Stanley Gustavo Soares Batista v. Warden of the Golden State Annex Detention Facility

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 STANLEY GUSTAVO SOARES Case No. 1:26-cv-1520-DAD-JDP BATISTA (A-Number: 245-339-401), 12 Petitioner, 13 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS v. 14 WARDEN OF THE GOLDEN STATE 15 ANNEX DETENTION FACILITY, 16 Respondent. 17 18 Petitioner Stanley Gustavo Soares Batista entered the United States in 2023 and was re- 19 detained by ICE in 2025. Petitioner, proceeding with counsel, seeks a writ of habeas corpus 20 under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing that his re-detention without a bond hearing violates the Fifth 21 Amendment. For the following reasons, I recommend that the petition be granted and that 22 petitioner be afforded a bond hearing. 23 Background 24 In October 2023, petitioner entered the United States, was detained by immigration 25 officials, and then was released on his own recognizance. ECF No. 8-1 at 3. Petitioner thereafter 26 applied for asylum. Id. 27 In December 2025, petitioner was arrested and charged with assault with a dangerous 28 weapon in violation of Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 265, § 15B(b). See ECF No. 16-1 at 1 2. That charge remains pending. Upon his release from local authorities in December 2025, 2 petitioner was re-detained by ICE. ECF No. 8-1 at 2. Since his re-detention, petitioner has not 3 been afforded a bond hearing. ECF No. 16 at 2. 4 Procedural History 5 On February 23, 2026, petitioner, initially proceeding pro se, filed a petition for writ of 6 habeas corpus. ECF No. 1. On March 17, 2026, respondent filed an answer. ECF No. 8. 7 Petitioner thereafter filed a reply. ECF No. 9. On April 1, 2026, I granted petitioner’s motion for 8 the appointment of counsel, and counsel appeared one week later. See ECF Nos. 10 & 12. On 9 April 21, 2026, petitioner filed a supplemental reply.1 ECF No. 16. The petition and answer are 10 deemed submitted. 11 Legal Standard 12 A federal court may grant habeas relief when a petitioner shows that his custody violates 13 federal law. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a), (c)(3), 2254(a); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 374-75 14 (2000). “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of 15 that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” 16 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas corpus may be granted to a 17 petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 18 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of 19 reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have 20 been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). A district court’s habeas jurisdiction 21 includes challenges to immigration detention. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). 22 Analysis 23 Petitioner claims that his re-detention without a bond hearing violates the Fifth 24 Amendment. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 46-49. Respondent argues that petitioner’s detention is mandatory 25 under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). ECF No. 8 at 3. Confusingly, respondent later argues that this court is 26

27 1 Petitioner concurrently filed a motion for preliminary injunction, which respondent has opposed. See ECF Nos. 17 & 20. In light of my recommendation that the petition be granted, I 28 recommend that petitioner’s motion for preliminary injunction, ECF No. 17, be denied as moot. 1 “not the correct forum” to adjudicate whether petitioner is subject to section 1226(c) because 2 petitioner “has not exhausted his administrative remedy to contest his mandatory detention.” See 3 ECF No. 20 at 2-3. Respondent’s argument is misplaced because the answer to the petition is 4 predicated on the position that section 1226(c) applies to petitioner; consequently, it would be 5 fundamentally unfair to bar petitioner from contesting that position. See ECF No. 8 at 2-6. 6 Moreover, petitioner’s exhaustion is excused because the “pursuit of administrative remedies 7 would be a futile gesture.” See Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004); Quijada 8 Cordoba v. Knight, 809 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1117 (D. Idaho 2025) (holding that administrative 9 remedies would be futile because the Board of Immigration Appeals has “clearly staked its 10 position” that all noncitizens present in the United States “without being admitted or paroled” are 11 subject to mandatory detention) (collecting cases). Accordingly, I begin by determining whether 12 section 1226(c) applies to petitioner, and then I analyze his due process claim. 13 Under section 1226(c), the attorney general “shall take into custody” any noncitizen who 14 “is charged with, is arrested for, is convicted of, admits having committed, or admits committing 15 acts which constitute the essential elements of any burglary, theft, larceny, shoplifting, or assault 16 of a law enforcement officer offense, or any crime that results in death or serious bodily injury to 17 another person.”2 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii). The term “serious bodily injury” has the meaning 18 given such term “in the jurisdiction in which the acts occurred.” Id. § 1226(c)(2). In 19 Massachusetts—where petitioner was arrested and charged—a “serious bodily injury” means a 20 “bodily injury which results in a permanent disfigurement, loss or impairment of a bodily 21 function, limb or organ, or a substantial risk of death.” See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, §§ 13A, 22 13K, 15A, 15D. 23 Here, as noted, petitioner was charged with assault with a dangerous weapon under 24 Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 265, § 15B(b).3 See ECF No. 16-1 at 2. There is no

