Stanley v. Mason County Jail

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: March 1, 2022
• Docket: 3:21-cv-05860
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 9 10 SLOAN P. STANLEY, CASE NO. 3:21-cv-05860-MJP-JRC 11 Plaintiff, ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE OR 12 v. AMEND COMPLAINT 13 MASON COUNTY JAIL, et al., 14 Defendants. 15 16 This matter is before the Court on plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis 17 (“IFP”) and proposed complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Dkts. 1, 1-2) and on referral from the 18 District Court. Plaintiff is incarcerated at the Mason County Jail and proceeds pro se. 19 Plaintiff’s proposed complaint is subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 20 1915A. For the reasons discussed herein, plaintiff’s proposed complaint fails to state a claim 21 upon which relief can be granted. However, the Court will offer plaintiff an opportunity to 22 amend his proposed complaint to cure the deficiencies identified in this Order. If plaintiff 23 chooses to amend his proposed complaint, he must file the amended proposed complaint on the 24 1 Court’s form on or before April 1, 2022. Failure to do so or to comply with this Order to show 2 cause will result in the undersigned recommending dismissal of this matter without prejudice. 3 Plaintiff should be aware that should the Court grant the IFP motion, he would be 4 required to make partial payments toward the $350 filing fee. The Court declines to rule on the 5 IFP motion until plaintiff has presented the Court with a viable complaint. If plaintiff chooses

6 not to proceed with this case, he will not be required to make partial payments toward the $350 7 filing fee, which is what he would be required to pay if the Court granted plaintiff’s request for 8 IFP status. 9 DISCUSSION 10 Plaintiff initiated this matter in November 2021 by filing a proposed civil rights 11 complaint and an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). Dkt. 1. In his proposed 12 complaint, plaintiff seeks to sue Mason County Jail and the Mason County Jail Chief (Kevin 13 Hanson) for alleged civil rights violations. Dkt. 1-2, at 3. 14 I. Mason County Jail

15 Plaintiff names Mason County Jail as a defendant. Dkt. 1-2, at 3. However, a county jail 16 is not generally an appropriate defendant in a § 1983 matter. Rather, the municipality (Mason 17 County) is the appropriate defendant for such a claim. See Nolan v. Snohomish County, 59 Wn. 18 App. 876, 883 (1990). 19 Even if plaintiff amends his pleading to name Mason County, however, plaintiff cannot 20 prevail on a § 1983 claim against a municipality, such as a county, unless plaintiff demonstrates 21 that the alleged constitutional deprivation was the result of a “policy or custom” of the 22 county. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989); Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. 23 Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978). A plaintiff must show that the municipality’s employees 24 1 or agents acted pursuant to an official custom, pattern, or policy that violated the plaintiff’s civil 2 rights, or that the entity ratified the unlawful conduct. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–91. 3 Moreover, liability exists only where the municipality acts with “deliberate indifference” to the 4 rights of the plaintiff. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388. 5 If plaintiff amends his complaint to assert claims against Mason County, rather than

6 Mason County Jail, he must include plausible allegations of how a municipal custom, pattern, 7 policy, or ratification of unlawful conduct was the moving force behind the alleged violations 8 and he must explain how the municipality acted with deliberate indifference to him. 9 II. Defendant Hanson 10 Plaintiff does not specifically allege any actions by defendant Hanson that violated 11 plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Indeed, other than naming Hanson as a defendant, plaintiff does 12 not mention defendant Hanson at all. 13 Although plaintiff appears to name defendant Hanson on the basis that Hanson is in a 14 position of authority at the defendant Jail, supervisory liability cannot form the basis for liability

15 under section 1983. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Rather, a plaintiff must 16 establish that each individual “[g]overnment-official defendant, through the official’s own 17 individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Id. In other words, supervisory officials 18 “cannot be held liable unless they themselves” violated a constitutional right. Id. Thus, 19 supervisory liability can be imposed only if (1) the supervisor was personally involved in the 20 constitutional deprivation, or (2) there is a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s 21 wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 22 1989). 23 24 1 If plaintiff wishes to proceed, he must amend his claims against defendant Hanson to 2 explain how Hanson himself violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights and not merely rely on 3 Hanson’s position at the Jail. 4 II. Substantive Claims 5 A. Access to the Courts

