Stanford v. Howard University

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: November 3, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2023-3041
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ROGELIO A. STANFORD,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 23 - 3041 (SLS) v. Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan

HOWARD UNIVERSITY,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Rogelio Stanford brings this action against Howard University alleging that his application

for the role of lieutenant at the university’s Department of Public Safety was denied due to his

race, ethnicity, religion, national origin, and age in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Howard seeks summary judgment, arguing that

Mr. Stanford was not selected because his application did not include his professional or

educational experience, a cover letter, or his resume. Because a jury could not find that Howard’s

reason for denying the application was pretextual based on the existing record, the Court grants

Howard’s motion and dismisses the case.

BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The Court draws the facts, assumed to be true, from Howard’s statement of material facts,

see Defendant Howard University’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (SUMF), ECF No.

28, which is “undisputed for purposes of the [summary judgment] motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); see also LCvR 7(h)(1); Richardson v. D.C. Dep’t of Youth Rehab. Servs., 271 F. Supp.

3d 113, 117 (D.D.C. 2017).1

Rogelio Stanford is a 65-year-old Hispanic male with Panamanian and Caribbean heritage.

SUMF ¶ 1. Mr. Stanford has been employed by Howard’s Department of Public Safety (DPS)

since 1983. SUMF ¶ 2. He began his employment at Howard as a campus police officer and then

received a promotion to his current position of sergeant in 2001. Id. In 2017 or 2018, Mr. Stanford

applied for the position of lieutenant at Howard. SUMF ¶ 14. For that application, he received an

interview but not an offer. Id. In 2022, Mr. Stanford again applied for the position of lieutenant.

SUMF ¶ 7. In that application, Mr. Stanford only filled out the Internal Candidate Questionnaire,

and left the “Education,” “Work History,” and “Credentials” categories blank. SUMF ¶ 10. In lieu

of a resume submission, Mr. Stanford attached a photograph of his face. SUMF ¶¶ 9, 11.

Mr. Stanford’s application identifies himself as “Black or African American (United States of

America)” and “Hispanic.” SUMF ¶ 12. The application does not include his date of birth or

identify Mr. Stanford as an individual of Panamanian or Caribbean heritage. SUMF ¶¶ 12, 51.

Mr. Stanford did not include any professional or educational experience, a resume, or a

cover letter with his 2022 application because he “believe[d] [his] experience is well known in the

[D]epartment” and “HR had [his] information in hand” from his prior application. SUMF ¶ 13. So,

1 Pursuant to Local Rule 7(h), “the Court may assume that facts identified by the moving party in its statement of material facts are admitted, unless such a fact is controverted in the statement of genuine issues filed in opposition to the motion.” LCvR 7(h)(1). Howard’s motion is “accompanied by a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue” consistent with this rule. Id.; see Defendant Howard University’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (SUMF), ECF No. 28, at 32. And in opposing summary judgment, Mr. Stanford does not dispute the facts in the statement with “a separate concise statement of genuine issues.” LCvR 7(h)(1). Howard noted this lack of dispute in its Reply, ECF No. 30, at 4, and Mr. Stanford did not seek “leave to supplement the response” to dispute the factual characterizations. See Richardson, 271 F. Supp. 3d at 117 (noting a court may accept the statement as undisputed in this circumstance).

2 Mr. Stanford “did not submit any application based upon [his] skill because [his] skill is well

known in the [D]epartment as one who has done the lieutenant position, one who has relieved the

midnight shift lieutenant. So [he is] sure that they are aware of who [he is].” SUMF ¶ 15.

Mr. Stanford believed Howard had sufficient information to review the application “[b]ecause they

keep documents” and “because they know who I am.” SUMF ¶ 14.

DPS Operations Coordinator, Unique Armstrong, reviewed applications for the 2022

lieutenant position, including Mr. Stanford’s 2022 application. SUMF ¶ 21. Ms. Armstrong never

met Mr. Stanford in person and was unaware of Mr. Stanford’s work history or experience when

she reviewed his application. SUMF ¶ 23. Ms. Armstrong did not have access to Mr. Stanford’s

internal employee personnel files or date of birth when reviewing his application and was thus

limited to application itself. SUMF ¶¶ 23, 51. Ms. Armstrong did not select Mr. Stanford for an

interview for the position and his application was ultimately denied. SUMF ¶¶ 22, 29.

On May 12, 2023, Mr. Stanford submitted another application for the lieutenant position.

SUMF ¶ 30. And, on June 2, 2023, Mr. Stanford filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging discrimination based on his national

origin (Hispanic-Panamanian) and age (then 64). SUMF ¶ 37. On July 17, 2023, the EEOC issued

a Determination and Notice of Rights, notifying Mr. Stanford that it would not proceed further

with its investigation and that it made “no determination about whether further investigation would

establish violations of the statute.” SUMF ¶ 41.

