurance agreement. The Department and many of the providers asserted that all of the providers who did not have an “affiliated provider contract” with the HMO were protected under the insolvency endorsement.
On May 4, 1987, the Florida Department of Insurance instituted receivership proceedings against each of the three HMOs and was appointed receiver of each.5 In those proceedings, the Department, on its own behalf, as a named additional rein-sured party under each of the three reinsurance agreements, and as a representative of a class consisting of certain hospitals and doctors that allegedly were “unaffiliated providers,” filed complaints against State Mutual and Provident. The Department’s claim against both reinsurers sought to require the reinsurers to pay “unaffiliated providers” under the respective reinsurance agreements. North Bre-vard County Hospital District d/b/a Jess Parrish Memorial Hospital (Jess Parrish) filed a separate lawsuit against Provident, as reinsurer of Sunshine and Suncoast, to collect proceeds of over $355,000 as an “unaffiliated provider.” The Sunshine, Suncoast and Jess Parrish proceedings were formally consolidated and heard together with the State Mutual proceedings. Wuesthoff Memorial Hospital, Inc. (Wues-thoff) intervened in the consolidated proceedings against Provident, claiming Provident owed it an amount in excess of $336,-000 based on its alleged status as an “unaffiliated provider.” Both Jess Parrish and Wuesthoff had service contracts with Sunshine. Neither hospital had entered an “affiliated provider contract.”
In the IMC receivership proceeding, State Mutual and the Department filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the meaning of the term “unaffiliated providers.” In the three consolidated cases, Jess Parrish moved for partial summary judgment based on its position on the meaning of the term “unaffiliated providers.” Provident, likewise, moved to dismiss the Department’s second amended complaint and filed a motion for summary judgment against Wuesthoff and Jess Parrish based on its position on the meaning of the term. The trial court granted State Mutual’s motion for partial summary judgment against the Department of Insurance and denied the Department’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment against State Mutual. The court also granted Provident’s amended motion for summary judgment against Wuesthoff and Jess Parrish, denied Jess Parrish’s motion for summary judgment against Provident, and dismissed the Department’s second amended complaint for declaratory judgment against Provident. We affirm the trial court’s orders for the reasons set out in this opinion.
The trial court properly interpreted the term “unaffiliated provider” as a provider without a contract based on the history of federal and state regulation of HMOs and the common usage of the term in the HMO industry.
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KAHN, Judge.
Appellants, in these four consolidated cases,2 challenge circuit court orders granting summary judgment for reinsurers Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company (Provident) and State Mutual Life Assurance Company of America (State Mutual), denying the motions for summary judgment filed by health care providers and dismissing the second amended complaint of the Department of Insurance. The issue in all four cases is whether the circuit court erred in interpreting the term “unaffiliated provider” in health maintenance organization (HMO) insolvency endorsements as [507] providers without contracts. The State Mutual case also raises a second issue regarding the validity of its Endorsement No. 3 which defined the term “unaffiliated provider.” 3 The reinsurance agreements in the Provident cases do not have any endorsements defining the term “unaffiliated provider.”
This appeal is the result of the collapse of three separate HMOs. The three HMOs are International Medical Centers, Inc. (IMC), a Miami based HMO with about 175,000 members, many of whom are on medicare; Sunshine Health Plan, Inc. (Sunshine), an HMO operating in Brevard, Volu-sia and Flagler counties; and Suncoast Health Plan, Inc. (Suncoast), an HMO operating in Sarasota and Manatee counties. Appellee State Mutual Life Assurance Company of America (State Mutual) was the reinsurer of IMC and appellee Provident Life & Accident Insurance Company, Inc. (Provident) was the reinsurer of the other two HMOs. All three of the reinsurance agreements between the HMOs and the reinsurers included a provision requiring the reinsurer, in the event of the HMO’s insolvency, to provide payment to “unaffiliated providers.”4
[508] There is substantial dispute as to the definition of “unaffiliated provider.” Each of the HMOs utilized three classes of health care providers from whom HMO members could obtain health care. One group of providers had “affiliated provider contracts” which established procedures, practices and policies which the provider agreed to follow. The providers who had affiliated provider contracts were paid a capitated amount for providing primary health care services to the IMC members assigned to the affiliated provider’s clinic and were responsible for providing and [509] paying for all physician services including specialists from the monthly capitation payment. They thereby shared in the HMO’s profits or losses depending upon the costs of providing services to HMO members assigned to his or her clinic in relation to the capitation payment. The second class of providers had contracts with the HMO to furnish the necessary medical services at a pre-established rate but did not have “affiliated provider contracts” with the HMO. The third category of providers were those without any type of contract. HMO members used them in cases of emergency, when they were out of town or when they needed a specialist not within the HMO’s network.
