Starr v. Warden, et al.

2006 DNH 110

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: September 27, 2006
• Docket: 04-CV-002-SM
• Status: Published

Opinion

Starr v. Warden, et a l . 04-CV-002-SM 09/27/06 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Darren Starr, Plaintiff

v. Civil No. 04-cv-02-SM Opinion No. 2006 DNH 110 Bruce Cattell, Warden of the Northern New Hampshire Correctional Facility, et a l .,

O R D E R

Darren Starr, an inmate at the Northern Correctional

Facility in Berlin, New Hampshire ("NCF"), brings this action

seeking compensatory and punitive damages, as well as declaratory

and injunctive relief, for what he says was the wrongful denial

of his constitutionally protected rights. Specifically, Starr

claims defendants unlawfully prohibited him from obtaining a

marriage license and, for a period of at least 18 months,

prevented him from marrying his girlfriend. Defendants deny that

they violated Starr's constitutional rights and, because they

have changed their policy governing inmates' access to marriage

licenses, they say his claims are moot. Pending before the court

are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion for

summary judgment (document no. 86) is granted and plaintiff's

motion for summary judgment (document no. 95) is denied.

Standard of Review

When ruling on a party's motion for summary judgment, the

court must "view the entire record in the light most hospitable

to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging all reasonable

inferences in that party's favor." Griqqs-Rvan v. Smith. 904

F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir. 1990). Summary judgment is appropriate

when the record reveals "no genuine issue as to any material fact

and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter

of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) . In this context, "a fact is

'material' if it potentially affects the outcome of the suit and

a dispute over it is 'genuine' if the parties' positions on the

issue are supported by conflicting evidence." Intern'l Ass'n of

Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Winship Green Nursing Ctr.,

103 F.3d 196, 199-200 (1st Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).

Background

Prior to 2002, when inmates at NCF (including those

classified as C-3 status and higher) wished to marry, staff at

NCF would transport them to the local town hall to obtain the

2 necessary state marriage license.1 Subsequently, however, that

policy changed. The Department of Corrections determined that,

for security reasons, it would no longer transport C-3 inmates

outside the prison to obtain marriage licenses. Officials at the

Department of Corrections also interpreted state law (probably

erroneously) to prohibit the transportation of C-3 inmates

outside the prison to obtain marriage licenses. See generally

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 623:1. Consequently, defendants say they

viewed the change in policy as being both counseled by security

concerns and mandated by statute.

In July of 2000, Starr was committed to NCF and classified

as a "C-3" inmate. He is not eligible for "C-2" status for

several years. In October of 2002, Starr and his girlfriend

decided to wed. Accordingly, he asked NCF officials to arrange

for his transportation to the local town clerk, so he might

complete the necessary paperwork and obtain a marriage license.

He was told that, as a C-3 inmate, he was not eligible for

transportation to the town clerk's office. Nevertheless,

officials at NCF contacted several town clerks from neighboring

communities and asked if they would be willing to come to NCF so

1 The term C-3 refers to an inmate's custody classification level, which can range from C-l (minimum) to C-5 (maximum).

3 Starr might fill out the appropriate paperwork and obtain a

marriage license. All declined. Starr was then informed that he

would have to wait until he was designated a C-2 inmate before he

would be eligible for transportation out of the prison to obtain

a marriage license.

Approximately 18 months later, in April of 2005, officials

at NCF changed the policy concerning C-3 inmates and marriage

licenses. Because they had been unable to find a local town

clerk willing to come to NCF to assist inmates in obtaining

licenses, officials at NCF decided that they would transport

inmates to the correctional facility in Concord, twice each year,

where a town clerk would come in to assist inmates. That same

month, NCF officials informed Starr of the change in policy and

asked if he wanted to be placed on the list of inmates seeking

transportation to Concord to obtain a marriage license. Starr

declined, saying he preferred to wait until the fall.

