Opinion
KEENAN, J.
Paul Stanley was convicted in a bench trial on one count of possession with the intent to distribute cocaine. The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the evidence introduced at trial that Stanley possessed drug paraphernalia containing cocaine residue and records consistent with the distribution of cocaine is sufficient to support a conviction of possession with intent to distribute. We find that it is not and, accordingly, reverse Stanley’s conviction.
On the evening of June 16, 1987, officers of the Henrico County police department conducted surveillance of an automobile parked at the Fox Rest Apartments. The officers had received information from a confidential informant that Stanley, a probation violator, possessed cocaine and would be getting into the car. Shortly after their arrival, the officers observed Stanley and a companion leave the alcove of the apartment complex. Stanley was carrying a small travel bag, which he put into the car. Both men then got into the car and drove off.
Two other officers intercepted the car within a mile of the apartment complex. When Stanley was unable to produce a driver’s license, one of the officers conducted a DMV check which indicated that Stanley’s license had been suspended. Stanley was then placed under arrest. Stanley’s companion was also arrested after the other officer discovered a film canister containing suspected cocaine during a pat-down search.
[869]*869The officers then conducted an inventory search of the vehicle, including the bag which Stanley had placed in the car.1 In the bag, the officers found a triple beam balance scale and a plastic straw, both of which contained cocaine residue. The officer also found Inositol powder, glassine type bags and cut twist ties, caps from hypodermic needles, an envelope labelled “Cocaine Importing Company of Miami, Florida,” and account papers and ledgers. At trial, the Commonwealth introduced evidence that Inositol powder is commonly used by street dealers to cut cocaine, that the papers appeared to be ledgers of drug transactions, and that the glassine bags and twist ties were used to package cocaine for distribution.
Initially, we note that Stanley does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence with regard to possession of cocaine. The only issue before us is whether the evidence was sufficient to establish the greater offense of possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute. In determining whether a defendant is guilty of possession with the intent to distribute, the trier of fact is entitled to weigh all the circumstances in a given case. Adkins v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 437, 439-40, 229 S.E.2d 869, 871 (1976). The quantity of narcotics possessed is only one factor to be considered. Hunter v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 569, 570, 193 S.E.2d 779, 780 (1973). Thus, a conviction for possession with the intent to distribute may be upheld even though the quantity of drugs seized is consistent with personal use. See, e.g., Colbert v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 1, 4, 244 S.E.2d 748, 749 (1978); Hambury v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 435, 438, 350 S.E.2d 524, 525 (1986).
The question before us, however, is whether an individual actually possessing only a residue of a controlled substance may be convicted of possession of that controlled substance with the intent to distribute. Possession with intent to distribute is a crime which requires “an act coupled with a specific intent.” Adkins, 217 Va. at 440, 229 S.E.2d at 871. We hold that for a defendant to be convicted of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to distribute, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant possessed the controlled substance contemporaneously with his intention to distribute that substance.
[870]*870In the case before us, no evidence was presented to support an inference that Stanley intended to distribute the residue found in his possession. To the contrary, the quantity of residue found in Stanley’s possession was too small to be distributed. Assuming that the trier of fact could infer from the evidence introduced at trial that Stanley had in the past distributed cocaine, there was no basis on which the trier of fact could infer that the residue introduced at trial was part of that larger supply. Moreover, no evidence was presented as to when or where the supply had been either possessed or distributed. Because we find that the Commonwealth failed to prove contemporaneous possession and intent to distribute, Stanley’s conviction must be reversed.
We find that this case is distinguishable from the decisions in Colbert and Hambury, since in those cases, the amount of controlled substance seized from the defendant was large enough to be distributed, although not large enough, standing alone, to raise a presumption that the drugs were possessed with the intent to distribute. In addition, in those cases evidence was introduced to establish that the drugs seized were part of a larger amount which the defendant had distributed.
