Starling v. Starling

Opinions

Opinion

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA 24-667

Filed 4 June 2025

Orange County, No. 21 CVD 000974-670

ANNA LEYF PEIRCE STARLING, Plaintiff,

v.

JAMES LINTON STARLING, Defendant.

Appeal by Defendant from order entered 19 March 2024 by Judge Samantha

Cabe in Orange County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 25 February

2025.

Connell & Gelb, PLLC, by Attorney Michelle D. Connell, for Plaintiff–Appellee.

Patrick Law, PLLC, by Attorney Kirsten A. Grieser, for Defendant–Appellant.

MURRY, Judge.

James L. Starling (Defendant) appeals from an order granting Anna L.P.

Starling (Plaintiff) sole legal custody of their two minor children and authorizing her

to move with the children to Charlottesville, Virginia. For the reasons below, this

Court affirms the trial court’s order.

I. Background

Plaintiff and Defendant married on 21 July 2007, separated on 5 July 2018,

Opinion of the Court

and divorced on 29 October 2019. The parties share two children, born in 2010 and

2013, respectively. At Plaintiff’s request, on 18 September 2020, the trial court

appointed Bonnie Ferrell as a parenting coordinator for the parties. John Bowman

replaced her in that role on 19 January 2022. On 16 August 2021, Plaintiff filed for

sole legal and primary physical custody of the children, citing Defendant’s lack of

cooperation with the parenting coordinator’s guidelines as the basis for her request.

On 15 March 2022, the trial court issued a temporary order awarding Plaintiff sole

legal custody and joint physical custody of the children. Around that time, Plaintiff

applied for a job in Virginia and began taking the children to interview at schools

there.

On 23 March 2023, Defendant moved to modify the temporary custody order

to require that the children remain at their current schools in North Carolina and to

prevent Plaintiff from “taking actions that support her moving the children out of

state.” The trial court denied Defendant’s motion at an 18 April 2023 hearing, ruling

instead that Plaintiff would continue to have sole legal custody and providing

Defendant with additional physical custody during the summertime. The trial court

also requested the parties to provide it with suggested “long weekends” and times for

custodial exchanges of the children. Defendant contemporaneously moved for the

trial court to enter its ruling as a permanent order to allow him to appeal.

On 20 June 2023, parenting coordinator John Bowman filed a “Report to the

Court” (Report) recounting Defendant’s noncompliance with conduct guidelines for

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communication between himself and the children, both generally and in messages

regarding the children’s upcoming move to Virginia. Bowman concluded that

“Defendant’s [non]compliance and efforts to change plans made for the children’s

benefit . . . escalat[ed] conflict and confusion.” Bowman also sought the trial court’s

guidance in compelling Defendant to comply with instructions, noting Defendant’s

“escalating defiance and impulsivity” and “continued failure to follow directives,

protocols, and boundaries.” Defendant moved to dismiss the Report on 12 July 2023,

claiming that Bowman had no authority to file it because no valid order appointed

him as parenting coordinator. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion on 13 July

2023 and clarified that “Bowman is appointed as Parenting Coordinator” in an order

issued that same day, which consolidated previous separate case filings.

On 19 March 2024, the trial court entered a permanent custody order,

awarding Plaintiff sole legal and primary physical custody of the minor children and

Defendant secondary physical custody with visitation every other weekend during

the school year and on weekdays during summer break. It also authorized Plaintiff

to move with the minor children to Charlottesville, Virginia. Defendant timely

appealed the trial court’s order on 17 April 2024.

II. Jurisdiction

This Court has jurisdiction to hear Defendant’s appeal because the trial court’s

permanent custody order is a “final judgment of a district court in a civil action” on

the issue of child custody. N.C.G.S. § 7A-27(b)(2) (2023).

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III. Analysis

On appeal, Defendant asks this Court to vacate and remand the trial court’s

permanent custody order for a new trial because it lacked (1) subject-matter

jurisdiction to appoint a parenting coordinator and (2) sufficient evidence to support

its findings of fact that, in turn, do not support its conclusions of law. A trial court’s

“subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law[ ] reviewed de novo on appeal.” McKoy

v. McKoy, 202 N.C. App. 509, 511 (2010). Review of a trial court’s findings of fact is

“strictly limited to determining whether . . . [they] are supported by competent

evidence, in which event they are conclusively binding on appeal, and whether those

factual findings in turn support the judge’s ultimate conclusions of law.” State v.

Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632 (2008) (quotation omitted). If “supported by competent

evidence,” a trial court’s findings of fact are “conclusive on appeal . . . even if . . . there

is evidence to the contrary.” Sisk v. Transylvania Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 364 N.C. 172, 179

(2010). For the reasons below, this Court holds that the trial court (1) properly

exercised its subject-matter jurisdiction in appointing a parenting coordinator and (2)

supported its findings of fact in the permanent custody order with competent

evidence.

