Stankey v. Waddell

256 N.W.2d 117, 1977 S.D. LEXIS 166
CourtSouth Dakota Supreme Court
DecidedJune 22, 1977
Docket11610
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 256 N.W.2d 117 (Stankey v. Waddell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering South Dakota Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stankey v. Waddell, 256 N.W.2d 117, 1977 S.D. LEXIS 166 (S.D. 1977).

Opinion

DUNN, Chief Justice.

In this action, the state appeals an Eighth Judicial Circuit Court ruling which granted plaintiff abatement of her 1971 personal property taxes. Plaintiff in December 1973, filed an application for abatement with defendant, the Dewey County Board of Commissioners. She claimed that the property was exempt from taxation because she was an enrolled member of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe 1 and because the property was within the boundaries of the Cheyenne River Indian Reservation. The application was denied. The board determined that the property was located in that portion of Dewey County lying within the original boundaries of the Cheyenne River Reservation which had been disestablished by the Act of May 29, 1908, 35 Stat. 460, 2 and was not exempt from taxation. Plaintiff appealed to the circuit court which granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of plaintiff, relying on the decision of the United States Circuit Court for the Eighth Circuit in United States ex rel. Condon v. Erickson, 1973, 8 Cir., 478 F.2d 684. We reverse.

The facts were stipulated by the parties. The location of the personal property was patented by the United States to Edward Anderson on October 10, 1917, recorded January 21, 1918, and ever since has been and now is in nontrust status. Substantially the same personal property was taxed to Bernel Stankey, a non-Indian, and plaintiff, his wife, prior to his death in 1968. The 1971 personal property tax assessment form was made out to and assessed only in plaintiff’s name.

The boundaries of the Cheyenne River Reservation were originally established by the Act of March 2, 1889, 25 Stat. 888. 3 The issue presented in this case is whether the 1908 Act, which authorized the sale and disposition of a portion of the reservation, disestablished part of the reservation or merely opened a part of it for homestead entry. If the Act disestablished part of the reservation and altered the original boundaries, South Dakota courts have jurisdiction over the disestablished portion where there is no Indian allotment (i. e. checkerboard jurisdiction). If the Act merely opened lands on the reservation for settlement and the original boundaries remain, all of the lands within the original boundaries are “Indian country” and are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States Government. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a). Absent disestablishment, plaintiff would be exempt from personal property taxes for her property on the reservation. Bryan v. *119 Itasca County, Minnesota, 1976, 426 U.S. 373, 96 S.Ct. 2102, 48 L.Ed.2d 710; Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 1973, 411 U.S. 145, 93 S.Ct. 1267, 36 L.Ed.2d 114.

In United States v. La Plant, 1911, D.C. S.D., 200 F. 92, the court held that the use of the term “diminished” reservations in the 1908 Act necessarily indicated a congressional intent to extinguish the Indians’ title to the lands at the time of the Act’s passage. The La Plant decision was followed by this court in State v. Sauter, 1925, 48 S.D. 409, 205 N.W. 25. See also: Lafferty v. State for Jameson, 1963, 80 S.D. 411, 125 N.W.2d 171; State v. Barnes, 1965, 81 S.D. 511, 137 N.W.2d 683. However, in United States ex rel. Condon v. Erickson, 1972, D.C.S.D., 344 F.Supp. 777, the federal court abandoned its earlier decision and ruled that absent an express provision in the Act which restored the lands to the public domain, it could not impute that purpose. 4 The court relied on Seymour v. Superintendent, 1962, 368 U.S. 351, 82 S.Ct. 424, 7 L.Ed.2d 346, and City of New Town, North Dakota v. United States, 1972, 8 Cir., 454 F.2d 121, which held that opening a reservation to settlement is not inconsistent with continued reservation existence. See also: Mattz v. Arnett, 1973, 412 U.S. 481, 93 S.Ct. 2245, 37 L.Ed.2d 92; Russ v. Wilkins, 1976, D.C.N.D.Cal., 410 F.Supp. 579. This decision was affirmed in United States ex rel. Condon v. Erickson, 1973, 8 Cir., 478 F.2d 684. That court acknowledged that it was a close case, but concluded that a holding favoring federal jurisdiction was required “unless Congress has ‘expressly or by clear implication’ diminished the boundaries.” 478 F.2d at 689.

In the case at bar, plaintiff maintains that we are bound to follow the Condon decision because it has not been expressly overruled by the Eighth Circuit. The state contends that Condon is no longer a correct interpretation because the court in that case did not look at the legislative history behind the Act. It maintains that the United States Supreme Court in DeCoteau v. District County Court for Tenth Judicial Circuit, 1975, 420 U.S. 425, 95 S.Ct. 1082, 43 L.Ed.2d 300, removed the barrier to such inquiry, and that since DeCoteau the Eighth Circuit has expressed some doubts about the continued validity of Condon.

While the court in Condon did state it considered the legislative history of the 1908 Act, but rejected it after finding it inconsistent, 5 the court further stated it could not determine the intent “by application of the traditional methods of statutory construction.” United States ex rel. Condon v. Erickson, supra, at 688. Rather than speculate as to whether the Eighth Circuit now may favor use of a different method of inquiry into the legislative history, we will attempt to determine the congressional intent within the guidelines of several recent United States Supreme Court decisions.

At the time of the ,1908 Act, Congress had plenary power to abrogate the provisions of the earlier Act setting the boundaries of the Cheyenne River Reservation, Lone Wolf v. Hitchock, 1903, 187 U.S. 553, 23 S.Ct. 216, 47 L.Ed. 299; Choate v. Trapp, 1912, 224 U.S. 665, 32 S.Ct. 565, 56 L.Ed.

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256 N.W.2d 117, 1977 S.D. LEXIS 166, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stankey-v-waddell-sd-1977.