State Correctional Institution v. Weaver

606 A.2d 547, 146 Pa. Commw. 381, 1992 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 215
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedMarch 16, 1992
Docket319 C.D. 1991
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 606 A.2d 547 (State Correctional Institution v. Weaver) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State Correctional Institution v. Weaver, 606 A.2d 547, 146 Pa. Commw. 381, 1992 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 215 (Pa. Ct. App. 1992).

Opinion

DOYLE, Judge.

The State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh, Department of Corrections (Department) appeals an order of the State Civil Service Commission (Commission) which directed the Department to return James S. Weaver’s name to the eligibility list for promotion to Corrections Officer II.

The relevant facts are as follows: On January 7, 1985 while employed as a Corrections Officer I, Weaver sustained serious injuries to his left shoulder, neck and head when he intervened in an altercation between inmates and a deputy sheriff. As a result of his injuries, Weaver was on medical leave for approximately one year. 1 In January 1986, Weaver was ordered back to work and was assigned to light duty status. 2

In 1989 Weaver took the Civil Service test for Corrections Officer II and was placed in the first position on the eligible for promotion list. By letter dated February 14, 1990 Weaver was informed that he was retroactively promoted to Corrections Officer II effective November 27, 1989. In the same letter, Weaver was requested to provide a statement from his physician indicating that Weaver was able to *384 perform all the duties and responsibilities required of a Corrections Officer II. By letter dated March 16, 1990, Weaver was advised that because he did not provide the requested medical clearance by the deadline date of March 12, 1990, he was returned, or “demoted,” to Corrections Officer I effective March 19, 1990 for failure to satisfactorily complete the probationary period. 3

Thereafter, the Department requested that the Commission remove Weaver’s name from the eligible list. By letter dated July 19, 1990, the Commission granted this request. Weaver’s name was to be removed for a period of thirty six (36) months unless Weaver submitted medical documentation showing that he was able to work earlier. If such medical documentation were submitted, he could then request reactivation of his eligibility. Weaver appealed the removal of his name from the eligible list under Section 951(b) of the Civil Service Act, Act of August 5, 1941, P.L. 752, as amended, 71 P.S. § 741.951(b). 4 Section 951(b) provides that any person who is aggrieved by an alleged violation of Section 905.1 of the Civil Service Act, 71 P.S. § 741.905(a), 5 may appeal to the Commission. Section 905.1 prohibits discrimination against “any person in recruitment, examination, appointment, training, promotion, retention or any other personnel action ... because of political or religious opinions or affiliations because of labor union affiliations or because of race, national origin or other non-merit factors.” Weaver alleged that he was discriminated against because of sex, handicap and other non-merit factors.

The Commission found that the Department accommodated Weaver’s disability by creating a light duty position for him while retaining him as a Corrections Officer I. It concluded, however, once having established different criteria for Weaver’s employment, “the denial of advancement *385 within that separate category was discriminatory.” Accordingly, the Commission ordered Weaver’s name returned to the eligibility list for Corrections Officer II. Appeal to this Court followed.

The Department raises two issues on appeal: 1) that there is insufficient evidence to support a finding of discrimination, and 2) that the Commission erred by failing to consider the relationship between the Civil Service Act and the terms of the Collective Bargaining Agreement in the promotion of a classified employee. We review these issues keeping in mind that our scope of review of an order of the Commission is limited to determining whether constitutional rights have been violated, an error of law has been committed and necessary factual findings are supported by substantial evidence. Rosselli v. Reading Housing Authority, 116 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 177, 541 A.2d 417 (1988).

We first consider the Department’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. A person claiming discrimination in a personnel action has the burden of presenting evidence to support such a charge. Department of Corrections v. Colyer, 133 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 413, 576 A.2d 416 (1990). Discrimination cannot be inferred by the Commission; rather there must be some affirmative support adduced to sustain the allegations of discrimination. Harper v. Department of Public Welfare, 123 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 340, 553 A.2d 521 (1989). Once the employee has met his burden, the employer must demonstrate a nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct. Allegheny County Health Department v. Bandyk, 117 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 275, 544 A.2d 527 (1988).

Weaver’s sole evidence of discrimination based on his handicap is the promotion of two Corrections Officer I’s to Corrections Officer II’s while the officers were off duty on disability leave. These promoted officers were not requested to provide medical clearance prior to assuming the duties of their new positions. However, the Personnel Officer for the facility at which Weaver worked, Peter *386 Balestrerie, testified that the Corrections Officers who were promoted while on disability had injuries which were temporary. Balestrerie further testified that both of these officers work inside the institution and their duties are no different from any other Corrections Officer II on probationary status. 6 These officers are thus not similarly situated to Weaver whose disability is of a permanent nature and who is not permitted to have inmate contact. 7 We therefore hold as a matter of law that Weaver has not met his burden of showing discrimination based on his handicap.

We next look to whether Weaver has established that his removal was based on other non-merit factors. 8 The term “non-merit factor” is not defined by the Civil Service Act but in Balas v. Department of Public Welfare, 128 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 205, 214, 563 A.2d 219, 223 (1989), this Court announced that merit criteria which are the criteria relevant to the proper execution of the employee’s duties, are job related, and touch in some logical and rational manner upon competency and ability.

In its adjudication, the Commission did not address Weaver’s ability to perform the duties of a Corrections Officer II; however the Commission did find that Weaver continues to have some physical limitations and is prohibited from having inmate contact.

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Bluebook (online)
606 A.2d 547, 146 Pa. Commw. 381, 1992 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 215, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-correctional-institution-v-weaver-pacommwct-1992.