After the HMOs became insolvent, the reinsurers contended that only the third class of provider, providers without contracts, were unaffiliated providers afforded protection under the reinsurance agreement. The Department and many of the providers asserted that all of the providers who did not have an “affiliated provider contract” with the HMO were protected under the insolvency endorsement.
On May 4, 1987, the Florida Department of Insurance instituted receivership proceedings against each of the three HMOs and was appointed receiver of each.5 In those proceedings, the Department, on its own behalf, as a named additional rein-sured party under each of the three reinsurance agreements, and as a representative of a class consisting of certain hospitals and doctors that allegedly were “unaffiliated providers,” filed complaints against State Mutual and Provident. The Department’s claim against both reinsurers sought to require the reinsurers to pay “unaffiliated providers” under the respective reinsurance agreements. North Bre-vard County Hospital District d/b/a Jess Parrish Memorial Hospital (Jess Parrish) filed a separate lawsuit against Provident, as reinsurer of Sunshine and Suncoast, to collect proceeds of over $355,000 as an “unaffiliated provider.” The Sunshine, Suncoast and Jess Parrish proceedings were formally consolidated and heard together with the State Mutual proceedings. Wuesthoff Memorial Hospital, Inc. (Wues-thoff) intervened in the consolidated proceedings against Provident, claiming Provident owed it an amount in excess of $336,-000 based on its alleged status as an “unaffiliated provider.” Both Jess Parrish and Wuesthoff had service contracts with Sunshine. Neither hospital had entered an “affiliated provider contract.”
In the IMC receivership proceeding, State Mutual and the Department filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the meaning of the term “unaffiliated providers.” In the three consolidated cases, Jess Parrish moved for partial summary judgment based on its position on the meaning of the term “unaffiliated providers.” Provident, likewise, moved to dismiss the Department’s second amended complaint and filed a motion for summary judgment against Wuesthoff and Jess Parrish based on its position on the meaning of the term. The trial court granted State Mutual’s motion for partial summary judgment against the Department of Insurance and denied the Department’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment against State Mutual. The court also granted Provident’s amended motion for summary judgment against Wuesthoff and Jess Parrish, denied Jess Parrish’s motion for summary judgment against Provident, and dismissed the Department’s second amended complaint for declaratory judgment against Provident. We affirm the trial court’s orders for the reasons set out in this opinion.
The trial court properly interpreted the term “unaffiliated provider” as a provider without a contract based on the history of federal and state regulation of HMOs and the common usage of the term in the HMO industry.
[510] The terms of a statute must be given their plain meaning. See Powell v. State, 508 So.2d 1307, 1310 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (absent an explicit statement of legislative intent to the contrary, the words in a statute must be given their plain meaning), rev. denied, 518 So.2d 1277 (Fla.1987); National Fed. of Retired Persons v. Dep’t of Insurance, 553 So.2d 1289, 1290 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (plain meaning of a term can be ascertained by reference to a common dictionary definition). In the present case, however, the term “unaffiliated provider” is ambiguous.6 In the context of HMO insolvency endorsements, the term “unaffiliated provider” can arguably be a provider who is not owned or controlled by the HMO, i.e., a provider who does not have an “affiliated provider contract,” or a provider who is not in any way associated with the HMO, i.e., a non-contract provider. Based on the ambiguity of the term, the court properly looked at the context in which section 641.285(5)(a), Florida Statutes, was written to determine the meaning of the term “unaffiliated provider.” See In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals by Tenth Judicial Circuit Public Defender, 561 So.2d 1130, 1137 (Fla.1990) (where language of statute is ambiguous, the court must look beyond the language of the statute to determine legislative intent); Ison v. Zimmerman, 372 So.2d 431 (Fla.1979); Deltona Corp. v. Florida Public Service Com’n, 220 So.2d 905 (Fla.1969) (the court may look to the legislative intent and purpose of the statute where plain meaning of statute is unclear).
