Standard Manufacturing Co. v. United States

32 Cont. Cas. Fed. 73,222, 7 Cl. Ct. 13, 40 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1215, 1984 U.S. Claims LEXIS 1240
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedDecember 7, 1984
DocketNo. 594-84C
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 32 Cont. Cas. Fed. 73,222 (Standard Manufacturing Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Standard Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 32 Cont. Cas. Fed. 73,222, 7 Cl. Ct. 13, 40 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1215, 1984 U.S. Claims LEXIS 1240 (cc 1984).

Opinion

ORDER ON MOTIONS RELATING TO DISCOVERY

WHITE, Senior Judge.

Standard Manufacturing Company, the plaintiff, seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(3) (1982) in connection with a Certificate of Competency which the Small Business Administration (SBA) issued on or about November 7, 1984, to Hydraulics International, Inc., the intervenor.

According to the complaint, the plaintiff, the intervenor, and four other corporations submitted offers in response to a Request for Proposals (RFP) which the Air Force issued on or about May 29, 1984, for its anticipated 3-year requirements for a device known as the Aerial Stores Lift Truck, MJ-1B, sometimes referred to as the Bomb Lift Loader. The procurement had been set aside for small business.

It is inferred that the intervenor submitted the proposal that would be least expensive to the Government. In any event, the complaint states that the contracting officer determined the intervenor to be a non-responsible offeror. The intervenor then applied to the SBA for a Certificate of Competency; and, on or about November 7, 1984, the Washington headquarters of the SBA granted a Certificate of Competency to the intervenor. Thereupon, on November 7, 1984, the Air Force orally notified the plaintiff that it intended to award a contract on the solicitation to the intervenor.

The present action followed.

The plaintiff has filed a “Motion to Order Expedited Limited Discovery”; and the defendant and intervenor have responded by filing motions for protective orders.

Depositions

In its motion, the plaintiff proposes (inter alia) to take the depositions of the following individuals:

(1) The Air Force contracting officer who made the initial determination that the intervenor was non-responsible;

(2) The Air Force project engineer on the Bomb Lift Loader project;

(3) The Air Force engineer who participated in the pre-award survey of the intervenor;

(4) The SBA official in Washington who made the decision to grant the Certificate of Competency to the intervenor;

(5) The official in the SBA regional office who acted for that office on the intervenor’s application for a Certificate of Competency; and

(6) The SBA personnel who provided technical guidance and information on the basis of which the SBA determined that the intervenor was entitled to a Certificate of Competency.

According to the complaint, the posture of the case at this point is that the plaintiff, a responsible offeror, has submitted a responsive proposal in accordance with the [15]*15RFP; and the plaintiff is seeking judicial relief from the action of the SBA in issuing a Certificate of Competency to the intervenor.

Of course, some official of the SBA acted finally for the Washington headquarters of the agency in deciding that a Certificate of Competency should be issued to the intervenor. Under the provisions of 15 U.S.C. § 637(b)(7)(C) (1982), the affirmative action of this official superseded the previous action of the Air Force contracting officer regarding the non-responsibility of the intervenor, and was binding upon the contracting officer and upon all other procurement personnel of the Government. As the Air Force contracting officer and other Air Force personnel do not bear any responsibility for the issuance of the Certificate of Competency to the intervenor, it would be inappropriate to depose such personnel concerning the action of the SBA deciding official.

Therefore, under a line of decisions by our predecessor, the United States Court of Claims, and by this court, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that, in relation to its proposal, the action of the SBA deciding official was not “fair and impartial” (Heyer Products Company v. United States, 135 Ct.Cl. 63, 69, 140 F.Supp. 409, 413 (1956)), or was “arbitrary or capricious” (Keco Industries, Inc. v. United States, 192 Ct.Cl. 773, 782, 428 F.2d 1233, 1238 (1970)), or was “in violation of the * * * [plaintiffs] rights under the Constitution, * * * contrary to statutes or regulations, or * * * otherwise arbitrary or capricious” (Related Industries, Inc. v. United States, 2 Cl.Ct. 517, 520 (1983)), or was without a “rational basis” (Planning Research Corp. v. United States, 4 Cl.Ct. 283, 291 (1983)).

The plaintiffs complaint is against the issuance of the Certificate of Competency to the intervenor. Consequently, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the action of the SBA deciding official was improper under the judicially established standard mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

Turning now to the portion of the plaintiffs motion seeking leave to take the deposition of the SBA official who made the final decision authorizing the granting of a Certificate of Competency to the intervenor, the problem is whether it is permissible for a litigant to quiz an administrative official concerning the latter’s reasons for making, in an administrative proceeding, a determination to which the litigant objects. This question was considered by the Supreme Court in the case of United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 61 S.Ct. 999, 85 L.Ed. 1429 (1941). That case involved a determination by the Secretary of Agriculture fixing the maximum rates that could be charged by market agencies under the Packers and Stockyards Act. The Court analogized the role of the Secretary in presiding over an administrative proceeding to that of a judge; and the Court concluded that probing the Secretary’s mental processes would violate the integrity of the administrative process (id. at 422, 61 S.Ct. at 1004).

Subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court have relaxed somewhat the broad prohibition announced by the Court in Morgan. In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971), the Court indicated that where there was no contemporaneous explanation in the administrative record of an administrative official’s decision, a lower court might permit the decision maker to be examined concerning the decision (id. at 420, 91 S.Ct. at 825).

Also, in Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 93 S.Ct. 1241, 36 L.Ed.2d 106 (1973) (per curiam), the Court suggested that “[i]f * * there was such failure to explain administrative action as to frustrate effective judicial review, the remedy was not to hold a de novo hearing but, as contemplated by Overton Park, to obtain from the agency, either through affidavits or testimony, such additional explanation of the reasons for the agency decision as may prove necessary” (id. at 142-43, 93 S.Ct. at 1244).

In the present case, the defendant has filed under seal, and subject to an agree[16]

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32 Cont. Cas. Fed. 73,222, 7 Cl. Ct. 13, 40 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1215, 1984 U.S. Claims LEXIS 1240, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/standard-manufacturing-co-v-united-states-cc-1984.