In January of 2006, Starr and his fiance broke off their

engagement. Nevertheless, he says he is still entitled to

damages as compensation for the roughly 18 months that he was

denied the opportunity to obtain a marriage license.

4 Discussion

I. Inmates and the Right to Mar r y .

In 1987, the Supreme Court held that, despite incarceration,

inmates retained the constitutionally protected right to marry.

Turner v. Saflev, 482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987). The Court recognized,

however, that an inmate's right to marry is, "like many other

rights, . . . . subject to substantial restrictions as a result

of incarceration." Ici. at 95.

When a correctional facility's regulations interfere with an

inmate's constitutionally protected right to marry, such

regulations are valid only if they are "reasonably related to

legitimate penological interests." Ici. at 89. To assist lower

courts in determining whether a challenged regulation passes

constitutional scrutiny, the Court identified four factors that

should be considered:

1. whether there is a logical, valid connection between the regulation and the penological goal(s) sought to be advanced by that regulation - a connection that is not so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational;

2. whether there are alternate means by which the inmate might exercise the asserted constitutional right - means that remain open to him despite his incarceration;

5 3. whether the accommodation requested by the inmate so that he might exercise the asserted constitutional right would have an adverse effect on guards, other inmates, and/or the allocation of prison resources; and, finally,

4. whether there are any obvious, easy alternate means by which the prison might accommodate the inmate's exercise of the asserted right.

See I d . at 89-92. Importantly, however, the Supreme Court urged

lower courts to exercise restraint and give appropriate deference

to the expert judgments of prison administrators.

Running a prison is an inordinately difficult undertaking that requires expertise, planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of government. Prison administration is, moreover, a task that has been committed to the responsibility of those branches, and separation of powers concerns counsel a policy of judicial restraint. Where a state penal system is involved, federal courts have . . . additional reason to accord deference to the appropriate prison authorities.

Id. at 84-85.

II. The NCF Policy.

Evaluated in light of the four factors identified by the

Turner court, NCF's former policy of not transporting C-3 inmates

to the local town clerk's office did not violate Starr's

constitutionally protected right to marry his fiance. First, it

6 is important to note that NCF did not have a policy that

prohibited C-3 status inmates (like Starr) from getting married.

Instead, the challenged policy provided that NCF staff would not

transport C-3 status (or higher) inmates outside the prison to

the local town clerk's office. Consequently, C-3 status inmates

who wished to obtain a marriage license would have to arrange (or

NCF staff would have to arrange) for a local town clerk to come

to the prison. The articulated justification for the policy — to

eliminate security risks associated with transporting C-3 status

(and higher) inmates outside the confines of the prison and into

a public place — was both reasonable and compelling.

Moreover, the accommodation sought by Starr - transportation

out of the prison and to the local town clerk's office - would

have had an adverse effect on NCF guards and the allocation of

prison resources. Plainly, when an inmate (particularly one who

has been classified as C-3 status or higher) is transported

outside the confines of the prison, numerous security measures

must be implemented. That is particularly true when the inmate

is being transported to a public place, rather than another

correctional facility. Finally, when NCF officials denied

Starr's request to be transported to the town clerk's office,

there were no obvious, easy alternatives by which NCF officials

7 could accommodate his desire to obtain a marriage license.

During the period in question, NCF officials made repeated

inquiries of local town clerks in the neighboring communities to

see if any were willing to come to the prison. None volunteered.

And, while NCF officials eventually decided that they could

accommodate Starr's request by transporting him to the prison in

Concord (where a town clerk had volunteered to assist inmates

seeking marriage licenses), that solution was not so obvious or

self-evident that it occurred to either Starr or defendants when

Starr made his initial request. If Starr had actually suggested

that NCF officials transport him to the prison in Concord, and if

those officials had refused such a request, this might be a

different case. But he did not.