At the time the term “unaffiliated provider” was used in section 641.285(5)(a), there was no other reference to “unaffiliated provider” in the Florida Statutes. The only other reference to “unaffiliated provider” was found in the federal regulations. The language in section 641.-285(5)(a), Florida Statutes, was taken almost verbatim from the 1975 federal regulation, 42 CFR § 110.108(a)(3)(1975).7 The federal regulation required federally qualified HMOs to have a “plan for handling insolvency” including continuation of benefits for the duration of the contract period for which payment has been made, continuation of benefits to members who are confined on the date of insolvency in an inpatient facility until their discharge, and payment to ‘unaffiliated providers’ for services rendered.” 42 CFR § 110.108(a)(3) (1975). This was the first use of the industry phrase “unaffiliated providers” in any statute or regulation.
In 1980 the federal government issued “interpretive rulings” that were published in the Federal Register. The Notice published by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) expressly provided that federal regulators would use the rulings in regulating HMOs. Among the rulings was the following definition of the term “unaffiliated providers”:
[511] For purposes of this section, an unaffiliated provider is a provider who is not (a) a member of the HMO’s staff or associated with its contracting medical group(s) or IPA(s); (b) a health professional under a direct services contract with the HMO; or (c) an entity, such as a hospital, with which an HMO has an arrangement for the provision of basic health service. 45 Fed.Reg. 28654 (Apr. 29, 1980).
Although this definition was never enacted in law, it is still accorded great weight. Charter Peachford Hasp., Inc. v. Bowen, 803 F.2d 1541, 1544 (11th Cir.1986) (“An agency’s interpretation of a regulation it has been authorized to promulgate is also entitled to great deference and must be upheld unless it is unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious or inconsistent with the statute”). The federal government two years later adopted 42 CFR § 110.108(a)(3)(b), which provided that one method by which an HMO could meet regulatory obligations was to have “[insolvency insurance, acceptable to the Secretary.” In order to be acceptable, such insurance was required to provide coverage for “unaffiliated providers.” The reference to “unaffiliated providers” was deleted in 1985 from 42 CFR § 110.108(a)(l)(iv), see supra note 4, expressly because it was duplicative of 42 CFR 110.108(a)(3)(B). The Federal Register on February 14, 1985 stated:
We proposed deleting the requirement for payments to unaffiliated providers because it is unnecessary in light of other regulatory provisions. Arrangements must be in place for payment to unaffiliated providers to meet pre-insolvency liabilities (§ 110.108(a)(3)), and services must be provided to members after insolvency through the period for which premiums have been paid, at no additional cost to members (see the first clause of § 110.108(a)(l)(iv)).
There were no objections to the proposal and it has been adopted.
50 Fed.Reg. 6172 (February 14, 1985).
In 1985, the Florida Legislature amended section 641.285(5)(a), Florida Statutes, to include a requirement for the same three classes of benefits provided in the 1975 code: (1) continuation of benefits for the duration of the contract period for which payment has been made, (2) continuation of benefits to members in an inpatient facility on the date of insolvency until their discharge, and (3) payments to unaffiliated providers for services rendered. This was the first and only use of the phrase “unaffiliated providers” in Florida law.8 These three classes of benefits for which an insolvency plan was required, were adopted al[512] most verbatim from the 1975 federal regulation.
Although the Department contends that the federal government has withdrawn its requirement for coverage of claims of “unaffiliated providers” prior to the parties’ entry into the Reinsurance Agreement, the federal government still requires that insolvency endorsements include coverage for claims of “unaffiliated providers” and has not withdrawn the Federal Register definition. Under federal and various other state laws, health maintenance organizations are still required to provide insolvency protection for “unaffiliated providers” as defined in the federal register. 50 Fed. Reg. 6172 (Feb. 14, 1985); Mich.Com.Laws Ann. § 333.21002 (West Supp.1990); 31 Pa. Code § 301.2(c) (1990); Virginia Regulations of the Department of Insurance N.I.L.S. Reg. 28 at 294.2 (Sept. 1, 1987).