In Colbert, the defendant was arrested in a parking lot during a rock concert. A search of his truck yielded a styrofoam container which contained five “nickel” bags of marijuana totalling 54.2 grams. In addition, several hundred dollars in small bills were found stuffed in the defendant’s pockets. The Supreme Court rejected Colbert’s argument that the evidence was consistent with personal use, stating:
In the first place, nothing in the record suggests that the defendant personally used marijuana. Second, the quantity involved is not necessarily indicative of a lack of intent to distribute; indeed, the jury might well have inferred that the quantity seized was what remained from a larger supply held for distribution. Third, the method of packaging does indicate an intent to distribute; . . . Finally, considering the foregoing matters along with the testimony concerning money found “stuffed down” in the defendant’s pocket, the jury reasonably could have concluded that the defendant had consummated numerous sales of marijuana at the rock concert.
[871]*871Colbert, 219 Va. at 4, 244 S.E.2d at 749.
In Hambury, the evidence before the court included statements by the defendant that he owned the marijuana and gave it to his friends and relatives in return for money. Thus, the court concluded that this evidence, along with the manner in which the marijuana was packaged and the presence of paraphernalia used in the packaging process, was sufficient to sustain a conviction for possession with the intent to distribute, although only two ounces of marijuana were actually seized. 3 Va. App. at 438, 350 S.E.2d at 525; see also State v. Cartier, 133 N.H. 217, 221-22, 575 A.2d 347, 349-50 (1990) (“Not only could the [approximately four grams of cocaine and more than two grams of marijuana] shown in this case have been the residue of a larger supply, but the other evidence of commercial activity convincingly indicated the possessor’s intent to distribute”).
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Opinion
KEENAN, J.
Paul Stanley was convicted in a bench trial on one count of possession with the intent to distribute cocaine. The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the evidence introduced at trial that Stanley possessed drug paraphernalia containing cocaine residue and records consistent with the distribution of cocaine is sufficient to support a conviction of possession with intent to distribute. We find that it is not and, accordingly, reverse Stanley’s conviction.
On the evening of June 16, 1987, officers of the Henrico County police department conducted surveillance of an automobile parked at the Fox Rest Apartments. The officers had received information from a confidential informant that Stanley, a probation violator, possessed cocaine and would be getting into the car. Shortly after their arrival, the officers observed Stanley and a companion leave the alcove of the apartment complex. Stanley was carrying a small travel bag, which he put into the car. Both men then got into the car and drove off.
Two other officers intercepted the car within a mile of the apartment complex. When Stanley was unable to produce a driver’s license, one of the officers conducted a DMV check which indicated that Stanley’s license had been suspended. Stanley was then placed under arrest. Stanley’s companion was also arrested after the other officer discovered a film canister containing suspected cocaine during a pat-down search.
[869]*869The officers then conducted an inventory search of the vehicle, including the bag which Stanley had placed in the car.1 In the bag, the officers found a triple beam balance scale and a plastic straw, both of which contained cocaine residue. The officer also found Inositol powder, glassine type bags and cut twist ties, caps from hypodermic needles, an envelope labelled “Cocaine Importing Company of Miami, Florida,” and account papers and ledgers. At trial, the Commonwealth introduced evidence that Inositol powder is commonly used by street dealers to cut cocaine, that the papers appeared to be ledgers of drug transactions, and that the glassine bags and twist ties were used to package cocaine for distribution.
Initially, we note that Stanley does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence with regard to possession of cocaine. The only issue before us is whether the evidence was sufficient to establish the greater offense of possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute. In determining whether a defendant is guilty of possession with the intent to distribute, the trier of fact is entitled to weigh all the circumstances in a given case. Adkins v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 437, 439-40, 229 S.E.2d 869, 871 (1976). The quantity of narcotics possessed is only one factor to be considered. Hunter v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 569, 570, 193 S.E.2d 779, 780 (1973). Thus, a conviction for possession with the intent to distribute may be upheld even though the quantity of drugs seized is consistent with personal use. See, e.g., Colbert v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 1, 4, 244 S.E.2d 748, 749 (1978); Hambury v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 435, 438, 350 S.E.2d 524, 525 (1986).
The question before us, however, is whether an individual actually possessing only a residue of a controlled substance may be convicted of possession of that controlled substance with the intent to distribute. Possession with intent to distribute is a crime which requires “an act coupled with a specific intent.” Adkins, 217 Va. at 440, 229 S.E.2d at 871. We hold that for a defendant to be convicted of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to distribute, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant possessed the controlled substance contemporaneously with his intention to distribute that substance.