25 2 The statute also requires that the noncitizen be “inadmissible” under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(A), (6)(C), or (7). 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(i). Because petitioner is “present in 26 the United States without being admitted or paroled,” he is “inadmissible” under § 1182(a)(6)(A). 27 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). 3 Respondent initially characterized the charge as “assault and battery with a dangerous 28 weapon.” ECF No. 8 at 1-2. However, after petitioner pointed out that the charge is only for 1 information about the incident in the record other than petitioner’s allegation that the charge 2 stems from “a verbal argument with his neighbor.” See ECF No. 17 at 5. The charging section 3 penalizes anyone who, “by means of a dangerous weapon, commits an assault upon another.” 4 Mass. General Laws ch. 265, § 15B(b). Under Massachusetts law, an assault either consists of 5 “an attempted battery” or “an immediately threatened battery.” Com. v. Gorassi, 432 Mass. 244, 6 247 (2000). 7 There is no allegation or evidence that petitioner’s alleged crime resulted in a bodily 8 injury, much less a serious one. Instead, respondent argues that the charge subjects petitioner to 9 mandatory detention under section 1226(c) because of Massachusetts’ definition of serious bodily 10 injury: “bodily injury which results in a permanent disfigurement, loss or impairment of a bodily 11 function, limb or organ, or a substantial risk of death.” See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 15A(d) 12 (emphasis added). Respondent argues that “[t]he First Circuit has held: ‘the harm threatened by 13 an assault is far more violent than offensive touching when committed with a weapon that is 14 designed to produce or used in a way that is capable of producing serious bodily harm or 15 death.’” ECF No. 20 at 2 (quoting Collins v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 3d 105, 115 (D. Mass. 16 2019)) (emphasis added by respondent). Accordingly, respondent’s argument seems to be that 17 although petitioner’s charge did not result in bodily injury, his alleged crime nonetheless carried 18 “a substantial risk of death” such that it constitutes a “serious bodily injury” under Massachusetts 19 law. This argument is unpersuasive because “serious bodily injury” is defined as a “bodily injury 20 which results in . . . a substantial risk of death.” See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, § 15A(d) 21 (emphasis added). An act that did not result in a bodily injury—even if it did carry “a substantial 22 risk of death”—cannot constitute a “serious bodily injury” in Massachusetts. 23 Thus, because there is no indication that petitioner’s alleged crime resulted in a “serious 24 bodily injury to another person,” I find that petitioner is not subject to mandatory detention under 25 section 1226(c). See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii). I next turn to petitioner’s due process claim, 26 assault—as opposed to assault and battery—respondent began characterizing the offense as 27 “assault with a dangerous weapon.” See ECF No. 16 at 1 n.1; ECF No. 17 at 5; ECF No. 20 at 1. To be sure, court records demonstrate that petitioner has been charged with assault with a 28 dangerous weapon. See ECF No. 16-1 at 2. 1 though it bears mention that even if I found that petitioner were subject to mandatory detention 2 under section 1226(c), I still would proceed to his due process claim to consider whether he is 3 entitled to relief. See Shoimov v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-1603 CSK, 2026 WL 35624, at *5 (E.D. 4 Cal. Jan. 6, 2026) (“Even when a statute allows the government to arrest and detain an individual, 5 a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause may entitle the individual to procedural 6 protections not found in the statute.”). 7 Courts analyze procedural due process claims in two steps: first, we consider whether 8 there exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and, second, we evaluate 9 what procedures are necessary to ensure that any deprivation of that protected liberty interest 10 accords with the Constitution. See Kentucky Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 11 (1989). I consider each in turn. 12 To determine whether a specific conditional release rises to the level of a protected liberty 13 interest, courts have compared “specific conditional release in the case before them with the 14 liberty interest in parole as characterized by Morrissey [v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1971)].” 15 Gonzalez-Fuentes v. Molina, 607 F.3d 864, 887 (1st Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and 16 citation omitted). In Morrissey, the Supreme Court explained that parole from a criminal 17 conviction “enables [the parolee] to do a wide range of things open to persons” who have never 18 been in custody or convicted of any crime, including to live at home, work, and “be with family 19 and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life.” 408 U.S. at 482. The 20 court observed that while “the [government] properly subjects [the parolee] to many restrictions 21 not applicable to other citizens,” such as monitoring and seeking authorization to work and travel, 22 the petitioner’s “condition is very different from that of confinement in a prison.” Id. “The 23 parolee has relied on at least an implicit promise that parole will be revoked only if he fails to live 24 up to the parole conditions.” Id. The revocation of parole undoubtedly “inflicts a grievous loss 25 on the parolee.” Id. (quotations omitted). Therefore, in Morrissey, the Supreme Court found that 26 a parolee in a criminal case possessed a protected interest in “continued liberty.” Id. at 481-84. 