6 Plaintiff alleges that his right to access the courts has been violated because he has 7 ongoing pro se legal action in federal court and because the jail requires plaintiff to either use a 8 “safety pencil” to write with or to go to the jail law library to use a pen. Dkt. 1-2, at 6. 9 The right of access to the courts ensures a “reasonably adequate opportunity to present 10 claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts,” although it does not create 11 a freestanding right to prison law libraries or legal assistance. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 12 (1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The right of access to the courts 13 “guarantees no particular methodology but rather the conferral of a capability—the capability of 14 bringing contemplated challenges to sentences or conditions of confinement before the

15 courts.” Id. at 356. It is this “capability, rather than the capability of turning pages in a law 16 library, that is the touchstone” of the right of access to the courts. Id. at 356–57. Because the 17 right of access to the courts is not an “abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal 18 assistance, an inmate cannot establish relevant actual injury simply by establishing that his 19 prison's law library or legal assistance program is subpar in some theoretical sense.” Id. at 351. 20 Moreover, plaintiff must show that he suffered an “actual injury” that was caused by 21 defendants’ actions to prevail on a claim of violation of the right to access the courts. See id. at 22 354–55. That is, plaintiff “must show that official acts or omissions ‘hindered his efforts to 23 24 1 pursue a [non-frivolous] legal claim.’” Phillips v. Hust, 588 F.3d 652, 655 (9th Cir. 2 2009) (quoting Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351 (alteration in original)). 3 Here, plaintiff’s allegations fall short of a colorable claim of denial of access of the 4 courts. He alleges only that he believes his legal work must be done in ink (but acknowledges 5 that he has not been held to such a rule) and that he prefers to use a pen. Dkt. 1-2, at 6. He fails

6 to allege that jail staff’s actions have plausibly hindered efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous legal 7 claim. Plaintiff’s allegations are inadequate to create a viable claim of denial of the right to 8 access the courts. 9 B. Dental Hygiene 10 Plaintiff next alleges that his Fourteenth Amendment right to adequate dental hygiene is 11 being violated because he is not allowed to use dental floss in jail. Dkt. 1-2, at 12. Because 12 plaintiff alleges that he is being held pending retrial, the Court assumes without deciding that the 13 Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Eighth Amendment, applies to plaintiff’s claim. 14 “Pretrial detainees are entitled to ‘adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical

15 care, and personal safety.’” Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 16 1996) (quoting Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982)). To state a claim of 17 unconstitutional conditions of confinement against an individual defendant, 18 a pretrial detainee must allege facts that show: 19 (i) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial 20 risk of suffering serious harm; (iii) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances 21 would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making the consequences of the defendant's conduct obvious; and (iv) by not taking such 22 measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff's injuries.

23 Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2018). 24 1 Whether the conditions and conduct rise to the level of a constitutional violation is an 2 objective assessment that turns on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Id. 3 However, “a de minimis level of imposition” is insufficient. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 4 n.21 (1979). 5 Courts have generally held that the deprivation of dental floss is not a serious enough

6 harm to create a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment claim. E.g., Andrich v. Arpaio, No. 7 CV1602111PHXDJHJZB, 2016 WL 11631346, at *8 (D. Ariz. Dec. 13, 2016); Firor v. 8 Hardinger, No. CV JFM-15-2875, 2016 WL 4491715, at *3 (D. Md. Aug. 24, 2016) (“The 9 deprivation of dental floss, is simply not so repugnant to the conscience or incompatible with the 10 evolving standards of decency that it satisfies the seriousness prong of a deliberate indifference 11 claim.”) (internal citation omitted); Gomez v. Westchester County, No. 12-CV-6869, 2015 WL 12 1054902, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2015) (detainee’s allegation regarding his inability to 13 obtain dental floss did not establish a sufficiently serious medical need), aff’d, 649 Fed. App’x 14 93 (2d Cir. 2016).