On August 4, 2023, Mr. Stanford received an offer to interview for the 2023 lieutenant

position. SUMF ¶ 32. Mr. Stanford never responded to the interview invitation, and Howard

followed up with Mr. Stanford on August 23, 2023 “to see if [he was] still interested in

interviewing for [the 2023] Lieutenant Position.” SUMF ¶¶ 33–34. Mr. Stanford still did not

3 respond. SUMF ¶ 35. Mr. Stanford testified that he did not respond or accept the interview for the

2023 lieutenant position because he received notice from the EEOC of his right to sue the

University. SUMF ¶ 36.

B. Procedural Background

On October 12, 2023, Mr. Stanford filed this action alleging unlawful employment

discrimination and retaliation by Howard in its consideration of his 2022 application. Compl., ECF

No. 1. Mr. Stanford alleges that he was not selected for the position because of his Hispanic

ethnicity, Panamanian-Caribbean national origin, Holiness Pentecostal religion, and age of over

sixty years, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-

17, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634.

Compl. 1-2. On December 22, 2023, Howard filed a partial motion to dismiss the retaliation claims.

Def’s Partial Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 9. This Court granted that motion and granted Mr. Stanford

leave to amend his Complaint by May 1, 2024. See Minute Order (April 17, 2024). Mr. Stanford

declined to amend the Complaint. Following discovery, Howard now moves for summary

judgment. Mot., ECF No. 28. This motion is fully briefed and ripe for review. See Opp’n, ECF

No. 29; Reply, ECF No. 30.

LEGAL STANDARD

A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “The burden is on the movant to make the initial showing of the absence of

any genuine issues of material fact.” Ehrman v. United States, 429 F. Supp. 2d 61, 66 (D.D.C.

2006) (citations omitted). “The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable

inferences are to be drawn in [its] favor.” Estate of Parsons v. Palestinian Auth., 651 F.3d 118,

123 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).

4 DISCUSSION

Absent direct evidence of discrimination, courts evaluate disparate treatment claims under

Title VII and the ADEA using the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell-Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under that framework, a plaintiff must first establish (1) that

he “is a member of a protected class”; (2) that he “suffered an adverse employment action”; and

(3) that “the unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of discrimination.” Teneyck v. Omni

Shoreham Hotel, 365 F.3d 1139, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (cleaned up). If a plaintiff establishes a

prima facie case of discrimination, “[t]he burden then must shift to the employer to articulate some

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the [adverse employment action].” McDonnell Douglas,

411 U.S. at 802. After the employer asserts a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the action,

“the district court need not—and should not—decide whether the plaintiff actually made out a

prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas.” Brady v. Office of Sergeant of Arms, 520 F.3d 490,

494 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original). Rather, the court asks: “Has the employee produced

sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer’s asserted non-discriminatory

reason was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally discriminated against the

employee”—in other words, that the preferred reason is pretextual. Id.

A plaintiff may establish pretext “directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory

reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered

explanation is unworthy of credence.” Francis v. District of Columbia, 731 F. Supp. 2d 56, 71

(D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)). And a

court grants summary judgment for the defendant when the record is insufficient for “a reasonable

jury to find that the employer’s stated reason” for the adverse employment action “is pretext” and

there is an absence of “any other evidence” suggesting “that unlawful discrimination was at work.”

Barnett v. PA Consulting Grp., 715 F.3d 354, 358 (D.C. Cir. 2013).

5 In moving for summary judgment, Howard assumes that Mr. Stanford can make out a

prima facie case of discrimination but argues that it has a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

its decision not to interview and hire Mr. Stanford. See Mot. 8–9. Howard asserts that it did not

interview or hire Mr. Stanford for the 2022 lieutenant role because his application lacked a resume,

cover letter, and any professional or educational experience. Mot. 8. Mr. Stanford retorts that this

reason was pretextual because Howard gave more consideration to a younger, Black, American,

non-Hispanic male, who it ultimately interviewed and selected. Opp’n 8. The Court is unpersuaded

that a jury could find pretext on this record.

A. Comparator Evidence

It is true that one “method of demonstrating that an employer’s explanation is pretextual is

to show that similarly situated persons of a different race or sex received more favorable

treatment.” Brady, 520 F.3d at 495 (citation omitted). But the key to this inquiry is that the other

person must be “similarly situated,”—i.e., “all of the relevant aspects of [the plaintiff’s]

employment situation were nearly identical to those of the” other person. Burley v. Nat’l Passenger

Rail Corp., 801 F.3d 290, 301 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Holbrook v. Reno, 196 F.3d 255, 261

(D.C. Cir. 1999)). Comparator evidence demonstrates pretext when the employer treated that other

person “more favorably in the same factual circumstances.” Id. (quoting Brady, 520 F.3d at 495).