The federal government9 now claims the federal definition, which they call an “informal” definition, does not preclude state regulators from adopting a different definition imposing stricter standards. We need not reach this contention since Florida regulators have never done so. The mandatory insolvency amendment required by the Department referenced the purview of the federal regulations and the Florida Statute in the same breath as it mandated a provision for payment of “unaffiliated providers.” Nothing in the Department’s pre-suit communications with the HMOs suggested that the term had two quite different meanings.
The Department and federal government assert that federal law should be disregarded because of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011,10 which leaves regulation of the “business of insurance” to the states unless federal laws specifically provide otherwise. The McCarran-Ferguson Act, however, has nothing to do with the regulation of HMOs. See O’Reilly v. Ceuleers, 912 F.2d 1383, 1389 (11th Cir.1990) (“when [Florida Statutes] Chapter 631 and 641 are applied to IMC, the [Florida] insurance commissioner is not ‘regulating the business of insurance’ ”). The federal government does regulate HMOs. Furthermore the Department’s chief HMO regulator himself referenced the federal rules in promulgating the insolvency insurance requirement.
The court properly relied on the federal provision to find the meaning of the term “unaffiliated provider.” See Gay v. Inter-County Telephone & Telegraph Co., 60 So.2d 22, 23 (Fla.1952) (Florida statutes patterned on federal law should be given the same construction as the federal law). [513] In its order granting State Mutual’s motion for partial summary judgment, the court held:
There is no basis for any assertion that the term ‘unaffiliated providers’ was intended to have, or did have, any different meaning under the Florida Statute than under the federal regulation on which it was patterned.
The meaning of the phrase ‘unaffiliated providers,’ as initially used in the federal regulation in 1975, as still used by federal regulators, and as used in § 641.-285(5)(a)l, Florida Statutes (1985), is a provider of services to an HMO’s members that does not have a contract for the provision of such services.
The court’s interpretation of “unaffiliated providers” is supported by additional evidence. The Department’s chief HMO regulator and two of its examiners when deposed below testified that an unaffiliated provider is a provider without a contract. No Department employee testified to the contrary. See PW Ventures, Inc. v. Nichols, 533 So.2d 281, 283 (Fla.1988) (“contemporaneous” construction by regulating agency is entitled to deference). The Department also published a HMO Consumers’ Guide which advised subscribers that “HMO members must use physicians employed by or under contract with the HMO.... If you want to see a doctor who is not affiliated with the HMO, you will have to pay your own expenses unless referred by an HMO physician.” (e.s.).
Affidavits from various Florida and national experts in the HMO field establish that within the industry the term “affiliated provider” is a provider with a contract and “unaffiliated provider” is a provider without a contract. Jack MacDonald, Senior Vice President of Medical Affairs at Tallahassee Regional Medical Center and former member of the board of directors of Capital Health Plan (a Florida HMO), expressly stated that “[t]he term ‘unaffiliated provider’ does not refer only to providers that are not under common ownership or control of the HMO.” He indicated that whether a provider is “unaffiliated” depends entirely on whether there was a contract and not the method of payment. According to the record, Dennis Threadgill, Chief Attorney for the Department of Insurance, Division of Rehabilitation and Liquidation, explained in a memo and letter in 1987 that “[cjontract providers are those providers who worked for IMC under contracts which have provisions which provide they can look to IMC for payment. They cannot sue the subscriber for payment. Non-contract providers are not limited to looking to IMC for payment. Therefore, it is critical that State Mutual be required to provide payment to the non-contract providers.” Compelling evidence exists to demonstrate that, prior to these lawsuits, substantial agreement existed which identified the term “unaffiliated provider” as a provider without a contract.