In support of his claims, Starr suggests that when he asked

NCF officials to transport him to the local town clerk's office,

he was no different than an inmate who was ill and needed medical

treatment at a local hospital. That is to say, Starr suggests

that, just as NCF officials have a constitutional obligation to

transport ailing inmates to a local hospital if they cannot

receive adequate treatment within the confines of the prison, NCF

officials have an analogous constitutional obligation to

transport inmates seeking a marriage license to a local town clerk if they cannot obtain such a license within the prison

itself.

Simply stated, Starr reads too much into the precedent on

which he relies. The Turner Court held that, absent the

advancement of legitimate penological objectives, prison

officials cannot prohibit inmates from marrying. Importantly,

the Court did not hold that prisons have a constitutionally

mandated obligation to affirmatively assist inmates in their

efforts to wed.

To be sure, Starr does point the court to an opinion in

which the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that:

Turner's test extends to situations in which an inmate's right to marry will be completely frustrated without prison officials' affirmative assistance. Although it was not previously clearly established, we now hold that the distinction between actively prohibiting an inmates's exercise of his right to marry and failing to assist is untenable in a case in which the inmate's right will be completely frustrated without officials' involvement. Therefore, where an inmate will be unable to marry without prison officials' affirmative assistance. Turner's strictures apply.

Toms v. Taft. 338 F.3d 519, 526-27 (6th Cir. 2003). Importantly,

however, even if the court assumes that Toms accurately describes

9 the law in this circuit, a prison official's refusal to

affirmatively assist an inmate in his or her efforts to marry is

still subject to the Turner analysis. That is to say, if a

prison official's refusal to assist the inmate is grounded in a

policy justified by legitimate penological goals, is neither

unreasonable nor arbitrary, and there are no obvious, easy

alternate means by which the inmate might achieve his or her

objective, the policy will survive constitutional scrutiny. Such

is the case here, where NCF officials based their refusal to

transport Starr on a policy that was uniformly applied, was

reasonably related to legitimate penological concerns, and there

were no ready alternate means by which they might accommodate

Starr's desire to marry his fiance. In fact, NCF officials

affirmatively explored such an alternative - attempting to

identify a town clerk willing to come to the prison - but were

unsuccessful.

Given the undisputed facts of this case, as a matter of law,

defendants did not violate Starr's constitutionally protected

right to marry by denying his request for transportation out of

the prison and to the local town clerk's office.

10 III. Qualified Immunity.

Even if defendants had a constitutionally mandated

obligation to affirmatively assist Starr in his efforts to obtain

a marriage license, and even if they breached that obligation

(and, thus, violated his constitutionally protected rights), they

still would be entitled to the protections afforded by qualified

immunity.

A government official is entitled to qualified immunity from

personal liability if the challenged "■'conduct [did] not violate

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.'" Aversa v. United States.

99 F.3d 1200, 1214 (1st Cir. 1996) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald.

457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). The challenged conduct is measured by

a standard of objective reasonableness, that is: "Could an

objectively reasonable official, situated similarly to the

defendant, have believed that his conduct did not violate the

plaintiff['s ] constitutional rights, in light of clearly

established law and the information possessed by the defendant at

the time of the allegedly wrongful conduct?" Wood v. Clemons. 89

F.3d 922, 927 (1st Cir. 1996). And, as the Court of Appeals for

the First Circuit has observed.

11 To determine a defendant's eligibility for qualified immunity, courts must define the right asserted by the plaintiff at an appropriate level of generality and ask whether, so characterized, that right was clearly established when the harm-inducing conduct allegedly took place. This does not mean that a right is clearly established only if there is precedent of considerable factual similarity. It does mean, however, that the law must have defined the right in a quite specific manner, and that the announcement of the rule establishing the right must have been unambiguous and widespread, such that the unlawfulness of particular conduct will be apparent ex ante to reasonable public officials. After all, qualified immunity for public officials serves important societal purposes, and it is therefore meant to protect all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.

Bradv v. Dill. 187 F.3d 104, 115-16 (1st Cir. 1999) (citations

and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis supplied).