27 Recently, confronted with questions similar to those raised by petitioner, courts in this 28 Circuit have found that noncitizens released from ICE custody acquire a liberty interest in their 1 continued release. See, e.g., Labrador-Prato v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1598-DC-SCR, 2025 WL 2 3458802, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2025); Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 3 2025). “Even where the revocation of a person’s freedom is authorized by statute, that person 4 may retain a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause.” Rico-Tapia v. Smith, No. 5 1:25-cv-00379-SASPKJM, 2025 WL 2950089, at *8 (D. Haw. Oct. 10, 2025) (citing Gagnon v. 6 Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) and Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1972)). I 7 agree with the bulk of other courts to have considered the issues presented here and find that 8 petitioner has a protected liberty interest in his continued release. 9 Immigration officials released petitioner on his own recognizance in October 2023. ECF 10 No. 8-1 at 3. Since his release, petitioner has lived in the United States, subject to ICE 11 supervision but outside of custody, for over two years. Petitioner thereby formed “enduring 12 attachments of normal life.” See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. I conclude that petitioner’s initial 13 release and time out of custody have created a constitutionally protected liberty interest in 14 continued release. See Guillermo M. R. v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-5436-RFL, 2025 WL 1983677, at *4 15 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2025) (recognizing that “the liberty interest that arises upon release [from 16 immigration detention] is inherent in the Due Process Clause”); Ortega v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv- 17 5259-JST, 2025 WL 1771438, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2025) (collecting cases finding released 18 noncitizens to have strong liberty interests). 19 Once a court has found that a noncitizen has a liberty interest in continued release, the 20 court must next determine what procedural protections the government must afford the noncitizen 21 before depriving him of that liberty interest. This requires balancing the factors laid out in 22 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 993 23 (9th Cir. 2017) (applying Mathews factors in immigration detention context). 24 The Mathews test requires courts to consider: 25 First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through 26 the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s 27 interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 28 requirement would entail. 1 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 2 First, petitioner has a significant private interest in his continued release. “Freedom from 3 imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at 4 the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. 5 Petitioner has a private interest in his continued release that developed over the two years 6 between his release and re-detention. See Noori v. LaRose, No. 25-cv-1824-GPC-MSB, 2025 7 WL 2800149, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2025) (“Petitioner has a private interest in remaining free, 8 which developed over the year he resided in the United States.”). 9 Turning to the second Mathews factor, the risk of erroneous deprivation without a bond 10 hearing is high. Prior to releasing petitioner, immigration officers necessarily determined that he 11 presented neither a danger to the community nor a risk of flight. See Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 12 1034 (explaining that a petitioner’s “release from ICE custody after her initial apprehension 13 reflected a determination by the government that she was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the 14 community”). Absent a pre-deprivation bond hearing in front of a neutral arbiter, the risk of 15 erroneous deprivation is high given the possibility that petitioner’s re-detention will not be 16 pursuant to a valid state interest. See Omer G. G. v. Kaiser, No. 1:25-cv-01471-KES-SAB, 2025 17 WL 3254999, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2025) (“Civil immigration detention, which is 18 ‘nonpunitive in purpose and effect[,]’ is justified when a noncitizen presents a risk of flight or 19 danger to the community.”) (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690). 20 “Where, as here, ‘[the petitioner] has not received any bond or custody . . . hearing,’ ‘the 21 risk of an erroneous deprivation [of liberty] is high’ because neither the government nor [the 22 petitioner] has had an opportunity to determine whether there is any valid basis for her detention.” 23 Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1035 (quoting Singh v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-00801, 2025 WL 24 1918679, at *7 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2025)). Respondent offers no evidence or argument indicating 25 that any procedural safeguards have been employed following petitioner’s re-detention; more 26 generally, they give the court no reason to believe that any efforts have been made to prevent 27 erroneous deprivation of petitioner’s liberty. See id. On the contrary, the fact that the 28 government maintains that petitioner is subject to mandatory detention indicates that it has not 1 taken sufficient efforts to prevent an erroneous deprivation of his liberty. Accordingly, “the 2 probable value of additional procedural safeguards, i.e., a bond hearing, is high.” See A.E. v. 3 Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-0107-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 1424382, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2025), 4 report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 1808676 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2025). 