Other cases have referred to providers with contracts as “affiliated.” Health Care Plan, Inc. v. Schweiker, 553 F.Supp. 440, 442 (D.N.J.1982), aff'd without opinion, 707 F.2d 1391 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815, 104 S.Ct. 71, 78 L.Ed.2d 84 (1983); Blue Cross of Rhode Island v. Cannon, 589 F.Supp. 1483, 1486 (D.R.I.1984); Giordano v. Ramirez, 503 So.2d 947, 948 (Fla.3d DCA1987). The term “unaffiliated providers” has commonly been used in the statutes and regulations of other states as meaning providers without contracts. No state statute or regulation uses the term in any other manner. The testimony in the record also establishes that common industry usage of the term is providers without contracts. Even the Department and its supporters have repeatedly used the term in this manner.
The Department and its supporters contend that the purpose of the HMO Act was to strengthen the development of HMOs and to protect providers and encourage them to participate in HMOs. They assert the court’s interpretation will defeat the purpose of the HMO Act and result in the weakening, if not destruction, of the HMO industry. These arguments are not convincing. The insolvency provision at issue here was designed to protect subscribers, not providers. This statutory purpose is demonstrated by (1) the fact that the feder[514] al regulation that requires insolvency coverage is titled “protection of members,” 42 CFR § 110.108(a)(3) (1985); (2) the waiver of 42 CFR § 110.108(a)(3) if the Secretary determines that applicable state law provides that members of the HMO may not be liable for payment of any fees [not just the fees of affiliated providers] which are the legal obligation of the HMOs, 42 CFR § 110.108(3)(ii) (1985); and (3) the provision in section 641.285, Florida Statutes, which allows for insolvency coverage as an alternative to the deposit requirement of section 641.285(1). In Florida, insolvency coverage is only one of several alternatives to meet the requirements of section 641.285, Florida Statutes. See § 641.285, Fla.Stat. Moreover, expert MacDonald testified that an HMO’s ability to attract or retain affiliated providers is not affected by insolvency coverage. HMOs throughout the nation have flourished even where insolvency coverage is required for only non-contract providers. Providers with contracts are, and have been free to negotiate with HMOs as to contractual terms. They are free to reject entirely an HMO’s contract with its attendant benefits.
Construing “unaffiliated provider” as a provider without a contract furthers the goal of protecting the HMO subscribers by providing an incentive for non-contract providers to treat a subscriber whose HMO has become insolvent. Contract providers, unlike non-contract providers, may be required by provisions in their contract to guarantee the continuation of health care services, in the event of insolvency of the HMO, until the end of the contract period for which payment has been made. See § 641.285(5)(a)2, Fla.Stat., supra note 4.
The Department also asserts that the circuit court’s order would render the contract’s coverage for claims of unaffiliated providers meaningless because there is no such thing as a provider without a contract. Clearly, there are providers who have neither an “affiliated provider contract” nor a service contract with the HMO. An implied contract arising between provider and patient when services are rendered is not tantamount to a contract between the provider and the HMO for purposes of insolvency insurance. State Mutual has estimated that IMC’s unaffiliated providers are owed between $6 million and $11 million while Provident Life has already paid hundreds of thousands of dollars to noncon-tract providers in connection with the insolvency of two much smaller HMOs. The distinction between contract and noncon-tract providers has also been applied in federal medicare statutes and other federal statutes and regulations governing HMOs. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300e(b)(3)(A)(iv).
Jess Parrish claims that its board relied on the representations of Sunshine that they were covered by an insolvency endorsement. However, its action (if any) would be against the party making the representations rather than Provident. The same is true of provisions in service contracts for insolvency protection. The HMO breaching the contract, not the rein-surer, would be liable. No evidence produced by the Department or the providers indicates that the reinsurers in these cases ever assumed the risk for contract providers.
Based on the federal and state legislative history of the term “unaffiliated provider” and the evidence and case law supporting the trial court’s interpretation of that term, we affirm the trial court’s orders.
Due to our affirmance of the trial court’s interpretation of the term “unaffiliated provider,” we need not address the Department’s second issue in the State Mutual case regarding the validity of Endorsement Number 3 which defines that term.
AFFIRMED.
MINER and ALLEN, JJ., concur.