15 Having reviewed plaintiff’s allegations, the Court finds that he has not pleaded such a 16 serious harm from the lack of dental floss at the jail as to implicate the Fourteenth Amendment. 17 C. Television and Newspapers 18 Plaintiff alleges that the lack of television and newspapers in the jail violates his rights to 19 “free[dom] to obtain information” and to be free from cruel punishment. Dkt. 1-2, at 13. 20 Prisoners have a First Amendment right to receive published materials, including news 21 materials, subject to reasonable limitations. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). 22 “But that right does not create an affirmative duty on prisons to provide news publications 23 [or television news broadcasts] to inmates.” Collins v. Burl, No. 2:11-CV-40-DPM-BD, 2011 24 1 WL 2457532, at *1 (E.D. Ark. June 17, 2011) (ruling that prisoner’s claim failed as a matter of 2 law where defendants did not themselves provide prisoner with published “material or access 3 to television news”). 4 Further, there is no constitutional right to watch television in prison. James v. 5 Milwaukee County, 956 F.2d 696, 699 (7th Cir. 1992) (denial of television does not constitute a

6 cognizable civil rights claim); Murphy v. Walker, 51 F.3d 714, 718, n. 8 (7th Cir. 1995) (per 7 curiam) (same); Gladson v. Rice, 862 F.2d 711, 713 (8th Cir. 1988) (same); Montana v. 8 Commissioners Court, 659 F.2d 19, 23 (5th Cir. 1981) (“The claims relating to the usage of radio 9 and television were properly dismissed as frivolous. These claims do not pertain to federal 10 constitutional rights.”); Manley v. Fordice, 945 F. Supp. 132, 136-37 (D. Miss. 1996) (“[T]here 11 is simply no right to television while incarcerated. . . . [S]uch items are luxuries, and any 12 allowance of them in prisons is merely an altruistic act on the part of the Department of 13 Corrections.”); see also Rawls v. Sundquist, 929 F. Supp. 284, 291 (M.D. Tenn. 1996), aff’d, 113 14 F.3d 1235 (6th Cir. 1997) (no equal protection violation where death row inmates were denied

15 satellite television because the denial “is within the wide-ranging discretion granted to prison 16 administrators and does not impinge the Inmate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights”). 17 Therefore, plaintiff cannot bring a plausible claim for a constitutional violation on the 18 basis that the jail does not provide prisoners with television or newspapers. 19 CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF AND CLERK’S OFFICE 20 Due to the deficiencies described above, unless plaintiff shows cause or amends the 21 proposed complaint, the Court will recommend dismissal of the proposed complaint without 22 prejudice. If plaintiff intends to pursue a § 1983 civil rights action, plaintiff must file a proposed 23 amended complaint and within the amended complaint, plaintiff must write a short, plain 24 1 statement telling the Court: (1) each constitutional right or statute that plaintiff believes was 2 violated; (2) the name or names of the person or persons who violated the right; (3) exactly what 3 each individual or entity did or failed to do; (4) how the action or inaction of each individual or 4 entity is connected to the violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights; and (5) what specific injury 5 plaintiff suffered because of the individuals’ conduct. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371–

6 72, 377 (1976). 7 If plaintiff still wishes to pursue a § 1983 claim, then plaintiff shall present the amended 8 complaint on the form provided by the Court. The amended complaint must be legibly written or 9 typed in its entirety, it should be an original and not a copy, it should contain the same case 10 number, and it may not incorporate any part of the original complaint by reference. The 11 amended complaint will act as a complete substitute for the original complaint and not as a 12 supplement. An amended complaint supersedes all previous complaints. Forsyth v. Humana, 13 Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997) overruled in part on other grounds, Lacey v. Maricopa 14 County, 693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2012). Therefore, the amended complaint must be complete in

15 itself, and all facts and causes of action alleged in the original complaint that are not alleged in 16 the amended complaint are waived. Forsyth, 114 F.3d at 1474. The Court will screen the 17 amended complaint to determine whether it contains factual allegations linking each defendant to 18 the alleged violations of plaintiff’s rights. 19 If plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint or fails to adequately address the issues 20 raised herein on or before April 1, 2022, the undersigned will recommend dismissal of this 21 action without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). 22 The Court notes that plaintiff has filed a motion for the presiding district court judge in 23 this matter, Judge Pechman, to review his motion to accept his financial statement and his 24 1 motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Dkt. 10, at 2. The undersigned declines to rule on this 2 motion at this time. 3 The Clerk is directed to send plaintiff the appropriate forms for filing a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 4 civil rights complaint and a copy of this Order and to renote the motion to proceed IFP for 5 consideration on April 1, 2022.

6 Dated this 1st day of March, 2022. A 7 8 J.Richard Creatura Chief United States Magistrate Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24