5 “Third, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without . . . a hearing is ‘low.’” 6 Salazar v. Casey, No. 25-cv-2784-JLS, 2025 WL 3063629, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2025) 7 (citation omitted). “In immigration court, custody hearings are routine and impose a ‘minimal’ 8 cost.” Carballo v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-0978-KES-EPG, 2025 WL 2381464, at *8 (E.D. Cal. 9 Aug. 15, 2025) (quoting Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1094 (E.D. Cal. 2025)). 10 Respondent has not provided any information about the additional burden that would fall on them 11 as a result of being required to provide a bond hearing. See ECF No. 8. 12 Accordingly, a consideration of the Mathews factors demonstrates that petitioner’s re- 13 detention without a bond hearing violates his due process rights. Given this finding, I must 14 determine the appropriate remedy. Petitioner seeks immediate release or, alternatively, a bond 15 hearing. ECF No. 1 at 17. Respondent does not address this issue. See ECF No. 8. 16 The Supreme Court has recognized that “[h]abeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful 17 executive detention,” and the “typical remedy for such detention is, of course, release.” Munaf v. 18 Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008). The Court has also observed, however, that “release need not 19 be the exclusive remedy and is not the appropriate one in every case in which the writ is granted.” 20 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008). “Indeed, common-law habeas corpus was, above 21 all, an adaptable remedy. Its precise application and scope changed depending upon the 22 circumstances.” Id.; see also Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 239 (1968) (The federal habeas 23 statute “does not limit the relief that may be granted to discharge of the applicant from physical 24 custody.”). 25 Before re-detaining petitioner, due process would ordinarily require a pre-deprivation 26 hearing. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990) (“[T]he [Supreme] Court usually has 27 held that the Constitution requires some kind of a hearing before the State deprives a person of 28 liberty or property.”). However, “there may be situations that urgently require arrest, in which a 1 prompt post-deprivation hearing is appropriate.” Guillermo M.R. v. Kaiser, 791 F. Supp. 3d 2 1021, 1036 (N.D. Cal. 2025). For example, in Martinez Hernandez v. Andrews, the court held 3 that, where the petitioner had allegedly violated his parole, a post-deprivation hearing was 4 appropriate because it was “at least arguable that providing [the petitioner] with notice and a pre- 5 deprivation hearing would have been impracticable and/or would have motivated his flight.” No. 6 1:25-cv-1035-JLT-HBK, 2025 WL 2495767, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2025). 7 Here, upon petitioner’s arrest, local authorities transported him to a courthouse, where he 8 was released but then immediately re-detained by ICE because an administrative warrant for his 9 arrest had already been issued. See ECF No. 8-1 at 2; ECF No. 8-3. Under these circumstances, I 10 find that it is “at least arguable that providing [petitioner] with notice and a pre-deprivation 11 hearing would have been impracticable and/or would have motivated his flight.” See Martinez 12 Hernandez v. Andrews, 2025 WL 2495767, at *12. Accordingly, the present record does not 13 establish that petitioner was constitutionally entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing. 14 Due process still required, however, that petitioner be afforded a “prompt post-deprivation 15 hearing.” See Guillermo M.R., 791 F. Supp. 3d at 1036. Petitioner, as noted, has not been 16 provided such a hearing. Accordingly, I find that the appropriate remedy is a bond hearing. See 17 Archundia v. Wofford, No. 1:26-cv-1452-DJC-CSK, 2026 WL 607977, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 18 2026) (finding a bond hearing to be the proper remedy where petitioner was previously arrested 19 for “allegedly engaging in prostitution”) (citing J.S.H.M. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-1309-JLT- 20 SKO, 2025 WL 2938808, at *15-16 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2025)). 21 Conclusion 22 Based on the foregoing, I recommend that petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus be granted. 23 Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that: 24 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus, ECF No. 1, be GRANTED. 25 2. Petitioner (A-Number: 245-339-401) be provided a bond hearing within seven days of 26 the date of the court’s order. At this hearing, the government shall bear the burden of 27 establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that petitioner poses a danger to the community or 28 a risk of flight, and petitioner shall be allowed to have counsel present. 1 3. Respondent be ordered to file a status report, within five days of the bond hearing, 2 | confirming that the hearing occurred. 3 4. Petitioner’s motion for preliminary injunction, ECF No. 17, be DENIED as moot. 4 5. The Clerk of Court be ordered to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. 5 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 6 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within seven days of 7 || service of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the 8 | court and serve a copy on all parties. Any such document should be captioned “Objections to 9 | Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations,” and any response shall be served and filed 10 | within seven days of service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file 11 | objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See 12 | Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 13 1991). 14 15 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: _ April 27, 2026 Q_——_ 17 JEREMY D. PETERSON 18 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 10