[870]*870In the case before us, no evidence was presented to support an inference that Stanley intended to distribute the residue found in his possession. To the contrary, the quantity of residue found in Stanley’s possession was too small to be distributed. Assuming that the trier of fact could infer from the evidence introduced at trial that Stanley had in the past distributed cocaine, there was no basis on which the trier of fact could infer that the residue introduced at trial was part of that larger supply. Moreover, no evidence was presented as to when or where the supply had been either possessed or distributed. Because we find that the Commonwealth failed to prove contemporaneous possession and intent to distribute, Stanley’s conviction must be reversed.
We find that this case is distinguishable from the decisions in Colbert and Hambury, since in those cases, the amount of controlled substance seized from the defendant was large enough to be distributed, although not large enough, standing alone, to raise a presumption that the drugs were possessed with the intent to distribute. In addition, in those cases evidence was introduced to establish that the drugs seized were part of a larger amount which the defendant had distributed.
In Colbert, the defendant was arrested in a parking lot during a rock concert. A search of his truck yielded a styrofoam container which contained five “nickel” bags of marijuana totalling 54.2 grams. In addition, several hundred dollars in small bills were found stuffed in the defendant’s pockets. The Supreme Court rejected Colbert’s argument that the evidence was consistent with personal use, stating:
In the first place, nothing in the record suggests that the defendant personally used marijuana. Second, the quantity involved is not necessarily indicative of a lack of intent to distribute; indeed, the jury might well have inferred that the quantity seized was what remained from a larger supply held for distribution. Third, the method of packaging does indicate an intent to distribute; . . . Finally, considering the foregoing matters along with the testimony concerning money found “stuffed down” in the defendant’s pocket, the jury reasonably could have concluded that the defendant had consummated numerous sales of marijuana at the rock concert.
[871]*871Colbert, 219 Va. at 4, 244 S.E.2d at 749.
In Hambury, the evidence before the court included statements by the defendant that he owned the marijuana and gave it to his friends and relatives in return for money. Thus, the court concluded that this evidence, along with the manner in which the marijuana was packaged and the presence of paraphernalia used in the packaging process, was sufficient to sustain a conviction for possession with the intent to distribute, although only two ounces of marijuana were actually seized. 3 Va. App. at 438, 350 S.E.2d at 525; see also State v. Cartier, 133 N.H. 217, 221-22, 575 A.2d 347, 349-50 (1990) (“Not only could the [approximately four grams of cocaine and more than two grams of marijuana] shown in this case have been the residue of a larger supply, but the other evidence of commercial activity convincingly indicated the possessor’s intent to distribute”).
We are also not persuaded by the decisions of other jurisdictions to the contrary. See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 732 F.2d 1017, 1020 (1st Cir. 1984) (The defendant’s conviction for possession with intent to distribute was affirmed because a reasonable jury could conclude from the evidence “that the defendant was conducting an ongoing business, and that more substantial amounts of cocaine had been present within a reasonable time of the discovery,” in view of the amount of paraphernalia discovered which still contained residue); Commonwealth v. LaPerle, 19 Mass. App. 424, 429, 475 N.E.2d 81, 84-85, appeal denied, 394 Mass. 1104, 478 N.E.2d 1274 (1985) (The defendant’s conviction for possession with the intent to distribute cocaine was affirmed because the existence of cocaine residue on several items associated with cocaine use or distribution including scales, cutting powder far in excess of the amount needed to cut the residue, and two packages of wrapping papers was sufficient to permit the inference “that a merchantable amount of cocaine had previously been present, and that [the defendant] had intended to distribute it”); State v. Simpson, 275 S.C. 426, 272 S.E.2d 431 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981) (Evidence that defendant had constructive possession of residue recovered from the seized airplane along with circumstantial evidence that the plane had been used in a drug smuggling operation was sufficient to sustain his conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana). We find that these decisions permit the trier of fact to convict a defendant [872]*872solely on the speculation that because the defendant possessed paraphernalia and residue at the time of arrest, he necessarily held a larger quantity for distribution within a reasonable time of the arrest and in close proximity to the arrest. We do not believe that this is a reasonable inference from the evidence presented.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and this cause is remanded to the trial court for a new trial for possession of cocaine if the Commonwealth be so advised.
Reversed and remanded.
Koontz, C.J., Barrow, J., Benton, J., Duff, J., Moon, J., and Willis, J., concurred.