State Bar Assn. v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co.

153 A.2d 453, 146 Conn. 556, 1959 Conn. LEXIS 209, 4 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5195
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
DecidedJune 30, 1959
StatusPublished
Cited by24 cases

This text of 153 A.2d 453 (State Bar Assn. v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
State Bar Assn. v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 153 A.2d 453, 146 Conn. 556, 1959 Conn. LEXIS 209, 4 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5195 (Colo. 1959).

Opinion

Daly, C. J.

The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that the defendant corporation was, and for a long time had been, unlawfully practicing law in this state in violation of the common law and §§ 7638 and 7641 of the 1949 Revision of the General Statutes (Rev. 1958, §§ 51-80, 51-88) 1 and in contempt of court. They sought an injunction restraining the defendant from engaging in any and all of the acts and practices alleged and a judgment declaring whether those acts and practices, singly or in com *558 bination, constituted the unlawful practice of law and violations of the statutes. In another action brought by the plaintiffs against the Hartford National Bank and Trust Company, the complaint contained the same allegations and prayers for relief. The court found all the issues except one for the defendant in each case. The plaintiffs appealed from the judgments, which were rendered on April 15, 1957. The two appeals were combined by the order of the trial court pursuant to § 382 of the Practice Book. The cases were decided by this court on April 15, 1958. State Bar Assn. v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863.

In our opinion we stated (p. 234): “[T]he question for determination is whether each defendant, acting through its employees, performed acts, in or out of court, ‘commonly understood to be the practice of law.’ ” At pages 236 and 237 we said: “Each defendant, acting through its employees, in disseminating general information concerning the application, scope and effect of various laws and in reviewing wills and trust agreements was acting primarily for itself in obtaining or holding trust department customers. Those acts and practices did not constitute the practice of law. In performing other acts and in carrying on other practices, it was not acting primarily for itself; it was administering and settling the affairs of estates. The mere fact that it was not acting for itself in performing an act or acts in or out of court does not, however, compel the conclusion that such performance constituted the practice of law. As stated above, the decisive question is whether the acts performed were such as are ‘commonly understood to be the practice of law.’ Grievance Committee v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 330, 22 A.2d 623. The decision by a trust department officer or *559 employee that no uncertain or unclear legal issue is involved, that no controversy is likely to arise and that independent outside counsel should not be retained would not legalize the performance of the acts by a trust officer or employee. The court erred in concluding as a matter of law that the drawing up of all of the various types of instruments drafted and composed by each defendant’s trust department employees could not and consequently did not constitute the unlawful practice of law and also in concluding as a matter of law that each defendant’s appearance and representation at probate court hearings by attorneys who were salaried employees could not and did not constitute the unlawful practice of law. Upon the basis of the facts found, we cannot say that the court erred in concluding that each defendant, acting by and through its trust department employees, lawyers or laymen, in preparing tax returns and dealing with and appearing before state and federal tax authorities in connection with taxes claimed to be due from estates administered by it did not engage in the unlawful practice of law. We do not hesitate to say, however, that if the record indicated that either the preparation of the tax returns or the matters dealt with involved tax law problems of a type such that their solution would be ‘commonly understood to be the practice of law,’ we would hold that the acts performed constituted the unlawful practice of law.”

We held that there was error in part in both cases. The judgments were set aside and the cases were remanded with direction to render judgments as then on file except as modified to accord with our opinion. The trial court, carrying out its interpretation of this mandate, rendered a judgment on July 21, 1958, containing the provisions appearing *560 in the footnote. 2 The defendant in each case appealed. In the action against the Hartford National Bank and Trust Company, the parties stipulated that the judgment rendered in the present case would be conclusive upon them.

*561 “In carrying out the direction of a mandate [of the Supreme Court of Errors], the Superior Court is limited to the specific direction of the mandate as interpreted in the light of the opinion.” Mazzotta v. Bornstein, 105 Conn. 242, 243, 135 A. 38. The judgment rendered on July 21, 1958, from which *562 this appeal is taken, was not in accordance with, the mandate of this court. In our opinion (145 Conn. 222, at 233), we said: “As stated in the finding, a great many legal problems of a complex nature arise in the fiduciary administration of decedents’ estates. These include questions of domicil and who are heirs at law; valuation of stockholdings in certain corporations, of leasehold estates, and of remainder interests; decisions on what dividends and accrued interest are included in the inventory and to whom the household furniture belongs; determina *563 tion of which of the claims against an estate are properly presented and of questions relating to statutes of limitation and the priority in order of payment of claims against an insolvent estate; decisions on whether a transfer was made in contemplation of death or was intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment upon death and whether to concede the taxability of the items involved; determination of what are allowable deductions under the succession tax law and what items are included in the computation of the tax; completion of federal estate tax returns, each of which contains many schedules, including those listing jointly owned property, marital deductions and transfers prior to death; and preparation of preliminary and final accounts, and the making of the necessary calculations, in the distribution of estates. Few, if any, estates do not have some problems of a legal nature. There is a considerable body of case law built up around the succession and transfer tax statutes of this state.” We did not state that legal problems of a complex nature arise in the fiduciary administration of every decedent’s estate.

To minimize misunderstanding of the meaning of our previous mandate, we append in the footnote 3 *564 an injunction and a declaration of the rights of the parties which would conform to that mandate. The proposed injunction is written on the principle that appearances at probate court hearings necessarily constitute the practice of law.

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Bluebook (online)
153 A.2d 453, 146 Conn. 556, 1959 Conn. LEXIS 209, 4 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5195, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-bar-assn-v-connecticut-bank-trust-co-conn-1959.