Importantly, as suggested in Dill. a defendant does not lose

the protection of qualified immunity if he or she acts

mistakenly, as long as the mistake was objectively reasonable, as

qualified immunity is intended to protect '■'■'all but the plainly

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.'" Veilleux

v. Perschau. 101 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996) (quoting Mallev v.

Briggs. 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).

A preliminary question, then, is whether Starr's asserted

constitutional right - to have NCF officials provide him with

12 transportation to the local clerk's office so he might obtain a

marriage license - was '■'clearly established" in 2003. It was

not. As the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit noted in July

of 2003 (shortly before Starr made his request for transportation

to the clerk's office), the case law at that time "fail[ed] to

show that an inmate's right to marry was so clearly established

that an official reasonably would believe that declining to

assist an inmate in obtaining a marriage license is

unconstitutional." Toms, 338 F.3d at 526. While the Toms court

went on to hold that, in future cases, prison officials in the

Sixth Circuit would be required to affirmatively assist inmates'

efforts to marry (absent justification that passes muster under

the Turner factors), that single judicial opinion can hardly be

said to have "clearly established" the constitutional principle

on which Starr's claims turn. In short, in 2003, the notion that

prison officials have a constitutionally imposed obligation to

affirmatively assist inmates in their efforts to marry was

neither "unambiguous" nor was it "widespread." Dill, 187 F.3d at

116. See, e.g.. Beasley v. Konteh. 433 F. Supp. 2d 874, 877

(N.D. Ohio 2006) ("Thus, prison officials need not affirmatively

assist inmates by allowing them to leave prison temporarily to

accomplish a lawful objective that implicates a constitutional

right, such as the right to marry.").

13 Here, the principle of law on which Starr's claims hinge was

not so well-established and widespread that one could plausibly

conclude that a reasonable and well-trained prison official in

defendants' position would have known that his or her decision

not to transport Starr would violate his constitutional rights.

Stated somewhat differently, given the state of the law at the

time, the record establishes that defendants were not "plainly

incompetent," nor did they "knowingly violate the law" when they

denied Starr's request for transportation to the town clerk's

office. Veilleux. 101 F.3d at 3.

Conclusion

This case presents a somewhat unusual situation - Starr

complains that, by refusing to transport him outside the confines

of the prison, defendants effectively prevented him from

exercising his constitutionally protected right to marry. In

other words, although defendants never had a policy that

prohibited inmates from marrying, Starr claims they violated his

constitutionally protected rights by failing to affirmatively

assist him in exercising that right - that is, by refusing to

transport him to the local town clerk's office. The difficulty

with Starr's claim is this: while the Supreme Court made clear

that correctional officials cannot unreasonably prohibit an

14 inmate from exercising the constitutionally protected right to

marry, there is scant support in the case law for the proposition

that those officials can be liable for failing to assist an

inmate in exercising that right - Starr points only to Toms, a

single judicial opinion. And, even applying the principles of

law articulated in the Toms opinion to the case at hand,

defendants are still entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The decision not to honor Starr's request for transportation to

the local town clerk's office was grounded in a prison policy

that met the test articulated in Turner.

Finally, even if defendants had violated Starr's

constitutionally protected rights by refusing to transport him to

the local town clerk's office, they would still be entitled to

the protections afforded by qualified immunity. When defendants

refused Starr's request, an inmate's right (if any) to

affirmative assistance from prison officials in order to exercise

the right to marry was not "clearly established" in this circuit.

For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in

defendants' memoranda, defendants' motion for summary judgment

(document no. 86) is granted and plaintiff's motion for summary

15 judgment (document no. 95) is denied. The parties' motions in

limine (documents no. 99 and 103) are denied as moot.

The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in accordance with

this order and close the case.

SO ORDERED.

Sreven j / McAuliffe Chief Judge

September 27, 2006

cc: Darren Starr, pro se Mary E. Maloney, Esq.