Stanford R. Brookshire and Wife, Edith M. Brookshire, and Voris G. Brookshire, and Wife, Helen M. Brookshire v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

273 F.2d 638, 5 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 469, 1960 U.S. App. LEXIS 5728
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedJanuary 4, 1960
Docket7977
StatusPublished
Cited by29 cases

This text of 273 F.2d 638 (Stanford R. Brookshire and Wife, Edith M. Brookshire, and Voris G. Brookshire, and Wife, Helen M. Brookshire v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stanford R. Brookshire and Wife, Edith M. Brookshire, and Voris G. Brookshire, and Wife, Helen M. Brookshire v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 273 F.2d 638, 5 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 469, 1960 U.S. App. LEXIS 5728 (4th Cir. 1960).

Opinion

THOMSEN, District Judge.

Petitioners Stanford R. Brookshire and Voris G. Brookshire are partners trading as Engineering Sales Company. The other petitioners are their wives. In 1952 the partnership voluntarily, without seeking or obtaining permission from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, changed its method of keeping its books of account and its method of reporting its income for federal income tax purposes from the cash receipts and dis *639 bursements method of accounting to the accrual method. The Tax Court sustained the action of the Commissioner requiring the partnership (1) to include in its 1952 income the monies collected in 1952 on accounts receivable existing as of 1 January 1952, representing sales made but not paid for in 1951, and (2) to reduce the cost of goods sold by that part of the inventory on hand 1 January 1952 which had been paid for and deducted from the partnership’s income in prior years. The petition for review challenges those rulings.

The sections of the I.R.C. of 1939 and of T.R. Ill which bear upon the problem, are set out in Note 1. The facts are set out in the careful opinion of the Tax Court, Atkins, J., 31 T.C. 1157, and may be summarized here.

The partnership originally operated as a manufacturer’s agent, selling on a commission basis, taking no title to the *640 merchandise, and assuming no responsibility for the collection of accounts. The books were set up on a cash receipts and disbursement method of accounting. Monthly and annual profit and loss statements were prepared on that basis. The partnership income tax returns for all years before 1952 were prepared on the cash basis; the figures used in computing income were taken solely from the cash receipts journal and the cash disbursements journal.

About 1940 the partnership began to make credit sales, and opened a cash receivable ledger for collection purposes. It also maintained a sales journal, in which invoices were listed by number and notations were made as to dates of payments. The entries in this journal were never totaled; they were used for cross-reference purposes only. For some years the inventory consisted solely of V-belts and material left over from such belts. About 1943 the partnership began to take a physical inventory at the end of each year and to prepare, for managerial information and occasionally for bank and credit reports, a balance sheet showing accounts receivable, accounts payable, and inventory. About 1945 the partnership began to make purchases for inventory, but before 1952 it maintained no accounts payable ledger. Neither the accounts receivable ledger, the sales journal nor the inventories were used in computing or reporting income.

The records and returns for 1948 and prior years were examined by an agent of the Internal Revenue Service sometime after 1948. Stanford Brookshire testified that this agent said it would be a good idea for the partnership to go on an accrual basis; the agent did not say that an accrual basis was required, and the returns were accepted on the cash basis. The method was not changed at that time, because the partners did not think it was necessary. 2 The Tax Court found that the cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting clear *641 ly reflected the income of the partnership for the years before 1952.

In 1952 a general ledger was set up. Accounts receivable, accounts payable and inventory existing as of 1 January 1952 were entered in this ledger with proper offsetting credits to the partners’ capital accounts. The partnership did not request or receive permission from the Commissioner to change its method of accounting and reporting income, 3 but the partnership return for 1952 was prepared and submitted on an accrual basis. In that return the partnership did not include in income the amount of the accounts receivable existing as of 1 January 1952, or the collections thereon during that year; in computing the cost of goods sold, credit was taken for the full amount of inventory on hand 1 January 1952, including items which had been paid for and deducted prior to 1952.

The Commissioner accepted the 1952 return on the accrual basis, but increased the partnership’s 1952 income (1) by the amount of the cash collected in 1952 on the accounts receivable representing 1951 sales and (2) by the net amount of the merchandise inventory which had been deducted from income both in 1951 and in 1952. 4 This determination was approved by the Tax Court. 5

Taxpayers’ contention seems to be: that in the years before 1952 the partnership was engaged in the purchase and sale of merchandise to a substantial degree, sold on open account, and had substantial inventories of merchandise and accounts receivable; that under T.R. Ill, sec. 29.41-2, the cash method of accounting did not correctly reflect the net income for those years; so, despite the fact that during all of those years it kept its books on the cash basis and deliberately filed its tax returns on the cash basis, its action in so doing was erroneous, and the Commissioner had no right, in the year of change, to increase the income by items which taxpayers contend were properly income of a prior year or years.

Section 41 of the 1939 Code provided that net income should be computed in accordance with the method of accounting regularly employed in keeping the books of the taxpayer; but “if the method employed does not clearly reflect the income, the computation shall be made in accordance with such method as in the opinion of the Commissioner does clearly reflect the income”.

*642 During all years before 1952, the books of the partnership were kept on a cash basis. Taxpayers prepared their income tax returns on that basis and they were accepted by the Commissioner, who did not and does not question the adequacy of that basis for the years prior to 1952. T.R. Ill, sec. 29.41-2 states in part that “in any case in which it is necessary to use an inventory, no method of accounting in regard to purchases and sales will correctly reflect income except an accrual method”. However, as the Tax Court noted, some reasonable flexibility must be permitted in determining when the purchase and sale of merchandise becomes such an income producing factor as to require the use of inventories and a change to an accrual method, in order to reflect clearly the income of a taxpayer. In some instances either method may clearly reflect the income.

The Tax Court found that the cash method clearly reflected the income of the partnership for the years before 1952. That finding was supported by opinion evidence and by other facts in the record; we cannot say that it was wrong.

Petitioners are not in the position of taxpayers who reported their income incorrectly in the past. On the contrary, they are taxpayers who, having kept their books and reported their income correctly on the cash basis, voluntarily changed their accounting method. Consequently, T.R. Ill, sec.

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Bluebook (online)
273 F.2d 638, 5 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 469, 1960 U.S. App. LEXIS 5728, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stanford-r-brookshire-and-wife-edith-m-brookshire-and-voris-g-ca4-1960.