Stapleton v. Talmadge (In Re Talmadge)

371 B.R. 96, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 2237, 2007 WL 1941807
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedJune 28, 2007
Docket5-06-bk-50001
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 371 B.R. 96 (Stapleton v. Talmadge (In Re Talmadge)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stapleton v. Talmadge (In Re Talmadge), 371 B.R. 96, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 2237, 2007 WL 1941807 (Pa. 2007).

Opinion

*97 OPINION

JOHN J. THOMAS, Bankruptcy Judge.

The United States Trustee contends that the Chapter 7 filing of the Debtors is presumed abusive under the Bankruptcy Code, § 707(b)(2). The Debtors dispute that conclusion and suggest that the statutory language is being misinterpreted.

If I find that a consumer Chapter 7 debtor is abusing the provisions of Chapter 7, then I may dismiss the case. 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2). The relevant portion of § 707(b)(2) states:

(A)(i) In considering under paragraph (1) whether the granting of relief would be an abuse of the provisions of this chapter, the court shall presume abuse exists if the debtor’s current monthly income reduced by the amounts determined under clauses (ii), (iii), and (iv), and multiplied by 60 is not less than the lesser of—
(I) 25 percent of the debtor’s nonpri-ority unsecured claims in the case, or $6,000, whichever is greater; or
(II) $10,000 1 .
(ii)(I) The debtor’s monthly expenses shall be the debtor’s applicable monthly expense amounts specified under the National Standards and Local Standards, and the debtor’s actual monthly expenses for the categories specified as Other Necessary Expenses issued by the Internal Revenue Service for the area in which the debtor resides, as in effect on the date of the order for relief, for the debtor, the dependents of the debtor, and the spouse of the debtor in a joint case, if the spouse is not otherwise a dependent. Such expenses shall include reasonably necessary health insurance, disability insurance, and health savings account expenses for the debtor, the spouse of the debtor, or the dependents of the debtor. Notwithstanding any other provision of this clause, the monthly expenses of the debtor shall not include any payments for debts. In addition, the debtor’s monthly expenses shall include the debtor’s reasonably necessary expenses incurred to maintain the safety of the debtor and the family of the debtor from family violence as identified under section 309 of the Family Violence Prevention and Services Act, or other applicable Federal law. The expenses included in the debtor’s monthly expenses described in the preceding sentence shall be kept confidential by the court. In addition, if it is demonstrated that it is reasonable and necessary, the debtor’s monthly expenses may also include an additional allowance for food and clothing of up to 5 percent of the food and clothing categories as specified by the National Standards issued by the Internal Revenue Service.

There appears to be no dispute as to the Debtors’ current monthly income. Disagreement arises as to “debtor’s monthly expenses” as that term is utilized in 707(b) (2)(A) (ii) (I).

The first component of “debtor’s monthly expenses” is the Debtors’ “applicable monthly expense amounts specified under the National Standards and Local Standards.” The National and Local standards are guidelines established by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to provide consistency in certain expense allowances in advancing tax collection. National Standards are described as allowances for food, clothing and other items, while Local Standards represent maximum allowances for housing and utilities and transportation, http:// www. irs. gov/individuals/article/0„ id=965Jp8, 00.html. These Standards are *98 known as “Collection Financial Standards.”

Collection Financial Standards are used to help determine a taxpayer’s ability to pay a delinquent tax liability.
Allowances for food, clothing and other items, known as the National Standards, apply nationwide except for Alaska and Hawaii, which have their own tables. Taxpayers are allowed the total National Standards amount for their family size and income level, without questioning amounts actually spent.
Maximum allowances for housing and utilities and transportation, known as the Local Standards, vary by location. Unlike the National Standards, the taxpayer is allowed the amount actually spent or the standard, whichever is less.

http://www.irs.g0v/individuals/article/O,, id=965^3, 00.html

The specific dispute herein appears to be under the category of “Local Standards” dealing with the ownership of vehicles. [Allowable Living Expenses for Transportation] The IRS table in this regard, sets forth, simply:

_Ownership Costs_

_First Car Second Car

National $471$332

Separate from that is a table setting forth “Operating Costs & Public Transportation Costs.”

The issue presented to me is whether the term “Ownership Costs” requires anything more than mere ownership or does it require the debtor to be subject to an installment lien payment.

The United States Trustee argues that the Debtors have improperly included “ownership expenses” for vehicles in their itemization of allowable living expenses. She maintains that ownership expenses should not be tallied unless there be a debt against the vehicle.

Philosophically, I don’t know what Congress in the Bankruptcy Code, or the IRS, as a part of their National and Local Standards, should have done to streamline the operation of-BAPCPA. I do know that Congress specifically referred to the applicable National and Local Standards of the IRS when creating the formula that they did. While the Local Standard ostensibly allows for a deduction arising from mere ownership of a vehicle, the commentary to the standard explains that the amount applicable is actual expense or the Local standard, whichever is less.

Perhaps, as evidence of the existence of an ambiguity is the significant split of cases on this very issue. In fact, one court has compiled a list of 14 bankruptcy cases allowing a deduction for a vehicle not financed, and 11 cases that have rejected that proposition. 2 This proportion has *99 grown to 20 for the deduction 3 and 14 against. 4

Similarly, commentators have expressed a difference of opinion on the proper interpretation of these provisions. See, Michael Louis Catreet, Legislative Update: Means Testing and the Vehicle Ownership/Lease Expense Deduction: Allowance or Actual Expense?, ABI Journal, Vol. XXVI, No. 5, p. 10, June 2007; Gary Neus-tadter, 2005: A Consumer Bankruptcy Odyssey, 39 Creighton L.Rev. 225, 295 (2006); and Eugene R. Wedoff, Means Testing in the New § 707(b), 79 Am. Bankr.L.J. 231, 257-58 (2005).

I have little to add to the commentary in these opinions and articles, many of which are articulate and well-reasoned. I merely note that a perceived ambiguity requires that we resort to legislative history.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
371 B.R. 96, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 2237, 2007 WL 1941807, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stapleton-v-talmadge-in-re-talmadge-pamb-2007.