Although the record shows that the selected candidate (and perhaps other applicants) did

receive more consideration than Mr. Stanford, it does not provide any basis to conclude that the

difference in treatment was for any reason other than Mr. Stanford’s incomplete application. See,

e.g., SUMF ¶¶ 52–62. Mr. Stanford does not point to any other “similarly situated” applicant—

i.e., someone who also submitted an incomplete application—who was given more consideration

or selected for an interview. Brady, 520 F.3d at 495. Rather, Mr. Stanford complains that he was

6 treated worse than applicants who submitted completed applications. Opp’n 7. On this record, a

jury could not conclude that Mr. Stanford was treated worse than other applicants “in the same

factual circumstances.” Burley, 801 F.3d at 301 (citation omitted).

Mr. Stanford further argues that Howard should have notified him that his application was

incomplete and remedied the deficiency by either reviewing his employee records as an internal

hire or requesting a resume from him. Opp’n 9. And Mr. Stanford suggests that Howard’s failure

to do so demonstrates pretext. Id. But again, Mr. Stanford does not point to another applicant who

submitted an incomplete application and was provided an opportunity to rectify it. Id. Nothing in

the record shows that Mr. Stanford was treated worse than other applicants in “near identical”

circumstances in relation to the “relevant aspects” of his application. Burley, 801 F.3d at 301

(citation omitted).

B. Other Evidence of Discrimination

Next, Mr. Stanford alleges that the chosen candidate was “hand-picked” and

“predetermined” such that the process was “neither competitive nor fair.” Opp’n 7, 10. But the

record lacks any evidence that “race” or any other protected characteristic was a “factor” in that

determination. Pollard v. Quest Diagnostics, 610 F. Supp. 2d 1, 21 (D.D.C. 2009). Indeed,

assuming the selected candidate was hand-picked, other applicants with the same characteristics—

black, non-Hispanic males born in the United States—were then also disadvantaged by this

decision. See Opp’n 4 (listing other alleged candidates). Simply put, pre-determination alone

“provides no [] factual basis for the inference that [Mr. Stanford] was not selected because of his

race, sex, or age.” Dismukes v. United States Dep’t of Veterans Affs., No. 23-cv-02259, 2025 WL

343190, at *6 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 2025) (alterations omitted) (quoting Webster v. Haaland, No. 23-

cv-3050, 2024 WL 4240286, at *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 19, 2024)). Demonstrating pretext requires “more

7 than simply criticizing the employer’s decision making process.” Silva v. Cleary Gottlieb Steen &

Hamilton LLP, 253 F. Supp. 3d 119, 127 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Hairston v. Vance-Cooks, 773

F.3d 266, 272 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).

Furthermore, nothing in the record indicates that Ms. Armstrong, Howard’s evaluator, had

any knowledge of Mr. Stanford’s national origin, religion, or age when reviewing the applications.

See SUMF ¶¶ 23, 51. Although Mr. Stanford testified that some Howard employees asked him to

repeat himself due to his accent throughout his employment, he does not claim that Ms. Armstrong

was among those individuals. See SUMF ¶ 44. And pretext cannot be demonstrated when “[t]he

record . . . contains no evidence that the individuals who made the hiring determinations knew of

[the plaintiff’s]” protected characteristics. Pollard, 610 F. Supp. 2d at 22 (alterations in original)

(quoting Jackson v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 2004 WL 1301274, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 29, 2003)).2

***

In sum, there is no genuine dispute of material fact because the record lacks any evidence

for a fact finder to determine that Mr. Stanford’s application was denied “because of” a protected

characteristic under Title VII or the ADEA. Pollard, 610 F. Supp. 2d at 22 (quoting Brady, 520

F.3d at 493, 496 n.4). To demonstrate pretext, “‘a plaintiff may not rest on mere speculation

alone[,] but must produce some objective evidence’ in support of his theories.” Id. (quoting

Hamilton v. Paulson, 542 F.Supp.2d 37, 60 (D.D.C. 2008)) (emphasis in original). Mr. Stanford

has not done so.

2 See also Vickers v. Powell, 493 F.3d 186, 196 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (noting the inquiry focuses on the “ultimate decision maker” (quoting Griffin v. Wash. Convention Ctr., 142 F.3d 1308, 1311–12 (D.C. Cir. 1998)); Tolson v. James, 315 F. Supp. 2d 110, 116 (D.D.C. 2004) (“It is the perception of the decisionmaker which is relevant.” (quoting Waterhouse v. Dist. of Columbia, 124 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2000)).

8 CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment, ECF No. 28. A separate order will issue.

SPARKLE L. SOOKNANAN United States District Judge

Date: November 3, 2025