A. Appointment of Parenting Coordinator

First, Defendant argues the trial court lacked the subject-matter jurisdiction

necessary to appoint the parenting coordinator because no custody issue was pending

and no custody order had been entered at the time of the appointment. Under

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N.C.G.S. § 50-91, a trial court may appoint a parenting coordinator “at any time in a

child custody action involving minor children . . . on or after the entry of a custody

order . . . or upon entry of a contempt order involving a custody issue” in three

circumstances: (1) if all parties “consent to the appointment and the scope of the

parenting coordinator’s authority,” (2) upon one party’s “motion . . . requesting the

appointment of a parenting coordinator,” or (3) “[u]pon the court’s own motion.”

N.C.G.S. § 50-91(a) (2023). If the trial court appoints a parenting coordinator without

the parties’ consent, it must “specific[ally] find[ ] that the action is a high-conflict

case, that the appointment of the parenting coordinator is in the best interests of any

minor child in the case, and that the parties are able to pay for the cost of the

parenting coordinator.” Id. § 50-91(b).

Here, Plaintiff moved on 10 August 2021 to appoint a parenting coordinator.

She also filed a complaint seeking custody of the minor children on 16 August 2021,

which the trial court granted on 15 March 2022. The trial court appointed a parenting

coordinator on 30 August 2022, after finding that doing so “is in the best interest of

the children, [that] the parties agree to the appointment of the Parenting

Coordinator, and [that] the parties are able to pay for the cost of the Parenting

Coordinator.” Defendant claims the appointment was “void when it was entered”

because it was entered “by consent and without a hearing, not by a motion of the trial

court.” But the statute provides that the trial court is not required to raise such a

motion if all parties consent to the appointment, which they did here. See id.

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§ 50-91(a)(1). Thus, this Court holds that the trial court properly exercised its subject-

matter jurisdiction by meeting the statutory requirements for parenting coordinator

appointments. N.C.G.S. § 50-91(a) (2023).

B. Validity of Permanent Custody Order

We first address Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant did not preserve the right

to challenge any findings of fact because Defendant’s proposed issues on appeal do

not identify any specific findings of fact not supported by the evidence. Defendant’s

proposed issue challenges whether “the evidence presented at trial support[s] the

facts and conclusions of law rendered by the trial court in the 19 March 2024 Custody

Order” without mentioning specific challenged findings. However, a party’s proposed

issues on appeal are not binding. A party’s “list of proposed issues on appeal shall not

preclude . . . [the party] from presenting arguments on other issues in its brief.” N.C.

R. App. 10(c). Thus, a party can argue an issue for the first time in its pleadings

without including it in the proposed issues on appeal. Accordingly, we next consider

the specific findings of fact Defendant challenged in his brief.

Defendant argues that all or portions of the trial court’s Findings of Fact 23,

25–27, 32–34, 41, and 53 are not supported by competent evidence. To support his

claims, Defendant introduces additional facts, which purportedly contradict the trial

court’s conclusions. For example, he attempts to refute Finding of Fact 23(a), which

states, “Defendant acted contrary to the court’s order and signed [one of] the minor

child[ren] up for a basketball league without Plaintiff’s collaboration or consent,” by

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stating that he did so “to preserve a potential spot” in the league. Similarly, he asserts

that in making Finding of Fact 53, which concerns Plaintiff’s relocation with the

children to Virginia, the trial court failed to consider evidence that the children’s

current “educational opportunities” are “nearly or equivalent to those in Virginia”

and that the children have “equal family connections” in North Carolina as they do

in Virginia.

But a trial court need not consider every possible piece of evidence in making

its findings of fact, so long as the trial court’s findings of fact are “supported by

competent evidence” from the record. Sisk, 364 N.C. at 179. If so, they are “conclusive

on appeal . . . even [with] . . . evidence to the contrary.” Id. Here, the trial court

supported each contested finding with evidence from the record, incorporating

testimony from the parenting coordinator and the parties and analyzing relevant

caselaw regarding interstate relocation. Thus, this Court holds that competent

evidence supports the contested findings of fact and affirms the trial court’s

permanent custody order.

Assuming arguendo that Defendant’s contested findings of fact were not

supported by competent evidence, this Court would “simply disregard[ ] information

contained in findings of fact that lack sufficient evidentiary support and examine[ ]

whether the remaining findings support the trial court’s determination.” In re

A.J.L.H., 384 N.C. 45, 48 (2023). Here, the remaining unchallenged findings of fact

would still support the trial court’s conclusion that there has been a “substantial

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change of circumstances that affects the welfare of the children” and that it would be

in their best interest to modify the custody arrangement.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, this Court affirms the trial court’s permanent

custody order awarding sole legal custody of the minor children to Plaintiff and

authorizing her to move with them to Charlottesville, Virginia.

AFFIRMED.

Judges TYSON and WOOD concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).

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